DEBATERS'  HANDBOOK  SERIES 


MONROE   DOCTRINE 


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Capital  Punishment     (2d  ed.  rev.) 

Commission  Plan  of  Municipal  Govern- 
ment (3d  ed.  rev.  and  enl.) 

Election  of  United  States  Senators  (2d  ed. 
rev.) 

Income  Tax    (2d  ed.  rev.  and  enl. ) 

Initiative  and  Referendum  (3d  ed.  rev. 
and  enl.) 

Central  Bank  of  the  United  States 

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putes (2d  ed.  rev.  and  enl.) 

Compulsory  Insurance 

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Free  Trade  vs.  Protection 

Government  Ownership  of  Railroads  (2d 
ed.  rev.  and  enl.) 

Reciprocity 

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Each  volume,  one  dollar  net 


Debaters'    Handbook    Series 


SELECTED  ARTICLES 


ON  THE 


MONROE  DOCTRINE 


COMPILED  BY 

EDITH   M.  PHELPS 


THE  H.  W.  WILSON  COMPANY 

WHITE  PLAINS,  N.  Y.f  AND  NEW  YORK  CITT 

1915 


Published  March.   1915 


EXPLANATORY  NOTE 

The  development  of  affairs  in  Mexico  during  the  past  few 
years  as  well  as  the  change  in  European  affairs  have  revived  the 
discussion  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine.  In  response  to  the  conse- 
quent demand  for  material  on  the  subject  this  volume  has  been 
compiled  for  the  use  of  students,  debaters,  and  others  wishing 
to  make  a  study  of  the  question.  This  volume  follows  the  general 
plan  of  the  other  volumes  in  this  series  and  contains  affirmative 
and  negative  briefs,  a  selected  bibliography,  and  reprints  of 
valuable  material  covering  the  history  and  present  status  of  the 
Monroe  Doctrine,  and  also  the  arguments  for  and  against  its 
retention  as  a  part  of  our  permanent  foreign  policy. 

E.  M.  PHELPS. 
February  27,  1915. 


300872 


<; 

*s 


CONTENTS 

BRIEF 

Affirmative , x 

Negative xii 

BIBLIOGRAPHY 

General  References xv 

Affirmative  References xxiii 

Negative  References xxv 

INTRODUCTION I 

Introduction ;. ix 

GENERAL  DISCUSSION 

Moore,    John    Bassett.      Non-intervention    and   the    Monroe 

Doctrine Harper's  Magazine      5 

Woodburn,  James  Albert.     Monroe  Doctrine  and  Some  of  Its 

Applications  Chautauquan     18 

Mahan,  A.  T.     Monroe  Doctrine National  Review    23 

Evolution  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine Harper's  Weekly    44 

Alvarez,  Alejandro.     Latin  America  and  International  Law. 

, American  Journal  of  International  Law    48 

Magdalena  Bay  Resolution 

American  Journal  of  International  Law    56 

Latane,  John  Holladay.     Effects  of  the  Panama  Canal  on  Our 

Relations  with  Latin  America 

Annals  of  the  American  Academy    58 

Woolsey,  Theodore  S.    Monroe  Doctrine  Fundamentals 

North  American  Review    64 

Kraus,    Herbert.      What   European   Countries   Think   of  the 

Monroe  Doctrine Annals  of  the  American  Academy    71 

Wheless,  Joseph.     Monroe  Doctrine  and  Latin  America 

. Annals  of  the  American  Academy    76 

Blakeslee,  George  H.     Should  the  Monroe  Doctrine  Continue 

to  Be  a  Foreign  Policy  of  the  United  States? 

American  Society  of  International  Law.     Proceedings    94 

Barrett,  John.     Pan-American  Policy:  The  Monroe  Doctrine 

Modernized Annals  of  the  American  Academy  104 


viii  CONTENTS 

Hull,   William   I.     Monroe  Doctrine :    National    or   Interna- 
tional ?  American  Society  of  Internationl  Law.  Proceedings  108 

AFFIRMATIVE  DISCUSSION 

Elihu.    Real  Monroe  Doctrine 

American  Society  of  International  Law.  Proceedings  123 
w/Taft,    William   H.    Monroe   Doctrine:    Its    Limitations    and 

Implications  Independent  137 

Roberts,  W.  Carman.    Vitality  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine.... 
Craftsman  141 

Callahan,  J.  Mi     Modern  Meaning  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine. 
..  Journal  of  Race  Development  143 

Scruggs,    William    L.      Monroe    Doctrine — Its    Origin    and 
Import  North  American  Review  150 

Stanwood,  Edward.     Moral  Aspects  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine. 
Outlook  154 

Chester,  Colby  N.     Present  Status  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine. 
Annals  of  the  American  Academy  160 

MacCorkle,  William  A.     Monroe  Doctrine  and  Its  Applica- 
tion to  Haiti Annals  of  the  American  Academy     167 

Notable  Pan  American  Addresses 

Bulletin.    Pan  American  Union  174 

NEGATIVE  DISCUSSION 
v/Bmgham,  Hiram.   Should  We  Abandon  the  Monroe  Doctrine? 

Journal  of  Race  Development  179 

^/Dole,  Charles  F.     Right  and  Wrong  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine. 

Atlantic  Monthly  199 

Bingham,   Hiram.     Monroe  Doctrine:  An   Obsolete   Shibbo- 
leth   Atlantic  Monthly  210 

Tucker,  George  F.    Monroe  Doctrine 

... Journal  of  Race  Development  224 

Commercial  Side  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine.  Review  of  Reviews  228 

Wellman,  Walter.     Shall  the  Monroe  Doctrine  Be  Modified? 
North  American  Review  230 

Shuster,  W.  Morgan.     Is  there  a  Sound  American  Foreign 
Policy  ?   Century  238 

Brooks,    Sydney.     Some   Aspects    of  the    Monroe   Doctrine. 
Fortnightly  Review    246 


I 


BRIEF 

Resolved,  That  ^e  Monroe  Doctrine  should  be  continued  as 
part  of  the  permanent  foreign  policy  of  the  United  States. 

INTRODUCTION 

j£.    The  Monroe  Doctrine  has  been  the  subject  of  considerable 
discussion  in  the  past  few  years. 

A.  In  conferences  which  have  convened   for  the   special 

study  of  our  international   relations. 

B.  In  the  press,  on  the  platform,  and  by  the  people,  not 

only  in  the  United  States,  but  also  in  Europe  and 
in  Central  and  South  America. 

C.  It    has    been    condemned    by    some    and    vigorously 

reasserted  by  others  as  part  of  our  foreign  policy. 
JT.    The  Monroe  Doctrine,  as  formulated  in  President  Monroe's 
message  of  1823,  was  the  result  of  two  circumstances. 
The  claim  of  Russia  to  occupy  territory  in  the  North- 
west. 

B.     The    threatened    intervention    of    the    Holy    Alliance 
to    restore    to    Spain    her    former    South    American 
colonies. 
II£'  President  Monroe's  declaration  was  • 

£i.  That  the  American  continents  were  thereafter  not  to 
be  considered  open  to  colonization  by  European 
Powers. 

y.    That  any  intervention  in  South  American  affairs  would 

be  regarded  as  unfriendly  toward  the  United  States. 

IV.     It  is  generally  admitted  that  the  Doctrine  has  been  extended 

to  include         u<Jrf-A 
A:'    Tfcat^the  United   States   has  a  paramount  interest  in 

American  affairs. 

B.  Thar  it  will  resist,  forcibly  if  necessary,  all  European 
agression. 

The  acquisition  of  new  territory. 
Political  intervention. 


1 


BRIEF 

The  extension  of  existing  boundaries. 
The  transfer  of  sovereignty  or  territory,  if  against 
the  interests  of  the  United  States. 

AFFIRMATIVE 

I.     Both  reason  and  authority  support  the  Monroe  Doctrine 
as  part  of  our  foreign  policy. 

A.  It    is    based    on    the    right    of    self-defense    which    is 

supported  by  international  law. 

B.  It  is  also  based  t»n  the  duty   of  preserving  the  peace 

and  safety  ami  the  desirability  of  maintaining  the 
republican  governments  of  our  weaker  neighbors. 

C.  It  has  been  declared  and  followed  by  the  United  States 

ever  since  it  was  first  stated. 

1.  It  has  been  declared  and  acted  upon  again  and  again 

by  the  executive  branch  of   our  Government. 

2.  Although   it   has   never  been   enacted   into   law   by 

Congress,  every  resolution  relating  to  it  has  been 
in  its  support. 

D.  It  has  been  supported  by  other  nations. 

1.  European   Powers   have   acquiesced   in    its   mainte- 

nance. 

2.  Every  Latin-American   republic  has   at   some  time 

or  other  affirmed  it. 

E.  The  argument  that  it  has  been  extended,  and  without 

justification,    beyond    the    limits    set    by    Monroe    is 
unsound. 

1.  The  underlying  principle  is  the  same. 

2.  The  extensions  have  been  in  harmony  with  the  de- 

velopment of  the  interests  of  the  United  States. 

F.  It  is  not  true  that  the  Monroe  Doctrine  prevents  Euro- 

pean Powers  from  enforcing  their  just  claims  against 

Latin-American  republics. 

i.  European  Powers  have  every  right  to  intervene  in 
behalf  of  their  own  interests  or  that  of  their 
subjects  so  long  as  they  do  not  contemplate 
permanent  occupation  of  Latin-American  terri- 
tory. 

^  '&>^ 


BRIEF  xi 

II.    The  Monroe  Doctrine  is  supported  by  experience. 

A.  Under  it  the  Latin-American  republics  have  been  able 

to  continue  their  independent  existence  and  have 
grown  and  prospered  free  from  the  domination  of 
any  European  Power. 

B.  It  has  been  of  great  value  to  the  United  States. 

1.  It  has  made  for  our  peace  and  prosperity. 

2.  It  has  added  to  our  prestige  and  strengthened  our 

position  among  the  world  powers. 

3.  It  has   given   us   moral   supremacy   in   the   western 

hemisphere. 

C.  It  has  made  for  international  peace. 

i.  It  has  prevented  the  old-world  Powers  from  bringing 
their  quarrels  into  the  new. 

III.     The  Doctrine  is  still  a  necessary  part  of  our  foreign  policy. 
A.     It  is  still  necessary  for  self-preservation." 

i.  To  abandon  it  would  not  only  impair  our  prestige 
among  nations  but  would  invite  danger  from 
foreign  aggression. 

a.  It  \yould  be  necessary  to  increase  our  army  and 

havy. 

b.  The   mere    fact   that   the    Doctrine    has    existed 

tyas  relieved  us  from  this  necessity  so  far. 
2.     It  is  made  more  necessary  than  ever  before  by  our 
duty  to   preserve   the    neutrality   of  the    Panama 
Canal. 

B.     It  is  essential  to  the  welfare  of   Central  and   South 
America. 

1.  The  need  of  European  Powers  for  more  territory 

would  soon  bring  about  in  South  America  a 
repetition  of  what  has  happened  in  Africa,  if 
the  Motiroe  Doctrine  did  not  exist  to  prevent 
it. 

2.  The  argument  that  it  would  be  to  our  advantage 

and  that  of  Latin-America  if  these  republics 
were  to  become  European  colonies  is  untenable. 

a.  These  peoples  are  strong  and  progressive. 

b.  They  have  a  right  to  an  independent  existence. 


xii  BRIEF 

IV.  There  is  no  foundation  for  the  attitude  of  hatred  and 
suspicion  that  exists  among  some  of  the  peoples  of 
Central  and  South  America  toward  the  Monroe  Doctrine. 

A.  When  we  have  intervened  in  the  affairs  of  these  re- 

publics it  has  been  done  in  a  disinterested  manner 
and  has  been  for  the  benefit  of  all  concerned. 

B.  In  so  far  as  the  Doctrine  applies  to  Argentina,  Brazil 

and  Chile,  it  is  never  likely  to  be  enforced,  both 
because  these  countries  are  fully  able  to  protect 
their  own  interests  and  because  they  are  so  remote 
from  the  United  States  as  to  make  any  violation 
of  the  Doctrine  with  respect  to  them  of  little  harm 
to  our  interests. 

V.  To  invite  the  Latin-American  republics  to  share  with  us 
the  responsibility  of  maintaining  the-  principles  of  the 
Monroe  Doctrine  on  the  American  continents  would 
be  impracticable. 

A.  It  is  not  likely  that  many  of  them  would  be  willing 

to  accept  the  responsibility 

B.  To    join    with    some    of    them,    say    with    Argentina, 

Brazil  and  Chile,  in  maintaining  the  Doctrine  on 
behalf  of  the  others  would  excite  jealousy  and 

suspicion  among-  the  remaining  republics. 
C  ~    ft(.    &(rA/j^>t~*4  8    <vt/«..rwK,v 
r    .   5^*  WCSA-^wtUlft*    ^^U».     JU     , 

•  »~txW*,  NEGATIVE.       ^^  ^. 

fy.,  The  Monroe  Doctrine  is  supported  neither  by  reason  nor 
by  authority. 

A.  It  has  no  place  in  international  law 

i.  It  is  contrary  to  international  law  in  that  it  per- 
mits us  to  intervene  in  affairs  between  other 
nations  where  we  are  not  concerned. 

B.  It  is  not  supported  by  the  laws  of  the  United  States. 

1.  It  has  never  received  legislative  sanction. 

2.  It  has  not  been  uniformly  supported  in  practice. 

C.  It  is  not  supported  by  the  practice  of  other  nations, 
i.     It  has  been  distinctly  repudiated  by  some. 

D.  It    has    been    expanded    beyond    the    limits    set    by 

Monroe. 


BRIEF  xiii 

1.  Monroe  did  not  threaten  to  use  force. 

2.  He  did  not  guarantee  to  maintain  existing  boun- 

daries. 

E.  The  circumstances  which  called  it  forth  have  ceased 

to  exist. 

1.  The  Holy  Alliance  no  longer  exists. 

2.  All  parts  of  America  are  now  under  the  rule  of 

civilized  nations. 

F.  The   Doctrine   is   inconsistent. 

i.  The  United  States  forbids  intervention  in  Cen- 
tral and  South  America  but  retains  the  privi- 
lege of  interfering  in  old-world  affairs. 

The  Doctrine  is  not  supported  by  experience. 

A.  It  has  not  been  to  the  advantage  of  the  Central  and 

South  American   republics. 

i.  European  colonization  would  have  made  for  stable 
government  and  for  the  development  of  com- 
merce and  natural  resources. 

B.  It  has  been  to  the  disadvantage  of  the  United  States. 

1.  It  has  been  a  constant   menace  to   friendly   rela- 

tions both  with  South  America  and  with  Euro- 
pean Powers. 

2.  It  has  been  of  no  use  to  us  in  maintaining  peace 

and  safety. 

There  is  no  reason  why  we  should  maintain  the  Monroe 
Doctrine  in  the  future. 

A.  There  is  no  longer  any  necessity  for  it. 

1.  There  is  no  danger  of  colonization  by  any  European 

Power. 

2.  The    peaceful    colonization    by    European    immi- 

grants that  is  now  going  on  means  a  higher 
type  of  civilization,  and  more  efficient  govern- 
ment, and  is  also  the  best  security  against 
foreign  invasion. 

B.  The  United   States  is   not  justified  in  continuing  to 

declare  it. 

i.  It  is  an  unwarranted  interference  with  the  right 
of  the  other  American  governments  to  do  as 
they  please. 

vwf***<* 


xiv  .  BRIEF 

C.  Our  claim  that  in  continuing  to  declare  this  doctrine 
we  are  acting  only  in  the  interests  of  the  Latin- 
American  republics  is  no  longer  recognized. 

1.  Our  course   in   respect  to   Santo  Domingo,    Cuba, 

the  Philippines  and  the  securing  of  territory 
for  the  Panama  Canal  makes  such  a  declaration 
seem  inconsistent. 

2.  The    Latin-American    countries    feel    that    we    are 

actuated  by  a  desire  for  power  and  so  they 
hate  and  fear  us. 

IV.     To    continue    to    maintain   the    Monroe    Doctrine    will    be 
greatly  to  our  disadvantage. 

A.  It  will  be  necessary  to   increase  our  navy   in   order 

to  enforce  it. 

B.  It  puts  on  us  the  responsibility  of  maintaining  order 

in  these  weaker  republics  and  seeing  that  they  meet 
their  just  obligations. 

i.     Such    a    course    is    contrary   to    the    principles    of 
international    relations. 

C.  It  may  result  in  making  Argentina,   Brazil  and  Chile 

our  enemies  and  this,  with  their  growing  com- 
mercial and  naval  strength  might  some  day  be 
disastrous  for  us. 

V.  It  would  be  to  the  best  advantage  of  the  United  States 
to  abandon  the  Doctrine  entirely  and  join  with  these 
Central  and  South  American  republics  for  mutual 
helpfulness  and  defense. 

A.     If   this   is   not   practicable    we   could    at   least   enlist 

Argentina,    Brazil    and    Chile    with   us    to    prevent 

foreign  invasion  and  to  defend  the  weaker  countries. 

i.     There  is  every  reason  to  believe  that  they  would 

favor   such  an  alliance. 


BIBLIOGRAPHY 


An  asterisk  (*)  preceding  a  reference  indicates  that  the  entire  article 
or  a  part  of  it  has  been  reprinted  in  this  volume.  Many  of  the  magazine 
articles  and  pamphlets  listed  here,  as  well  as  similar  material  that  may  be 
published  after  this  volume  is  issued,  may  be  secured  at  reasonable  rates 
from  the  Wilson  Package  Library  operated  by  The  H.  W.  Wilson  Company. 

BIBLIOGRAPHIES 

Independent.  77:310.  Mr.  2,  '14.    Both  Sides;  Debate:  Resolved, 

That  the  Monroe  Doctrine  Should  Be  Abandoned. 

Affirmative  and  negative  briefs  are  given. 
Oilman,  Daniel  C.     James  Monroe,  pp.  253-80.     Bibliography  by 

J.  F.  Jameson.    Houghton,  Mifflin.    1883. 
Ringwalt,    Ralph    C.     Briefs    on    Public    Questions,    pp.    84-92. 

Longmans.    1913. 

Briefs  are  also  included. 
Shurter,  Edwin  DuBois,  and  Taylor,  Carl  Cleveland.     Both  Sides 

of   100   Public   Questions    Briefly  Debated,   pp.   55-7.    Hinds, 

Noble  &  Eldredge.  1913. 


GENERAL  REFERENCES 

Books,  Pamphlets  and  Documents 

Adams,  Charles  Francis.  Monroe  Doctrine  and  Mommsen's  Law. 
Houghton,  Mifflin.  1914. 

Appears  also  in  the  American  Society  of  International  Law.     Proceed- 
ings:   1914:  22-32. 

Beard,  Charles  A.  American  Government  and  Politics,   pp.  333-7. 

Macmillan.  1911. 
Blakeslee,  George  H.,  ed.    Clark  University  Addresses,  November, 

1913.    G.  E.  Stechert  &  Co.     1914. 

Many  of  these  papers  also  appear  in  the  Journal  of  Race  Development 
for  January,    1914. 

Blakeslee,  George  H.  Our  Relations  with  South  America  and 
How  to  Improve  Them.  No.  76.  I2p.  pa.  Am.  Ass'n  for  In- 
ternational Conciliation,  Sub-Station  84,  New  York  City. 
March,  1914. 


xvi  BIBLIOGRAPHY 

Bigelow,  John,  Jr.  American  Policy:  The  Western  Hemisphere 
in  Its  Relation  to  the  Eastern.  Scribner.  1914. 

Bonilia,  Policarpo.  Wilson  Doctrine:  How  the  Speech  of  Presi- 
dent Wilson  at  Mobile,  Ala.,  Has  Been  Interpreted  by  the 
'Latin-American  Countries.  42p.  pa.  1914. 

Cleveland,  Grover.  Venezuelan  Boundary  Controversy.  Prince- 
ton Univ.  Press.  1913. 

Coolidge,  Archibald  C.  United  States  as  a  World  Power,  pp. 
95-120.  Macmillan.  1908. 

Edgington,  Thomas  B.    Monroe  Doctrine.    Little,  Brown.    1905. 

Everett,  Edward.  Monroe  Doctrine.  No.  34.  i7p.  pa.  Local  Pub- 
lication Society,  863  Broadway,  Boston.  1863. 

Extracts  from  Official  Declarations  of  the  United  States  Em- 
bodying the  Monroe  Doctrine,  1789-1901.  In  American  History 
Leaflets,  edited  by  Albert  B.  Hart  and  Edward  Channing. 
No.  4.  32p. 

Ford,  Worthington  C.  Some  Original  Documents  on  the  Genesis 
of  the  Monroe  Doctrine.  (In  Proceedings  of  the  Massachu- 
setts Historical  Society.  2d  Ser.  Vol.  XV.  1901-1902.) 

Foster,  John  W.  Century  of  American  Diplomacy.  Chap.  XII. 
pp.  438-78.  Houghton,  Mifflin.  1901. 

Hamilton,  Stanislaus  M.  Writings  of  James  Monroe.  6th  Vol. 
PP.  303-444-  Putnam's.  1902. 

Hart,  Albert  Bushnell.  American  Foreign  Policy.  Chap.  VII. 
pp.  211-40.  Macmillan.  1901. 

Reprinted  from  the  American  Historical  Review,  October,   1901. 

Hershey,  Amos  S.  Essentials  of  International  Public  Law.  Mac- 
millan. 1912. 

See  index. 
Hill,  Mabel.    Liberty  Documents,  pp.  321-39.    Liberties  of  Other 

American  Peoples,  1823.    Longmans.    1901. 

Valuable. 
Keasbey,  Lindley  M.    Nicaragua  Canal  and  the  Monroe  Doctrine. 

Putnam's.    1896. 
Kohler,    Charles.     Monroe   Doctrine.    48?.    pa.     Savannah,    Ga. 

1903. 
Latane,  John  H.   Diplomatic  Relations  of  the  United  States  and 

Spanish  America.    The  Johns  Hopkins  Press.    1900. 
McMaster,   John    B.    Origin,    Meaning  and   Application    of    the 

Monroe  Doctrine.    Altemus.    1896. 


BIBLIOGRAPHY  xvii 

McMaster,  John  B.   With  the  Fathers,   pp.  1-54.    Appleton.    1896. 
•Michigan  Political   Science   Association.     Publications.    Vol.  II. 

pp.  101-19.   1896-1897.  Real  Monroe  Doctrine.   B.  A.  Hinsdale. 
Monroe  Doctrine.     Old  South  Leaflets.    No.  56,  2Op.  pa. 
Moore,    John    Bassett.      American    Diplomacy:    Its    Spirit    and 

Achievements,  pp.  131-67.     Harper.     1905. 
Oliveira,  Lima,  Manoel  de.    Relations  of  Brazil  with  the  United 

States.    No.  69.  I4p.  pa.  Am.  Ass'n  for  International  Concilia- 
tion.   1913. 
Oppenheim,  L.     International  Law.  Vol.  I.  pp.  66,  188.  Longmans. 

1906. 
Phelps,   Edward  J.    Orations   and  Essays,    pp.  233-53.    Harper. 

1901. 

Address  delivered  on  the  Monroe  Doctrine  in  Brooklyn,  March  30, 
1896,  before  the  Brooklyn  Institute  of  Arts  and  Sciences.  Same  reprinted 
in  America  and  Europe:  A  Study  of  International  Relations  (Questions  of 
the  Day  Series).  Putnam's.  1896. 

President   Wilson   on   the    United    States    and   Latin   America: 

Address  before  the  Southern  Commercial  Congress,   Mobile, 

Ala.,  October  27,  1913.  4p.  pa.    World  Peace  Foundation,  40 

Mt.  Vernon  St.,  Boston,  Mass. 
Reddaway,    William    F.     Monroe    Doctrine.     University    Press, 

Cambridge.    1898.    • 
Ringwalt,    Ralph    C.     Briefs    on    Public    Questions,     pp.    84-92. 

Longmans.   1913. 
Romero,    Matias.     Mexico    and    the    United    States,    p.    330-3. 

Putnam's.     1898. 
Scruggs,    William    L.     Colombian    and    Venezuelan    Republics. 

pp.  242-67.    Little,  Brown.    1900. 
Snow,  Freeman.     Treaties  and  Topics  in  American  Diplomacy. 

PP-  237-427.   Boston  Book  Co.    1894. 
Stockton,    Alfred    C.    Monroe    Doctrine    and    Other    Addresses. 

Pp.  1-75-    J-  &  A.  McMillan,  St.  John,  N.  B.     1898. 
Turner  Frederick  J.    Essays  in  American  History,    pp.  231-67. 

Beginnings    of    Spanish    American    Diplomacy.     William    S. 

Robertson.    Holt.    1910. 

Usher,   Roland  G.     Pan-Americanism ;   A   Forecast  of  the  In- 
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PP-  390-406.    Century.     1915. 

2 


xviii  BIBLIOGRAPHY 

Magazine  Articles 

*American  Journal  of  International  Law.  3 :  269-353.  Ap.  '09. 
Latin  America  and  International  Law.  Alejandro  Alvarez. 

*American  Journal  of  International  Law.  6:937-9.  O.  '12.  Mag- 
dalena  Bay  Resolution. 

American  Journal  of  International  Law.  8:515-9.  Jl.  '14.  Pan 
American  Origin  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine.  Charles  L. 
Chandler. 

American  Political  Science  Review.  6:546-63.  N.  '12.  Monroe 
Doctrine  Abroad  in  1823-24.  William  S.  Robertson. 

American  Society  of  International  Law.  Proceedings.  1914 :  22-32. 
Origin  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine.     Charles   Francis   Adams. 
Reprinted    by    Houghton,    Mifflin    in    1914    as    Monroe    Doctrine    and 

Mommsen's  Law. 

American  Society  of  International  Law.  Proceedings.  1914:34- 
59.  Statements,  Interpretations,  and  Applications  of  Monroe 
Doctrine  and  of  More  or  Less  Allied  Doctrines,  from  1823 
to  1845.  William  R.  Manning. 

American  Society  of  International  Law.  Proceedings.  1914 :  59- 
105.  Statements,  Interpretations  and  Applications  of  the 
Monroe  Doctrine  from  1845  to  1870.  James  M.  Callahan. 

American  Society  of  International  Law.  Proceedings.  1914 :  105- 
13.  Statements,  Interpretations,  and  Applications  of  the  Mon- 
roe Doctrine  and  of  More  or  Less  Allied  Doctrines  from  1870 
to  the  Present  Time.  John  H.  Latane. 

American  Society  of  International  Law.  Proceedings.  1914: 
143-54.  Monroe  Doctrine — a  Gospel  of  Peace.  Eugene 
Wambaugh. 

American  Society  of  International  Law.  Proceedings.  1914 :  202- 
17.  European  Attitude  toward  the  Monroe  Doctrine. 
Charlemagne  Tower. 

*American  Society  of  International  Law.  Proceedings.  1914:217- 
29.  Should  the  Monroe  Doctrine  Continue  to  Be  a  Policy  of 
the  United  States?  George  H.  Blakeslee. 

Annals  of  the  American  Academy.  22 :  1-19.  Jl.  '03.  Position  of 
the  United  States  on  the  American  Continent — Some  Phases 
of  the  Monroe  Doctrine.  Francis  B.  Loomis. 

Annals  of  the  American  Academy.  26:27-31.  Jl.  '05.  Responsi- 
bilities of  International  Leadership.  Emory  R.  Johnson. 


BIBLIOGRAPHY  xix 

Annals  of  the  American  Academy.  37:602-8.   My.  'n.    Monroe 

Doctrine  at  the  Fourth  Pan-American  Conference.   Alejandro 

Alvarez. 
Annals  of  the  American  Academy.  54:57-62.  Jl.  '14.     Latin  View 

of  the  Monroe  Doctrine.    Leopold  Grahame. 
*Annals  of  the  American  Academy.  54 :  66-83.  Jl.  '14.    Monroe 

Doctrine  and  Latin  America.   Joseph  Wheless. 
*Annals  of  the  American  Academy.  54:84-91.  Jl.  '14.    Effects  of 

the    Panama   Canal   on    our   Relations   with    Latin    America. 

John  Holladay  Latane. 

Annals  of  the  American  Academy.  54:  92-8.  Jl.  '14.    Monroe  Doc- 
trine and  the  Canning  Myth.     Charles  H.   Sherrill. 

Same.  Congressional  Record.  51:6524-5   (unbound).  Ap.  4,  '14. 
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of  Europe  toward  the  Monroe  Doctrine.    A.   Maurice  Low. 
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European  Countries  Think  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine.    Herbert 

Kraus. 
Annals  of  the   American   Academy.    54 : 1130-3.   Jl.   '14.     Monroe 

Doctrine. 
Atlantic  Monthly.  89:482-91.  Ap.  '02.     Pan-American  Diplomacy. 

John  W.  Foster; 
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Latin  America.     F.  Garcia  Calderon. 
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L.  Ames   Brown. 
Bench  and  Bar,  n.  s.  7:41-6.  D.  '13.    Lord  Haldane,  Mexico  and 

the  Monroe  Doctrine. 
Century.    62:283-97,    405-19.    Je.-Jl.    '01.     Venezuelan    Boundary 

Dispute.     Grover    Cleveland. 
Century.  86:750^64.   S.  '13.     Monroe  Doctrine  in  the  Venezuela 

Dispute.     Charles  R.  Miller. 
*  Chautauquan.  22 :  549-56.  F.  '96.     Monroe  Doctrine  and  Some  of 

Its  Applications.    James  Albert  Woodburn. 
Chautauquan.  34:467-74.  F.  '02.  OUT  Dog  in  the  Manger  Policy 

in  South  America.     George  B.  Waldron. 

Chautauquan.  34:492-501.  F.  '02.     Spanish  America  and  the  Mon- 
roe  Doctrine.     E.   E.    Sparks. 
Contemporary    Review.    105:21-9.    Ja.    '14.     President    Wilson's 

Latin-American    Policy.     A.    Maurice    Low. 

Same.    Living  Age.     280:451-7-   F-   21,   '14. 


xx  BIBLIOGRAPHY 

Current  Opinion.  57:85.  Ag.  '14.  Pan-American  Diplomacy 
Superseding  the  Monroe  Doctrine  in  Mexico. 

Eclectic  Magazine.  1146 :  195-204.  Mr.  '06.  Latin  America  and  the 
United  States. 

Edinburgh  Review.  203 : 236-62.  Ja.  '06.     Growth  of  an  American 
Foreign  Policy. 
Same.    Living  Age.    248:515-34.    Mr.   3,   '06. 

Edinburgh  Review.  219:212-36.  Ja.  '14.     New  Monroism.    Wal- 
ter A.  Phillips. 
Same.    Living  Age.    280:643-58.    Mr.   14,  '14. 

Everybody's.  25:756-65;  26:77-85.  D.  'ii-Ja.  '12.  Dollar  Diplo- 
macy; Uncle  Sam,  Wall  Street  and  Co.  Open  a  Spanish- 
American  Branch.  Henry  M.  Hyde. 

Fortnightly     Review.     78:837-51.     N.     '02.     Monroe     Doctrine. 
J.  Brougham  Leech. 
Same.    Living  Age.    236:129-40.    Ja.    17,  '03. 

Forum.  20 : 713-20.  F.  '96.  Lord  Salisbury  and  the  Monroe  Doc- 
trine. Oscar  S.  Straus. 

Gunton's.  24:302-6.  Ap.  '03.  Application  of  the  Monroe  D'oc- 
trine  by  Europe.  R.  S.  Guernsey. 

*Harper's  Magazine.  100 : 857-69.  N.  '04.  Non-intervention  and 
the  Monroe  Doctrine.  John  Bassett  Moore. 

Harper's  Weekly.  46 :  1978.  D.  20,  '02.  Correct  English  View  of 
the  Monroe  Doctrine. 

Harper's  Weekly.  47:187-8.  Ja.  31,  '03.  German  Emperor  and 
the  Monroe  Doctrine. 

Harper's  Weekly.  47 : 230.  F.  7,  '03.  Europe  and  the  Monroe 
Doctrine.  Sydney  Brooks. 

Harper's  Weekly.  49 : 9.  Ja.  7,  '05.  Ex-Secretary  Root  on  the 
Monroe  Doctrine. 

Harper's  Weekly.  49:276,  293.  F.  25,  '05.  Europe  and  the  New 
Monroe  Doctrine..  Sydney  Brooks. 

Harper's  Weekly.  49:528-9.  Ap.  15,  '05.  Varying  Views  of  the 
New  Monroe  Doctrine. 

Harper's  Weekly.  49 :  1220.  Ag.  26,  '05.  President  Roosevelt  on 
the  Monroe  Doctrine. 

*Harper's  Weekly.  50:1738-9.  D.  8,  '06.  Evolution  of  the  Mon- 
roe Doctrine. 

Harvard  Graduates  Magazine.  14:13-24.  S.  '05.     European  Con- 
cert and  the  Monroe  Doctrine.    James  B.  Angell. 
Also  published  in  his  Selected  Addresses.     Longmans.     1912. 


BIBLIOGRAPHY  xxi 

Independent.   54 : 721-3.    Mr.   27,   '02.      Canada   and  the   Monroe 

Doctrine.    John  W.  Foster. 
Independent.  62 : 902-4.  Ap.   18,  '07.    Monroe,   Calvo  and  Drago 

Doctrines.     Herbert  W.  Brown. 
Independent.  77:310.  Mr.  2,  '14.     Both  Sides,  Debate:  Resolved. 

That  the  Monroe  Doctrine  Should  Be  Abandoned. 
Independent.  80:445-6.   D.   21,   '14.      Pan-American  Opportunity. 

Herbert  W.  Bowen. 
Journal  of  Race  Development.  4 :  306-18.  Ja.  '14.     Present  Day 

Phase  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine.     F.  E.  Chadwick. 
Journal     of    Race     Development.     4:319-23.     Ja.     '14.     Monroe 

Doctrine    from    a    South    American    Viewpoint.     Charles    H. 

Sherrill. 
*Journal    of    Race    Development.    4:324-33.    Ja.    '14.      Monroe 

Doctrine.     George   F.  Tucker. 

Literary  Digest.  45 : 248-9.  Ag.  17,  '12.     New  Monroeism. 
Literary  Digest.  45:459-60.  S.  21,  '12.    Japan's  View  of  the  New 

Monroe  Clause. 
Literary  Digest.  45 :  661-2.  O.  19,  '12.     Mr.  Bryce  on  North  and 

South  American  Coolness. 
Literary  Digest.  46:68.  Ja  n,  '13.    Monroe  Doctrine  in  Putu- 

mayo. 

Literary  Digest.  46:334-5.  F.  15,  '13.     Republic  of  the  Dollar. 
Literary  Digest.  46:626-7.  Mr.  22,  '13.     Mr.  Wilson's  Word  to 

Latin  America. 
Literary    Digest.    47 :  1055.    N.    29,    '13.    As    France    Sees    Our 

Mexican  Policy. 
Living   Age.    225 : 586-8.   Je.    2,    'oo.    American    Policy   and   the 

Monroe  Doctrine. 

Living  Age.  274:48-50.  Jl.  6,  '12.    Japan  and  the  Monroe  Doc- 
trine. 

Living  Age.  274 :  697-9.  S.  14,  '12.     Senator  Lodge's   Resolution. 
Living    Age.    277 : 57-6o.    Ap.    5,    '13.     Mexico    and    the   United 

States. 
Living    Age.    279:119-20.    O.    n,    '13.     Brazil    and    the    United 

States. 

Living  Age.  280:177-80.  Ja.  17,  '14.     Monroe  Doctrine. 
Nation.  62:4-5.  Ja.  2,  '96.    Development  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine. 
Nation.  62:90-1.  Ja.  30,  '96.    "The  Doctrine." 
Nation.  74:341-2.  My.  i,  '02.    Adams  Doctrine. 


xxii  BIBLIOGRAPHY 

Nation.  99:  604-5.  N.  19,  '14.  Germany  and  the  Monroe  Doctrine. 
Glanville  Terrell. 

Nation.  100:114-6.  Ja.  28,  '15.  American  Policy;  The  Western 
Hemisphere  in  Its  Relation  to  the  Eastern,  by  John  Bigelow. 
Review. 

*National  Review.  40:871-89.  F.  '03.  Monroe  Doctrine.  A.  T. 
Mahan. 

Nineteenth  Century.  52 :  533-53.  O.  '02.  Monroe  Doctrine.  Freder- 
ick Pollock. 

Nineteenth  Century.  53 :  587-98.  Ap.  '03.  South  American  Repub- 
lics and  the  Monroe  Doctrine.  John  Macdonell. 

North  American  Review.  183:474-83.  S.  21,  '06.  United  States 
and  Latin  America.  John  Barrett. 

North  American  Review.  192 :  178-87.  Ag.  '10.  All  America. 
John  Barrett. 

*North  American  Review.  199:833-40.  Je.  '14.  Monroe  Doctrine 
Fundamentals.  Theodore  S.  Woolsey. 

North  American  Review.  200:824-30.  D.  '14.  Monroe  Doctrine 
and  the  War.  George  Harvey. 

Outlook.  59 :  1004-6.  Ag.  27,  '98.    New  Monroe  Doctrine. 

Outlook.  103 :  526-8.  Mr.  8,  '13.  Monroe  Doctrine :  Poll  of  the 
Foreign  Press. 

Outlook;  105 : 523-5.  N.  8,  '13.  President  Wilson  and  Latin 
America :  Poll  of  the  Press. 

Outlook.  105 :  738-42.  D.  6,  '13.    All-America.    Ernest  H.  Abbott. 

Outlook.  108 : 521-4.  N.  4,  '14.  Germany  and  the  Monroe 
Doctrine. 

Outlook.  108 :  554-5.  N.  4,  '14.  Monroe  Doctrine  and  the  Euro- 
pean War.  F.  W.  B.  Crafer. 

Political  Science  Quarterly.  23 :  385-93.  S.  '08.  Chief  Questions 
of  Present  American  Politics.  John  W.  Burgess. 

Review  of  Reviews.  20 : 560-7.  N.  '99.  Results  of  the  Peace 
Conference  in  Their  Relation  to  the  Monroe  Doctrine. 
Frederick  H.  Holls. 

Review  of  Reviews.  43:462-5.  Ap.  'n.  Uncle  Sam  on  Police 
Duty.  Arthur  W.  Dunn. 

Review  of  Reviews.  47:83-91.  Ja.  '13.  Will  the  Democrats  Re- 
verse Our  Foreign  Policies? 

Review  of  Reviews.  48 : 357-8.  S.  '13.  Argentine  Opinion  of 
the  United  States. 


BIBLIOGRAPHY  xxiii 

Scribner's.  45 :  364-8.  Mr.  '09.    American  Concert  of  the  Powers. 

Theodore  S.  Woolsey. 
World's    Work.   2:1320-5.    O.    '01.    Greater   America.     Frederic 

Emory. 
World's    Work.     26:142.    Je.    '13.     Obligations    of    the    Monroe 

Doctrine. 
World's  Work.  29:377-85.  F.  '15.    Diplomacy  Our  First  Line  of 

Defense.    W.  Morton  Fullerton. 
Yale    Review,    n.    s.   3:412-8.    Ja.    '14.     Monroe    Doctrine:     An 

Obsolete  Shibboleth,  by  Hiram  Bingham.     Review. 

AFFIRMATIVE  REFERENCES 

Books,  Pamphlets  and  Documents 

Kasson,  John  A.     Evolution  of  the  Constitution  of  the  United 

States    of    America    and    History   of    the    Monroe    Doctrine. 

pp.  221-73.     Houghton,  Mifflin.     1904. 
Taft,  William  H.     United  States  and  Peace.    Chap.  I,  pp.  1-39. 

Scribner.     1914. 
Tower,  Charlemagne.     Essays  Political  and  Historical,  pp.  7-37. 

Lippincott.     1914. 
Whelpley,   James    D.     American    Public    Opinion.     Chapman    & 

Hall,  London.     1914. 

Magazine  Articles 

*American  Society  of  International  Law.    Proceedings.   1914:6- 

22.    Real  Monroe  Doctrine.    Elihu  Root. 

Same.    American  Journal  of  International  Law.    8:427-42.    July,    1914- 
American  Society  of  International  Law.    Proceedings.  1914:119- 

26.    Misconceptions  and  Limitations  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine. 

John  W.  Foster. 
American  Society  of  International  Law.    Proceedings.  1914 :  126- 

43.    Misconceptions  and  Limitations  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine. 

Leo  S.  Rowe. 
American  Society  of  International  Law.    Proceedings.  1914:171- 

9.   What  Countries    Benefit  by  the  Monroe  Doctrine?   Joseph 

Wheless. 
*Annals  of  the  American  Academy.  54:  1-4.  Jl.  '14.   Pan-American 

Policy:    The  Monroe  Doctrine  Modernized.    John  Barrett. 


xxiv  BIBLIOGRAPHY 

*Annals   of  the   American   Academy.   54 : 20-7.   Jl.   '14.     Present 

Status  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine.     Colby  N.  Chester. 
*Annals  of  the  American  Academy.  54:28-56.  Jl.  '14.     Monroe 

Doctrine  and  Its  Application  to  Haiti.  William  A.  MacCorkle. 
Annals  of  the  American  Academy.  54:113-8.  Jl.  '14.  Meaning  of 

the  Monroe  Doctrine.    Charles  M.  Pepper. 
•Annals  of  the  American  Academy.   54:119-23.  Jl.  '14.    Monroe 

Doctrine:    A  Solution  of  Its  Problem.    Philip  M.  Brown. 
Annals  of  the  American  Academy.    54:124-9.    Jl.    '14.    Monroe 
•  Doctrine  and  the  Foreign  Policy  of  the  United  States  in  the 

Western  Hemisphere.   J.  J.  Slechta. 
Arena.  23 : 247-53.  Mr.  'oo.    Monroe   Doctrine  Repeal  and   Our 

Next  War.    John  Chetwood, 
Atlantic   Monthly.    1109:589-93.   My.   '12.     Aspects   of  American 

Society  and  Policy.     B.  Moses. 
*Bulletin.      Pan  American  Union.    34:790-800.   Je.  '12.    Notable 

Pan  American  Addresses. 
Canadian   Magazine.   25 :  166-7.  Je-  '°5-    Can  the  United   States 

Hold  South  America? 
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Doctrine.    Frank  Clark. 
^Craftsman.  25:311-4.  Ja.  '14.    Vitality  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine. 

W.  Carman  Roberts. 
Harper's  Weekly.  47  :/7i-2.  My.  9,  '03.    An  American  Criticism 

of  the  Monroe  Doctrine. 
Independent.   52:1101-3.    My.   10,   'oo.     Boer  Republics  and   the 

Monroe  Doctrine.    A.  T.  Mahan. 
Independent.  55:9-11.  Ja.  i,   '03.     Positive  Side  of  the  Monroe 

Doctrine.   Paul  S.  Reinsch. 
Independent.    61 :  1119-21.  N.  8,  '06.     Professor  Burgess's  Berlin 

Lecture. 

Independent.    76 : 328-9.  N.  20,  '13.     New  Monroe  Doctrine. 
Independent.  76 :  530-1.  D.  18,  '13.     Monroe  Doctrine  not  Obsolete. 
*Independent.  76:540-4.  D.  18,  '13.   Monroe  Doctrine:  Its  Limita- 
tions and  Implications.    William  H.  Taft. 

Reprinted  in  Scott,  F.  W.,  and  Zeitlin,  J.     College  Readings  in  English 
Prose,    pp.  308-23. 
International.  7:30.  Jl.  '12.    Does  Germany  Threaten  the  Monroe 

Doctrine?    R.  P.  Stegler. 


BIBLIOGRAPHY  xxv 

*Journal    of    Race    Development.     4:359-69.    Ja.    '14.     Modern 

Meaning  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine.    J.  M.  Callahan. 
Nineteenth    Century.     53 : 581-6.    Ap.    '03.     Europe    and    South 

America.-  Somers  Somerset. 
North  American  Review.   133 1523-33.  D.  '81.    Monroe  Doctrine 

in  1881.   John  A.  Kasson. 
North  American  Review.  160:651-8.  Je.  '95.    England,  Venezuela 

and  the  Monroe  Doctrine.    Henry  Cabot  Lodge. 
*North  American  Review.  176:185-99.  F.  '03.   Monroe  Doctrine — 

Its  Origin  and  Import.     William  L.  Scruggs. 
North  American  Review.  176:728-33.  My.  '03.    Monroe  Doctrine 

from  an  English  Standpoint.    Alexander  E.  Miller. 
North    American    Review.    199:841-56.    Je.    '14.     Real    Monroe 

Doctrine.     Elihu  Root. 
*Outlook.   70:371-4.    F.  8,  '02.     Moral  Aspects   of  the   Monroe 

Doctrine.    Edward  Stanwood. 
Outlook.    72:971-3.    D.    27,    '02.      Venezuela    and    the    Monroe 

Doctrine. 

Outlook.  79:366-8.  F.  ii.  '05.    New  Monroe  Doctrine. 
Outlook.  106:582-9.  Mr.  14,  '14.    South  America  and  the  Monroe 

Doctrine.    Theodore  Roosevelt 
Outlook.  106:631-7.  Mr.  21,  '14.   Chile  and  the  Monroe  Doctrine. 

Theodore  Roosevelt. 
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Doctrine. 

World's  Work.  25 : 387.  F.  '13.    New  Monroe  Doctrine. 
World's  Work.  28:52-8.  My.  '14.    Our  Moral  Empire  in  Mexico: 

President  Wilson's   Policy  in  Mexico  as  an  Example  of  the 

New  Monroe  Doctrine.   William  B.  Hale. 

NEGATIVE  REFERENCES 
Books,  Pamphlets   and  Documents 

Bingham,   Hiram.     Monroe  Doctrine:    An   Obsolete   Shibboleth. 

Yale  Univ.  Press.  1913. 
Crichfield,  George  W.    American  Supremacy:  Rise  and  Progress 

of  the  Latin  American  Republics  and  Their  Relations  to  the 

United  States  under  the  Monroe  Doctrine.    Vol.  II.  pp.  373- 

500.    Brentano's.    1908. 


xxvi  BIBLIOGRAPHY 

Dole,  Charles  F.  Right  and  Wrong  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine. 
I2p.  pa.  World  Peace  Foundation.  1912. 

Henderson,  John  B.  American  Diplomatic  Questions.  Part  IV. 
pp.  289-448.  Macmillan.  1901. 

Reid,  Whitelaw.  American  and  English  Studies,  i  :  75-89.  Mon- 
roe Doctrine  and  the  Polk  Doctrine.  Scribner.  1913. 

Magazine   Articles 

American  Historical  Review.  7:77-91.  O.  '01.    Monroe  Doctrine 
and  the  Doctrine  of  Permanent  Interest.    Albert  B.  Hart. 
Reprinted  with  Revisions  in  Hart,  Albert  B.     Foundations  of  American 

Foreign  Policy,    pp.  211-40.     Macmillan.     1911. 

American  Political  Science  Review.  6 :  sup.  164-72.  F.  '12.  Point 
of  View  of  Latin-America  on  the  Inter-American  Policy  of  the 
United  States.  Henry  Gil. 

Also    found    in    American    Political    Science    Association.      Proceedings. 
1911. 
American  Society  of  International   Law.  Proceedings.   1914:180- 

96.     Latin   American  Attitude  toward  the   Monroe   Doctrine. 

Hiram  Bingham. 

Same.    Yale  Review,  n.  s.  3:  656-72.  Jl.  '14. 
*American  Society  of  International  Law.  Proceedings.  1914:155- 

69.     Monroe  Doctrine:    National   or  International?     William 

I.  Hull. 
Annals  of  the   American  Academy.   54:5-19.  Jl.   '14.     Study  of 

Iberic-America.     F.  E.  Chadwick. 
*Atlantic  Monthly.  95 :  567-73.  Ap.  '05.     Right  and  Wrong  of  the 

Monroe  Doctrine.     Charles  F.  Dole. 
Atlantic  Monthly.   109:172-9.  F.  '12.     Letter  to  Uncle  Sam. 

*  Atlantic   Monthly.    111:721-34.   Je.   '13.     Monroe   Doctrine:    An 

Obsolete  Shibboleth.     Hiram  Bingham. 
Blackwood's.     195 : 574-7.    Ap.     '14.      Meaning    of    the    Monroe 

Doctrine. 
*Century.    87:233-41.    D.    '13.      Is    There    a    Sound    American 

Foreign  Policy?     W.  Morgan  Shuster. 
Congressional     Record.     50:2847-52     (unbound).     J'e.     18,     '13. 

Monroe    Doctrine.     Hiram    Bingham. 

Reprinted  from  Atlantic  Monthly,  June,   1913. 

*  Fortnightly  Review.  76:1013-26.  D.  '01.     Some  Aspects  of  the 

Monroe  Doctrine.     Sydney  Brooks. 
Same.    Living  Age.    232:65-76.    Ja.   n,  '02. 


BIBLIOGRAPHY  xxvii 

Fortnightly    Review.    98 : 869-78.    N.  '12.    Monroe    Doctrine— Its 

Precept  and  Practice.     Percy   F.   Martin. 

Same.    Living  Age.    275:771-8.    D.  28,  '12. 
Fortnightly  Review.   101 :  671-81  Ap.  '14.     Monroe  Doctrine  and 

the  Latin  American  Republics     R.  J.  MacHugh. 

Same.    Living  Age.    281:515-23.    My.   30,  '14. 
Forum.    20 : 456-64.    D.    '95.       Monroe    Doctrine :    Defence,  not 

Defiance.     Alfred  C.  Cassatt. 
Forum.     20 : 705-12.     F.     '96.       President's     Monroe     Doctrine. 

Theodore    S.    Woolsey. 

Reprinted  in  Straus,   Oscar   S.     American   Spirit,    pp.   59-78.      Century. 
1913- 

Forum.    46:525-35.    N    'n.    Monroe    Doctrine    in    the    Balance. 

Julius  Chambers. 
Harper's  Weekly.  56:  15.  S.  7,  '12.     Latest  Phase  of  the  Monroe 

Doctrine.     Sydney  Brooks. 

Harper's  Weekly.  57 :  5.  Jl.  19,  '13.     Monroe  Doctrine  and  Mexico. 
*Journal  of  Race   Development.  4:334-58.  Ja.  '14.     Should   We 

Abandon  the  Monroe  Doctrine?     Hiram  Bingham. 

Reprinted  as  a  separate  pamphlet.     Apply  to  Professor  Hiram  Bingham. 
Yale  University,  New  Haven,  Conn. 
Literary    Digest.    44:978-9.    My.    n    '12.     German    Rage    at    the 

Monroe  Doctrine. 
Literary    Digest.    44:1151-2.    Je.     i,    '12.      More    Rage    at    the 

Monroe  Doctrine. 
Literary  Digest.  45:1117-8.  D.    14,  '12.     Raging  at  the  Monroe 

Doctrine. 
Literary    Digest.    47 :  1219.    D.    20,    '13.    American    Slap    at    the 

Monroe  Doctrine. 
Munsey's.  28:488-91.  Ja.  '03.     Monroe  Doctrine.     R.  H.  Tither- 

ington. 

Nation.  97:556.  D.  n,  '13.     Idealizing  the  Monroe  Doctrine. 
*North  American  Review.  173:832-44.  D.  '01.     Shall  the  Monroe 

Doctrine  Be  Modified?     Walter  Wellman. 
North  American  Review.  176:518-29.  Ap.  '03.     Monroe  Doctrine 

a  Bar  to  Civilization. 
North    American    Review.    180:586-601.    Ap.  '05.    New  Monroe 

Doctrine :  Edward  S.  Rapallo  and  Domingo  B.  Castillo. 
North  American  Review.  198 :  779-89.  D.  '13.     New  Basis  Needed 

for  the  Monroe  Doctrine.     George  H.  Blakeslee. 
Outlook.  79 :  710-2.  Mr.  18,  '05.     Monroe  Doctrine.     C.  M.  Mead. 


xxviii  BIBLIOGRAPHY 

Popular    Science    Monthly.    49 : 433-9.   Ag.    '96.     Proposed    Dual 

Organization  of  Mankind.     William  G.  Sumner. 
Review  of  Reviews.  30:351.  S.  '04.     Monroe  Doctrine  and  World 

Peace. 
*Review  of  Reviews.  34:  114.  Jl.  '06.     Commercial   Side  of  the 

Monroe    Doctrine. 
Review   of  Reviews.   34 : 244.    Ag.   '06.     Frank   South   American 

View  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine- 
Review  of  Reviews.  49:  104-5.  Ja.  '14.     New  Basis  for  the  Monroe 

Doctrine. 
Yale   Review,  n.   s.    3 : 656-72.  Jl.   '14.    Latin   America   and  the 

Monroe  Doctrine.     Hiram  Bingham. 


SELECTED  ARTICLES  ON 
THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE 


INTRODUCTION 

One  cannot  proceed  very  far  into  the  study  of  the  Monroe 
Doctrine  before  it  is  evident  to  him  that  a  great  deal  of  confu- 
sion and  misunderstanding  exist  in  regard  to  the  subject.  We 
are  tempted  to  agree  with  Mr.  Philip  M.  Brown,  former  United 
States  Minister  to  Honduras,  who  applies  to  it  the  dictum  of 
James  G.  Elaine  concerning  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty,  "im- 
perfectly comprehended,  contradictorily  interpreted,  and  mutually 
vexatious."  It  is  well,  therefore,  that  the  student  of  this  subject 
have  clearly  in  mind  just  what  the  Doctrine  was  originally  and 
know  the  essential  facts  of  its  history  before  delving  into  the 
mass  of  literature  that  has  been  published  for  or  against  it  as  a 
part  of  our  foreign  policy. 

It  is  not  the  intention  here  to  recite  this  history  more  than 
to  state  as  briefly  as  may  be  done,  the  bare  facts  which  may 
serve  as  a  basis  for  study.  For  the  details  the  student  should  con- 
sult the  articles  contained  in  the  following  General  Discussion, 
as  well  as  articles  to  be  found  in  general  histories  and  encyclo- 
paedias. 

The  events  which  evoked  the  Monroe  Doctrine  were  two : 
(i)  The  threatened  intervention  of  the  Holy  Alliance  to  restore 
to  Spain  her  former  colonies  in  South  America  who  had  revolted 
recently  and  set  up  republican  governments,  and  (2)  The  Ukase 
issued  by  the  Emperor  of  Russia  in  1821,  to  exclude  all  other 
nations  from  the  northwest  coast  of  North  America  from  the 
Bering  Strait  down  to  the  sist  parallel  of  north  latitude. 

The  Monroe  Doctrine  was  proclaimed  as  a  part  of  President 
Monroe's  message  to  Congress  of  1823.  The  exact  wording  of 
this  Doctrine  will  be  found  in  the  following  articles.  Briefly 
stated,  it  declared  (i)  That  the  intervention  of  European  Powers 
in  the  affairs  of  the  independent  governments  of  the  western 
hemisphere  would  be  considered  unfriendly  to  the  United  States, 


l  SELECTED  ARTICLES  ON 

and  (2)  That  the  American  continents  were  thenceforth  not 
'to  be  considered  as  subjects  for  future  colonization  by  any 
European  Powers. 

Following  the  publication  of  the  message  Henry  Clay  at- 
tempted to  have  a  resolution  endorsing  it  passed  by  Congress, 
but  this  attempt  failed.  The  Monroe  Doctrine  has  remained, 
however,  as  a  part  of  our  foreign  policy  and  has  been  expanded 
beyond  the  intentions  of  its  promoters.  Up  to  the  time  of  the 
beginning  of  President  Polk's  administration  in  1845  the  Doc- 
trine was  rarely  mentioned  in  the  United  States  although  it  was 
invoked  in  several  instances  by  the  Latin-American  countries. 
*~.  It  is  in  Polk's  administration  that  we  find  the  first  extension 
of  the  Doctrine.  In  his  first  annual  message  Polk  reaffirmed  it 
by  declaring  against  any  European  colonization  on  the  North 
American  continent.  It  was  virtually  extended  when  it  was  re- 
asserted by  Polk,  in  the  annexation  of  Texas  and  the  compromise 
with  England's  claim  to  Oregon  territory,  on  the  49th  parallel, 
to  mean  that  the  United  States  had  a  right  to  enlarge  at  the 
expense  of  its  neighbors.  Polk  invoked  it  once  more  in  1848  to 
prevent  foreign  interference  in  Yucatan. 

^  It  is  generally  agreed  that  the  Doctrine  was  violated  by  the 
Clayton-Bulwer  Treaty  of  1850  but  was  splendidly  vindicated  by 
the  withdrawal  of  France  from  Mexico  in  1866  at  the  request  of 
our  Secretary  of  State,  Mr.  Seward.  It  is  notable  that  the  Mon- 
roe Doctrine  was  not  mentioned  in  all  the  correspondence  relating 
to  this  matter.  The  Monroe  Doctrine  was  invoked  again  in  1866 
by  Secretary  Seward  when  Chile  and  Peru  were  at  war  wlfri 
Spain.  Another  appeal  was  made  to  it  when  the  confederation 
of  the  Canadian  provinces  came  about  in  1867.  Again,  in  1870 
President  Grant  urged  the  annexation  of  San  Domingo  as  an 
"adherence  to  the  Monroe  Doctrine."  No  action  was  taken  by 
Congress  either  time. 

It  was  invoked  again  in  1895  during  the  dispute  of  Venezuela 
with  England  over  the  boundary  line  and  was  extended  by  Presi- 
dent Cleveland  and  Secretary  of  State  Olney  to  mean  that  the 
United  States  must  settle  the  interior  affairs  of  America  itself. 
This  was  the  occasion  of  Secretary  Olney's  famous  dictum, 
"Today  the  United  States  is  practically  sovereign  on  this  conti- 
nent, and  its  fiat  is  law  upon  the  subjects  to  which  it  confines 
its  interposition." 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  3 

Later  developments  would  seem  to  be  in  harmony  with  the 
principle  thus  laid  down  by  President  Cleveland,  that  the  United 
States  had  the  right  itself  to  intervene  actively  in  Central  and 
South  American  affairs.  We  took  control  of  Porto  Rico  and  the 
Philippines  and  laid  certain  limitations  on  Cuba.  President  Roose- 
velt' declared  our  responsibility  to  European  nations  for  the  con- 
duct of  Latin-America.  In  San  Domingo  we  took  over  the  cus- 
tom houses  and  are  acting  as  receiver  for  European  nations.  Our 
course  with  respect  to  Nicaragua  and  Panama  would  seem  to 
carry  out  the  same  principle.  President  Wilson's  course  in  re- 
fusing to  recognize  Huerta  and  his  Mobile  speech  are  claimed 
by  some  to  be  still  further  extensions  of  our  policy. 

The  events  of  the  last  few  years,  especially  in  Mexico  and 
Panama  have  revived  the  discussion  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  and 
it  is  urged  by  many  that  it  is  outworn  and  should  be  abandoned. 
It  is  gradually  being  borne  in  upon  us  that  our  course  has  not 
gained  for  us  such  friendly  relations  with  our  southern  neighbors 
as  is  desirable  for  our  best  interests.  It  is  worthy  of  remark 
that  two  distinct  bodies  have  thought  it  worth  while  to  devote 
entire  conferences  to  the  study  of  our  relations  with  these  south- 
ern republics  and  incidentally  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine.  The  Clark 
University  Conference,  held  late  in  1913,  was  devoted  to  Latin- 
America,  the  papers  and  discussions  having  since  been  published 
in  book  form  under  the  editorship  of  George  H.  Blakeslee.  Most 
of  them  are  also  to  be  found  in  the  Journal  of  Race  Development 
for  January,  1914.  The  eighth  annual  conference  of  the  American 
Society  of  International  Law  was  concerned  largely  with  a  dis- 
cussion of  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  which  has  since  been  published 
in  the  Proceedings  of  this  Society  for  1914.  The  July,  1914,  num- 
ber of  the  Annals  of  the  American  Academy  is  devoted  also  to  a 
study  of  our  international  relations  and  includes  much  material  of 
value  on  the  Monroe  Doctrine.  These  three  collections  have  been 
quoted  from  liberally  in  the  following  pages. 

The  compiler  of  this  volume  has  experienced  more  than 
ordinary  difficulty  in  classifying  the  material  both  in  the  biblio- 
graphy and  the  reprints  because  of  the  lack  of  any  clear  line 
of  demarcation  between  the  solutions  suggested  by  the  advocates 
and  opponents  of  the  Doctrine.  For  this  reason  the  student  will 
find  in  the  General  Discussion  and  in  the  section  of  the  Biblio- 
graphy headed  General  References,  much  material  that  will 


4  THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE 

supplement  the  arguments  to  be  found  in  the  Affirmative  and 
Negative  Discussions.  As  so  much  material  has  been  published 
on  the  subject,  references  to  general  histories  and  encyclopaedias 
have  not  been  included.  It  also  seemed  advisable  to  exclude  a 
number  of  valuable  books  on  Central  and  South  America  which 
would  be  useful  to  the  student  wishing  to  obtain  a  wider  knowl- 
edge of  these  continents  and  their  people  and  governments.  Among 
them  may  be  named  Calderon's  "Latin  America,"  Bryce's  "South 
America :  Observations  and  Impressions,"  W.  R.  Shepherd's 
"Latin  America,"  and  Hiram  Bingham's  "Across  South  Amer- 
ica." 

E.  M.  PHELPS. 
February  27,  1915. 


GENERAL  DISCUSSION 

Harper's    Magazine.    109:857-69.    November,    1904 

Non-intervention  and  the  Monroe  Doctrine.    John  Bassett  Moore 

Among  the  rules  of  conduct  prescribed  for  the  United  States 
by  the  statesmen  who  formulated  its  foreign  policy,  none  was 
conceived  to  be  more  fundamental  or  more  distinctively  Amer- 
ican than  that  which  forbade  intervention  in  the  political  affairs 
of  other  nations.  The  right  of  the  government  to  intervene  for 
the  protection  of  its  citizens  in  foreign  lands  and  on  the  high 
seas  never  was  doubted ;  nor  was  such  action  withheld  in  proper 
cases.  But,  warned  by  the  spectacle  of  the  great  European  strug- 
gles that  had  marked  the  attempts  of  nations  to  control  one 
another's  political  destiny,  the  statesmen  of  America,  believing 
that  they  had  a  different  mission  to  perform,  planted  themselves 
upon  the  principle  of  the  equality  of  nations  as*  expounded  by 
Grotius  and  other  masters  of  international  law.  This  principle 
was  expressed  with  peculiar  felicity  and  force  by  Vattel,  who 
declared  that  nations  inherited  from  nature  "the  same  obliga- 
tions and  rights,"  that  power  or  weakness  .could  not  in  this  re- 
spect produce  any  difference,  and  that  a  "small  republic"  was  "no 
less  a  sovereign  state  than  the  most  powerful  kingdom."  The 
same  thought  was  tersely  phrased  by  Chief-Justice  Marshall,  in 
his  celebrated  affirmation :  "No  principle  is  more  universally 
acknowledged  than  the  perfect  equality  of  nations.  Russia  and 
Geneva  have  equal  rights."  And  as  the  Declaration "  of  Inde- 
pendence proclaimed  life,  liberty,  and  the  pursuit  of  happiness 
to  be  "unalienable  rights"  of  individual  men,  so  the  founders  of 
the  American  republic  ascribed  the  same  rights  to  men  in  their 
aggregate  political  capacity  as  independent  nations. 

While  the  principle  of  non-intervention  formed  an  integral 
part  of  the  political  philosophy  of  American  statesmen,  its  prac- 
tical importance  was  profoundly  impressed  upon  them  by  the" 
narrowness  of  their  escape  from  being  drawn,  by  the  alliance 
with  France,  into  the  vortex  of  the  European  conflicts  that  grew 


6  SELECTED  ARTICLES  ON 

out  of  the  French  revolution.  Even  before  American  independ- 
ence was  acknowledged  by  Great  Britain,  American  statesmen 
scented  the  dangers  that  lurked  in  a  possible  implication  in 
European  broils.  "You  are  afraid,"  said  Richard  Oswald  to 
John  Adams,  "of  being  made  the  tool  of  the  powers  of  Europe." 
"Indeed  I  am,"  said  Adams.  "What  powers?"  inquired  Oswald. 
"All  of  them,"  replied  Adams ;  "it  is  obvious  that  all  the  powers 
of  Europe  will  be  continually  manoeuvring  with  us  to  work  us  into 
their  real  or  imaginary  balances  of  power.  .  .  .  But  I  think 
that  it  ought  to  be  our  rule  not  to  meddle."  In  1793  the  revo- 
lutionary government  of  France,  apparently  doubting  the  appli- 
cability of  the  existing  alliance  with  the  United  States  to  the 
situation  in  Europe,  submitted  a  proposal  for  "a  national  agree- 
ment, in  which  two  great  peoples  shall  suspend  their  commercial 
and  political  interests  and  establish  a  mutual  understanding  to 
defend  the  empire  of  liberty,  wherever  it  can  be  embraced." 
This  proposal  the  American  government  declined;  and  its  re- 
sponse found  practical  embodiment  in  its  acts.  The  reasons  for 
the  policy  of  -non-intervention  and  neutrality,  to  which  the  ad- 
ministration of  the  time  so  sedulously  adhered,  were  eloquently 
summed  up  by  Washington  in  that  immortal  political  legacy,  his 
Farewell  Address.  "The  great  rule  of  conduct  for  us,  in  regard 
to  foreign  nations,"  said  Washington,  "is,  in  extending  our  com- 
mercial relations,  to  have  with  them  as  little  political  connection 
as  possible.  So  far  as  we  have  already  formed  engagements,  let 
them  be  fulfilled  with  perfect  good  faith.  Here  let  us  stop."  The 
same  thought  was  conveyed  by  Jefferson,  in  his  first  inaugural 
address,  in  the  apothegm,  "Peace,  commerce,  and  honest  friend- 
ship with  all  nations,  entangling  alliances  with  none." 

In  connection  with  the  principle  of  non-intervention,  a  promi- 
nent place  must  be  given  to  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  the  object  of 
which  was  to  render  intervention  unnecessary  by  precluding  the 
occasions  for  it.  On  September  26,  1815,  the  Emperors  of  Aus- 
tria and  Russia  and  the  King  of  Prussia  signed  at  Paris  a  personal 
league  commonly  called  the  Holy  Alliance,  the  design  of  which 
was  declared  to  be  the  administration  of  government,  in  matters 
both  internal  and  external,  according  to  the  precepts  of  justice, 
charity,  and  peace.  To  this  end  the  allied  monarchs,  "looking 
upon  themselves  as  delegated  by  Providence"  to  rule  over  their 
respective  countries,  engaged  to  "lend  one  another,  on  every 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  7 

occasion  and  in  every  place,  assistance,  aid,  and  support."  In 
the  course  of  time,  as  revolt  against  the  arrangements  of  the 
Congress  of  Vienna  spread  and  grew  more  pronounced,  the 
alliance  came  more  and  more  to  assume  the  form  of  a  league  for 
the  protection  of  the  principle  of  legitimacy — the  principle  of  the 
divine  right  of  kings  as  opposed  to  the  rights  of  the  people — 
against  the  encroachments  of  liberal  ideas.  Congresses  were 
held  at  Aix-la-Chappelle,  Troppau,  and  Laybach,  for  the  purpose 
of  maturing  a  programme  to  that  end.  The  league  was  joined  by 
the  King  of  France;  but  England,  whose  Prince  Regent  had 
originally  given  it  his  informal  adhesion,  began  to  grow  hostile. 

Her  own  government,  with  its  free  and  parliamentary  insti- 
tutions, was  founded  on  a  revolution;  and  the  allies,  in  the 
circular  issued  at  Troppau,  had  associated  "revolt  and  crime," 
and  had  declared  that  the  European  Powers  "had  an  undoubted 
right  to  take  a  hostile  attitude  in  regard  to  those  states  in  which 
the  overthrow  of  the  government  might  operate  as  an  example." 
In  a  circular  issued  at  Laybach  they  denounced  "as  equally  null, 
and  disallowed  by  the  public  law  of  Europe,  any  pretended  reform 
effected  by  revolt  and  open  force."  In  October,  1822,  they  held 
a  congress  at  Verona  for  the  purpose  of  concerting  measures 
against  the  revolutionary  government  in  Spain;  and  in  yet  an- 
other circular  announced  their  determination  "to  repel  the  maxim 
of  rebellion,  in  whatever  place  and  under  whatever  form  it  might 
show  itself."  Their  ultimate  object  was  more  explicitly  stated 
in  a  secret  treaty  in  which  they  engaged  mutually  "to  put  an  end 
to  the  system  of  representative  governments"  in  Europe,  and  to 
adopt  measures  to  destroy  "the  liberty  of  the  press."  Popular 
movements  were  forcibly  suppressed  in  Piedmont  and  Naples ; 
and  in  April,  1823,  France,  acting  for  the  allies,  invaded  Spain 
for  the  purpose  of  restoring  the  absolute  monarch  Ferdinand 
VII.  Before  the  close  of  the  summer  such  progress  had  been 
made  in  this  direction  that  notice  was  given  to  the  British  gov- 
ernment of  the  intention  of  the  allies  to  call  a  congress  with  a 
view  to  the  termination  of  the  revolutionary  governments  in 
Spanish  America. 

At  this  time  Lord  Castlereagh,  who  had  always  been  favorably 
disposed  towards  the  alliance,  had  been  succeeded  in  the  conduct 
of  the  foreign  affairs  of  England  by  jGeorge  Canning,  who  re- 
flected the  popular  sentiment  as  to  the  policy  of  the  allied  powers. 


8  SELECTED  ARTICLES  ON 

The  independence  of  the  Spanish-American  governments,  which 
had  now  been  acknowledged  by  the  United  States,  had  not  as  yet 
been  recognized  by  Great  Britain.  But  English  merchants,  like 
those  of  the  United  States,  had  developed  a  large  trade  with  the 
Spanish-American  countries — a  trade  which  the  restoration  of 
those  regions  to  a  colonial  condition  would,  under  the  commercial 
system  then  in  vogue,  have  cut  off  and  destroyed. 

In  view  of  this  common  interest,  Canning,  towards  the  close 
of  1823,  began  to  sound  Richard  Rush,  the  American  minister  at 
London,  as  to  the  possibility  of  a  joint  declaration  by  the  two 
governments  against  the  intervention  of  the  allies  in  Spanish 
America.  Canning  once  boasted  that  he  had  called  into  being 
the  New  World  to  redress  the  balance  of  the  Old.  The  meaning 
of  this  boast  can  be  understood  only  in  the  light  of  his  proposals. 
In  a  "private  and  confidential"  note  to  Rush,  of  August  23,  1823, 
he  declared:  "i.  We  conceive  the  recovery  of  the  colonies  of 
Spain  to  be  hopeless.  2.  We  conceive  the  question  of  the  recogni- 
tion of  them,  as  independent  states,  to  be  one  of  time  and  circum- 
stances. 3.  We  are,  however,  by  no  means  disposed  to  threw 
any  impediment  in  the  way  of  an  arrangement  between  them  and 
the  mother  country  by  amicable  negotiation.  4.  We  aim  not  at 
the  possession  of  any  portion  of  them  ourselves.  5.  We  could 
not  see  any  portion  of  them  transferred  to  any  other  power  with 
indifference." 

If  these  opinions  and  feelings  were  shared  by  the  United 
States,  Canning  thought  the  two  governments  should  declare 
them  in  the  face  of  the  world,  as  the  best  means  of  defeating 
the  project,  if  any  European  Power  should  cherish  it,  of  subju- 
gating the  colonies  in  the  name  of  Spain,  or  of  acquiring  any 
part  of  them  itself  by  cession  or  by  conquest.  He  therefore  desired 
Rush  to  act  upon  his  proposals  at  once,  if  he  possessed  the  power 
to  do  so.  It  was  said  of  Richard  Rush  by  an  eminent  Senator 
that,  in  the  course  of  an  unusually  long  and  important  diplomatic 
career,  he  "never  said  a  word  that  was  improper,  nor  betrayed 
a  thought  that  might  peril  his  country's  fortunes."  On  the 
present  occasion  he  acted  with  his  usual  good  judgment.  His 
powers  did  not  embrace  the  making  of  such  a  declaration  as 
Canning  desired;  but,  while  he  expressed  the  opinion  that  Can- 
ning's sentiments,  except  as  to  independence,  which  the  United 
States  had  already  acknowledged,  were  shared  by  his  government, 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  9 

he  lost  no  time  in  reporting  the  matter  to  the  President.  Monroe, 
on  receiving  the  correspondence,  hastened  to  take  counsel  upon 
it.  Jefferson,  whose  opinion  was  solicited,  replied :  "Our  first  and 
fundamental  maxim  should  be  never  to  entangle  ourselves  in  the 
broils  of  Europe;  our  second,  never  to  suffer  Europe  to  inter- 
meddle with  cis-Atlantic  affairs."  He  was  disposed  to  look 
with  favor  upon  cooperation  with  England  in  the  direction  sug- 
gested, and  Madison  shared  his  opinion.  In  the  cabinet  of  Mon- 
roe, Calhoun  inclined  to  invest  Rush  with  power  to  join  England 
in  a  declaration,  even  if  it  should  pledge  the  United  States  not 
to  take  either  Cuba  or  Texas.  The  President  at  -first  was  in- 
clined to  Calhoun' s  idea  of  giving  Rush  discretionary  powers,  but 
this  was  opposed  by  John  Quincy  Adams,  who  maintained  that 
we  could  act  with  England  only  on  the  basis  of  the  acknowledged 
independence  of  the  Spanish-American  states.  The  views  of 
Adams  prevailed.  His  basal  thought  was  the  right  of  self- 
government,  which  he  believed  to  be  the  duty  and  the  interest 
of  the  United  States  to  cherish  and  support.  He  thought  that 
the  United  States  should  let  England  make  her  own  declaration. 
This  England  did,  without  waiting  for  the  decision  of  the  United 
States.  On  October  9,  1823,  Canning,  in  an  interview  with  Prince 
de  Polignac,  French  ambassador,  declared  that  while  Great 
Britain  would  remain  "neutral"  in  any  war  between  Spain  and 
her  colonies,  the  "junction"  of  any  foreign  power  with  Spain 
against  the  colonies  would  be  viewed  as  constituting  "entirely  a 
new  question,"  upon  which  Great  Britain  "must  take  such  deci- 
sion" as  her  interests  "might  require." 

In  his  annual  message  to  Congress  of  December  2,  1823,  Presi- 
dent Monroe  devoted  to  the  subject  a  long  passage.  The  sub- 
stance of  it  is,  however,  conveyed  in  a  few  sentences.  After 
adverting  to  the  abstention  of  the  United  States  from  European 
wars  and  to  the  dangers  to  be  apprehended  from  the  system  of 
the  allied  Powers,  he  declared:  "We  owe  it,  therefore,  to  candor 
and  to  the  amicable  relations  existing  between  the  United  States 
and  those  Powers,  to  declare  that  we  should  consider  any  attempt 
on  their  part  to  extend  their  system  to  any  portion  of  this  hemis- 
phere as  dangerous  to  our  peace  and  safety.  With  the  existing 
colonies  or  dependencies  of  any  European  Power  we  have  not 
interfered  and  shall  not  interfere.  But  with  the  governments 
who  have  declared  their  independence  and  maintained  it,  and 


io  SELECTED  ARTICLES  ON 

whose  independence  we  have,  on  great  consideration  and  on  just 
principles,  acknowledged,  we  could  not  view  any  interposition  for 
the  purpose  of  oppressing  them,  or  controlling  in  any  other 
manner  their  destiny,  by  any  European  Power,  in  any  other  light 
than  a  manifestation  of  an  unfriendly  disposition  towards  the 
United  States." 

The  sentences  just  quoted  specially  relate  to  the  aims  of  the 
Holy  Alliance ;  but  there  is  another  passage  in  the  message  which 
is  also  often  cited  as  embodying  the  Monroe  Doctrine.  In  1821, 
the  Emperor  of  Russia  issued  a  ukase,  by  which  he  assumed,  as 
owner  of  the  shore,  to  exclude  foreigners  from  carrying  on  com- 
merce and  from  navigating  and  fishing  within  a  hundred  Italian 
miles  of  the  northwest  coast  of  America,  from  Bering  Strait 
down  to  the  51  st  parallel  of  north  latitude.  As  this  assertion  of 
title  embraced  territory  which  was  claimed  by  the  United  States 
as  well  as  by  Great  Britain,  both  those  governments  protested 
against  it.  In  consequence  the  Russian  government  proposed  to 
adjust  the  matter  by  amicable  negotiation;  and  instructions  to 
that  end  were  prepared  by  John  Quincy  Adams  for  the  American 
ministers  at  London  and  St.  Petersburg.  At  a  meeting  of  the 
cabinet  on  June  28,  1823,  while  the  subject  was  under  discussion, 
Adams  expressed  the  opinion  that  the  claim  of  the  Russians  could 
not  be  admitted,  because  they  appeared  to  have  no  "settlement" 
upon  the  territory  in  dispute;  and  on  July  17  he  informed  Baron 
Tuyl,  then  Russian  minister  at  Washington,  "that  we  [the  United 
States]  should  contest  the  right  of  Russia  to  any  territorial 
establishment  on  this  continent,  and  that  we  should  assume 
distinctly  the  principle  that  the  American  continents  are  no 
longer  subjects  for  any  new  European  colonial  establishments." 
With  reference  to  this  subject,  President  Monroe,  in  the  message 
above  quoted,  said:  "In  the  discussions  to  which  this  interest 
has  given  rise,  and  in  the  arrangements  by  which  they  may 
terminate,  the  occasion  has  been  judged  proper  for  asserting  as 
a  principle  in  which  the  rights  and  interests  of  the  United  States 
are  involved,  that  the  American  continents,  by  the  free  and 
independent  condition  which  they  have  assumed  and  maintain, 
are  henceforth  not  to  be  considered  as  subjects  for  future  col- 
onization by  any  European  Powers." 

By  the  term  "future  colonization"  President  Monroe  evidently 
intended  to  convey  the  same  meaning  as  was  expressed  by  the 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  II 

terms  "settlement"  and  "colonial  establishments"  previously  em- 
ployed by  Adams.  They  were  used  to  denote,  what  they  were 
then  commonly  understood  to  mean,  the  acquisition  of  title  to 
territory  by  original  occupation  and  settlement.  But  in  the 
course  of  time  the  phrase  "future  colonization"  came  to  receive 
a  broader  interpretation.  President  Polk,  in  his  annual  message 
of  December  2,  1845,  declared  that,  while  existing  rights  of  every 
European  nation  should  be  respected,  it  should  be  "distinctly 
announced  to  the  world  as  our  settled  policy  that  no  future  Euro- 
pean colony  or  dominion  shall,  with  our  consent,  be  planted  or 
established  on  any  part  of  the  North-American  continent."  By 
pronouncing  against  the  establishment  by  a  European  Power  of 
any  "dominion" — a  term  which  included  even  the  voluntary  trans- 
fer of  territory  already  occupied — President  Polk  expressed  a 
conception  which  has  come  generally  to  prevail,  and  which  is 
embodied  in  the  popular  phrase,  "No  more  European  colonies  on 
these  continents."  The  same  meaning  is  conveyed  in  the  phrase, 
"America  for  the  Americans,"  which  signifies  that  no  European 
Power  shall  be  permitted  to  acquire  new  territory  or  to  extend  its 
dominions  in  the  western  hemisphere. 

In  this  sense,  but  apparently  with  the  qualification  in  the 
particular  case  that  only  a  forcible  acquisition  of  territory  was 
forbidden,  the  Monroe  Doctrine  was  invoked  by  President  Cleve- 
land in  respect  of  the  Venezuelan  boundary  question.  This  inci- 
dent, as  is  well  known,  grew  out  of  a  long-standing  dispute  be- 
tween Great  Britain  and  Venezuela,  which  was  the  continuation 
of  a  dispute  two  centuries  old  between  the  Netherlands  and  Spain 
as  to  the  limits  of  the  Dutch  and  Spanish  settlements  in  Guiana. 
In  1844  Lord  Aberdeen  proposed  to  Venezuela  a  conventional 
line,  beginning  at  the  river  Moroco.  This  proposal  was  declined ; 
and,  chiefly  in  consequence  of  civil  commotions  in  Venezuela, 
negotiations  remained  practically  in  abeyance  till  1876.  Vene- 
zuela then  offered  to  accept  the  Aberdeen  line ;  but  Lord  Grenville 
suggested  a  boundary  farther  west;  and  in  subsequent  negotia- 
tions the  British  demand  was  extended  still  farther  in  that  direc- 
tion. Venezuela,  representing  that  this  apparent  enlargement  of 
British  dominion  constituted  a  pure  aggression  of  her  territorial 
rights,  invoked  the  aid  of  the  United  States  on  the  ground  of  the 
Monroe  Doctrine.  Venezuela  asked  for  arbitration,  and  in  so 
doing  included  in  her  claim  a  large  portion  of  British  Guiana. 


12  SELECTED  ARTICLES  ON 

Great  Britain  at  length  declined  to  arbitrate  unless  Venezuela 
would  first  yield  all  territory  within  a  line  westward  of  that 
offered  by  Lord  Aberdeen.  In  these  circumstances,  Mr.  Olney, 
as  Secretary  of  State,  in  instructions  to  Mr.  Bayard,  American 
ambassador  at  London,  of  July  20,  1895,  categorically  inquired 
whether  the  British  government  would  submit  the  whole  contro- 
versey  to  arbitration.  In  these  instructions  Mr.  Olney  declared 
that  the  Monroe  Doctrine  did  not  establish  a  "protectorate"  over 
other  American  states ;  that  it  did  not  relieve  any  of  them  "from 
its  obligations  as  fixed  by  international  law  nor  prevent  any 
European  Power  directly  interested  from  enforcing  such  obliga- 
tions or  from  inflicting  merited  punishment  for  the  breach  of 
them";  but  that  its  "single  purpose  and  object"  was  that  "no 
European  Power  or  combination  of  European  Powers"  should 
"forcibly  deprive  an  American  state  of  the  right  and  power  of 
self-government,  and  of  shaping  for  itself  its  own  political  for- 
tunes and  destinies."  This  principle  he  conceived  to  be  at  stake 
in  the  dispute  between  Great  Britain  and  Venezuela,  because,  as 
the  dispute  related  to  territory,  it  necessarily  imported  "political 
control  to  be  lost  by  one  party  and  gained  by  the  other." 

"To-day,"  declared  Mr.  Olney,  "the  United  States  is  practically 
sovereign  on  this  continent,  and  its  fiat  is  law  upon  the  subjects 
to  which  it  confines  its  interposition."  All  the  advantages  of  this 
superiority  were,  he  affirmed,  at  once  imperilled  if  the  principle 
should  be  admitted  that  European  Powers  might  convert  Ameri- 
can states  into  colonies  or  provinces  of  their  own.  Lord  Salis- 
bury declined  unrestricted  arbitration;  and  when  his  answer 
was  received,  President  Cleveland,  on  December  17,  1895,  laid 
the  correspondence  before  Congress.  "If  a  European  Power,  by 
an  extension  of  its  boundaries,  takes  possession  of  the  territory 
of  one  of  our  neighboring  republics  against  its  will  and  in  dero- 
gation of  its  rights,"  it  was,  said  President  Cleveland,  the  precise 
thing  which  President  Monroe  had  declared  to  be  "dangerous 
to  our  peace  and  safety";  but,  he  added,  "any  adjustment  of  the 
boundary  which  that  country  [Venezuela]  may  deem  for  her 
advantage  and  may  enter  into  of  her  own  free  will  cannot,  of 
course,  be  objected  to  by  the  United  States'." 

He  then  recommended  the  appointment  by  the  United  States 
of  a  commission  to  investigate  the  merits  of  the  controversy, 
and  declared  that,  if  the  title  to  the  disputed  territory  should  be 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  J3 

found  to  belong  to  Venezuela,  it  would  be  the  duty  of  the  United 
States  "to  resist  by  every  means  in  its  power,  as  a  wilful  aggres- 
sion upon  its  rights  and  interests,  the  appropriation  by  Great  Brit- 
ain of  any  lands  or  the  exercise  of  governmental  jurisdiction 
over  any  territory  which,  after  investigation,  we  have  determined 
of  right  belongs  to  Venezuela." 

This  declaration  produced  great  excitement,  in  the  United 
States  as  well  as  in  England.  So  far  as  it  seemed  to  imply,  as 
the  language  has  often  been  construed  to  do,  that  the  United 
States  possessed  the  right,  by  means  of. an  ex  parte  commission, 
appointed  by  itself  and  composed  of  its  own  citizens,  authorita- 
tively to  fix  the  boundary  between  two  other  independent  nations, 
it  went  beyond  the  immediate  necessities  of  the  case.  If  the  com- 
mission had  ever  reported,  its  conclusions  probably  would  have 
been  treated  as  advisory  rather  than  definitive,  and  would  have 
been  made  the  basis  of  further  correspondence  with  both  govern- 
ments. 

The  actual  position  insisted  upon  in  Mr.  Olney's  instructions 
to  Mr.  Bayard,  as  well  as  in  the  rest  of  President  Cleveland's 
message,  was  that  the  United  States  would  resist  the  palpable 
and  substantial  seizure  and  appropriation  by  Great  Britain  of 
Venezuelan  territory.  This  position  was  quite  in  harmony  with 
the  spirit  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine.  Congress  unanimously  pro- 
vided for  the  appointment  of  a  commission  of  investigation;  but 
the  commission,  immediately  after  its  organization,  addressed 
to  Mr.  Olney,  through  its  president,  Mr.  Justice  Brewer,  a  letter 
setting  forth  its  peaceful  and  non-partisan  character  and  the  de- 
sirability of  securing  the  cooperation  of  Great  Britain  and  Vene- 
zuela in  obtaining  evidence.  At  the  close  of  his  letter,  Mr.  Justice 
Brewer  observed :  "The  purposes  of  the  pending  investigation 
are  certainly  hostile  to  none,  nor  can  it  be  of  advantage  to  .any 
that  the  machinery  devised  by  the  government  of  the  United 
States  to  secure  the  desired  information  should  fail  of  its  pur- 
pose." 

This  statement  was  communicated  to  Great  Britain  as  well  as 
to  Venezuela,  and  both  governments  promptly  responded  to  the 
appeal.  The  labors  of  the  commission  were,  however,  brought 
to  a  close  by  the  conclusion  of  a  treaty  of  arbitration,  signed  by 
Great  Britain  and  Venezuela,  but  negotiated  between  Great 
Britain  and  the  United  States,  the  predominant  feature  of  which 


14  SELECTED  ARTICLES  ON 

was  the  application  of  the  principle  of  prescription,  under  the 
definite  rule  that  fifty  years'  adverse  holding  of  a  district,  either 
by  exclusive  political  control  or  by  actual  settlement,  should 
suffice  to  constitute  national  title.  The  adoption  of  the  principle 
of  prescription,  on  which  the  arbitrators  would  necessarily  have 
acted,  even  if  it  had  not  been  incorporated  into  the  treaty,  at 
once  rendered  nugatory  the  greater  part  of  the  Venezuelan  claim. 
Although  the  extreme  British  claim  was  not  allowed,  the  terri- 
torial results  of  the  arbitration  were  decidedly  favorable  to  that 
government.  It  must,  however,  be  conceded  that  the  most  im- 
portant political  result  of  the  Venezuelan  incident  was  not  the 
decision  upon  the  territorial  question,  but  the  official  adoption 
of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  by  the  Congress  of  the  United  States, 
and  its  explicit  acceptance  by  the  principal  maritime  power  of 
Europe. 

The  latest  official  exposition  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  was 
given  by  President  Roosevelt  in  his  annual  message  of  December 
3,  1901,  in  which  he  said :  "The  Monroe  Doctrine  is  a  declaration 
that  there  must  be  no  territorial  aggrandizement  by  any  non- 
American  power  at  the  expense  of  any  American  power  on 
American  soil.  It  is  in  no  wise  intended  as  hostile  to  any  nation 
in  the  Old  World.  .  .  .  This  doctrine  has  nothing  to  do  with  the 
commercial  relations  of  any  American  power,  save  that  it  in  truth 
allows  each  of  them  to  form  such  as  it  desires.  .  .  .  We  do  not 
guarantee  any  state  against  punishment  if  it  misconducts  itself, 
provided  that  punishment  does  not  take  the  form  of  the  ac- 
quisition of  territory  by  any  non-American  power."  An  occasion 
for  the  practical  application  of  this  definition  soon  arose.  On 
December  n,  1901,  the  German  ambassador  at  Washington  left 
at  the  Department  of  State  a  memorandum  in  which  it  was 
stated  that  the  German  government  proposed  to  take  certain 
coercive  measures  against  Venezuela,  for  the  satisfaction  of 
claims,  based  partly  on  breaches  of  contract  and  partly  on  violent 
wrongs,  which  it  had  been  found  to  be  impracticable  otherwise 
to  bring  to  a  settlement.  At  the  same  time  the  memorandum 
declared  that  "under  no  circumstances"  would  the  German 
government  consider  in  its  proceedings  "the  acquisition  or  the 
permanent  occupation  of  Venezuelan  territory."  In  acknowledg- 
ing the  receipt  of  this  memorandum,  on  the  i6th  of  December, 
Mr.  Hay  adverted  to  the  fact  that  the  German  ambassador,  on 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  15 

his  recent  return  from  Berlin,  had  conveyed  personally  to  the 
President,  and  had  afterwards  repeated  to  himself,  the  assur- 
ance of  the  German  Emperor  that  the  imperial  government  had 
no  purpose  or  intention  to  make  even  the  smallest  acquisition  of 
territory  on  the  South- American  continent  or  the  adjacent 
islands;  and  in  view  of  this  circumstance,  and  of  the  further 
assurance  given  in  the  memorandum,  Mr.  Hay  declared  that  the 
President,  while  "appreciating  the  courtesy  of  the  German  gov- 
ernment in  making  him  acquainted  with  the  state  of  affairs 
referred  to,"  did  not  regard  himself  "as  called  upon  to  enter 
into  the  consideration  of  the  claims  in  question."  The  coercive 
measures  contemplated  by  the  German  government  were  post- 
poned for  a  year,  and  were  then  taken  in  conjunction  with  the 
British  government,  which  also  made  to  the  United  States,  on 
November  13,"  1902,  a  frank  communication  of  its  purposes.  To 
this  communication  Mr.  Hay  replied  that  "the  government  of  the 
United  States,  although  it  regretted  that  European  Powers  should 
use  force  against  Central  and  South  American  governments, 
could  not  object  to  their  taking  steps  to  obtain  redress  for 
injuries  suffered  by  their  subjects,  provided  that  no  acquisition 
of  territory  was  contemplated."  In  the  hostilities  with  Venezuela 
that  ensued  the  assurances  of  the  powers  were  honorably  kept, 
but  peaceful  relations  wrere  eventually  restored  through  the  frank 
exercise  of  the  friendly  offices  of  the  United  States. 

In  popular  discussions  the  position  has  sometimes  been  urged 
that  it  is  a  violation  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  for  a  European 
Power  to  employ  force  against  an  American  republic  for  the 
purpose  of  collecting  a  debt  or  satisfying  a  pecuniary  demand, 
no  matter  what  may  have  been  its  origin.  For  this  supposition, 
which  is  discredited  by  the  declarations  and  the  acts. of  President 
Roosevelt  and  Mr.  Hay,  there  appears  to  be  no  official  sanction. 
It  is  true  that  in  Wharton's  International  Law  Digest,  under  the 
head  of  the  "Monroe  Doctrine,"  two  alleged  manuscript  instruc- 
tions by  Mr.  Elaine  to  the  American  minister  at  Paris,  of  July 
23  and  December  16,  1881,  are  cited  as  authority  for  the  state- 
ment that  "the  government  of  the  United  States  would  regard 
with  grave  anxiety  an  attempt  on  the  part  of  France  to  force  by 
hostile  pressure  the  payment  by  Venezuela  of  her  debt  to  French 
citizens."  The  citation,  however,  is  wholly  inadvertent.  Both 
instructions  are  published  in  the  volume  of  Foreign  Relations  for 


16  SELECTED  ARTICLES  ON 

1881 ;  and  they  refer,  not  to  "hostile  pressure,"  but  to  a  rumored 
design  on  the  part  of  France  of  "taking  forcible  possession  of 
some  of  the  harbors  and  a  portion  of  the  territory  of  Venezuela 
in  compensation  for  debts  due  to  citizens  of  the  French  Republic." 
Even  in  regard  to  this  they  nowhere  express  "grave  anxiety," 
but  merely  argue  that  such  a  proceeding  would  be  unjust  to 
other  creditors,  including  the  United  States,  since  it  would  deprive 
them  of  a  part  of  their  security ;  while  they  avow  the  "solicitude" 
of  the  government  of  the  United  States  "for  the  higher  object 
of  averting  hostilities  between  two  republics  for  each  of  which 
it  feels  the  most  sincere  and  enduring  friendship." 

In  1861  the  United  States  formally  admitted  the  right  of 
France,  Spain,  and  Great  Britain  to  proceed  jointly  against 
Mexico  for  the  satisfaction  of  claims.  "France,"  said  Mr. 
Seward  on  that  occasion,  in  an  instruction  to  the  American 
minister  at  Paris,  of  June  26,  1862,  "has  a  right  to  make  war 
against  Mexico,  and  to  determine  for  herself  the  cause.  We 
have  the  right  and  interest  to  insist  that  France  shall  not  improve 
the  war  she  makes  to  raise  up  an  anti-republican  or  anti-American 
.government,  or  .to  maintain  such  a  government  there."  In  a 
similar  vein,  Mr.  Seward,  writing  to  the  American  minister  in 
Chile,  on  June  2,  1866,  with  reference  to  the  hostilities  then  in 
progress  between  Spain  and  the  republics  on  the  west  coast  of 
South  America,  and  particularly  to  the  bombardment  of  Val- 
paraiso by  the  Spanish  fleet,  declared  that  the  United  States  did 
not  intervene  in  wars  between  European  and  American  states 
"if  they  are  not  pushed,  like  the  French  war  in  Mexico,  to  the 
political  point" ;  that  the  United  States  had  "no  armies  for  the 
purpose  of  aggressive  war ;  no  ambition  for  the  character  of  a 
regulator." 

A  tendency  is  often  exhibited  to  attach  decisive,  importance 
to  particular  phrases  in  President  Monroe's  message  of  1823, 
or  to  the  special  circumstances  in  which  they  originated,  as  if 
they  furnished  a  definitive  test  of  what  should  be  done  and 
what  should  be  omitted  under  all  contingencies.  The  verbal 
literalist  would,  on  the  one  hand,  make  the  United  States  an 
involuntary  party  to  all  controversies  between  European  and 
American  governments,  in  order  that  -the  latter  may  not  be 
"oppressed";  while  the  historical  literalist  would,  on  the  other 
hand,  treat  Monroe's  declarations  as  obsolete,  since  the  conditions 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  17 

to  which  they  especially  referred  no  longer  exist.  But  when  we 
consider  the  mutations  in  the  world's  affairs,  these  modes  of 
reasoning  must  be  confessed  to  be  highly  unsatisfactory.  The 
"Monroe  Doctrine"  has  in  reality  become  a  convenient  title  by 
which  is  denoted  a  principle  that  doubtless  would  have  been 
wrought  out  if  the  message  of  1823  had  never  been  written — the 
principle  of  the  limitation  of  European  power  and  influence  in 
the  Western  Hemisphere.  We  have  seen,  in  the  first  paper  of 
this  series,  that  as  early  as  1778  the  Continental  Congress,  in  the 
treaty  of  alliance  with  France,  obtained  from  its  ally  the  renun- 
ciation of  any  claim  to  the  British  possessions  in  North  America. 
When  Washington,  in  his  Farewell  Address,  observed  that  Europe 
had  "a  set  of  primary  interests,  which  to  us  have  none,  or  a  very 
remote  relation,"  he  lent  emphasis  to  the  thought  that  it  was 
desirable  so-  far  as  possible  to  dissociate  America  from  the  vicis- 
situdes of  European  politics.  Giving  to  this  thought  a  further 
reach,  Jefferson,  while  President,  in  1808,  declared:  "We  shall 
be  satisfied  to  see  Cuba  and  Mexico  remain  in  their  present 
dependence,  but  very  unwilling  to  see  them  in  that  of  either 
France  or  England,  politically  or  commercially.  We  consider 
their  interests  and  our  as  the  same,  and  the  object  of  both  must 
be  to  exclude  European  influence  from  this  hemisphere."  On 
January  15,  1811,  twelve  years  before  Monroe's  message  was 
published,  Congress,  in  secret  session,  "taking  into  view  the 
peculiar  situation  of  Spain  and  her  American  provinces,"  and 
"the  influence  which  the  destiny  of  the  territory  adjoining  the 
southern  border  of  the  United  States  might  have  upon  the'ir 
security,  tranquillity,  and  commerce,"  resolved  that  the  United 
States  could  not  "without  serious  inquietude  see  any  part  of 
said  territory  pass  into  the  hands  of  any  foreign  power";  and 
the  President  was  authorized  to  occupy  all  or  any  part  of  the 
Floridas,  "in  the  event  of  an  attempt  to  occupy  the  same,  or 
any  part  thereof,  by  any  foreign  government." 

In  the  long  struggle,  which  was  eventually  crowned  with 
success,  to  exclude  European  domination  from  the  interoceanic 
canal  routes,  and  to  secure  the  construction  of  a  neutralized  canal 
under  American  auspices,  American  statesmen  no  doubt  were 
aided  by  the  authority  of  Monroe's  declarations,  but  were  by  no 
means  dependent  upon  them.  It  is  a  remarkable  fact  that  Seward, 
neither  in  the  formal  demand  upon  France  in  1865  to  desist  from 


i8  SELECTED  ARTICLES  ON 

armed  intervention  in  Mexico  for  the  purpose  of  overthrowing 
the  domestic  republican  government  under  Juarez  and  establish- 
ing on  its  ruins  the  foreign  imperial  government  under  Maxi- 
milian, nor  in  any  of  the  official  correspondence  relating  to  the 
subject,  mentioned  the  "Monroe  Doctrine,"  although  his  action 
came  within  the  letter  as  well  as  the  spirit  of  the  message  of 
1823.  President  Polk,  on  the  other  hand,  in  pronouncing  against 
the  acquisition  of  new  "dominion"  in  North  America  by  a  Euro- 
pean Power,  although  he  was  well  within  the  limits  of  the 
"Monroe  Doctrine"  as  it  is  now  understood,  invoked  a  passage 
that  fell  far  short  of  sustaining  his  position.  It  would  be  easy 
to  cite  many  similar  examples. 

The  Monroe  Doctrine,  as  a  limitation  upon  the  extension  of 
European  Power  and  influence  on  the  American  continents,  is 
now  generally  recognized  as  a  principle  of  American  policy.  To 
its  explicit  acceptance  by  Great  Britain  and  Germany  there  may 
be  added  the  declaration  which  was  spread  by  unanimous  con- 
sent upon  the  minutes  of  the  Hague  Conference,  and  which  was 
permitted  to  be  annexed  to  the  signature  of  the  American  dele- 
gates to  the  convention  for  the  peaceful  adjustment  of  inter- 
national disputes,  that  nothing  therein  contained  should  be  so 
construed  as  to  require  the  United  States  "to  depart  from  its 
traditional  policy  of  not  entering  upon,  interfering  with,  or  en- 
tangling itself  in  the  political  questions  or  internal  administration 
of  any  foreign  state,"  or  to  relinquish  "its  traditional  attitude 
toward  purely  American  questions." 

Chautauquan.    22:549-56.   February,    1896 

Monroe  Doctrine  and  Some  of  Its  Applications.     James  Albert 
Woodburn 

The  times  since  1823  at  which  claims  have  been  put  forth  for 
the  application  of  this  doctrine  have  been  numerous.  The  Pan- 
ama Congress  in  1825-6;  repeated  discussions  concerning  Cuba; 
the  case  of  Yucatan  in  1848;  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty,  1850, 
and  the  Nicaraguan  Canal;  the  French  intervention  in  Mexico, 
1861-5,  and  numerous  minor  instances  since  our  Civil  War — in 
connection  with  all  these  the  Monroe  Doctrine  has  been  brought 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  19 

into  discussion.  Our  space  does  not  permit  us  to  discuss  here 
more  than  one  of  these,  and  we  choose  the  only  one  in  which,  as 
it  seems  to  us,  the  Monroe  Doctrine  has  ever  been  fairly  appli- 
cable— the  case  of  Mexico,  1861-5. 

On  October  31,  1861,  a  convention  was  held  in  London  be- 
tween England,  France  and  Spain,  avowedly  to  consider  how 
these  nations  might  secure  redress  and  security  for  their  citizens 
in  Mexico.  Some  of  these  citizens  held  Mexican  bonds  which 
that  government,  it  was  said,  was  not  willing,  or  not  able,  to  pay. 
Complaint  was  also  made  that  life  and  property  were  not  safe  in 
Mexico.  The  convention  provided  for  such  occupation  of 
Mexico  and  "such  other  operations"  as  should  be  necessary  or 
suitable  to  secure  these  objects. 

Payment  of  debts  might  be  secured  under  the  then  existing 
government  of  Mexico,  but  to  secure  the  other  object,  i.  e.,  the 
permanent  security  of  life  and  liberty,  these  new  allied  powers 
deemed  that  a  new  government  for  Mexico  was  necessary.  This 
meant  a  war  of  conquest  upon  that  country,  though  it  was  as- 
serted that  the  Mexicans  -themselves  might  determine  of  what 
form  their  new  government  should  be.  The  United  States  was 
invited  to  become  a  party  to  this  treaty — that  is,  after  the  terms 
of  the  treaty  had  been  arranged  and  its  execution  begun.  Secre- 
tary Seward  endeavored  to  remove  the  occasion  for  this  inter- 
ference by  offering  our  aid  to  Mexico  to  help  her  pay  her  debt. 
Mexico  consented  to  the  arrangement;  but  when  -Mr.  Seward 
gave  information  of  such  proposals  to  the  allied  Powers,  the 
propositions  for  a  peaceful  settlement  were  rejected  as  unsatis- 
factory. One  apology  for  their  proposed  intervention  could  now 
no  longer  be  urged  by  the  allies.  But  they  could  no  longer  be 
satisfied  by  the  payment  of  the  debts  due  them.  Their  bald 
proposition  now  was  that  they  would  make  war  on  Mexico  in 
order  to  change  her  form  of  government  upon  the  pretext  that 
foreign  residents  were  not  safe  in  that  country. 

The  motives  behind  the  movement  are  best  seen  from  the 
letter  of  the  French  emperor  ordering  the  French  commander  to 
march  upon  the  capital  of  Mexico:  "to  redress  grievances;  to 
establish  bounds  to  the  extension  of  the  United  States  further 
south,  to  prevent  her  from  becoming  the  sole  dispenser  of  the 
products  of  the  New  World."  The  allies  were  moving  for  power 


20  SELECTED  ARTICLES  ON 

and  commercial  influence,  though  the  French  emperor  disclaimed 
any  design  of  forcing  a  government  upon  Mexico.  But  there 
are  those  unreasonable  enough  to  remember  that  the  avowals 
made  to  the  world  are  not  always  those  which  reveal  the  real 
influences  behind  the  scenes  in  cabinet  councils.  The  sequel 
proves  the  suspicion. 

On  April  9,  1862,  at  another  conference  between  these  three 
Powers  (at  Orizaba)  England  and  Spain  objected  that  France  had 
gone  beyond  the  terms  of  the  first  convention  in  giving  military 
, aid  in  Mexico  to  the. party  favoring  an  imperial  government,  and 
these  two  Powers  therefore  withdrew  from  further  cooperation. 
Says  Mr.  Dana : 

But  France,  whose  pecuniary  claims  upon  Mexico  were  much  smaller 
than  those  of  the  other  powers,  and  more  questionable,  left  to  itself  in 
Mexico,  proceeded,  •  by  military  aid  to  the  Imperialist  party,  to  establish 
that  party  in  possession  of  the  capital,  and,  under  the  protection  of  the 
French  forces,  an  Assembly  of  Notables  was  called,  without  even  a  pre- 
tense of  a  general  vote  of  the  Mexican  people.  This  assembly  undertook 
to  establish  an  imperial  form  of  government,  and  to  offer  the  throne  to  the 
Archduke  Maximilian  of  Austria. 

The  French  emperor  acknowledged  this  government  and  en- 
tered into  a  treaty  to  give  it  support  and  security  by  military  aid. 

Now,  where,  during  all  this  time,  was  the  Monroe  Doctrine? 
Here  was  a  plain  case.  Here  was  a  clear,  undisputed  European 
"interposition  for  the  purpose  of  controlling  the  destiny"  of  an 
American  state.  If  the  Monroe  Doctrine  were  not  to  be  asserted 
in  such  a  flagrant  intervention  in  the  affairs  of  an  American 
state  it  is  not  to  be  doubted  that  it  could  never  again  have  been 
consistently  referred  'to  as  a  principle,  or  precedent,  in  our 
foreign  relations.  As  a  policy  the  Monroe  Doctrine  would  have 
fallen  into  a  state  of  "innocuous  desuetude."  It  is  important  to 
note  how  the  precedent  of  Monroe  and  Adams  was  followed  by 
Lincoln,  Seward,  and  Grant. 

On  April  4,  1864,  the  House  of  Representatives  passed  a  reso- 
lution by  unanimous  vote,  denouncing  the  French  intervention. 
Mr.  Seward,  our  secretary  of  state  for  foreign  affairs,  set  forth 
our  position  that  we  regarded  France  as  a  belligerent  in  Mexico. 
We  acknowledged  the  right  of  one  nation  to  make  war  upon  an- 
other for  international  objects,  and  that  one  belligerent  might 
secure  military  possession  of  the  soil  of  the  other,  if  she  could. 
And,  as  between  these  belligerents,  we  did  not  enter  into  the 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  21 

merits  of  the  controversy.     Mr.   Seward,   in  his  dispatch  to  the 
French  government  says: 

But  France  appears  to  us  to  be  lending  her  great  influence  to  destroy 
the  domestic  republican  government  of  Mexico,  and  to  establish  there  an 
imperial  system  under  the  sovereignty  of  a  European  prince.  This  is  the 
real  cause  of  our  national  discontent,  that  the  French  army  which  is  now 
in  Mexico  is  invading  a  domestic  republican  government  there,  for  the 
avowed  purpose  of  suppressing  it  and  establishing  upon  its  ruins  a  foreign 
monarchical  government,  whose  presence  there,  so  long  as  it  should  endure, 
could  not  but  be  regarded  by  the  people  of  the  United  States  as  injurious 
and  menacing  to  their  own  chosen  and  endeared  republican  institutions. 
We  have  constantly  maintained,  and  still  feel  bound  to  maintain  that  the 
people  in  every  state  on  the  American  continent  have  a  right  to  secure  for 
themselves  a  republican  government  if  they  choose,  and  that  interference 
by  foreign  states  to  prevent  the  enjoyment  of  such  institutions  deliberately 
established  is  wrongful,  and  in  its  effects  antagonistical  to  the  free  and 
popular  form  of  government  existing  in  the  United  States. 

This  is  a  very  fair  re-expression  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine. 
Certainly  the  circumstances  justified  this  reassertion.  .This  was 
at  the  close  of  the  Civil  War,  four  years  after  intervention  began 
— four  eventful  years  during  which  our  hands  were  pretty  well 
tied  against  foreign  controversy.  What  was  said  we  have  seen 
from  Seward ;  what  was  done  let  the  silent  soldier  tell.  Grant  in 
his  memoirs  says : 

England,  France,  and  Spain,  under  the  pretext  of  protecting  their 
citizens,  seized  upon  Mexico  as  a  foothold  for  establishing  a  European 
monarchy  upon  our  continent,  thus  threatening  our  peace  at  home.  I,  my- 
self, regarded  this  as  a  direct  act  of  war  against  the  United  States  by  the 
powers  engaged,  and  supposed,  as  a  matter  of  course,  that  the  United 
States  would  treat  it  as  such  where  their  hands  were  free  to  strike.  I  often 
spoke  of  the  matter  to  Mr.  Lincoln  and  the  secretary  of  war,  but  never 
heard  any  special  views  from  them  to  enable  me  to  judge  what  they  thought 
or  felt  about  it.  I  inferred  that  they  felt  a  good  deal  as  I  did,  but  were  un- 
willing to  commit  themselves  while  we  had  our  own  troubles  on  our  hands. 
All  of  the  powers  except  France  very  soon  withdrew  from  the  armed 
intervention  for  the  establishment  of  an  Austrian  prince  upon  the  throne  of 
Mexico;  but  the  governing  people  of  these  countries  continued  to  the  close 
of  the  war  to  throw  obstacles  in  our  way. 

After  the  surrender  of  Lee,  the'refore,  entertaining  the  opinion  here 
expressed,  I  sent  Sheridan  with  a  corps  to  the  Rio  Grande  to  have  him 
where  he  might  aid  Juarez  in  expelling  the  French  from  Mexico.  These 
troops  got  off  before  they  could  be  stopped  and  went  to  Rio  Grande,  where 
Sheridan  distributed  them  up  and  down  the  river,  much  to  the  consterna- 
tion of  the  troops  in  the  quarter  of  Mexico  bordering  on  that  stream. 
This  soon  led  to  the  request  from  France  that  we  should  withdraw  our 
troops  from  the  Rio  Grande  and  to  negotiations  for  the  withdrawal  of 


22  SELECTED  ARTICLES  ON 

theirs.'  Finally  Bazaine  was  withdrawn  from  Mexico  by  order  of  the 
French  government.  From  that  day  the  empire  began  to  totter.  Mexico 
was  then  able  to  maintain  her  independence  without  aid  from  us. 

This  theoretical  and  practical  reassertion  of  the  Monroe  Doc- 
trine bore  tangible  results,  and  it  indicated  a  policy  which  is 
unanimously  approved  by  the  American  people. 

Since  the  intervention  in  Mexico  there  have  been  several 
minor  incidents  which  have  given  rise  to  a  discussion  of  the 
Monroe  Doctrine.  Repeatedly,  in  the  public  discussions,  the 
doctrine  of  Monroe  has  been  misinterpreted  and  misapplied. 
Nicaragua  treats  Great  Britain  with  international  discourtesy  by 
the  expulsion  of  a  consul,  or  in  other  ways  inflicts  injuries. 
Great  Britain  demands  satisfaction  and  a  money  indemnity  and, 
upon  Nicaragua's  refusal  to  pay,  proceeds,  by  the  occupation  of  a 
Nicaraguan  port,  to  collect  forcibly  the  sum  demanded.  It  was 
asserted  by  some  that,  in  pursuance  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  the 
United  States  ought  to  interfere  in  behalf  of  Nicaragua.  Had  we 
used  the  Monroe  Doctrine  as  the  apology  for  interference  in  such 
a  quarrel,  it  would  have  been  equivalent  to  asserting  that  the 
great  precedent  of  Seward  and  Adams  had  committed  us  to  the 
folly  of  interfering  in  all  the  quarrels  of  other  American  states 
with  European  Powers  and  of  protecting  those  states  from  the 
just  consequences  of  their  insolence  and  misdeeds.  The  Monroe 
Doctrine  is  not  to  be  belittled  in  such  a  way. 

The  Monroe  Doctrine  did  not  commit  us  to  the  policy  of 
interfering  to  protect  our  American  neighbors  against  a  forcible 
territorial  aggression  by  a  European  Power.  No  student  of 
history  will  venture  to  say  that  it  did.  Whether  we  shall  inter- 
fere in  such  a  case  and  make  another's  quarrel  our  own  is  a 
matter  to  be  determined  by  public  policy  and  national  interests. 
The  precedent  of  Monroe  need  not  be  quoted,  or  relied  upon,  to 
justify  us.  Mr.  Calhoun,  in  opposing  President  Folk's  applica- 
tion of  the  doctrine  in  the  case  of  Yucatan,  in  1848,  denied  that 
the  doctrine  had  reference  to  transfers  of  sovereignty  in  territory 
by  coercion  or  agreement.  In  1856  Senator  Cass  made  the  same 
denial.  To-day  Secretary  Olney  holds  that  the  doctrine  applies 
in  a  case  of  territorial  transfer  by  coercion,  but  not  in  a  case  of 
transfer  by  agreement;  while  Senator  Lodge  and  others  would 
still  further  enlarge  the  doctrine  by  making  it  apply  to  cases  both 
of  coercion  and  agreement.  But  when  Calhoun  announced  the 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  23 

limitations  of  this  doctrine  within  what  he  well  knew  was  its 
original  scope,  he  had  no  wish  to  hamper  or  restrain  our  national 
activities.  Calhoun  spoke  like  a  statesman : 

In  disavowing  a  principle  which  will  compel  us  to  resist  every  case  of 
interposition  of  European  Powers  on  this  continent,  I  would  not  wish  to 
be  understood  as  defending  the  opposite,  that  we  should  never  resist  their 
interposition.  This  is  a  position  which  would  be  nearly  as  dangerous  and 
absurd  as  the  other.  But  no  general  rule  can  be  laid  down  to  guide  us 
on  such  a  question.  Every  case  must  speak  for  itself,  every  case  must  be 
decided  on  its  own  merits.  Whether  you  will  resist  or  not  and  the  measure 
of  your  -resistance — whether  it  shall  be  by  negotiation,  remonstrance,  or 
some  intermediate  measure,  or  by  a  resort  to  arms, — all  this  must  be  de- 
cided on  the  merits  of  the  question  itself. 

Calhoun  here  set  forth  the  truth  of  history,  and  he  voiced  the 
highest  and  truest  statesmanship  for  American  administrations 
in  dealing  with  this  question. 


National  Review.  40: 871-89.  February,   1903 

Monroe    Doctrine.     A.   T.    Mahan 

The  formulation  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  as  distinguished 
from  its  origin,  resulted,  as  is  universally  understood,  from  the 
political  conditions  caused  by  the  revolt  of  the  Spanish  colonies 
in  America.  Up  to  that  time,  and  for  centuries  previous,  the 
name  Spain  had  signified  to  Europe  in  general  not  merely  the 
mother  country,  but  a  huge  colonial  system,  with  its  special 
economical  and  commercial  regulation ;  the  latter  being  deter- 
mined through  its  colonial  relations,  upon  the  narrowest  con- 
struction of  colonial  policy  then  known,  which  was  saying  a  great 
deal.  Spain  stood  for  the  Spanish  Empire,  divisible  primarily 
into  two  chief  components,  Spain  and  Greater  Spain ;  the  mother 
country  and  the  colonies.  The  passage  of  time  had  been  grad- 
ually reversing  the  relative  importance  of  the  two  in  the 
apprehension  of  other  European  States.  In  Sir  Robert  Walpole's 
day  it  was  believed  by  many  besides  himself  that  Great  Britain 
could  not  make  head  against  France  and  Spain  combined.  The 
naval  power  of  Spain,  and  consequently  her  political  weight, 
still  received  awed  consideration  ;  a  relic  of  former  fears.  This 
continued,  though  in  a  diminished  degree,  through  the  War  of 
American  Independence;  but  by  the  end  of  the  century,  while 


24  SELECTED  ARTICLES  ON 

it  may  be  too  much  to  affirm  that  such  apprehension  had  wholly 
disappeared — that  no  account  was  taken  of  the  unwieldy  num- 
bers of  ill-manned  and  often  ill-officered  ships  that  made  up  the 
Spanish  navy — it  is  true  that  a  Spanish  war  bore  to  British  sea- 
men an  aspect  rather  commercial  than  military.  It  meant  much 
more  of  prize  money  than  of  danger ;  and  that  it  did  so  was  due 
principally  to  the  wealth  of  the  colonies. 

This  wealth  was  potential  as  well  as  actual,  and  in  both  aspects 
it  appealed  to  Europe.  To  break  in  upon  the  monopoly  enjoyed 
by  Spain,  and  consecrated  in  international  usage  both  by  accepted 
ideas  and  long  prescription,  was  an  object  of  policy  to  the  prin- 
cipal European  maritime  states.  It  was  so  conspicuously  to 
Great  Britain,  on  account  of  the  pre-eminence  which  commercial 
considerations  always  had  in  her  councils.  In  the  days  of  Wil- 
liam III.,  the  prospective  failure  of  the  Spanish  royal  house 
brought  up  the  question  of  what  other  family,  should  succeed, 
and  to  whom  should  be  transferred  the  great  inheritance  won 
by  Columbus,  Cortez,  and  Pizarro.  Thenceforth  the  thought  of 
dividing  this  spoil  of  a  decadent  empire — the  sick  man  of  that 
day — remained  in  men's  memory  as  a  possible  contingency  of  the 
future,  even  though  momentarily  out  of  the  range  of  practical 
politics.  The  waning  of  Spain's  political  and  military  prestige 
was  accompanied  by  an  increasing  understanding  of  the  value 
of  the  commercial  system  appended  to  her  in  her  colonies.  The 
future  disposition  of  these  extensive  regions,  and  the  fruition  of 
their  wealth,  developed  and  undeveloped,  were  conceived  as  ques- 
tions of  universal  European  policy.  In  the  general  apprehension 
of  European  rulers,  they  were  regarded  as  affecting  the  balance  of 
power. 

It  was  as  the  opponent  of  this  conception,  the  perfectly  natural 
outcome  of  previous  circumstances  and  history,  that  the  Monroe 
Doctrine  entered  the  field;  a  newcomer  in  form,  yet  having  its 
own  history  and  antecedent  conditions  as  really  as  the  conflicting 
European  view.  Far  more  than  South  America,  which  had  seen 
little  contested  occupation,  the  northern  continent  had  known 
what  it  was  to  be  the  scene  of  antagonistic  European  ambitions 
and  exploitation.  There  had  been  within  her  territory  a  balance 
of  power,  in  idea,  if  not  in  achievement,  quite  as  real  as  any  that 
had  existed  or  been  fought  for  in  Europe.  Canada  in  the  hands 
of  France,  and  the  mouth  of  the  Mississippi  in  alien  control,  were 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  25 

matters  of  personal  memory  to  many,  and  of  very  recent  tra- 
dition to  all  Americans  in  active  life  in  1810.  Florida  then  was 
still  Spanish,  with  unsettled  boundary  questions  and  attendant 
evils.  Not  reason  only,  but  feeling,  based  upon  experience  of 
actual  inconvenience,  suffering  and  loss — loss  of  life  and  loss 
of  wealth,  political  anxiety  and  commercial  disturbance — con- 
spired to  intensify  opposition  to  any  avoidable  renewal  of  similar 
conditions.  To  quote  the  words  of  a  distinguished  American 
Secretary  of  State — for  Foreign  Affairs — speaking  twenty  years 
ago,  "This  sentiment  is  properly  called  a  Doctrine,  for  it  has  no 
prescribed  sanction,  and  its  assertion  is  left  to  the  exigency  which 
may  invoke  it."  This  accurate  statement  places  it  upon  the 
surest  political  foundation,  much  firmer  than  precise  legal  enact- 
ment or  international  convention,  that  of  popular  conviction. 
The  sentiment  had  existed  beforehand;  the  first  exigency  which 
invoked  its  formulated  expression  in  1823  was  the  announced 
intention  of  several  great  Powers  to  perpetuate  by  force  the 
European  system,  whether  of  colonial  tenure,  or  balance  of  power, 
or  monarchial  forms,  in  the  Spanish  colonies;  they  being  then 
actually  in  revolt  against  the  mother  country,  and  seeking,  not 
other  political  relations  to  Europe,  but  simply  their  own  inde- 
pendence. 

This  political  question  of  independence,  however,  involved 
also  necessarily  that  of  commercial  relations;  and  both  were 
interesting  to  outside  States.  So  far  as  then  appeared,  renewed 
dependence  meant  the  perpetuation  of  commercial  exclusion 
against  foreign  states.  This  characterised  all  colonial  regulation 
at  that  time,  and  continued  in  Spanish  practice  in  Cuba  and  other 
dependencies  until  the  final  downfall  of  her  diminished  empire 
in  1898.  It  must  be  recognised,  therefore,  that  all  outside  parties 
to  the  controversy,  all  parties  other  than  Spain  and  her  colonies, 
which  had  special  incitements  of  their  own,  were  influenced  by 
two  classes  of  motives,  political  and  commercial.  These  are 
logically  separable,  although  in  practice  intertwined.  That  of 
the  Continental  Powers — Austria,  Prussia,  and  Russia,  with  the 
subsequent  accession  of  France — was  primarily  political.  Their 
object  was  to  perpetuate  in  South  America  political  conditions 
connected  with  the  European  system,  by  breaking  down  popular 
revolt  against  absolutist  government,  and  maintaining  the  con- 
dition of  dependence  upon  Spain.  Whither  this  might  lead  in  case 


26  SELECTED  ARTICLES  ON 

of  armed  intervention,  which  was  contemplated,  was  a  question 
probably  of  the  division  of  spoil ;  for  in  the  end  Spain  could 
hardly  pay  the  bill  otherwise  than  by  colonial  cessions.  But 
whether  the  movement  of  the  Holy  Alliance,  as  it  was  self-styled, 
issued  merely  in  the  suppression  of  popular  liberties,  or  intro- 
duced further  a  European  balance  of  power  with  its  rivalries  and 
conflicts,  its  war  and  rumours  of  wars,  both  results  were  politi- 
cally abhorrent  to  American  feelings  and  disturbing  to  American 
peace.  They  gave  rise  to  distinctly  political  objections  by  the 
people  and  statesmen  of  the  United  States.  From  these  senti- 
ments the  exigency  evoked  the  first  reasoned  official  expression 
of  the  national  conviction  and  purpose,  which  we  now  know  as 
the  Monroe  Doctrine.  Subsidiary  to  this  political  motive,  but 
clearly  recognised  and  avowed,  was  the  legitimate  inducement  of 
commercial  interest,  benefited  by  the  rejection  of  European  rule, 
and  to  be  injured  by  its  restoration. 

It  will  not  be  expected  that  a  British  Tory  administration, 
before  the  Reform  Bill  of  1832  and  with  the  protective  system 
and  Navigation  Act  in  full  force,  should  have  shared  the  particu- 
lar political  prepossessions  of  the  American  states,  geographically 
closely  concerned,  lately  themselves  colonies,  and  but  very 
recently  emerged  from  a  prolonged  conflict  with  British  com- 
mercial regulations  based  upon  the  ancient  conception  of  colonial 
administration.  But  Great  Britain,  in  addition  to  commercial 
ambitions  and  interests  greater  then  than  those  of  the  United 
States,  and  the  outcome  of  a  century  of  effort  against  the  Spanish 
monopoly,  did  have  also  a  distinct  political  leaning  in  the  matter. 
There  ran  through  both  political  parties  a  real  and  deep  sympathy 
with  communities  struggling  for  freedom.  The  iniquity  of  sup- 
pressing such  efforts  by  external  force  of  third  parties,  not  imme- 
diately concerned,  was  strongly  felt.  There  was  accepted  also 
among  British  statesmen  a  clearly  defined  rule  of  conduct,  which 
had  been  conspicuously  illustrated  in  the  early  days  of  the  French 
Revolution,  still  a  matter  of  recent  memory  in  1820,  that  inter- 
ference in  the  intestine  struggles  of  a  foreign  country,  such  as 
those  then  afflicting  both  the  Spanish  kingdom  and  colonies,  was 
neither  right  in  principle  nor  expedient  in  policy. 

Basing  its  action  firmly  on  these  convictions,  the  British 
Ministry,  under  the  influence  of  Canning,  intimated  clearly  that, 
while  neutral  towards  the  intervention  of  the  Holy  Alliance  in 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  27 

Spain  itself,  to  restore  there  the  old  order  of  things,  it  would  not 
permit  the  transport  of  armies  to  South  America  for  a  like  pur- 
pose. The  course  of  the  Alliance  in  Spain  was  viewed  with  dis- 
approval, but  it  did  not  immediately  concern  Great  Britain  to  an 
extent  demanding  armed  resistance.  The  case  of  the  colonies 
was  different.  Intervention  there  would  be  prejudicial  to  British 
mercantile  enterprise,  already  heavily  engaged  in  their  trade  and 
economical  development;  while,  politically,  the  occupation  of  the 
Peninsula  by  French  armies  would  be  offset  by  the  detachment 
of  the  colonies  from  their  previous  dependence.  To  the  effect  of 
this  British  attitude  the  position  of  the  United  States  Govern- 
ment, defined  by  President  Monroe  in  his  Message  of  December, 
1823,  constituted  a  powerful  support,  and  the  news  of  it  evoked 
general  satisfaction  in  England.  However  motived,  without  for- 
mal concert,  still  less  in  alliance,  the  two  English-speaking  coun- 
tries occupied  the  same  ground  and  announced  the  same  purpose. 
Spain  might  conquer  her  colonies  unaided,  if  she  could;  neither 
would  interfere;  but  the  attempt  of  other  Powers  to  give  her 
armed  assistance  would  be  regarded  by  each  as  unfriendly  to 
itself. 

From  this  momentary  community  of  position  exaggerated 
inferences  have  been  drawn  as  to  the  identity  of  impulses  which 
had  brought  either  State  to  it.  It  was  a  case  of  two  paths  con- 
verging; not  thenceforth  to  unite,  but  to  cross,  and  continue 
each  in  its  former  general  direction,  diverging  rather  than  ap- 
proximating. Though  crumbling  before  the  rising  stream  of  prog- 
ress, the  ideas  appropriate  to  the  eighteenth  century  had  not  yet 
wholly  disappeared  from  British  conceptions ;  still  less  had  the 
practice  and  policy  of  the  State  conformed  themselves  to  the 
changed  point  of  view  which,  in  the  middle  of  the  nineteenth  cen- 
tury, began  to  characterize  British  statesmanship  with  reference  to 
colonies.  The  battles  of  reformed  political  representation  and 
of  free  trade  were  yet  to  fight  and  win;  old  opinions  continued 
as  to  the  commercial  relationship  of  colonies  to  the  mother 
country,  although  modification  in  details  was  being  intro<Juced. 
The  West  Indies  were  still  the  most  important  group  in  the 
British  colonial  system,  and  one  of  the  latest  acts  of  Canning, 
who  died  in  1827,  was  to  renew  there  commercial  discrimination 
against  the  United  States;  a  measure  which,  however  prompted, 
could  scarcely  be  said  to  reflect  the  image  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine. 


28  SELECTED  ARTICLES  ON 

For  a  generation  then  to  come,  British  statesmen  remained 
under  the  domination  of  habits  of  thought  which  had  governed 
the  course  of  the  two  Pitts;  and  they  failed,  as  men  usually  fail, 
to  discern  betimes  changes  of  condition  which  modify,  if  not  the 
essentials,  at  least  the  application  even  of  a  policy  sound*  in 
general  principle.  In  1823,  not  ten  years  had  elapsed  since  the 
British  Government  had  contemplated  exacting  from  the  United 
States,  as  the  result  of  our  prostration  at  the  close  of  the  war  of 
1812,  territorial  cessions  and  concessions  which  might  make  an 
American  of  to-day,  ignorant  of  the  extremes  to  which  his  coun- 
try was  then  reduced,  gasp  with  amazement.  How  then  could  it 
be  that  Great  Britain,  which  for  centuries  had  been  acquiring 
territory,  and  to  whom  the  Americas  were  still  the  most  immedi- 
ate commercial  interest,  should  heartily  accept  the  full  scope  of 
the  Monroe  Doctrine,  as  applicable  to  the  extension  of  her  own 
dominion,  by  conquest  or  otherwise,  to  any  part  of  the  American 
continents  where  she  did  not  at  that  moment  have  clear  title? 
As  a  matter  of  fact  she  did  not  in  any  wise  accept  this.  The 
American  declaration  against  "the  extension  of  the  system  of  the 
allied  Powers  to  any  portion  of  this  hemisphere"  was  welcomed 
as  supporting  the  attitude  of  Great  Britain;  for  the  phrase,  in 
itself  ambiguous,  was  understood  to  apply  not  to  the  quintuple 
alliance  for  the  preservation  of  existing  territorial  arrangements 
in  Europe,  to  which  Great  Britain  was  a  party,  but  to  the  Holy 
Alliance,  the  avowed  purpose  of  which  was  to  suppress  by  exter- 
nal force  revolutionary  movements  within  any  state — a  course 
into  which  she  had  refused  to  be  drawn.  But  the  complementary 
declaration  in  the  President's  Message,  that  "the  American  conti- 
nents are  henceforth  not  to  be  considered  as  subjects  for  future 
colonisation  by  any  European  Power,"  was  characterised  in  the 
"Annual  Register"  for  1823  as  "scarcely  less  extravagant  than  that 
of  the  Russian  ukase  by  which  it  was  elicited,"  and  which  forbade 
any  foreign  vessel  from  approaching  within  a  hundred  miles  of  the 
Russian  possession  now  known  as  Alaska.  The  British  Govern- 
ment took  the  same  view ;  and  in  the  protocol  to  a  Conference 
held  in  1827  expressly  repudiated  this  American  claim. 

There  was  therefore  between  the  two  countries  at  this  moment 
a  clear  opposition  of  principle,  and  agreement  only  as  to  a  par- 
ticular line  of  conduct  in  a  special  case.  With  regard  to  the 
interventions  of  the  Holy  Alliance  in  Europe,  Great  Britain, 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  •  29 

while  reserving  her  independence  of  action,  stood  neutral  for  the 
time;  but  from  motives  of  her  own  policy  showed  unmistakably 
that  she  would  resist  like  action  in  Spanish  America.  The  United 
States,  impelled  by  an  entirely  different  conception  of  national 
policy,  now  first  officially  enunciated,  intimated  in  diplomatic 
phrase  a  similar  disposition.  The  two  supported  one  another  in 
the  particular  contingency,  and  doubtless  frustrated  whatever 
intention  any  members  of  the  Holy  Alliance  may  have  enter- 
tained of  projecting  to  the  other  side  of  the  Atlantic  their  "union 
for  the  government  of  the  world."  In  America,  as  in  Europe, 
Great  Britain  deprecated  the  intrusion  of  external  force  to  settle 
internal  convulsions  of  foreign  countries ;  but  she  did  not  commit 
herself,  as  the  United  States  did,  to  the  position  that  purchase 
or  war  should  never  entail  a  cession  of  territory  by  an  American 
to  a  European  State;  a  transaction  which  would  be  in  so  far 
colonisation.  In  resisting  any  transfer  of  Spanish  American 
territory  to  a  European  Power,  Great  Britain  was  not  advancing 
a  general  principle,  but  maintaining  an  immediate  interest. 
Her  motive,  in  short  had  nothing  in  common  with  the  Monroe 
Doctrine.  Such  principles  as  were  involved  had  been  formu- 
lated long  before,  and  had  controlled  her  action  in  Europe  as  in 
America. 

The  United  States  dogma,  on  the  contrary,  planted  itself 
squarely  on  the  separate  system  and  interests  of  America.  This 
is  distinctly  shown  by  the  comments  of  the  Secretary  of  State, 
John  Quincy  Adams,  in  a  despatch  to  the  American  Minister  in 
London,  dated  only  two  days  before  Monroe's  Message.  Alluding 
to  Canning's  most  decisive  phrase  in  a  recent  despatch: 

Great  Britain  could  not  see  any  part  of  the  colonies  transferred  to  any 
other  Power  with  indifference  [he  wrote].  We  certainly  do  concur  with 
her  in  this  position-;  but  the  principles  of  that  aversion,  so  far  as  they  are 
common  to  both  parties,  resting  only  upon  a  casual  coincidence  of  interests, 
in  a  national  point  of  view  selfish  *  on  both  sides,  would  be  liable  to  disso- 
lution by  every  change  of  phase  in  the  aspects  of  European  politics. 
So  that  Great  Britain,  negotiating  at  once  with  the  European  Alliance  and 
with  us  concerning  America,  without  being  bound  by  any  permanent  com- 
munity of  principle,  would  still  be  free  to  accommodate  her  policy  to  any 
of  those  distributions  of  power,  and  partitions  of  territory,  which  for  the 
last  half-century  have  been  the  ultima  ratio  of  all  European  political 
arrangements. 

*  Adams's  italics. 


30  SELECTED  ARTICLES  ON 

For  this  reason  Adams  considered  the  recognition  of  the  inde- 
pendence of  the  revolted  colonies,  already  made  by  the  United 
States,  in  March  1822,  moist  be  given  by  Great  Britain  also,  in 
order  to  place  the  two  states  on  equal  terms  of  co-operation. 
From  motives  of  European  policy,  from  which  Great  Britain 
could  not  dissociate  herself,  she  delayed  this  recognition  until 
1825;  and  then  Mr.  Canning  denned  his  general  course  towards 
the  Spanish  colonies  in  the  famous  words,  "I  called  the  New 
World  into  existence  to  redress  the  balance  of  the  Old.  I  re- 
solved that,  if  France  had  Spain,  it  should  not  be  Spain  with  the 
Indies."  His  coincidence  with  the  policy  of  the  United  States  is 
thus  seen  to  be  based,  and  properly,  upon  British  interests  as 
involved  in  the  European  system ;  but  that,  so  far  from  being  the 
Monroe  Doctrine,  is  almost  the  converse  of  it. 

Nor  was  it  only  in  direction  that  the  impulses  of  the  two 
states  differed.  They  were  unequal  in  inherent  vital  strength. 
The  motive  force  of  the  one  was  bound  to  accumulate,  and  that  of 
the  other  to  relax,  by  the  operation  of  purely  natural  conditions. 
An  old  order  was  beginning  to  yield  to  a  new.  After  three  cen- 
turies of  tutelage  America  was  slipping  out  of  European  control. 
She  was  reaching  her  majority  and  claiming  her  own.  Within 
her  sphere  she  felt  the  future  to  be  hers.  Of  this  sense  the 
Monroe  Doctrine  was  an  utterance.  It  was  a  declaration  of  inde- 
pendence; not  for  a  single  nation  only,  but  for  a  continent  of 
nations,  and  it  carried  implicitly  the  assertion  of  all  that  logically 
follows  from  such  independence.  Foremost  among  the  condi- 
tions ensuring  its  vitality  was  propinquity,  with  its  close  effect 
upon  interest.  Policy,  as  well  as  war,  is  a  business  of  positions. 
This  maxim  is  perennial ;  a  generation  later  it  was  emphasized  in 
application,  but  not  originated,  by  the  peopling  of  the  Pacific 
coast,  the  incidental  discovery  of  gold  in  California,  and  the 
consequent  enhanced  importance  of  the  Isthmus  of  Panama  to 
the  political  strategy  of  nations.  All  this  advanced  the  Monroe 
Doctrine  on  the  path  of  development,  giving  broader  sweep  to  the 
corollaries  involved  in  the  original  proposition;  but  the  tran- 
scendent positional  interest  of  the  United  States  no  more  needed 
demonstration  in  1823  than  in  1850,  when  the  Clayton-Bulwer 
Treaty  was  made,  or  than  now,  when  not  the  Pacific  coast  only, 
but  the  Pacific  Ocean  and  the  farther  East,  lend  increased  conse- 
quence to  the  isthmian  communications. 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  31 

The  case  of  the  United  States  is  now  stronger,  but  it  is  not 
clearer.  Correlatively,  the  admission  of  its  force  by  others  has 
been  progressive;  gradual  and  practical,  not  at  once  or  formal. 
Its  formulation  in  the  Monroe  Doctrine  has  not  obtained  the  full 
legislative  sanction  even  of  the  country  of  its  origin ;  and  its 
present  development  there  rests  upon  successive  utterances  of 
persons  officially  competent  to  define,  but  not  of  full  authority 
to  commit  the  nation  to  their  particular  expressions.  So,  too, 
international  acquiescence  in  the  position  now  taken  has  been  a 
work  of  time,  nor  can  there  be  asserted  for  it  the  final  ratification 
of  international  agreement.  The  Monroe  Doctrine  remains  a 
policy,  not  a  law,  either  municipal  or  international ;  but  it  has 
advanced  in  scope  and  in  acceptance.  The  one  progress  as  the 
other  has  been  the  result  of  growing  strength ;  strength  of  num- 
bers and  of  resources.  Taken  with  position,  these  factors  consti- 
tute national  power  as  they  do  military  advantage,  which  in  the 
last  analysis  may  always  be  resolved  into  two  elements,  force 
and  position. 

In  the  conjunction  of  these  two  factors  is  to  be  found  the  birth 
of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  and  its  development  up  to  the  present 
time.  It  is  a  product  of  national  interest,  involved  in  position, 
and  of  national  power  dependent  upon  population  and  resources. 
These  are  the  permanent  factors  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine;  and  it 
cannot  be  too  strongly  realised  by  Americans  that  the  permanence 
of  the  Doctrine  itself,  as  a  matter  of  international  consideration, 
depends  upon  the  maintenance  of  both  factors.  To  this  serious 
truth  record  is  borne  by  History,  the  potent  mother  of  national 
warning  and  national  encouragement.  That  the  Doctrine  at  its 
first  enunciation  should  not  at  once  have  obtained  either^  assent 
or  influence,  even  in  its  most  limited  expression,  was  entirely 
natural.  Although  not  without  an  antecedent  history  of  con- 
ception and  occasional  utterance  by  American  statesmen,  its 
moment  of  birth  was  the  announcement  by  Monroe;  and  it  had 
then  all  the  weakness  of  the  newborn,  consequent  upon  a  national 
inadequacy  to  the  display  of  organised  strength  which  had  been 
pathetically  manifested  but  ten  years  before.  After  the  destruc- 
tion of  the  rule  of  Spain  in  her  colonies,  except  in  Cuba  and 
Porto  Rico,  Great  Britain  remained  the  one  great  nation  besides 
the  United  States  possessed  of  extensive  territory  in  America. 
She  also  was  the  one  State  that  had  had  experience  of  us  as  an 


32  SELECTED  ARTICLES  ON 

enemy,  and  known  the  weakness  of  our  military  system  for 
offensive  action.  What  more  natural  than  that  she  should  have 
welcomed  the  first  promulgation  of  the  Doctrine,  in  its  original 
scope  directed  apparently  merely  against  a  combination  of  Con- 
tinental Powers,  the  purposes  of  which  were  offensive  to  herself, 
and  yet  fail  to  heed  a  root  principle  which  in  progress  of  time 
should  find  its  application  to  herself,  contesting  the  expansion  of 
her  own  influence  in  the  hemisphere,  as  being  part  of  the  Euro- 
pean system  and  therefore  falling  under  the  same  condemna- 
tion? Yet  even  had  she  seen  this,  and  fully  appreciated  the 
promise  of  strength  to  come,  it  was  to  be  expected  that  she  should 
for  the  meantime  pursue  her  own  policy,  irrespective  of  the  still 
distant  future.  It  may  be  advantageous  to  retard  that  which  must 
ultimately  prevail;  and  at  all  events  men  who  head  the  move- 
ments of  nations  are  not  able  at  once  to  abandon  the  traditions 
of  the  past,  and  conform  their  action  to  new  ideas  as  yet  un- 
assimilated  by  their  people. 

There  is  then  this  distinguishing  feature  of  the  Monroe  Doc- 
trine, which  classifies  it  among  principles  of  policy  which  are 
essentially  permanent.  From  its  correspondence  to  the  nature 
of  things,  to  its  environment,  it  possessed  from  the  first  a  vital- 
ity which  ensured  growth  and  development.  Under  such  con- 
ditions it  could  not  remain  in  application  at  the  end  of  a  half- 
century  just  what  it  had  been  in  terms  at  the  beginning.  Appre- 
hended in  leading  features  by  American  statesmen,  and  by  them 
embraced  with  a  conviction  which  the  people  shared — though 
probably  not  fully  understanding — it  received  from  time  to  time, 
as  successive  exigencies  arose  to  invoke  assertion,  definitions 
which,  enlarged  its  scope ;  sometimes  consistently  with  its  true 
spirit,  sometimes  apparently  in  excess  of  evident  limitations, 
more  rarely  in  defect  of  them.  But  from  the  fact  of  Great  Brit- 
ain's existing  territorial  possessions  in  America,  and  from  her 
commercial  pre-eminence  and  ambitions,  to  which  territorial  ac- 
quisition is  often  desirable,  it  was  also  in  the  nature  of  things 
that  with  her  successive  contentions  should  arise.  If  not  a  bal- 
ance of  power,  such  as  had  distracted  Europe,  at  least  opposing 
scales  existed  from  the  first ;  connected,  not  perhaps  with  the 
European  system  as  a  whole,  but  certainly  with  a  most  important 
component  of  that  system.  Moreover,  the  strength  of  Great 
Britain  in  America,  relatively  to  the  United  States,  was  not 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  33 

American  strength,  but  European  strength.  It  was  therefore 
unavoidably  invidious  to  the  sentiment  breathed  in  the  Monroe 
Doctrine,  and  much  more  so  when  the  United  States  was  weak 
than  when  she  became  strong. 

From  these  circumstances,  it  has  been  through  discussion  with 
Great  Britain  chiefly  that  the  Doctrine,  marking  the  advance  of 
the  sentiment,  has  progressed  from  definition  to  definition,  no 
one  of  which  is  final  in  an  authoritative  sense,  because  in  no  case 
clothed  with  full  legislative  sanction;  but  possessing,  neverthe- 
less, the  weight  which  attaches  to  the  utterances  of  those  who 
both  by  personal  ability  and  official  position  are  recognised  as 
competent  interpreters.  Such  enunciations,  ex  cathedra,  have  the 
force  of  judicial  decisions,  accepted  as  precedents  to  a  degree 
dependent  upon  the  particular  person,  or  upon  subsequent  general 
acceptance.  Not  in  every  case  have  the  positions  of  American 
administrations  in  this  matter  been  endorsed  by  their  successors 
or  the  public. 

It  is  vain,  therefore,  to  argue  narrowly  concerning  what  the 
Monroe  Doctrine  is,  from  the  precise  application  made  of  it  to 
any  one  particular  emergency.  Nor  can  there  be  finality  of  defi- 
nition, antecedent  to  some  national  announcement,  formally  com- 
plete, which  it  is  to  be  hoped  will  never  be  framed;  but  which, 
if  it  were,  would  doubtless  remain  liable  to  contrary  interpreta- 
tions, sharing  therein  a  fate  from  which  neither  the  enactments 
of  legislatures  nor  the  Bull  of  a  Pope  can  claim  exemption.  The 
virtue  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  without  which  it  would  die 
deservedly,  is  that,  through  its  correspondence  with  the  national 
necessities  of  the  United  States,  it  possesses  an  inherent  principle 
of  life,  which  adapts  itself  with  the  flexibility  of  a  growing  plant 
to  the  successive  conditions  it  encounters.  One  of  these  conditions 
of  course  is  the  growing  strength  of  the  nation  itself.  As  Doctor 
Johnson  ungraciously  said  of  taxing  Americans  for  the  first  time, 
"We  do  not  put  a  calf  to  the  plough,  we  wait  till  he  is  an  ox." 
The  Monroe  Doctrine,  without  breach  of  its  spirit,  can  be  made  to 
bear  a  burden  to  which  the  nation  a  hundred  years  ago  was 
unequal;  but  also,  as  our  present  Chief  Magistrate  has  wisely 
warned  us,  if  we  now  propose  to  assume  a  load  we  must  see  to 
it  that  the  national  strength  is  organised  to  endure  it.  That  also 
is  a  matter  of  national  policy,  quite  as  important  as  the  Doctrine 
itself, 


34  SELECTED  ARTICLES  ON 

For  these  reasons  it  is  more  instructive,  as  to  the  present  and 
future  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  to  consider  its  development  by 
successive  exhibitions  in  the  past  than  to  strive  to  cage  its  free 
spirit  within  the  bars  of  a  definition  attempted  at  any  one  mo- 
ment Such  an  attempt  the  present  writer  certainly  will  not  make. 
The  international  force  of  the  proposition  lies  in  its  evolution, 
substantially  consistent,  broadening  down  from  precedent  to 
precedent;  not  in  an  alleged  finality. 

The  aversion  manifested  by  the  Government  of  the  War  of 
Independence  towards  any  attempted  restoration  of  French 
dominion  in  Canada,  may  be  justly  considered  a  premonition  of 
the  Monroe  Doctrine,  anticipatory  of  the  ground  taken  by  both 
Monroe  and  Canning  against  a  transfer  of  Spanish  colonies  to 
any  other  European  Power.  At  'the  earlier  period  no  remon- 
strance was  raised  against  such  transfers  of  West  India  Islands, 
which  occurred  frequently  during  both  that  war  and  those  of  the 
French  Revolution  and  Napoleonic  period.  The  cession  of  Louisi- 
ana by  Spain  to  France,  in  1801,  excited  the  keenest  suscepti- 
bilities. How  far  resistance  might  have  been  carried  it  is  boot- 
less to  surmise ;  the  inoperativeness  of  the  transaction  did  not 
permit  the  full  consequences  to  develop.  Objection,  however 
appears  to  have  turned  upon  the  more  immediate  and  special 
motive  of  the  substitution  of  a  strong  power  for  a  weak  one,  in 
control  of  an  artery  of  trade  essential  to  our  people,  than  upon 
the  formulated  dogma  that  American  territory  was  not  matter 
for  political  exchange  between  European  States.  Moreover,  it 
needed  no  broad  maxim,  wide-reaching  in  application,  to  arouse 
popular  feeling,  and  guide  national  action,  in  a  matter  of  such 
close  and  evident  importance.  Repulsion  was  a  matter  of  instinct, 
of  feeling,  which  did  not  need  to  give  account  of  itself  to  reason. 
The  Louisiana  question  laid  its  hand  at  once  upon  the  heart  of 
the  nation.  It  concerned  the  country,  not  the  hemisphere;  and 
in  essential  principle  did  not  lead  out  beyond  itself,  pointing  the 
way  to  further  action.  It  had  finality. 

The  real  stepping-stone  by  which  national  interest  advanced 
to  hemispheric  considerations  was  Cuba.  From  every  circum- 
stance this  island  was  eminently  fitted  to  point  the  way  of  the 
future;  to  be  the  medium,  and  to  mark  the  transition,  from  a 
strictly  continental  policy  to  one  that  embraced  the  hemisphere. 
It  possessed  in  a  very  high  degree  the  elements  of  power,  from 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  35 

its  position,  size,  and  resources,  which  involved  immense  possi- 
bility for  development  of  strength.  Its  intrinsic  value  was  there- 
fore very  great;  but  further,  while  it  had  relations  to  our  con- 
tinental territory  only  less  important  than  the  lower  course  of 
the  Mississippi,  it  nevertheless  did  not  belong  to  the  Continent, 
to  which  the  Jeffersonian  school  of  thought,  in  power  from  1801 
to  1825,  would  strictly  confine  national  expansion.  The  point 
where  a  powerful  navy  would  be  needed  to  maintain  the  integrity 
of  the  national  possessions  marked  the  limit  of  advance  in  the 
theory  of  Jefferson.  Nevertheless,  to  him  also,  minimising  possi- 
bly the  need  of  a  fleet  to  ensure  access  over  so  narrow  a  strip 
of  sea,  "the  addition  of  Cuba  to  our  Confederacy  is  certainly 
exactly  what  is  wanted  to  round  our  power  as  a  nation  to  the 
point  of  its  utmost  interest."  To  prevent  its  falling  as  yet  into 
the  hands  of  any  other  European  Power,  he  expressed  to  Monroe 
in  1823  his  approval  of  entering  with  Great  Britain  into  a  joint 
guarantee  to  preserve  the  island  to  Spain ;  for  this,  he  argued, 
would  bind  the  most  dangerous  and  most  suspected  Power.  On 
subsequent  information,  however,  that  Great  Britain  had  stated 
positively  she  would  not  acquire  for  herself  any  Spanish  colony 
under  the  present  distress  of  Spain,  he  retracted  this  opinion; 
for  why,  said  he,  by  engaging  in  joint  guarantee,  concede  to  her 
an  interest  which  she  does  not  otherwise  possess?  Before  this, 
however,  Great  Britain  had  offered  to  assure  the  island  by  her 
own  sole  action,  on  condition  of  Spain  acknowledging  the  inde- 
pendence of  her  Continental  colonies;  thus  constituting  for  her- 
self the  interest  from  which  Jefferson  would  have  debarred  the 
consent  of  the  United  States. 

To  such  a  point  anxiety  for  American  ends,  and  consciousness 
of  American  lack  of  organised  strength,  would  then  carry  a 
practical  statesman  of  keen  American  instincts.  To  join  with  a 
European  State  in  guaranteeing  an  American  interest  was  not 
yet  an  anachronism.  A  like  anxiety  and  a  like  consciousness  were 
responsible  for  the  Clayton-Bulwer  Treaty,  which  proved  so  fer- 
tile a  source  of  diplomatic  contention  and  national  ill-will  in 
later  days.  Monroe's  Secretary  of  State,  John  Quincy  Adams, 
the  contemporary  and  survivor  of  Jefferson,  had  clearer  views 
and  stronger  purpose.  Recognising  in  Cuba  an  importance  to 
the  United  States  scarcely  inferior  to  any  part  of  the  then  exist- 
ing Union,  he  held  that  there  were  still  numerous  and  formidable 


36  SELECTED  ARTICLES  ON 

objections  to  territorial  dominion  beyond  sea.  The  aim  of  his 
policy  therefore  was  that  Spain  should  retain  Cuba;  but  when 
he  succeeded  Monroe  in  the  Presidency  in  1825,  having  received 
the  suggestion  of  a  joint  guarantee  by  Great  Britain,  France,  and 
the  United  States,  upon  condition  of  Spain  acknowledging  the 
independence  of  the  Spanish-speaking  Continent,  he  replied 
merely  that  the  matter  would  be  held  under  advisement,  and  fol- 
lowed this  in  1826  by  an  express  refusal :  "We  can  enter  into  no 
stipulations  by  treaty  to  guarantee  the  islands."  At  the  same 
time  it  was  clearly  stated  that  "the  United  States  would  not  con- 
sent to  the  occupation  of  Cuba  and  Porto  Rico  by  any  other 
European  Power  than  Spain,  under  any  contingency  whatever." 
Persistence  and  advance  on  this  line  are  indicated  by  the  words 
of  Webster,  when  Secretary  of  State  in  1843.  "The  Spanish 
Government  has  been  repeatedly  told  that  the  United  States 
would  never  permit  the  occupation  of  Cuba  by  British  agents  or 
forces  upon  any  pretext ;  and  that,  in  the  event  of  any  attempt  to 
wrest  it  from  her,  she  might  rely  upon  the  whole  military  and 
naval  resources  of  the  nation  to  aid  in  preserving  or  recovering 
it."  In  1851  a  farther  advance  in  definition  is  marked.  An  inti- 
mation was  received  that  Great  Britain  and  France  would  give 
orders  to  their  squadrons  in  the  West  Indies  to  protect  the  coasts 
of  Cuba  from  filibustering  expeditions,  fitted  out  in  the  United 
States.  Such  an  action,  it  was  replied,  "could  not  but  be  regarded 
by  the  United  States  with  grave  disapproval,  as  involving  on  the 
part  of  European  sovereigns  combined  action  of.  protectorship 
over  American  waters." 

By  this  time  the  discovery  of  gold  in  California,  and  the  de- 
veloping interest  of  the  Pacific,  had  constituted  the  isthmus  a 
second  stepping-stone,  as  Cuba  had  been  the  first,  leading  the 
United  States  to  recognise  an  external  territorial  interest ;  not 
indeed  extra-continental,  but  much  more  severed  from  her  ap- 
proach by  natural  and  military  obstacles  than  ever  Cuba  could  be. 
The  Clayton-Bulwer  Treaty,  framed  in  1850,  was  the  outward 
sign  of  a  far-reaching  interest  that  stretched  from  the  isthmus  to 
all  the  Caribbean  regions  through  which  lay  the  road  to  it.  Of 
this  an  indication  was  given  by  a  renewed  proposal,  made  in  con- 
cert by  Great  Britain  and  France,  that  they  with  the  United 
States  should  enter  into  a  joint  disclaimer  of  all  intent,  now  or 
hereafter,  to  obtain  possession  of  Cuba.  The  reply  to  this,  given 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  37 

in  December  1852,  was  that  to  enter  into  such  a  compact  "would 
be  inconsistent  with  the  principles,  the  tradition,  and  the  policy 
of  the  United  States."  The  proposition  involved  in  fact  an 
alliance,  similar  in  principle  to  that  by  which  the  Great  Powers 
of  Europe  guaranteed  the  settlement  of  Vienna;  and  its  being 
made  implied  a  sense  of  a  balance  of  power  and  interests  in  the 
American  hemisphere  in  which  European  Governments  would 
form  a  preponderant  constituent.  The  administration  of  that  day 
had  no  desire  to  get  Cuba,  for  it  apprehended  from  it  serious  peril 
to  the  Union  of  the  States,  which  had  just  passed  with  difficulty 
through  one  of  those  crises  that  presaged  the  great  war  of  1861 
to  1865.  In  1853  the  opposite  party  came  into  power,  identified 
with  the  policy  of  strengthening  the  institution  of  slavery.  To 
that  end  the  acquisition  of  Cuba  became  a  prominent  object;  not 
with  the  simple  view,  held  by  Jefferson  and  Adams,  of  rounding 
off  and  securing  the  national  domain,  but  to  embrace  and  control 
a  slave  region,  the  present  conditions  and  future  promise  of 
which  were  believed  to  imperil  the  system  in  the  Southern  States. 
The  nation  was  already  entered  upon  the  rapids  which  swept 
it  down  to  civil  war  and  revolution.  Nevertheless,  during  this 
period  was  successfully  fought  out  the  diplomatic  battle  with 
Great  Britain  concerning  the  Mosquito  Coast  and  the  Honduras 
Bay  Islands.  That  the  Clayton-Bulwer  Treaty  secured  to  Nicara- 
gua and  Honduras  the  surrender  of  these,  the  British  title  to 
which  was  disputed,  had  been  the  belief  of  the  United  States. 
This  was  the  quid  pro  quo  for  her  departure  from  traditional 
policy,  by  entering  into  a  joint  guarantee  of  an  American  canal, 
and  of  territory  belonging  to  an  American  state.  She  was  already 
by  treaty  with  Colombia,  sole  guarantor  of  transit  across  the 
Isthmus  of  Panama,  and  would  have  preferred  to  be  such  in  the 
case  of  the  Nicaraguan  Canal ;  but  the  claim  of  Great  Britain  to 
the  Mosquito  Coast,  though  denied  by  the  United  States,  involved 
the  Atlantic  terminus — San  Juan  or  Greytown.  It  was  a  question 
of  fight  or  compromise,  and  the  United  States,  though  powerful 
for  many  reasons  as  a  weight  in  international  balances,  was  not 
yet  strong  enough  to  go  to  war  over  a  disputed  title.  The  con- 
cession which  she  understood  herself  to  have  made  was  that  of 
accepting  a  join  guarantee  with  a  European  Power  for  an  Amer- 
ican interest  and  enterprise ;  the  concession  she  was  to  receive 
was  the  abandonment  of  British  political  control  over  the  regions 


38  SELECTED  ARTICLES  ON 

mentioned.  To  her  surprise  she  found  that  the  British  under- 
standing was  not  that  they  would  abandon  what  they  had,  but 
that  they  would  not  press  their  tenure  beyond  that  actually 
enjoyed.  The  controversy  terminated  in  the  prevalence  of  the 
United  States  contention,  so  that  in  1860  the  President  was  able 
to  report  to  Congress  a  settlement  perfectly  satisfactory  to  him. 

In  this  prolonged  discussion  the  influence  of  the  Monroe 
Doctrine  was  not  only  evident,  but  predominant.  Alike  in  what 
it  knowingly  surrendered — the  privilege  of  sole  guarantee — and 
in  what  it  obtained — the  relinquishment  of  a  doubtful  title  to 
American  territory — the  spirit  of  the  doctrine  was  consciously 
and  continuously  in  the  minds  of  -the  American  statesmen  and 
people ;  and  there  can  be  little  doubt  that  the  general  principle, 
as  distinguished  from  sensitiveness  over  particular  incidents, 
gained  decisively  both  in  defmiteness  and  depth  of  impression. 
There  was  advance  from  theory  to  action,  even  if  action  had  been 
limited  to  verbal  insistence ;  and  the  outcome  was  positive^  if  not 
wholly  satisfactory  on  the  score  of  our  own  concessions.  The 
subsequent  intervention  of  Louis  Napoleon  in  Mexico  came  most 
aptly  to  confirm  this  result.  Nothing  could  have  been  more 
opportune.  The  principle  became  concrete  in  a  striking  instance. 
The  interference  of  a  European  ruler  with  the  internal  affairs  of 
an  American  state  had  gone  to  the  point  of  overthrowing  its 
government,  and  establishing  a  monarchy  in  its  place ;  and  this 
not  only  happened  just  across  the  border,  but  coincided  with  the 
immense  organisation  of  force  left  by  the  Civil  War.  Action 
here  was  yet  more  positive  and  convincing.  Again  the  United 
States  had  obtained  by  pressure  the  restitution  of  American  con- 
trol over  American  territory,  asking  no  compensation  beyond  the 
satisfaction  of  principle  maintained. 

The  realization  of  power,  forced  upon  national  consciousness 
by  the  prodigious  exertions  of  the  Civil  War,  could  not  but  be 
felt  in  subsequent  external  policy.  Of  this  the  Monroe  Doctrine 
was  a  leading  element.  From  its  enunciation  in  1823  it  had 
grown  slowly  to  1850,  the  year  of  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty. 
The  acceptance  in  this  instrument  of  a  joint  guarantee  with  a 
European  State  over  American  territory  was  felt  to  be  in  viola- 
tion of  its  general  spirit,  and  was  substantially  an  admission  of 
national  weakness,  of  which  the  compromise  measures  of  the  same 
year  were  an  internal  indication.  The  foundations  of  the  Union 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  39 

were  shaking.  At  nearly  the  same  moment,  1850-51,  the  United 
States  co-operated  with  France  and  Great  Britain  to  compel  peace 
between  Haiti  and  Santo  Domingo.  These  steps,  scarcely  con- 
sistent with  the  tradition,  were  under  the  same  political  adminis- 
tration, although  the  death  of  President  Taylor  involved  a  change 
in  head  and  members.  Shortly  before  its  close,  the  Secretary  of 
State,  in  a  paper  that  commanded  wide  approval,  used  words 
which  have  value  as  indicating  the  point  to  which  national  vision 
had  as  yet  reached. 

It  has  been  a  steady  rule  of  our  policy  to  avoid  as  far  as  possible  all 
disturbance  of  existing  political  relations  of  the  West  Indies.  We  have 
felt  that  any  attempts  on  the  part  of  any  one  of  the  great  maritime  Powers 
to  obtain  exclusive  advantages  in  any  one  of  the  islands  would  be  apt  to 
be  followed  by  others,  and  to  end  in  converting  the  archipelago  into  a 
theatre  of  national  competition. 

This  was  a  policy  of  marking  time,  the  departure  from  which 
at  the  present  day,  if  the  United  States  is  to  be  reckoned  among 
maritime  powers,  is  evident.  An  advance  in  position  was  indeed 
close  at  hand.  The  exigency  of  the  isthmus,  already  felt,  was 
about  to  invoke  a  fresh  assertion  of  the  predominant  political 
interest  of  the  nation  against  European  influence  there;  both  in 
general,  as  American  territory,  and  in  particular,  as  the  line  of 
communication  between  our  Pacific  and  Atlantic  coasts.  Point 
was  given  to  this,  and  its  importance  emphasised  to  the  national 
consciousness  during  this  decade,  by  the  prolonged  discussion 
over  the  Clayton-Bulwer  Treaty,  which  centred  attention  upon 
the  relations  of  the  isthmiis  to  the  Monroe  Doctrine.  If  one 
administration  in  1856  suggested  a  joint  guarantee  for  the  neu- 
trality of  the  transit  zone,  its  successor  hastened  in  1857  to  affirm 
that  such  a  procedure,  in  common  with  other  Powers,  was  incon- 
sistent with  the  policy  of  the  United  States;  and  the  President 
in  successive  Messages  strongly  urged  the  purchase  of  Cuba. 

Despite  occasional  inconsistencies  the  general  tendency  is 
manifest  throughout.  .The  period  of  1850-1860  was  one  of  sus- 
pended action,  but  of  rapid  progress  in  the  realm  of  idea.  Opin- 
ion was  expanding,  and  hardening  into  conviction ;  but  the  anxie- 
ties and  uncertainties  attending  incipient  civil  convulsion  are  un- 
favourable to  external  effectiveness.  The  return  to  quiet  was  not 
merely  to  former  conditions,  but  to  vastly  enlarged  conception 
of  national  interests  and  strength.  The  constraint  upon  Napoleon 


40  SELECTED  ARTICLES  ON 

III  to  leave  Mexico,  in  1867,  was  the  act  of  the  administration 
that  directed  the  Civil  War.  To  it  succeeded  the  Presidency  of 
General  Grant,  among  whose  first  utterances  is  found,  in  1869, 
that  American  "dependencies  of  European  Powers  are  no  longer 
regarded  as  subjects  of  transfer  from  one  European  Power  to 
another."  Upon  this  advance  in  position  the  Secretary  of  State, 
Mr.  Fish,  a  year  later  commented  thus: 

This  is  not  a  policy  of  aggression,  but  it  opposes  the  creation  of  Euro- 
pean dominion  on  American  soil,  and  its  transfers  to  other  European 
Powers;  and  it  looks  hopefully  to  the  time  when,  by  the  voluntary  departure 
of  European  Governments  from  this  continent  and  the  adjacent  islands, 
America  shall  be  wholly  American.  It  does  not  contemplate  forcible 
intervention  in  any  legitimate  contest;  but  it  protests  against  permitting 
any  such  contest  to  result  in  increase  of  European  power  or  influence.* 

This  hope  of  a  voluntary  departure  was  not  infrequently  ex- 
pressed by  the  same  Secretary  to  the  British  Minister,  1869-71, 
during  the  discussions  antecedent  to  the  Treaty  of  Washington; 
and  it  was  grounded  in  part  at  least  upon  the  well-known  dis- 
position then  of  many  British  statesmen  to  foster  the  detach- 
ment of  the  colonies  from  the  mother  country.  On  American  lips 
the  words  were  scarcely  more  than  a  pious  aspiration,  towards 
conditions  which  would  remove  still  further  the  chance  of  Euro- 
pean entanglements.  Though  congruous  in  spirit,  they  form  no 
part  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  which  in  origin  was,  and  in  scope 
still  is,  essentially  conservative,  not  revolutionary;  expressly 
disclaiming,  indeed,  all  purpose  to  infringe  existing  conditions. 

The  national  consciousness  of  a  peculiar  and  critical  relation 
to  the  Central  American  isthmus  is  reflected  in  another  utterance 
of  Secretary  Fish. 

No  attack  upon  the  sovereignty  of  New  Granada  has  taken  place  since 
the  (guarantee)  treaty  of  1846,  though  this  Department  has  reason  to 
believe  that  one  has  been  on  several  occasions  threatened,  but  has  been 
averted  by  a  warning  from  this  Government  as  to  its  obligations  under  the 
treaty. 

The  position  thus  indicated  was  maintained  by  following  ad- 
ministrations, which  lay  especial  stress  upon  the  isthmian  condi- 
tions. These  had  become  the  focus,  upon  which  converged  all  the 
national  feelings  and  policy  which  united  to  elicit  the  Monroe 
Doctrine.  Particular  indisposition  was  expressed  to  any  joint 
guarantee. 

*  My  italics. 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  41 

The  President  (1881)  is  constrained  to  say  that  the  United  States  can- 
not take  part  in  extending  an  invitation  for  a  joint  guarantee,  and  to  state 
with  entire  frankness  that  the  United  States  would  look  with  disfavour  at 
an  attempt  at  concert  of  political  action  by  other  Powers  in  that  direction. 

It  was  joint  guarantee,  together  with  joint  disclaimer  of  ac- 
quiring future  tenure  over  any  part  of  Central  America  in  order 
to  control  the  canal,  that  brought  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty  into 
conspicuous  disfavour;  probably  as  seeming  to  imply  equality  of 
political  interest  between  the  United  States  and  the  other  guar- 
anteeing and  self-denying  Power.  The  equality  does  not  exist, 
and  apparent  admission  by  ourselves  was  even  more  distasteful 
than  its  suggestion  by  others.  It  was,  as  has  been  said,  "a 
consent  to  violate  the  traditional  and  time-honoured  policy  of  the 
country." 

Though  necessarily  traced  only  in  outline,  the  Monroe  Doc- 
trine is  seen  to  be  a  policy  substantially  consistent  throughout, 
manifesting  advance  in  expression  and  expansion  in  application; 
both  proofs  of  essential  vitality.  Yet,  neglecting  the  occasional 
fluctuations  to  which  all  progress  is  liable,  it  may  fairly  be  said 
that  the  entire  history  is  contained,  as  in  a  seed,  in  a  definition  of 
Monroe's,  rarely  quoted,  of  the  year  (1824),  following  the  one  so 
widely  known. 

The  deep  interest  we  take  in  their  (the  Spanish  colonies)  independence, 
which  we  have  acknowledged,  and  in  their  enjoyment  of  all  the  rights 
incident  thereto,  especially  in  the  very  important  one  of  instituting  their 
own  Governments,  has  been  declared.  .  .  .  It  is  impossible  for  Euro- 
pean Governments  to  interfere  in  their  concerns,  especially  in  those  alluded 
to,  without  affecting  us;  indeed  the  motive  which  might  induce  such  inter- 
ference in  the  present  state  of  the  war  would  appear  to  be  equally  applicable 
to  us. 

This  does  not  indeed  explicitly  state  every  several  proposition 
of  subsequent  administrations ;  but  of  those  which  have  remained, 
endorsed  by  the  general  consent  of  the  nation,  all  are  to  be  found 
in  germ,  though  not  in  development,  in  the  above  words.  Though 
firm  as  well  as  clear,  they  bear  the  impress  of  national  immaturity 
and  consequent  weakness.  The  fear,  known  to  have  been  enter- 
tained by  some  of  Monroe's  Cabinet,  that  the  motives  impelling 
the  Holy  Alliance  to  intervene  in  South  America  might  entail 
similar  steps  toward  the  United  States,  would  doubtless  be 
scouted  now;  but  the  wary  attitude  of  to-day,  with  its  increased 
scope  of  assertion,  simply  reproduces  what  in  the  earlier  period 
was  apprehension. 


42  SELECTED  ARTICLES  ON 

It  is  considered  by  the  United  States  essential  to  her  interests 
and  peace  to  'withstand  the  beginnings  of  action  which  might  lead 
to  European  intervention  in  the  internal  concerns  of  an  American 
state,  or  render  it  contributive  in  any  way  to  the  European  sys- 
tem, a  makeweight  in  the  balance  of  power,  a  pawn  in  the  game 
of  European  international  politics ;  for  such  a  condition,  if  real- 
ised, brings  any  European  contest  to  this  side  of  the  Atlantic;  and 
the  neighbourhood  of  disputes,  as  of  fire,  is  perilous.  A  rumour  of 
the  transfer  of  a  West  India  island,  or  such  an  occurrence  as  the 
existing  difficulty  between  Venezuela,  Germany,  and  Great 
Britain,  engages  instant  and  sensitive  attention.  This  does  not 
imply  doubt  of  the  wisdom  and  firmness  of  the  Government,  but 
indicates  an  instinctive  political  apprehension,  not  elicited  by 
greater  and  immediate1  interests  in  quarters  external  to  the 
continents.  It  is  remembered  that  intervention  was  contem- 
plated in  our  own  deadly  intestine  struggle  because  of  the  effect 
upon  European  interests,  although  only  economic;  for  we  were 
embarrassed  by  no  political  dependence  or  relation  to  Europe. 
Public  sentiment  intends  that  such  a  danger  to  the  American 
continents,  the  recurrence  of  which  can  only  be  obviated  by  the 
predominant  force  and  purpose  of  this  country,  shall  not  be 
indefinitely  increased  by  acquiescing  in  European  Governments 
acquiring  relations  which  may  serve  as  occasions  for  interference, 
trenching  upon  the  independence  of  action,  or  integrity  of 
territory  of  American  states. 

It  is  evident  that  for  a  nation  to  owe  money  to  a  foreign 
Government,  directly  or  by  guarantee,  is  a  very  different  political 
condition  to  that  of  indebtedness  contracted  in  open  market  to 
individuals.  It  is  evident  that  a  disputed  boundary  is  a  perennial 
source  of  danger;  and  of  implicit  threat  where  there  is  a  great 
difference  of  strength.  Such  an  ember  might  blow  into  a  flame  at 
a  moment  otherwise  unpropitious  for  the  United  States  to  assert 
its  traditional  policy;  just  as  the  long-standing  Transvaal  trouble 
might  very  conceivably  have  been  precipitated  into  war  at  a 
moment  most  inconvenient  to  Great  Britain.  As  it  was,  her 
course  in  other  quarters  is  believed  to  have  been  embarrassed  by 
the  South  African  War.  It  is  the  part  of  wisdom,  and  substan- 
tially of  justice,  to  exclude  such  occasions  of  offence,  or  to  insist 
upon  timely  settlement  where  they  exist. 

Granting  the  military  effect  of  the  isthmus  and  Cuba  upon 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  43 

the  United  States,  it  is  clear  that  for  them  .to  contract  relations 
of  dependence  upon  a  European  Power  involves  the  United  States 
at  once  in  a  net  of  secondary  relations  to  the  same  Power  poten- 
tial of  very  serious  result.  Why  acquiesce  in  such?  But  the 
fundamental  relations  of  international  law,  essential  to  the  inter- 
course of  nations,  are  not  hereby  contradicted.  National  rights, 
which  are  summed  up  in  the  word  independence,  have  as  their 
correlative  national  responsibility.  Not  to  invade  the  rights  of 
an  American  state  is  to  the  United  States  an  obligation  with  the 
force  of  law ;  to  permit  no  European  State  to  infringe  them  is  a 
matter  of  policy ;  but  as  she  will  not  acquiesce  in  any  assault  upon 
their  inc^endence  or  territorial  integrity,  so  she  will  not  coun- 
tenance by  her  support  any  shirking  of  their  international  respon- 
sibility. Neither  will  she  undertake  to  compel  them  to  observe 
their  international  obligations  to  others  than  herself.  To  do  so, 
which  has  been  by  some  most  inconsequently  argued  a  necessary 
corollary  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  would  encroach  on  the  very 
independence  which  that  political  dogma  defends;  for  to  assume 
the  responsibility  which  derives  from  independence,  and  can  only 
be  transferred  by  its  surrender,  would  be  to  assert  a  quasi 
suzerainty.  The  United  States  is  inevitably  the  preponderant 
American  power ;  but  she  does  not  aspire  to  be  paramount.  She 
does  not  find  the  true  complement  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  in  an 
undefined  control  over  American  states,  exercised  by  her,  and 
denied  to  Europe.  Its  correlative,  as  forcibly  urged  by  John 
Quincy  Adams  at  the  time  of  formulation,  and  since  explicitly 
adopted  by  the  national  consciousness,  is  abstention  from  inter- 
ference in  questions  territorially  European.  These  I  conceive 
embrace  not  only  Europe  proper,  but  regions  also  in  which 
propinquity  and  continuity,  or  long  recognised  occupancy,  give 
Europe  a  priority  of  interest  and  influence,  resembling  that  which 
the  Monroe  policy  asserts  for  America  in  the  American  conti- 
nents and  islands.  In  my  apprehension,  Europe,  construed  by  the 
Doctrine,  would  include  Africa,  with  the  Levant  and  India,  and 
the  countries  between  them.  It  would  not  include  Japan,  China, 
nor  the  Pacific  generally.  The  United  States  might  for  very 
excellent  reasons  abstain  from  action  in  any  of  these  last  named 
quarters,  in  any  particular  instance ;  but  the  deterrent  cause  would 
not  be  the  Monroe  Doctrine  in  legitimate  deduction. 


44  SELECTED  ARTICLES  ON 

Harper's  Weekly.  50:  1738-9.  December  8,  1906 
Evolution  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine 

Professor  John  Bassett  Moore  has  rendered  a  great  service 
to  students  of  American  history  by  his  Digest  of  International 
Law,  as  this  is  embodied  in  diplomatic  discussions,  treaties,  and 
other  international  agreements,  international  awards,  the  deci- 
sions of  municipal  courts,  and  the  writings  of  jurists.  This  work, 
which  has  just  been  completed  in  eight  volumes,  may  be  regarded 
as  practically  exhaustive.  There  is  no  subject  connected  with  the 
international  relations  of  the  United  States  with  regar^to  which 
it  may  not  be  consulted  with  profit.  It  is  to  what  Mr.Woore  has 
to  tell  us  about  the  Monroe  Doctrine  that  we  would  direct 
attention  at  this  time,  inasmuch  as  the  Santo  Domingo  Treaty 
is  coming  up  for  ratification  at  the  approaching  session  of  Con- 
gress, and  inasmuch  as  the  Pan-American  Conference  at  Rio  de 
Janeiro  decided  to  interrogate  the  next  Hague  Congress  as  to 
whether  it  should  be  deemed  permissible  to  enforce  by  violence 
the  payment  of  contractual  debts.  To  the  Monroe  Doctrine 
more  than  two  hundred  pages  of  Mr.  Moore's  sixth  volume 
are  devoted.  By  a  series  of  quotations  he  shows  that  the  germ 
of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  existed  long  before  it  was  formulated 
by  the  fifth  President.  For  example,  as  early  as  1793,  Jefferson, 
then  Secretary  of  State,  warned  our  ministers  at  Madrid  not 
to  bind  us  by  any  treaty  clause  to  guarantee  to  Spain  any  of  her 
American  colonies  against  the  success  of  its  struggle  for  inde- 
pendence, or  even  against  attack  by  any  other  nation.  In  1801, 
Rufus  King,  then  minister  to  England,  told  Lord  Hawkesbury 
that  we  should  be  content  to  let  the  Floridas  remain  in  the  hands 
of  Spain,  but  should  not  be  willing  to  see  them  transferred,  except 
to  ourselves.  In  1808  President  Jefferson  wrote  to  Governor 
Claiborne  of  Louisiana:  "We  should  be  well  satisfied  to  see 
Cuba  and  Mexico  remain  in  their  present  dependence,  but  very 
unwilling  to  see  them  in  that  of  either  France  or  England, 
politically  or  commercially.  We  consider  their  interests  and  ours 
as  the  same,  and  that  the  object  of  both  must  be  to  exclude  all 
European  influence  from  this  hemisphere."  In  1811,  Congress, 
replying  to  a  secret  message  from  President  Madison,  resolved 
in  secret  session  that  the  United  States  could  not,  without 
serious  inquietude,  see  any  part  of  the  territory  adjoining  the 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  45 

southern  border  of  the  United  States  pass  into  the  hands  of  any 
foreign  power,  but  that  "a  due  regard  to  their  own  safety  com- 
pelled them  {o  provide,  under  certain  contingencies,  for  the 
temporary  occupation  of  the  said  territory." 

Nothing  could  be  more  clear  than  the  foreshadowing  of  the 
Monroe  Doctrine  in  a  letter  addressed  by  Jefferson  to  William 
Short  on  August  4,  1820.  The  writer  dwelt  on  the  advantages 
of  a  cordial  fraternization  among  all  the  American  nations,  and 
the  importance  of  their  coalescing  in  an  American  system  of 
policy  totally  independent  of  and'  unconnected  with  that  of 
Europe.  Less  than  three  years  later,  in  April,  1823,  J.  Q. 
Adams,  Secretary  of  State,  writing  to  Mr.  Nelson,  minister  to 
Spain,  declared  that  the  rumored  intention  of  Spain  to  transfer 
Cuba  to  Great  Britain  would,  if  carried  out,  prove  unpropitious 
to  the  interests  of  our  Union.  He  did  not  hesitate  to  assert  that 
the  commanding  position  of  that  island  with  reference  to  the 
Gulf  of  Mexico  and  the  West  India  seas,  the  nature  of  its  pro- 
ductions and  of  its  wants,  furnishing  the  supplies  and  needing 
the  returns  of  a  commerce  immensely  profitable  and  mutually 
beneficial,  gave  it  an  importance  in  the  sum  of  our  national 
interests  with  which  that  of  no  other  foreign  territory  could  be 
compared,  and  little  inferior  to  that  which  bound  the  different 
members  of  our  Union  together. 

It  was  in  August,  1823,  that  George  Canning,  British  Secre- 
tary, sent  to  Mr.  Rush,  American  minister  at  London,  a  private 
confidential  memorandum,  in  which  he  said  that  England  aimed 
not  at  the  possession  of  any  part  of  Spanish  America,  but  could 
not  see  with  indifference  any  section  of  it  transferred  to  any 
other  power.  This  memorandum  was  forthwith  transmitted  to 
J.  Q.  Adams,  Secretary  of  State,  and  was,  by  President  Monroe, 
forwarded  to  ex-Presidents  Jefferson  and  Madison.  Monroe's 
own  impression  was  at  the  time,  he  said,  that  we  ought  to  view 
any  interference  on  the  part  of  the  European  Powers  with  the 
New  World,  and  especially  an  attack  on  the  South-American 
colonies  by  them,  as  an  attack  on  ourselves,  presuming  that,  if 
they  succeeded  with  them,  they  would  extend  their  aggression  to 
us.  Sensible,  however,  of  the  breadth  and  difficulty  of  the 
question,  he  desired  counsel  of  his  two  predecessors.  Jefferson, 
in  a  reply  dated  October  24,  1823,  said  that  he  could  honestly  join 
in  the  proposed  declaration  that  we  did  not  aim  at  the  acquisition 


46  SELECTED  ARTICLES  ON 

of  any  Spanish-American  possessions,  and  would  not  stand  in 
the  way  of  any  amicable  arrangement  between  them  and  their 
mother  country;  but  that  we  would  oppose,  with  all  our  means, 
the  forcible  interposition  of  any  other  power  under  any  form  or 
pretext,  and  most  especially  their  transfer  to  any  power  ]?y  con- 
quest, cession,  or  acquisition  in  any  other  way.  Madison  con- 
curred with  Jefferson.  On  November  15,  J.  Q.  Adams  stated  in 
his  diary  that  President  Monroe  had  shown  him  the  letters  from 
Jefferson  and  Madison,  and  that  "Calhoun  is  perfectly  moon- 
struck by  the  surrender  of  Cadiz,  and  says  the  Holy  Allies,  with 
ten  thousand  men,  will  restore  all  Mexico  and  all  South  America 
to  Spanish  dominion."  With  these  data  before  us,  we  can  under- 
stand how  Monroe  came  to  put  forth  his  famous  message  on 
December  2,  1823,  in  which  he  declared  that  while  with  the 
existing  colonies  or  dependencies  of  any  European  Power  we 
had  not  interfered,  and  should  not  interfere,  yet  "with  the 
governments  who  had  declared  their  independence  and  maintained 
it,  and  whose  independence  we  have  on  great  consideration  and 
on  just  principles  acknowledged,  we  could  not  view  any  inter- 
position for  the  purpose  of  oppressing  them,  or  controlling  in 
any  other  manner  their  destiny,  by  any  European  Power,  in  any 
other  light  than  as  the  manifestation  of  an  unfriendly  disposition 
towards  the  United  States." 

So  'much  for  the  gradual  genesis  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine 
during  the  thirty  years  following  the  first  indication  of  it  by 
Jefferson  in  1793.  Let  us  pass  to  some  of  the  more  significant 
cases  in  which  it  has  been  applied.  Toward  the  close  of  1827  the 
Argentine  Republic,  being  at  war  with  the  empire  of  Brazil, 
addressed  to  Henry  Clay,  then  Secretary  of  State,  an  inquiry  as 
to  the  scope  of  the  declarations  contained  in  President  Monroe's 
message  of  December  22,  1823.  Clay  replied  that  the  war  raging 
between  the  Argentine  Republic  and  the  empire  of  Brazil  could 
not  be  conceived  as  presenting  a  state  of  things  bearing  the 
remotest  analogy  to  the  case  which  Monroe's  message  had  depre- 
cated. "It  is,"  continued  Clay,  "a  war  strictly  American  in  its 
origin  and  its  objects.  It  is  a  war  in  which  European  allies 
have  taken  no  part."  Even  if  Portugal  and  the  Brazils  had 
remained  united,  and  the  war  had  been  carried  on  by  their  joint 
arms  against  the  Argentine  Republic,  that,  Clay  thought,  would 
have  been  far  from  presenting  the  case  which  the  message  con- 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  47 

templated.  Interesting,  too,  is  the  case  of  Yucatan,  where,  an 
Indian  outbreak  having  occurred  in  the  forties,  the  authorities 
offered  to  transfer  the  dominion  and  sovereignty  to  the  United 
States,  and,  at  the  same  time,  made  a  similar  offer  to  Great 
Britain  and  Spain.  With  reference  to  this  offer,  President  Polk 
said,  in  a  special  message  to  Congress,  that  while  it  was  not  his 
purpose  to  recommend  the  adoption  of  any  measure  with  a  view 
to  the  acquisition  of  the  dominion  and  sovereignty  over  Yucatan, 
yet,  according  to  our  established  policy,  we  could  not  consent  to 
a  transfer  of  this  dominion  and  sovereignty  to  either  Spain,  Great 
Britain,  or  any  other  European  Power. 

As  early  as  October,  1858,  reports  came  from  Europe  that 
a  naval  and  military  armament  was  about  to  leave  Spain  'des- 
tined to  attack  Mexico,  with  a  view  to  acquiring  political 
ascendency  there.  Lewis  Cass,  then  Secretary  of  State,  in  a 
letter  to  our  minister  at  Madrid,  pointed  out  that,  with  respect 
to  the  causes  of  war  between  Spain  and  Mexico  the  United 
States  had  no  concern  and  did  not  undertake  to  judge  them. 
Neither  should  we  claim  to  interpose  in  any  hostilities  which 
might  take  place.  Our  policy  of  observation  and  interference 
would  be  limited  to  protection  against  the  permanent  subjugation 
of  any  portion  of  the  territory  of  Mexico  or  of  any  other  Amer- 
ican state  by  any  European  Power  whatever.  (Jwo  years  later^ 
Cass,  in  a  letter  to  our  minister  in  Paris,  declared  that  the  United 
States  did  not  call  in  question  the  right  of  France  to  compel  the 
government  of  Mexico,  by  force,  if  necessary,  to  do  it  justice,  but 
that  the  permanent  occupation  of  any  part  of  the  territory  of 
Mexico  by  a  foreign  power,  or  an  attempt  in  any  manner  forcibly 
to  interfere  in  its  internal  concerns  or  to  control  its  political 
destiny,  would  give  great  dissatisfaction  to  the  United  States. 
It  is  well  known  that,  in  spite  of  this  warning,  Napoleon  III, 
taking  advantage  of  our  absorption  in  a  civil  war,  undertook,  by 
force,  to  establish  in  Mexico  an  empire  under  an  Austrian  arch- 
duke. No  sooner  was  the  Union  restored,  however,  than  General 
Sheridan  was  sent  with  an  army  of  about  fifty  thousand  men 
to  the  line  of  the  Rio  Grande,  and  another  army  was  organized 
for  the  purpose  of  acting  against  the  French  army  in  Mexico  in 
case  of  need.  About  the  same  time,  Seward,  Secretary  of  State,  . 
notified  the  French  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  that  whenever  | 
might  have  been  the  purposes  of  France  when  she  sent  an  army 


48  SELECTED  ARTICLES  ON 

to  Mexico,  the  proceedings  which  had  been  adopted  by  a  class  of 
Mexicans  for  subverting  the  republican  government  there  and  for 
availing  themselves  of  French  intervention  to  establish  on  its 
ruins  an  imperial  monarchy,  were  regarded  in  the  United  States 
as  having  been  taken  without  authority,  and  as  having  been 
prosecuted  against  the  will  and  opinion  of  the  Mexican  people. 
The  French  government  ultimately  agreed  to  withdraw  its  forces 
from  Mexico  within  the  term  of  seventeen  months,  and  as  a 
matter  of  fact  they  left  Mexican  soil  in  March,  1867. 

We  come,  lastly,  to  the  view  taken  by  President  Roosevelt 
and  Secretary  Hay  in  December,  1901,  at  a  time  when  a  joint 
blockade  of  Venezuelan  seaports  was  contemplated  by  Germany, 
Great  Britain,  and  Italy.  The  German  government  had  dis- 
avowed any  intention  of  making  the  smallest  acquisition  of  terri- 
tory on  the  South-American  continent  or  the  adjacent  islands. 
In  view  of  this  disavowal,  President  Roosevelt  said,  in  his 
message  of  December  3,  1901,  that  "The  Monroe  Doctrine  is  a 
declaration  that  there  must  be  no  territorial  aggrandizement  by 
any  non-American  power  at  the  expense  of  any  American  power 
on  American  soil.  It  is  in  no  wise  intended  as  hostile  to  any 
nation  in  the  old  world.  He  added  that  "we  do  not  guarantee 
any  state  against  punishment  if  it  misconducts  itself,  provided 
that  punishment  does  not  take  the  form  of  the  acquisition  of 
territory  by  any  non-American  power."  That  is  the  latest 
authoritative  definition  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine.  It  turned  out, 
however,  that,  by  the  prolonged  sequestration  of  the  customs 
revenue  of  a  Latin-American  republic,  the  destiny  of  that  com- 
monwealth might  be  affected  materially.  It  was  in  order  to  avert 
such  a  result  that  by  the  San  Domingo  Treaty,  now  pending 
in  the  Senate,  President  Roosevelt  undertook  to  interpose  in 
the  capacity  of  revenue- collector  and  apportioner  between  the 
Dominican  Republic  and  its  foreign  creditors. 

American   Journal    of   International   Law.    3:269-353.    April, 

1909 

Latin    America   and   International    Law.     Alejandro   Alvarez 

In  1823,  a  new  era  opens  in  the  policy  followed  by  the  United 
States  in  its  relations  with  the  rest  of  America.     That  republic 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  49 

then  understood  that  it  was  bound  to  the  other  states  of  the 
hemisphere  not  only  by  reason  of  being  neighbors,  but  because 
of  a  continental  solidarity  in  everything  pertaining  to  the  inde- 
pendence and  sovereignty  of  the  new  nations.  In  that  year,  under 
historic  circumstances  known  to  all,  Monroe,  while  having  pri- 
marily in  view  the  interests  of  his  country,  expressed  and 
epitomized  in  such  a  clear  manner  the  essence  of  the  inter- 
national situation  of  the  New  World,  that  his  declaration  became, 
as  we  have  already  said,  although  he  did  not  aim  to  formulate 
an  invariable  norm  of  international  policy,  the  gospel  of  the 
new  continent.  This  message,  which  declares  that  the  political 
system  of  Europe  is  different  from  that  of  the -American  states, 
contains  declarations  which  may  be  epitomized  in  the  following 
points : 

1.  The    states    of    the   new  world    are   entirely   independent 
and  sovereign. 

2.  And,   consequently,   the   regime  of  the  balance  of  power 
and    intervention,    the    basis   at   that   time    of   the   international 
politics  of  the  old  world,  can  not  be  extended  to  them.     Euro- 
pean intervention  is  condemned,  not  only  when  its  object  is  to 
change  the  form  of  government  adopted  by  the  states,  but  when 
it  aims  to  oppress  them  or  to  control  their  destinies  in  any  way. 

3.  That  the  states  of  Europe  can  not  acquire  by  occupation 
any  part  of  the  American  continent. 

Together  with  these  three  explicit  declarations,  there  are 
three  others  of  a  more  or  less  explicit  character  which  complete 
the  "Doctrine" : 

1.  That  respecting  the  colonies  of  Europe  then  existing  in 
America. 

2.  The  political  equality  of  the  states  of  the  continent,  par- 
ticularly from  the   point   of  view   of  their  independence   which 
therefore  negatived  the  right  of  any  to  interfere  in  the  internal 
affairs  of  another. 

3.  The  non-interference  of  the  United  States  in  the  domestic 
affairs  of  Europe,  save  when  they  constitute  a  menace  for  the 
independent  existence  of  America. 

On  declaring  the  intervention  of  Europe  in  America  is  not 
to  be  tolerated  and  that  the  American  continent  is  not  open  to 
European  colonization,  Monroe  contradicted  two  principles  of 
international  law  at  that  time  in  force:  that  of  intervention  and 


50  SELECTED  ARTICLES  ON 

that  of  the  acquisition  by  occupation  of  the  territories  that  were 
res  nullins.  The  contradiction  of  this  second  principle  is  par- 
ticularly important,  as  it  in  reality  amounted  to  establishing1, 
that,  in  America,  all  territory,  even  that  which  was  not  explored, 
and  which  was  consequently  nullius  (and  in  this  condition  there 
were  vast  stretches  of  country),  was  subject  to  the  sovereign 
authority  of  the  American  country  within  whose  limits  it  was 
located  during  the  colonial  epoch.  The  view  is  obtained  on  the 
basis  that  the  territory  of  this  continent  has  already  been  dis- 
tributed among  the  states  of  America,  and  that  each  one  exercises 
real  sovereign  authority  over  all  the  land  which  belongs  to  it, 
even  though  the*  regions  be  totally  uninhabited. 

The  Monroe  Doctrine  may  be  synthesized  in  this  fundamental 
idea :  no  one  of  the  two  continents  may  intermeddle  in  the  affairs 
of  the  other,  and  on  this  all  America  stands  united. 

On  recognizing  that  solidarity  of  interests  as  to  the  continu- 
ance of  their  independence  existed  between  the  states  of  Amer- 
ica^ Monroe  did  not  do  more  than  serve  as  an  echo  of  the 
sentiment  that  then  predominated  in  all  the  republics.  There- 
fore, whether  the  famous  message  of  1823  had  been  written  or 
not,  the  principles  contained  in  it  would  always  have  been 
sustained  in  the  New  World.  In  this  sense,  it  may  be  said,  and 
not  without  a  certain  amount  of  truth,  that  the  Monroe  Doctrine 
is  neither  'doctrine  nor  of  Monroe.  But  that  which  constitutes 
its  undeniable  merit  and  makes  it  famous,  is  that  such  an  exact 
synthetic  statement  of  the  destinies  of  America  should  have  been 
given  thus  early  in  the  period  of  emancipation,  by  a  people 
whose  increasing  power  would  not  permit  the  rest  of  the  world 
to  regard  that  statement  as  merely  Utopian.  It  was  this  that 
enabled  America,  from  the  very  beginning  of  independent  life, 
to  give  to  its  foreign  policies  a  safe  norm  instead  of  the  vague 
ideas  then  existent  on  these  subjects.  In  this  sense  the  Monroe 
Doctrine  is  doctrine  and  is  of  Monroe. 

The  best  proof  of  the  statement  that  the  Monroe  Doctrine 
expressed  the  aspirations  of  all  America,  is  to  be  found  in  the 
fact  that  from  the  date  of  the  Congress  of  Panama  of  1826,  all 
the  Latin-American  states  have  not  only  striven  to  proclaim  it 
solemnly  but  also  to  unite  to  make  it  respected ;  the  resolutions 
passed  by  this  congress  and  by  the  others  of  this  period,  not 
only  agree  with  it  and  clearly  show  the  effect  of  its  influence, 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  51 

but  make  an  effort  to  extend  it;  a  similar  influence  is  seen  to 
have  been  exerted  by  this  Doctrine  upon  the  conventions  cele- 
brated by  the  Latin  states  with  one  another. 

Publicists  have  not  only  failed  to  see  the  real  origin  and 
nature  of  the  Doctrine,  but  have  disfigured  its  true  meaning. 
For  the  majority  of  persons,  it  is  the  basis  of  the  policy  of 
hegemony  which  the  United  States  is  developing  on  the  Amer- 
ican continent.  The  writers,  however,  are  not  agreed  as  to 
the  significance  of  this  policy.  The  publicists  of  the  Old  World 
believe  that  the  United  States  has  repelled  Europe  from  America 
only  with  the  object  of  substituting  its  own  influence  for  that 
of  Europe.  Anglo-Americans  believe  that  the  Monroe  Doc- 
trine is  the  sacred  text  which  the  United  States  should  apply 
and  interpret  in  its  relations  with  the  mass  of  Latin-American 
states;  and  the  few  publicists  of  these  countries  who  have 
studied  the  Doctrine  see  in  it  a  mere  pretext  for  the  gradual 
and  progressive  absorption  by  the  great  republic  of  the  rest  of 
the  continent. 

These  points  of  view  are  inadmissable,  since  the  idea  of 
hegemony  does  not  grow  out  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  nor  is  its 
development  dependent  .upon  it :  •  and  the  same  objection  may 
be  made  to  the  attempt)  to  include  within  the  category  of 
"hegemony"  every  step  taken  by  the  United  States  in  inter- 
'  national  policy  in  the  American  continent. 

The  hegemony  of  the  United  States  is  the  fruit  of  the 
prodigious  and  rapid  development  attained  by  this  country, 
outdistancing  the  other  American  republics,  and  the  de  facto 
recognition  of  this  circumstance  not  only  by  the  states  of 
Europe  but  also  by  those  of  America.  So  it  has  been  able  to 
pursue  a  policy  on  the  continent  which  may  be  considered  from 
three  different  points  of  view  and  which  has  worked  toward 
three  different  ends: 

In  the  first  place,  the  United  States  as  the  most  powerful 
country  in  the  western  world,  has  maintained  the  Monroe  Doc- 
trine not  only  in  the  cases  originally  foreseen  by  it,  but  also 
(as  in  the  case  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  in  looking  to  its  own 
interest)  has  caused  it  to  serve  as  an  expression  of  the  growing 
necessities  and  aspirations  of  the  states  of  America,  aiming  to 
assure  their  independence  and  territorial  integrity.  In  this  direc- 
tion it  has  aimed  to  maintain  and  develop  the  Monroe  Doctrine. 


52  SELECTED  ARTICLES  ON 

In  the  second  place,  and  keeping  pace  with  the  above,  may  be 
noted  the  effort  of  the  United  States  to  assert  its  material 
preponderance  in  the  new  continent,  especially  when  there  has 
been  a  question  of  its  own  interests. 

Thirdly,  with  the  purpose  of  protecting  the  state  of  Amer- 
ica, it  has  taken  active  part  in  all  the  international  questions  of 
these  republics  that  it  believed  to  be  of  continental  importance, 
particularly  when  the  latter  have  become  involved  in  conflicts 
with  European  states. 

The  following  belong  to  the  first  category : 

Cases  involving  the  maintenance  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine: 
declaration  of  the  Secretary  of  State  Buchanan  in  1848,  at  the 
time  of  the  attempt  of  General  Flores  to  invade  Ecuador ; 
declarations  and  attitude  of  the  United  States  upon  the  French 
invasion  of  Mexico  in  1862 ;  declaration  of  Secretary  of  State 
Seward,  during  the  war  between  Spain  and  Chile-Peru ;  protest 
of  the  government  of  the  United  States  against  the  re-incor- 
poration of  the  island  of  Santo  Domingo  by  Spain. 

Cases  of  the  development  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine :  (a)  To 
prevent  the  states  of  Europe  from  acquiring  under  any  pretext, 
even  with  the  acquiescence  of  the  American  countries,  any 
portion  of  the  continent,  or  from  establishing  a  protectorate 
over  any  American  state :  declaration  of  Polk  in  1848  as  to 
Yucatan;  declaration  of  1895  upon  the  proposal  of  Nicaragua 
to  cede  to  England  Corn  Island  as  a  Naval  Station ;  declaration 
of  1904  and  1905  in  connection  with  the  coercive  measures  of 
England,  Italy  and  Germany  against  Venezuela. 

(b)  To  prevent  any  European  state  from  entering  upon 
an  occupation  of  a  more  or  less  permanent  character,  even  as  a 
war  measure,  of  any  part  of  the  territory  of  an  American 
country;  declaration  in  1840  by  Van  Buren  that  the  United 
States  would  prevent  by  force  the  military  occupation  of  Cuba 
by  England;  declaration  of  President  Roosevelt  at  the  time 
of  the  above-mentioned  action  of  England,  Italy  and  Germany. 

The  first  class  of  questions  can  not  be  placed  under  the 
heading  "hegemony  of  the  United  States."  As  in  the  case  of 
the  Monroe  Doctrine,  they  synthesize  and  accentuate  the  senti- 
ments of  the  entire  continent.  The  United  States  as  the  most 
powerful  of  the  states  of  America  becomes  the  natural  spokes- 
man of  the  continent  and  charges  itself  with  the  duty  of  making 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  53 

their  ideas  respected,  to  the  mutual  advantage  of  all.  This  is 
proved  not  only  by  the  fact  of  the  logical  extension  of  the 
Doctrine,  but  also  because  the  points  comprised  in  the  first 
division  of  questions  have  been  proclaimed  by  the  Latin  states 
in  their  congresses,  as  we  have  already  seen.  This  view  gains 
strength  also  through  the  circumstance  that  whenever  the  Latin 
states  found  themselves  in  any  of  these  difficult  situations,  they 
turned  to  the  Republic  of  the  North  for  protection;  and,  finally, 
because  these  states  have  striven  to  discover  new  applications 
for  the  Monroe  Doctrine  such  as  the  famous  proposal  of  the 
Argentine  Government,  known  under  the  name  of  the  Drago 
Doctrine,  regarding  which  we  will  have  something  to  say  later 
on. 

To  the  second  category  belong : 

(a)  To   prevent   one    European    state   from   transferring   to 
another,  without  the  consent  of  the  United  States,  the  colonies 
it  possesses  on  the  New  Continent:    declaration  of  Clay  in  1825 
to  the  governments   of  France  and  England,  to  the  effect  that 
the  Union  would  not  permit  Spain  to  transfer  Cuba  or  Puerto 
Rico  to  a  European  country.     President  Grant  later  reaffirmed 
this. 

(b)  To  present  itself  as  the   sole  master  and  guardian   of 
every  highway  between  the  United  States  and  Panama  to  con- 
nect   the    two    great    oceans:     Clayton-Bulwer    Treaty    of    1850. 
This  treaty  is  "anti-Monroe"  as  it  accepts  the  principle  that  a 
European  power  may  have  a  word  in  American  affairs,  but  the 
negotiations  of  the  United  States  to  abrogate  the  treaty  consti- 
tute manifestations  of  the  leadership  of  the  nation. 

(c)  To  intervene  in  the  formation  of  new  states  in  America 
whether    their    establishment    be    through    act    of   emancipation, 
secession  or  otherwise    (emancipation  of  Cuba  and  secession  of 
Panama). 

In  the  third  category  are  to  be  found  numerous  well-known 
examples,  among  which  it  may  be  well  duly  to  call  to  mind  here 
the  interference  of  the  United  States  in  1895  at  the  time  of  the 
dispute  between  England  and  Venezuela  as  to  the  boundary  of 
British  Guiana.  In  this  intervention,  which  is  a  most  charac- 
teristic act  of  hegemony,  the  discussion  between  the  chan- 
celleries of  the  United  States  and  England  on  the  Monroe 
Doctrine,  involved  the  point  advanced  by  Olney  that  American 


54  SELECTED  ARTICLES  ON 

problems  could  only  be  solved  by  Americans.  President  Cleve- 
land (message  of  December  17,  1895)  invoked  the  Monroe 
Doctrine.  The  conflict  was  terminated  by  the  Treaty  of  Feb- 
ruary 2,  1897,  between  England  and  Venezuela  which  submitted 
the  question  to  arbitration,  and  on  the  3rd  of  October,  1899, 
almost  the  entire  territory  was  adjudged  British  soil. 

The  second  and  third  categories  come  properly  within  the 
limits  of  the  idea  of  hegemony  and  not  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine, 
to  which,  indeed,  they  rather  run  counter. 

If  the  states  of  Latin  America  do  not  look  with  great  favor 
upon  the  policy  indicated  under  the  second  heading,  they  at 
least  do  not  condemn  it,  providing  it  be  pursued  with  reason 
and  all  proper  moderation.  As  to  the  third  category,  these 
states  not  only  do  not  reject  it,  but  have  sought  and  always  will 
seek  protection  under  it  whenever  it  may  operate  to  their 
benefit.  But  the  circumstance  that  the  United  States  has  not 
always  taken  the  lead  with  the  necessary  tact,  has  not  at  all 
times  given  its  protection  to  the  countries  of  America,  and  has 
held  itself  aloof  with  disdain  from  these  republics  •  until  a  late 
day,  explains  the  dread  they  have  felt  of  the  hegemony  of  the 
Union,  a  fear  fomented  by  the  press  and  literature  of  Europe 
which  represents  the  United  States  as  preparrng  to  absorb  all 
America. 

The  extension  given  to  the  Monroe  Doctrine  and  the 
hegemony  of  the  United  States,  unlike  the  doctrine  itself,  have 
not  been  formulated  as  one  piece  nor  at  one  time  or  in  a  solemn 
manner;  on  the  contrary,  they  have  grown  little  by  little  as 
circumstances  have  required  them.  And  it  is  even  more  curious 
to  note  that  the  United  States  did  not  appeal  to  the  doctrine 
during  the  time  when  it  was  strictly  applying  the  principles 
contained  therein,  and  that  it  has  appealed  to  it  when  its  appli- 
cation was  not  in  point  and  when  the  act  in  question  was  one 
of  hegemony  (e.  g.,  in  the  above  mentioned  conflict  between 
England  and  Venezuela). 

The  hegemony  of  the  United  States,  as  well  as  the  Monroe 
Doctrine,  has  'been  attacked  in  Europe  as  lacking  any  basis  in 
international  law.  But  the  truth  of  the  matter  is  that  the 
leadership  of  the  United  States  as  well  as  the  doctrine  have 
been  tacitly  recognized  by  the  states  of  Europe,  which  have  been 
the  first  to  turn  to  the  United  States  in  conflicts  with  Latin- 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  55 

American  states.  Further,  the  United  States  solemnly  and 
emphatically  re-asserted  its  determination  in  the  matter  in  the 
first  Hague  Conference.  This  country  then  showed  itself  more 
firmly  than  ever  disposed,  according  to  the  expression  of  one  of 
its  delegates,  "to  maintain  this  policy  and  the  Monroe  Doctrine, 
in  its  later  approved  and  extended  form,  carefully  and  ener- 
getically." 

It  may  be  said  regarding  the  position  of  hegemony  of  the 
United  States,  that  it  has  usually  asserted  itself  in  efforts  to 
prevent  civil  wars  in  countries  on  the  shores  of  the  Gulf  of 
Mexico!  Only  one  case  is  to  be  found  where  it  has  acted  in  the 
rest  of  the  continent:  viz.,  in  opposition  to  the  restoration  of 
the'  monarchy  of  Brazil,  in  1893-1894. 

It  may  be  further  said  that  its  manifestations  have  not 
shown  the  same  intensity  in  every  part  of  the  continent:  it  has 
been  much  more  effective  in  countries  lying  close  to  the  United 
States  than  in  those  that  are  more  distant.  The  interference  of 
the  northern  republic  has  been  particularly  marked  in  countries 
situated  on  the  Gulf  of  Mexico  (Cuba,  Panama  Canal,  secession 
of  the  Republic  of  Panama,  boundary  dispute  between  Venezuela 
and  England).  However,  there  is  one  case  on  record  where  it 
not  only  did  not  desire  to  intervene  but  when  it  refused  to  do 
so  after  having  been  called  upon  for  assistance — in  the  matter 
of  Lueders  out  of  which  grew  the  difficulty  between  Germany 
and  Haiti.  On  this  occasion  Secretary  of  State  Sherman 
declared  that  the  Monroe  Doctrine  did  not  compel  the  United 
States  to  be  involved  in  the  continual  conflicts  between  Ameri- 
can republics  and  other  nations. 

As  to  the  countries  situated  south  of  the  equatorial  line,  the 
leadership  of  the  United  States  has  hardly  ever  been  asserted, 
owing  to  the  small  interests  the  Union  has  in  these  regions,  the 
difficulties  of  distance,  and  the  more  perfect  organization  of  the 
governments  there,  which  has  not  made  it  necessary  to  interfere 
in  their  relations  with  foreign  powers.  On  several  occasions, 
the  United  States  refused  to  intervene:  as,  in  1881,  at  the 
time  of  the  war  between  Chile  and  Peru,  when  it  declined  to 
join  France  and  Great  Britain  in  order  to'  put  an  end  to 
hostilities,  and,  in  1897,  in  the  boundary  dispute  between  Chile 
and  Argentina. 

The  hegemony  of  the  United  States,  above  all,  according  to  ' 


56      ,  SELECTED  ARTICLES  ON 

the  significance  it  has  in  the  third  division,  is  comparable  to  the 
system  of  ''balance  of  power"  which  was  exercised  in  Europe 
by  the  Great  Powers,  though  the  two  notions  are  by  no  means 
to  be  confounded.  Far  from  deserving  absolute  condemnation, 
as  has  been  lightly  said  by  certain  publicists,  it  should  be  differ- 
ently judged,  as  having  been  generally  beneficial  to  America, 
as  it  has  made  this  hemisphere  respected  by  the  countries  of 
Europe  in  spite  of  the  acts  of  intervention  that  have  been 
carried  out  against  it.  But,  if  this  hegemony  is  not  .more 
burdensome  than  the  European  "balance  of  power,"  its  applica- 
tion possesses  this  one  defect,  however, — that,  being  exercised 
by  a  single  country  it  is  not  subject  to  proper  control.  Conse- 
quently it  will  never  have  the  prestige  and  moral  weight  that 
is  enjoyed  by  the  former. 

The  conclusion  which  we  reach  is  that  the  Monroe  Doctrine 
with  the  extension  of  its  principles,  as  well  as  the  policy  of 
hegemony,  gives  yet  another  characteristic  touch  to  the  inter- 
national relations  of  the  states  of  the  new  world,  and,  is, 
consequently,  of  great  importance  to  international  law. 

American  Journal   of   International   Law.   6:937-9.   October, 

1912 

Magdalena  Bay  Resolution 

Midway  in  the  southerly  third  of  the  west  coast  of  -Lower 
California,  and  perhaps  3,000  miles  from  Panama,  is  a  large 
bay.  The  back  country  is  barren  and  thirsty,  but  on  the  shore 
and  off  it  is  moss  which  contains  a  dye  and  fish.  Lumber  and 
cattle  are  said  to  be  possibilities  also.  An  American  company 
secured  here  from  Mexico  a  large  tract  of  land,  several  million 
acres,  which  border  on  the  bay  and  run  back  from  it.  This 
company  was  unprofitable.  Its  chief  creditor,  a  New  Hampshire 
lumberman,  has  taken  it  over  and  tried  to  secure  himself  by 
making  a  sale  to  certain  Japanese  subjects.  Before  concluding 
any  bargain,  however,  his  agent  very  properly  consulted  the 
United  States  Department  of  State  to  learn  its  attitude.  This 
was  adverse,  it  being  aware  of  the  outcry  sure  to  be  made  if  a 
Japanese  coaling,  fishery  or  other  station  or  colony  were  to  be 
established  on  our  side  of  the  Pacific.  Nor  did  Mr.  Knox  look 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  57 

with  more  favor  upon  a  sale  limiting  the  ownership  of  the 
Japanese  to  a  minority.  The  owner  and  creditor  of  the  con- 
cession seemed  to  have  sought  Japanese  aid  in  colonization 
because  no  other  labor  there  was  available.  The  Japanese 
Government  had  nothing  whatever  to  do  with  the  scheme. 
Moreover  by  Mexican  law  .  no  concession  holds  good  under 
heavy  penalty,  if  transfer  is  sought  by  the  concessionaires  to 
a  foreign  government. 

This  was  the  situation  then  when  the  susceptibilities  of  the 
Senate  were  aroused  last  July,  and  Mr.  Lodge  introduced  the 
following  Resolution : 

Resolved :  That  when  any  harbor  or  other  place  in  the 
American  continent  is  so  situated  that  the  occupation  thereof 
far  naval  or  military  purposes  might  threaten  the  communica- 
tions or  the  safety  of  the  United  States,  the  Government  of 
the  United  States  could  not  see  without  grave  concern  the 
possession  of  such  harbor  or  other  place  by  any  corporation  or 
association  which  has  such  a  relation  to  another  government 
not  American  as  to  give  that  government  practical  power  of 
control  for  national  purposes. 

It  is  understood  that  in  secret  session  for  the  last  word  but 
one  "national"  was  substituted  "naval  or  military." 

A  Senate  resolution  is  an  expression  of  its  opinion.  This 
resolution  was  intended  to  be  an  announcement  of  national 
policy  to  foreign  Powers.  It  was  introduced  after  information 
had  been  sought  from  the  President  on  the  subject.  This  went 
to  show  that  the  conduct  of  other  Powers  in  regard  to  those 
lands  had  been  entirely  correct.  In  the  discussion  which  led 
up  to  and  which  followed  the  introduction  of  this  resolution  it 
appeared  that  its  mover  chose  not  to  regard  it  as  an  extension 
of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  but  as  based  upon  the  law  or  right  of 
self-defense  which  is  fundamental,  the  Agadir  incident  being  a 
precedent.  But  in  Africa,  the  German  action  was  official 
governmental.  Whereas  at  Magdalena  Bay,  as  Senator  Rayner 
had  well  brought  out  in  May,  it  was  a  question  of  private 
commercial  use  only.  Has  the  United  States  a  right  to  assume 
that  private  commercial  use  of  such  a  harbor  as  this,  could  be 
so  easily  converted  into  government  use  as  to  warrant  its  pro- 
hibition before  any  sign  whatever  of  abuse  or  of  danger  was 
visible?  That  the  Senate  so  believes  is  clear,  for  it  passed 


58  SELECTED  ARTICLES  ON 

the  Lodge  resolution.  That  the  legal  mind  shares  this  view 
is  not  so  clear.  Let  us  state  it  in  general  terms.  On  the 
ground  of  self-defense  •  a  state  may  forbid  its  neighbor  to  sell 
lands  of  strategic  value  to  the  private  subject  of  a  third  Power, 
there  being  no  act,  but  mere  suspicion  to  warrant  the  fear  that 
the  third  Power  will  make  sinister  use  of  its  subjects'  property. 
What  becomes"  of  the  sovereign  right  of  the  neighbor  to  dispose 
of  its  lands,  for  commercial  development?  If  the  principle  of 
self-defense  is  unduly  stretched,  will  it  not  break  down  and 
become  ridiculous  ?  Is  an  attitude  of  constant  suspicion  con- 
sistent with  international  good-will?  These  are  doubts  which 
fairly  arise  from  the  Lodge  resolution. 


Annals  of  the  American  Academy.  54:84-91.  July,  1914 

Effects    of    the    Panama    Canal    on    Our    Relations    with    Latin 
America.     John    Holladay   Latane 

The  original  Monroe  Doctrine  announced  our  purpose  to  pro- 
tect all  the  independent  Latin-American  states  against  political 
interference  by  European  Powers.  We  have  now  gone  a  step 
further  and  established  formal  protectorates  by  treaty  over  Cuba 
and  Panama  guaranteeing  them  not  only  against  outside  inter- 
ference, but  against  internal  disorders,  and  a  similar  protectorate 
over  Nicaragua  has  been  proposed.  On  July  19,  1913,  a  treaty 
signed  with  Nicaragua  by  Mr.  Bryan  was  submitted  to  the  Sen- 
ate. It  embodied  almost  word  for  word  the  Platt  amendment, 
which  defined  our  relations  with  Cuba.  Nicaragua  agreed  not 
to  declare  war  without  the  consent  of  the  United  States ;  not 
to  sign  treaties  giving  foreign  powers  a  foothold  on  her  soil ; 
not  to  contract  any  foreign  debt  which  could  not  be  met  by  the 
ordinary  revenues  of  the  country;  and  to  recognize  the  right  of 
the  United  States  to  intervene  for  the  purpose  of  protecting 
the  independence  of  Nicaragua. 

There  were  other  equally  important  features  of  the  treaty 
which  will  be  considered  in  a  moment.  But  the  Senate  refused 
to  ratify  it.  The  committee  on  foreign  relations  reported  it 
unfavorably  by  a  vote  of  eight  to  four.  The  press  reports  in- 
dicate, 'however,  that  this  treaty  project  has  not  yet  been  finally 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  59 

abandoned,  but  that  ratification  will  be  again  urged  upon  the 
Senate  as  soon  as  more  pressing  matters  are  disposed  of. 

President  Roosevelt's  Dominican  policy  added  an  important 
corollary  to  the  Monroe  Doctrine.  He  held  in  brief  that  where 
it  was  necessary  to  place  a  bankrupt  American  republic  in  the 
hands  of  receivers,  the  United  States  must  undertake  to  act  as 
receiver  and  take  over  the  administration  of  its  finances;  that 
to  allow  a  European  Power  to  take  possession  of  the  custom 
houses  to  collect  the  duties,  the  only  effective  method  of  paying 
the  foreign  debt,  would  be  a  violation  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine. 
He  boldly  adopted  this  policy  and  finally  forced  a  reluctant 
Senate  to  acquiesce.  In  spite  of  the  criticism  .that  this  policy 
encountered,  the  Taft  administration  adopted  it  and  proposed 
to  extend  it  to  Honduras  and  Nicaragua.  In  January,  1911,  a 
treaty  placing  the  finances  of  Honduras  under  the  supervision 
of  the  United  States  was  signed  by  Mr.  Knox,  and  in  June  a 
similar  treaty  was  signed  with  Nicaragua.  These  treaties  pro- 
vided for  the  refunding  of  the  foreign  debt  in  each  case  through 
loans  made  by  American  bankers  and  secured  by  the  customs 
duties,  the  collector  in  each  case  to  be  approved  by  the  Presi- 
dent of  the  United  States,  and  to  make  an  annual  report  to  the 
department  of  state.  These  treaties  were  not  ratified  by  the 
Senate. 

Secretary  Knox  then  tried  another  solution  of  the  question. 
February  26,  1913,  a  new  treaty  with  Nicaragua  was  submitted 
to  the  Senate.  By  the  terms  of  this  treaty  Nicaragua  agreed  to 
give  the  United  States  an  exclusive  right  of  way  for  a  canal 
through  her  territory  and  a  naval  base  in  Fonseca  Bay  in  return 
for  a  payment  of  $3,000,000.  The  Senate  failed  to  act  on  this 
treaty,  as  the  close  of  the  Taft  administration  was  at  hand.  In 
July  Mr.  Bryan  submitted  to  the  Senate  a  third  treaty  with  Nica- 
ragua containing  the  provisions  of  the  second  Knox  treaty  and 
in  addition  the  provisions  of  the  Platt  amendment,  as  already 
stated  above.  This  arrangement  has  so  far  failed  to  receive 
the  approval  of  the  Senate.  It  is  to  be  noted  that  the  second 
Knox  treaty  and  the  Bryan  treaty  did  not  propose  financial 
administration  by  the  United  States,  but  the  Bryan  treaty  bound 
Nicaragua  not  to  create  a  public  debt  which  could  not  be  met 
by  the  ordinary  revenues  of  the  island. 

President  Wilson's  attitude   toward   foreign  concessions  is  a 


60  SELECTED  ARTICLES  ON 

matter  of  importance  and  carries  our  Latin-American  policy   a 
step  further.    As  he  expressed  it,  it  is  this : 

You  hear  of  concessions  to  foreign  capitalists  in  Latin  America.  You 
do  not  hear  of  concessions  to  foreign  capitalists  in  the  United  States.  They 
are  not  granted  concessions.  They  are  invited  to  make  investments.  The 
work  is  ours,  though  they  are  welcome  to  invest  in  it.  We  do  not  ask  them 
to  supply  the  capital  and  do  the  work.  It  is  an  invitation,  not  a  privilege, 
and  the  states  that  are  obliged  because  their  territory  does  not  lie  within 
the  main  field  of  modern  enterprise  and  action,  to  grant  concessions  are  in 
this  condition,  that  foreign  interests  are  apt  to  dominate  their  domestic 
affairs — a  condition  of  affairs  always  dangerous  and  apt  to  become  in- 
tolerable. 

What  these  states  are  going  to  seek,  therefore,  is  an  emancipation  from 
the  subordination  which  has  been  inevitable  to  foreign  enterprise  and  an 
assertion  of  the  splendid  character  which,  in  spite  of  these  difficulties,  they 
have  again  and  again  been  able  to  demonstrate. 

These  remarks  probably  had  reference  to  the  oil  concession 
which  Pearson  and  Son  of  London  had  arranged  with  the  presi- 
dent of  Colombia.  This  concession  covered  practically  all  of  the 
oil  interests  in  Colombia,  and  carried  with  it  the  right  to  include 
harbors  and  canals  in  the  country.  As  oil  is  coining  into  use 
as  a  naval  fuel  the  occupation  of  the  Colombian  oil  fields  and 
harbors  by  a  foreign  corporation  presented  a  serious  question. 
However,  before  the  meeting  of  the  Colombian  Congress  in 
November,  1913,  which  was  to  confirm  the  concession,  Lord 
Cowdray,  the  president  of  Pearson  and  Son,  withdrew  the 
contract,  alleging  as  his  reason  the  opposition  of  the  United 
States. 

The  next  policy  which  we  shall  consider  is  that  of  acquiring 
control  of  all  possible  canal  routes  so  that  no  competing  canal 
may  at  any  time  in  the  future  be  dug  by  other  powers.  The 
manner  in  which  we  acquired  the  Panama  Canal  Zone  produced 
a  very  bad  effect  throughout  Latin  America.  Following  Roose- 
velt's assertion  of  the  big-stick  policy  and  of  the  duty  of  the 
United  States  to  play  policeman  in  the  western  hemisphere,  his 
seizure  of  the  Canal  Zone — to  adopt  his  own  view  of  the  trans- 
action— aroused  serious  apprehension  and  made  the  countries  of 
Latin  America  believe  that  the  United  States  had  converted 
the  Monroe  Doctrine  from  a  protective  policy  to  a  policy  of 
selfish  aggression.  His  hasty  recognition  of  the  Panama  Repub- 
lic tended  to  strengthen  belief  in  the  reports  that  he  had 
instigated  the  revolution.  Colombia  felt  outraged  and  aggrieved, 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  61 

and  this  feeling  was  not  alleviated  by  Mr.  Roosevelt's  speech 
to  the  students  of  the  University  of  California  in  which  he 
boasted  that  he  had  taken  the  Canal  Zone,  and  that  if  he  had  not 
acted  as  he  did  the  matter  would  still  be  under  discussion. 

In  January,  1909,  shortly  before  the  close  of  the  Roosevelt 
administration,  Secretary  Root  had  undertaken  to  reestablish 
friendly  relations  with  Colombia  by  means  of  a  tripartite  treaty 
between  the  United  States,  Panama  and  Colombia.  The  pro- 
posed agreement  provided  for  the  recognition  of  the  Republic  of 
Panama  by  Colombia  and  for  the  transference  to  Colombia  as 
Panama's  share  of  the  public  debt  of  the  first  ten  instalments  of 
.the  annual  rental  of  $250,000  which  the  United  States  had  agreed 
to  pay  to  Panama  for  the  lease  of  the  Canal  Zone.  The  treaty 
was  ratified  by  the  United  States  and  by  Panama,  but  not  by 
Colombia.  The  Taft  administration  made  repeated  efforts  to 
placate  Colombia,  which  resulted  in  the  formulation  of  a  rather 
remarkable  proposition  by  Secretary  Knox  shortly  before  the 
close  of  the  Taft  administration.  His  proposals  were  that  if 
Colombia  would  ratify  the  Root  treaty  just  referred  to  the  United 
States  would  be  willing  to  pay  Colombia  $10,000,000  for  an  ex- 
clusive right  of  way  for  a  canal  by  the  Atrato  route  and  for 
the  perpetual  lease  of  the  Islands  of  St.  Andrews  and  Old  Provi- 
dence. These  proposals  were  rejected  by  Colombia.  The  Ameri- 
can minister,  Mr.  Du  Bois,  acting  on  his  own  responsibility, 
asked  informally  •  whether  $25,000,000  without  options  of  any 
kind  would  satisfy  Colombia.  The  answer  was  that  Colombia 
would  accept  nothing  but  the  arbitration  of  the  whole  Panama 
question.  Mr.  Knox  in  reporting  the  matter  to  the  President  said 
that  Colombia  seemed  determined  to.  treat  with  the  incoming 
Democratic  administration. 

In  his  message  to  the  Colombian  congress,  September,  1913, 
President  Restrepo  referred  to  the  conciliatory  attitude  of  Presi- 
dent Wilson,  and  added :  "The  probability  that  the  service  of 
the  Isthmian  Canal  will  soon  be  available,  the  advantage  of  culti- 
vating frankly  cordial  relations  with  the  United  States,  the  clear 
and  progressive  development  of  our  nationality,  and  the  peculiar 
needs  of  our  maritime  departments,  are  making  every  day  more 
close  our  rapprochement  with  the  great  Republic  of  the  North." 

It  would  probably  be  wise  policy  as  well  as  an  act  of  justice 
on  our  part  to  agree  upon  some  compromise  with  Colombia. 


62  SELECTED  ARTICLES  ON 

While  ordinarily  a  political  act  like  the  recognition  of  a  new 
state  is  not  a  proper  subject  for  arbitration,  there  are  certain 
features  of  the  Panama  case  which  posibly  afford  legal  ground 
for  Colombia's  demand  for  pecuniary  damages.  I  refer  to  Presi- 
dent Roosevelt's  interpretation  of  the  treaty  of  1846.  That  treaty 
was  a  contract  between  the  United  States  and  Colombia,  and  yet 
President  Roosevelt  construed  it  as  an  obligation  assumed  by 
the  United  States  for  the  benefit  of  the  world  at  large,  and  under 
this  interpretation  he  refused  to  allow  Colombia  to  land  troops 
in  Panama  for  the  purpose  of  putting  down  the  insurrection.  If 
Colombia  should  continue  to  insist  on  arbitration,  basing  her 
claims  on  President  Roosevelt's  forced  construction  of  the  treaty, 
it  is  difficult  to  see  how  the  United  States  could  refuse  to  sub- 
mit the  question  to  arbitration. 

The  Nicaraguan  treaty,  signed  by  Mr.  Bryan  but  not  ratified 
by  the  Senate,  provided  that  the  United  States  should  have  an 
exclusive  right  of  way  over  the  Nicaraguan  canal  route.  It  was 
stated  at  the  time  that  this  treaty  was  negotiated  that  Germany 
was  considering  the  possibility  of  getting  the  right  of  way  for  a 
canal  through  Nicaragua,  but  such  a  suggestion  seems  extremely 
improbable. 

Another  important  policy  is  the  acquisition  of  naval  stations 
in  the  Pacific  and  in  the  Caribbean.  The  Bryan  treaty  with 
Nicaragua,  as  we  have  already  seen,  provided  for  a  ninety-nine- 
year  lease  of  a  naval  base  in  Fonseca  Bay  and  also  for  the  lease 
of  the  Great  Corn  and  Little  Corn  Islands  in  the  Caribbean. 
The  Knox  proposals  to  Colombia  provided  for  coaling  stations 
on  the  islands  of  St.  Andrews  and  Old  Providence  in  the 
Caribbean. 

The  last  policy  to  which  I  shall  refer  is  President  Wilson's 
requirement  that  the  governments  of  Latin-American  states 
shall  be  constitutional  in  form  and  based  on  the  consent  of  the 
governed,  or,  to  state  it  negatively,  the  doctrine  of  non-recogni- 
tion. This  is  of  course  the  policy  that  the  administration  has 
adopted  in  the  case  of  Mexico.  In  his  Swarthmore  speech  Presi- 
dent Wilson  said:  "I  would  like  to  believe  that  all  this  hemi- 
sphere is  devoted  to  the  same  sacred  purpose  and  that  nowhere 
can  any  government  endure  which  is  stained  by  blood  or  sup- 
ported by  anything  but  the  consent  of  the  governed."  The  refusal 
to  recognize  a  revolutionary  government  is  not  as  novel  a  policy 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  .63 

as  some  of  the  opponents  of  the  Wilson  administration  would 
have  us  believe,  but  as  this  question  has  a  special  place  in  this 
volume  I  shall  not  venture  to  discuss  it  further. 

The  building  of  the  canal  has  thus  led  to  new  developments 
of  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  developments  not  applicable  to  firmly 
established  states  like  Argentina,  Brazil,  and  Chili,  but  limited 
to  what  we  Americans  erroneously  regard  as  typical  Latin- 
American  states,  that  is,  the  states  within  the  zone  of  the  Carib- 
bean. The  new  applications  of  the  simple  principle  announced 
by  President  Monroe  in  1823  have  aroused  the  apprehensions  of 
certain  Latin-American  writers,  and  their  denunciations  of  what 
they  are  pleased  to  call  this  pseudo-Monroeism  have  not  failed 
to  win  the  sympathetic  support  of  a  more  or  less  limited  number 
of  writers  in  this  country.  Some  of  these  writers  appear  to 
cherish  a  personal  grievance  against  this  cardinal  principle  of 
American  diplomacy  and  one  writer  in  particular  has  vehemently 
denounced  it  as  an  obsolete  shibboleth.  It  is  in  vain  that  the 
critics  point  out  the  difference  between  the  doctrine  of  1823  and 
the  doctrine  of  1914  or  the  difference  between  the  international 
situation  then  and  now.  If  the  original  policy  had  not  expanded 
with  the  lapse  of  time  or  taken  on  new  phases  with  the  develop- 
ment of.  new  situations,  it  would  long  since  have  ceased  to  be 
of  any  value  to  us,  for  the  exact  situation  that  called  forth  the 
original  declaration  in  1823  can  never  again  arise.  The  Monroe 
Doctrine  is  merely  a  name  that  Americans  have  given  for  ninety 
years  to  our  Latin-American  policy,  which  in  the  necessity  of 
things  has  undergone  changes  and  will  continue  to  undergo  them, 
and  it  is  no  more  likely  that  the  public  will  repudiate  the  name 
than  that  the  State  Department  will  repudiate  the  policy. 

Senor  Calderon,  in  the  Atlantic  Monthly  for  March,  1914, 
takes  issue  with  Professor  Bingham's  recent  attack  on  the 
Monroe  Doctrine  on  several  points.  He  says: 

It  is  not  true,  as  Professor  Bingham  maintains,  that  amongst  the  repub- 
lics which  form  the  ABC  alliance,  Argentina,  Brazil,  and  Chile,  powerful  and 
solidly  organized  states,  one  finds  any  jealous  opposition  to  the  neo-Saxon 
power — such  as  would  explain,  according  to  Professor  Bingham's  theory, 
the  alliance  of  these  ambitious  peoples.  On  the  contrary,  among  these  na- 
tions, out  of  range  of  North  American  action,  the  liveliest  sympathy  with 
the  politics  of  the  United  States  is  discernible.  .  .  .  It  is  rather  in  the 
"zone  of  influence"  of  the  United  States,  between  the  northern  frontier  of 
Mexico  and  Panama,  in  the  Antilles,  in  Colombia  and  Venezuela,  that 
hatred  against  the  United  States  has  become  a  popular  passion. 


64  SELECTED  ARTICLES  ON 

His  final  conclusion  as  to  the  future  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine 
we  may  safely  accept :  "The  wisest  statesmen  have  no  thought  of 
divorcing  this  doctrine  from  the  future  history  of  America,  even 
though  they  criticize  its  excesses  most  severely." 

North  American  Review.  199:833-40.  June,  1,914 
Monroe  Doctrine  Fundamentals.     Theodore  S.  Woolsey 

The  Monroe  Doctrine  in  its  ninety  years  of  life  has  been 
so  overlaid  with  comment  and  so  modified  and  enlarged  in  de- 
velopment that  we  are  apt  to  lose  sight  of  its  real  and  funda- 
mental character.  By  studying  its  essential  nature,  by  appreciating 
upon  what  it  is  founded  and  how  it  is  limited,  perhaps  we  may 
form  a  juster  sense  of  its  usefulness,  its  meaning,  its  legality. 
But  'before  all  and  throughout  all  we  must  keep  in  mind  that  it 
is  a  policy,  not  a  law,  municipal  or  international.  The  distinc- 
tions between  policy  and  law  are  wide  and  vital ;  here  are  certain 
of  them. 

A  nation's  policy  is  unilateral.  Though  affecting  other  states, 
it  is  formed  without  their  consent :  it  may  therefore  be  changed 
without  reference  to  their  wishes.  Germany  has  adopted  a  naval 
programme,  that  is,  a  policy  of  building  up  an  important  navy, 
without  consulting  Great  Britain.  The  United  States  determined 
to  dig  a  Panama  Canal  itself,  without  getting  the  consent  of 
other  commercial  powers  except  that  of  England,  which  had 
been  given  a  veto  of  such  action  by  treaty. 

A  nation's  policy  is  changeable  as  self-interest  dictates.  Thus 
France,  a  few  years  ago,  nagged  England  wherever  their  inter- 
ests met,  by  a  policy  of  pin-pricks;  then,  after  her  Russian  ally 
proved  a  broken  reed,  changed  attitude  and  welcomed  England 
to  the  Triple  Entente — all  within  a  decade. 

Policy  imposes  no  continuous  obligation  upon  a  state.  We 
here  in  America  are  quite  accustomed  to  have  the  action  of  one 
Administration  disavowed  by  the  next.  Our  financial  attitude 
toward  China  under  President  Taft  and  again  under  President 
Wilson  is  an  instance. 

Policy  is  based  upon  considerations  which  are  selfish  rather 
than  altruistic.  This  is  because  the  state,  like  any  other  incor- 
porate body,  has  a  fiduciary  duty  toward  its  subjects  which 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  65 

forbids  the  sacrifice  of  their  interests   for  the  sake  of  another 
state. 

In  all  these  aspects  policy  and  law  differ.  A  rule  of  inter- 
national law  comes  into  being  in  the  last  analysis  by  the  common 
consent  of  nations.  It  cannot  be  created,  though  it  may  be  sug- 
gested, by  a  single  power.  Great  Britain's  maritime  strength 
backed  by  her  administrative  and  judicial  attitude,  somewhat 
more  than  a  century  ago,  asserted  a  right  to  impress  seamen  out 
of  neutral  vessels  on  the  high  seas — i.  e.  to  enforce  a  municipal 
statute  outside  of  British  jurisdiction.  Unwarranted  by  tjie  con- 
sent of  other  states,  this  practice,  though  persisted  in  for  years, 
never  became  law  and  finally  lapsed.  A  law  is  universal,  not 
unilateral ;  it  is  fixed,  not  changeable  unless  changed  by  the  con- 
sent of  those  who  framed  it ;  it  is  binding  upon  a  state  even  if 
damaging  to  that  state's  interests;  it  is  neither  selfish  nor  al- 
truistic because,  once  having  become  operative,  no  question  of  self 
or  of  interest  enters  into  it.  Bearing  in  mind  these  distinctions, 
it  remains  to  show  that  the  Monroe  Doctrine  has  always  re- 
mained what  it  was  at  its  inception,  a  policy.  The  proof  is 
twofold.  First  no  international  agreement  can  be  found  which 
converts  it  from  policy  into  law.  Secondly,  there  has  not  come 
about  such  acquiescence  in  it  as  to  change  its  nature.  The  first 
statement  is  a  matter  of  record  and  is  perfectly  clear.  The  sec- 
ond may  be  doubted.  As  examples  of  an  opinion  contrary  to  the 
above  an  article  in  the  North  American  Review  for  1903,  by 
Mr.  Scruggs,  may  be  quoted,  also  the  reference  in  Cleveland's 
Venezuelan  Message. 

Mr.  Scruggs  argues  thus.  "Not  one  of  the  European  Powers 
has  ever  entered  formal  protest  against  it;  on  the  contrary,  all 
have  acquiesced  in  it  and  thus  tacitly  assented  to  it.  It  is  there- 
fore a  valid  part  of  the  public  law  of  this  continent,  and  until 
abandoned  by  us  or  until  formally  challenged  by  Europe  or  until 
modified  or  abrogated  by  public  treaty,  it  will  continue  to  be 
recognized  as  part  of  the  International  Code  of  the  Christian 
world." 

And  Mr.  Cleveland  said  in  reply  to  Lord  Salisbury's  objection : 
"It  may  not  have  been  admitted  in  so  many  words  to  the  Code 
of  International  Law,  but  since  in  international  councils  every 
nation  is  entitled  to  the  rights  belonging  to  it,  if  the  enforcement 
of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  is  something  we  may  justly  claim,  it  has 


66  SELECTED  ARTICLES  ON 

its  place  in  the  Code  of  International  Law  as  certainly  and  as 
securely  as  if  it  were  specifically  mentioned."  The  first  writer 
refutes  himself,  for  in  the  same  breath  he  calls  the  Doctrine  law, 
yet  says  we  can  abandon  it;  the  second  expresses  himself  too 
vaguely  for  specific  refutation.  It  is  enough  to  say  in  reply  that 
the  right  of  the  United  States  to  surrender  and  escape  from  the 
Monroe  Doctrine  or  to  alter  it  at  will  is  admitted  by  every  one. 
If  it  were  a  law  it  could  not  be  escaped  from  without  the  assent 
of  those  accepting  and  framing  it.  To  say  that  it  can  become  a 
law  by  mere  acquiescence  and  then  be  abrogated  or  modified 
by  the  ex  parte  act  of  one  state,  is  to  have  a  loose  and  mistaken 
idea  of  the  nature  of  the  law  of  nations.  Hence  when  a  writer 
asserts  that  the  Monroe  Doctrine  is  an  "obsolete  shibboleth"  he 
simply  means  that  it  is  a  policy  which  has  outgrown  its  usefulness, 
and,  not  being  law,  can  be  and  should  be  given  up,  which  is  a 
perfectly  legitimate  argument. 

There  are  now  three  fundamental  principles  which  character- 
ize the  policy  of  President  Monroe  as  it  was  and  as  it  is.  For 
the  sake  of  coherence  and  completeness  they  are  stated  together 
here  and  then  examined  separately. 

I.  The  Monroe  Doctrine  was  a  statement  of  policy,  originated 
and  maintained  by  reason  of  self-interest,  not  of  altruism. 

II.  It  was  justifiable  by  reason  of  the  right  of  self-defense 
(which  is  a  recognized  principle  of  International  Law). 

III.  It  called  no  new  rights  into  being,  therefore  whenever 
it  oversteps  the  principle  of  self-defense  reasonably  interpreted, 
the  right  disappears   and  the  policy  is  questionable  because  it 
then  violates  the  rights  of  others. 

I.  The  Monroe  Doctrine  dictated  by  self-interest.  The  cir- 
cumstances which  called  the  Monroe  Doctrine  into  being  are 
too  familiar  to  need  repetition.  But  the  underlying  motive  in 
it  may  not  be  so  clear.  This  had  nothing  to  do  with  fear  of 
enhancement  of  Spanish  power  in  Europe  which  was  incidentally 
struck  at,  because  in  the  same  message  the  United  States  was 
made  to  disclaim  all  European  ambitions.  "Our  policy  in  regard 
to  Europe  which  was  adopted  at  an  early  stage  of  the  wars 
which  have  so  long  agitated  that  quarter  of  the  globe,  never- 
theless remains  the  same,  which  is  not  to  interfere  in  the  internal 
concerns  of  any  of  its  powers." 

Nor   was   it   designed  primarily  to   aid  the   Latin-American 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  67 

states  in  winning  their  independence  or  to  preserve  that  in- 
dependence if  already  won.  If,  however,  Spain  should  recover 
her  American  possessions  by  the  help  of  her  European  backers 
(apostles  of  absolutism),  she  would  become  a  menace  to  the 
United  States  upon  this  continent. 

"With  the  existing  colonies  or  dependencies  of  any  European 
Power,"  said  Mr.  Monroe,  "we  have  not  interfered  and  shall 
not  interfere.  But  with  the  governments  who  have  declared 
their  independence  and  maintained  it,  and  whose  independence 
we  have  on  great  consideration  and  on  just  principles  acknowl- 
edged, we  could  not  view  any  interposition  for  the  purpose  of 
oppressing  them  or  controlling  in  any  other  manner  their  destiny 
by  any  European  Power  in  any  other  light  than  as  the  manifesta- 
tion of  an  unfriendly  disposition  toward  the  United  States.  In 
the  war  between  these  new  governments  and  Spain  we  declared 
our  neutrality  at  the  time  of  their  recognition,  and  to  this  we 
have  adhered  and  shall  continue  to  adhere,  provided  no  change 
shall  occur  which  in  the  judgment  of  the  competent  authorities 
of  this  Government  shall  make  a  corresponding  change  on  the 
part  of  the  United  States  indispensable  to  their  security." 

And  later  in  the  message  came  this  other  reference  to  the 
South- American  states:  "If  we  look  to  the  comparative  strength 
and  resources  of  Spain  and  those  new  governments  and  their 
distance  from  each  other,  it  must  be  obvious  that  she  can  never 
subdue  them.  It  is  still  the  true  policy  of  the  United  States 
to  leave  the  parties  to  themselves,  in  the  hope  that  other  parties 
will  pursue  the  same  course." 

The  policy  then  was  one  of  neutrality,  of  "leaving  the  parties 
to  themselves"  so  far  as  Spain  was  concerned,  which  would  not 
have  been  the  case  had  the  United  States  desired  primarily  to 
help  them. 

But  when  intervention  was  threatened  by  certain  great  Powers 
in  behalf  of  Spain,  then  indeed  was  there  evidence  of  "an  un- 
friendly disposition  toward  the  United  States."  This  idea  was 
amplified  thus:  "It  is  impossible  that  the  allied  Powers  should 
extend  their  political  system  to  any  portion  of  either  [American] 
continent  without  endangering  our  peace  and  happiness."  And 
again:  "We  owe  it,  therefore,  to  candor,  and  to  the  amicable 
relations  existing  between  the  United  States  and  those  Powers, 
to  declare  that  we  should  consider  any  attempt  on  their  part  to 


68  SELECTED  ARTICLES  ON 

extend  their  system  to  any  portion  of  this  hemisphere  as  dan- 
gerous to  our  peace  and  safety." 

Seventy  years  later,  President  Cleveland  in  his  Venezuelan 
message  asserted  the  same  principle  in  much  the  same  language. 
"Without  attempting  extended  argument  in  reply  to  these  posi- 
tions it  may  not  be  amiss  to  suggest  that  the  doctrine  upon 
which  we  stand  is  strong  and  sound,  because  its  enforcement  is 
important  to  our  peace  and  safety  as  a  nation,  and  is  essential 
to  the  integrity  of  our  free  institutions  and  the  tranquil  main- 
tenance of  our  distinctive  form  of  government." 

Incidentally,  no  doubt,  the  Monroe  policy  safeguarded  Latin 
America,  but  its  prime  object  was  to  protect  the  United  States; 
it  was  entered  into  from  motives  of  self-interest,  not  of  altruism. 
Neither  ethical  reasons  nor  legal  reasons,  therefore,  stand  in  the 
way  of  its  alteration  or  abrogation  if  a  changed  policy  so  wills. 

II.  The  Monroe  Doctrine  is  based  upon  the  right  of  self- 
defense. 

This  is  the  first  law  of  nations  as  of  individuals.  A  few 
sentences  are  quoted  almost  at  random  from  a  recent  and  very 
sound  authority,  Professor  Hershey,  to  show  the  nature  of  this 
right. 

The  right  of  self-preservation  takes  precedence  in  a  sense  of  all  other 
rights  and  duties  and  is  more  than  a  right  in  the  ordinary  use  of  this 
term.  ...  A  state  has  unquestionably  the  right  under  modern  condi- 
tions to  make  such  preparations  and  to  take  such  measures  as  it  may 
deem  necessary  for  it  own  safety  and  defense,  but  it  has  no  right  to  make 
a  disposition  of  its  forces  or  assume  an  attitude  threatening  to  the  existence 
or  safety  of  another  state. 

The  right  of  self-preservation  includes  the  right  to  preserve  the  in- 
tegrity and  inviolability  of  its  territory  with  the  corresponding  duty  of 
respecting  that  of  other  states. 

It  is  upon  this  right  of  self-defense  that  the  balance  of 
power  principle  was  based,  as  well  as  the  balancing  of  alliances, 
which  is  its  modern  substitute.  But  the  danger  which  warrants 
action  must  threaten  national  territory  or  national  life  or  the 
integrity  of  a  nation's  institutions.  It  must  be  real  and  serious, 
not  a  mere  blow  at  commercial  interests  or  political  prestige. 
And  if  we  study  again  the  language  of  Monroe's  message  we 
shall  see  how  real  the  menace  to  the  existence  of  the  United 
States  and  of  its  institutions  was,  which  he  believed  he  was 
combating.  "Dangerous  to  our  peace  and  safety,"  "endangering 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  69 

our  peace  and  happiness."  These  are  the  words  by  which  Mon- 
roe characterized  the  proposed  intervention  of  the  Holy  Alliance 
in  this  hemisphere.  Such  language  we  should  use  to-day  were' 
a  great  European  Power  to  seize  Cuba,  or  a  great  Oriental  Power 
a  slice  of  Lowrer  California. 

There  are  two  lines  of  reasoning  to  show  that  self-defense 
was  and  is  the  principle  upon  which  the  Monroe  Doctrine  rests. 
The  first  is  that  upon  subsequent  declarations  of  it,  this  prin- 
ciple has  been  adhered  to  and  restated  in  language  the  most 
explicit.  Examine  again  the  Venezuelan  version  in  1895.  Presi- 
dent Cleveland  objected  to  British  encroachment  upon  Venezuela 
because  (in  words  already  quoted)  it  threatened  "our  peace  and 
safety  as  a  nation";  because  it  endangered  "the  integrity  of  our 
free  institutions";  because  it  jeopardized  "the  tranquil  main- 
tenance of  our  distinctive  form  of  government."  Every  argument 
tending  to  show  that  the  policy  was  not  altruistic  proves  also, 
looking  at  the  obverse  of  the  medal,  that  it  must  have  been  based 
upon  the  idea  and  desire  of  self-protection. 

The  second  proof  of  our  contention  is  that  there  exists  no 
other  principle  upon  which  the  Doctrine  can  be  founded. 

Notice  what  the  Monroe  Doctrine  involved.  It  met  a  policy 
of  intervention  .by  a  warning  of  "hands  off."  It  set  a  limit  upon 
the  freedom  of  action  of  a  friendly  Power.  In  other  words,  it 
denied  the  full  sovereignty  of  that  Power.  Such  a  denial  of  a 
fundamental  right  can  only  be  justified  by  reason  of  some  prin- 
ciple equally  fundamental.  There  is  no  such  principle  except 
that  of  self-defense.  Here  was  no  claim  to  intervene  on  the 
score  of  outraged  humanity  as  in  Greece  or  Cuba;  nor  was  there 
any  question  of  international  police  power  such  as  in  south- 
eastern Europe  has  attempted  to  justify  its  interferences,  though 
this  in  fact  is  itself  dictated  by  fear,  is  itself  a  case  of  self- 
defense.  The  United  States,  warned  by  its  somewhat  sympathetic 
friends  abroad  that  a  plan  was  on  foot  to  crush  the  Latin-Ameri- 
can republics  and  restore  them  to  Spain,  their  former  sovereign, 
realized  the  danger  to  itself,  announced  that  it  was  a  danger, 
and  stopped  the  plan"  by  a  public  protest.  It  acted  in  defense 
of  vital  interests ;  one  can  hardly  reiterate  the  fact  too  often. 

III.     The  Monroe  Doctrine  called  no  new  rights  into  existence. 

Here  is  the  opportunity  for  much  loose  thinking.  Because 
the  Doctrine,  as  a  policy,  has  taken  on  new  forms,  has  been 


70  SELECTED  ARTICLES  ON 

altered,  expanded,  developed  like  the  opportunist  thing  which  it 
is,  we  are  apt  to  forget  that  its  fundamental  base  remains  and 
must  remain  unaltered.  It  is  indeed  a  paradox  that  the  stronger 
we  have  become  as  a  nation,  the  less  we  need  to  fear  any  power 
or  to  consider  any  principle  of  self-defense,  so  much  the  more 
broadly  has  the  policy  been  construed.  Whether  this  expanded 
policy  is  justified  or  unjustifiable  is  not  here  discussed.  It  is  the 
legal  rier^+  t1  rinciple,  not  the  policy  of  the  Doctrine, 

.-.^r  examination.  Whatever  becomes  of  the  policy, 
whether  it  be  expanded  or  be  surrendered,  whatever  the  power 
of  a  great  state  may  read  into  it,  the  principle  upon  which  it  is 
based  remains  unchanged.  A  policy  guiding  one  state  and  acqui- 
esced in  by  others  may  readily  change.  A  law  of  nations,  ex- 
cept with  the  consent  and  by  the  act  of  all  states,  does  not 
change.  We  may,  however,  well  remember  that  if  a  right  is 
pushed  beyond  its  reasonable  and  logical  limits,  it  becomes  an 
aggression  upon  the  rights  of  others.  A  policy,  therefore,  has 
its  limitations.  They  are  reached  when  the  rights  of  others  are 
violated.  By  the  Ashburton  treaty  of  1842,  disputed  territory 
in  northern  Maine  was  by  compromise  divided  between  Great 
Britain  and  the  United  States.  No  one  thought  the  Monroe 
Doctrine  violated,  though  it  meant  a  gain  of  territory  upon  this 
continent  by  a  European  Power  and  at  our  very  doors.  It  is 
reasonable,  therefore,  to  ask  for  proof  that  a  somewhat  similar 
struggle  for  territory  by  the  same  Power  in  distant  Venezuela, 
in  1895,  was  a  violation  of  the  Doctrine,  was  a  real  danger  to  our 
safety  and  to  our  institutions  as  Cleveland  said  it  was.  As  a 
policy,  submitted  to,  by  a  nation  desirous  of  our  good  will,  it 
may  be  defended ;  as  the  exercise  of  a  right,  not  so  easily,  be- 
cause the  basic  principle  was  probably  exceeded  and  thereby 
British  rights  invaded. 

This  is  a  single  illustration  of  what  seems  to  the  writer  a  self- 
evident  proposition.  If  a  state  pushes  its  action  beyond  the 
rights,  reasonably  interpreted,  upon  which  that  action  is  based, 
then  ipso  facto,  an  aggression  has  been  committed  upon  some 
other  state's  rights,  just  as  truly  as  one 'army  crossing  its  own 
frontier  invades  a  neighbor's  territory.  There  is  no  middle 
ground.  And  inasmuch  as  rights  are  based  upon  law,  without 
a  change  in  the  law  there  can  be  no  expansion  of  rights. 

The  Monroe  Doctrine  thus  is  to  be  regarded  from  a  two- 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  71 

fold  point  of  view :  as  a  policy  meaning  and  accomplishing  what 
other  states  submit  to,  and  what  seems  to  the  United  States 
useful :  as  a  measure  of  self-defense  which  cannot  be  pushed 
beyond  the  facts  calling  for  self-defense  and  yet  be  legally 
justifiable. 

The  writer  does  not  desire  to  call  in  question  the  develop- 
ment of  the  Monroe  Doctrine.  That  it  has  greatly  changed  in 
course  of  time  is  patent  to  every  one.  As  now  ordinarily  in+er- 
preted  it  denies  to  a  European  Power,  under  any  preter^,  xi'caii 
acquisition  of  territory  upon  the  American  hemisphere.  If  Euro- 
pean Powers  put  up  with  this  policy,  well  and  good.  If  the 
Latin-American  states  resent  the  air  of  superiority  implied  in 
this  interpretation,  that  is  a  phase  of  the  policy  which  must  be 
taken  into  account.  If  the  responsibility  which  the  United 
States  unconsciously  assumes  for  the  actions  of  its  neighbors 
becomes  a  burden  and  a  danger,  that  too  is  a  factor.  The  only 
purpose  of  the  present  argument  is  to  call  fresh  attention  to  the 
fundamental  basis  of  the  Doctrine  and  to  its  legal,  not  its  prac- 
tical, limitations,  with  the  thought  in  mind,  however,  that  no 
civilized  state,  the  United  States  least  of  all,  would  care  to  gain 
the  reputation  of  unscrupulousness  in  its  observance  of  Inter- 
national Law. 


Annals  of  the  American  Academy.  54: 107-12.  July,  1914 

What  European  Countries  Think  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine. 
Herbert  Kraus 

It  would  be  interesting  to  present  a  picture  of  the  many  inter- 
national conflicts  which  the  Monroe  Doctrine  has  prevented,  and 
at  the  same  time  to  attempt  to  portray  what  would  have  been  the 
probable  condition  of  affairs  on  the  American  continent  had  the 
Monroe  Doctrine  never  been  promulgated.  But  it  is  impossible 
for  any  human  brain  to  furnish  a  detailed  picture  of  this  imagi- 
nary situation.  To  do  so  would  require  the  prophetic  vision  of 
a  seer. 

No  stretch  of  imagination  is  necessary,  however,  to  recognize 
clearly  that  Central  and  South  America  without  this  great  prin- 
ciple of  isolation  would  be  a  field  of  great  rivalry  for  coloniza- 


72  SELECTED  ARTICLES  ON 

tion;  a  rivalry  which,  on  account  of  the  higher  value  of  the 
prizes  offered,  and  also  on  account  of  the  greater  power  of  resis- 
tance of  the  American  states  in  question,  would  make  the  strug- 
gle for  the  division  of  Africa  seem  small  in  comparison,  and 
cause  the  shedding  of  rivers  of  blood.  This  side  of  the  Monroe 
Doctrine  is,  as  a  rule,  not  yet  sufficiently  understood,  and  hence 
not  appreciated,  by  the  public  opinion  of  Europe,  which  follows, 
registers,  notes  and  criticizes  the  circumstances  in  which  this 
dogma  of  American  politics  is  applied. 

European  interest  in  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  at  least  in  the  three 
countries  chiefly  concerned,  viz.,  Germany,  England  and  France, 
is  uncommonly  great.  In  Europe  as  in  America  it  is  only  neces- 
sary to  connect  a  particular  incident  with  the  Monroe  Doctrine 
in  order  to  arouse  a  lively  public  interest.  Very  different,  how- 
ever, are  the  feelings  which  this  word  arouses  on  the  opposite 
shores  of  the  Atlantic.  In  the  United  States  one  always  finds 
confirmed  the  words  of  one  of  its  leading  statesmen,  who  once 
wrote  me  that  "it  may,  indeed,  almost  be  said  that  all  our  gov- 
ernment has  to  do  to  rally  the  people  to  the  support  of  any  meas- 
ure .  .  .  is  to  couple  it  with  the  revered  title  of  the  Monroe 
Doctrine." 

European  opjnion,  on  the  contrary,  generally  taking  a  critical 
attitude  towards  such  matters  as  are  coupled  with  the  Monroe 
Doctrine,  oscillates  between  a  dignified  reserve  and  a  certain 
distrust  which  soon  develops  into  open  hostility  on  the  part  of 
the  chauvinistic  press.  That  Europe  has  not  fully  appreciated 
the  causes,  aims  and  accomplishments  of  this  doctrine,  and  that 
the  full  comprehension  of  its  character  and  its  tasks  only  slowly 
and  hesitatingly  makes  its  way  in  the  public  opinion,  is  hardly  to 
be  wondered  at.  Is  the  situation,  after  all,  very  different  in  the 
United  States?  How  many  are  there  in  that  country  who  really 
have  a  correct  idea  of  the  purport  and  limitations  of  the  Monroe 
Doctrine,  based  on  an  intimate  and  unprejudiced  knowledge? 
How  often,  for  instance,  is  it  associated  with  affairs  with  which 
it  has  no  connection  whatever?  For  example,  what  relation 
has  it  with  the  much  discussed  question  of  the  Panama  Canal 
tolls?  This  controversy  is  nothing  more  than  a  dispute  about 
the  interpretation  of  treaty  rights.  And  yet  the  Monroe  Doctrine 
is  incessantly  drawn  into  the  discussion.  Even  such  a  man  as 
Champ  Clark  declared  in  his  recent  speech,  in  the  House,  against 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  73 

the  amendment  to  the  Panama  Canal  act,  that  "repeal  "would 
mean  practical  abandonment  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine." 

Although  some  German  papers  recently  went  so  far  as  to 
express  the  opinion  that  the  journey  of  Prince  Henry  of  Prussia, 
the  Kaiser's  brother,  to  South  America,  was  a  protest  on  the 
part  of  the  Kaiser  against  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  and  that  he  was 
thereby  showing  that  he  did  not  feel  himself  bound  by  it,  never- 
theless the  people  of  Germany  treat  such  a  groundless  statement 
with  the  contempt  it  deserves. 

The  chief  difficulty  the  European  experiences  in  interpreting 
the  Doctrine  lies  in  the  fact  that  he  unconsciously  judges  Ameri- 
can conditions  and  affairs  by  European  standards.  It  would  re- 
quire a  conscious  effort  for  the  people  of  a  continent  whose  po- 
litical sense  and  feeling  are  at  present  influenced  by  an  incessant 
rivalry  for  colonial  expansion,  to  conceive  that  a  state  may  have 
any  other  political  ideal;  that  its  ambition  may  not  necessarily 
strive  for  increase  of  power  by  colonial  acquisitions. 

That  the  United  States,  until  now,  has  not  shared  such  ambi- 
tions is  proved  by  the  history  of  her  foreign  policy.  This  policy 
furnishes  an  almost  unbroken  line  of  examples  to  sustain  such 
a  contention,  with  the  single  exception  of  the  wave  of  imperialism 
directed  toward  colonial  expansion  which  arose  at  the  time  of 
the  war  with  Spain,  but  which  quickly  subsided.  .It  is  impossible 
to  understand  American  foreign  policy,  and  with  it  the  Monroe 
Doctrine,  without  thoroughly  considering  this  difference  between 
the  political  ideals  of  Europe  and  the  United  States — a  difference 
which,  at  present,  undoubtedly  exists. 

On  the  other  hand,  I  may  venture  to  say  that  the  feeling  in 
Europe  towards  the  Monroe  Doctrine  is  slowly  changing.  It  is 
true,  one  sometimes  reads,  even  now,  heated  arguments  against 
this  Doctrine,  in  which,  unfortunately,  is  often  quoted  that  re- 
mark made  by  Bismarck  when  he  called  the  Monroe  Doctrine  "an 
international  impertinence."  But  such  arguments  seem  to  become 
less  frequent,  and,  on  the  whole,  the  number  of  sensible  and  more 
reasonable  critics,  who  consider  the  merits  as  well  as  the  weak- 
nesses of  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  steadily  increases.  A  convincing 
appeal  may  be  made  to  the  teachings  of  history.  They  refute  the 
hitherto  generally  accepted  argument  raised  against  the  doctrine, 
that  its  purpose  was  to  give  to  the  United  States  a  monopoly  of 
political  expansion  on  the  American  continent.  In  fact,  not  one 


74  SELECTED  ARTICLES  ON 

instance  can  be  proved  in  which  the  United  States  has  added 
territory  in  America  under  the  protection  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine. 
What  she  has  done  again  and  again,  acting  on  this  principle,  is 
to  prevent  the  over-sea  expansion  of  any  non-American  state. 

Of  particular  interest  is  the  change  of  public  opinion  in  Eu- 
rope in  another  direction.  Formerly  discussion  was  chiefly  cen- 
tered on  question  of  the  justification,  or  rather  the  lack  of 
justification,  for  the  existence  of  the  Doctrine.  This  question 
has  now  been  relegated  to  the  background  by  two  others.  One 
is  whether  the  United  States  can  and  will  maintain  the  Monroe 
Doctrine,  or  whether,  in  the  course  of  time  this  principle  will 
turn  against  the  country  which  formulated  it  and  become  a  bur- 
den. The  second  question  involves  the  duty  of  the  United  States, 
resulting  from  the  doctrine,  to  provide  for  peace  and  order  in 
Central  and  South  America,  and  a  reasonable  protection  for  non- 
American  interests.  Events  in  Mexico,  prior  to  the  recent  active 
measures  on  the  part  of  the  United  States,  chiefly  the  murder 
of  the  British  subject  Benton,  have  given  a  number  of  European 
newspapers  the  opportunity  to  remind  the  United  States  of  her 
duty — -to  play  the  role  of  American  policeman — a  duty  which 
ex-President  Roosevelt,  in  particular,  repeatedly  emphasized  as  a 
corollary  to  the  Monroe  Doctrine.  When,  however,  the  United 
States  interfered  in  Mexico  most  of  those  newspapers  had,  un- 
fortunately, already  forgotten  their  former  admonition. 

It  is  clear  that  Europeans,  becoming  more  and  more  reconciled 
to  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  accept  it  as  an  existing  fact  and  begin  to 
discuss  its  consequences. 

The  above  refers  only  to  the  old  style  Monroe  Doctrine,  to  the 
doctrine  which  wants  to  prevent  the  increase  of  political  power  of 
non-American  states  in  America,  and  which  may  be  styled  the 
political  Monroe  Doctrine.  The  affair  takes  a  different  aspect 
when  we  consider  that  new  tendency  to  extend  the  doctrine  into 
a  prevention  or  limitation  of  the  purely  economic  activity  of 
non-American  states,  or  their  citizens,  in  America. 

But  one  cannot  say  that  the  Monroe  Doctrine  has  actually 
developed  in  this  direction,  although  such  a  development  would 
not  be  inconsistent  with  its  character.  Its  transformation  into  a 
"commercial  Monroe  Doctrine"  is  relatively  easy,  and  signs  are 
not  wanting  that  it  already  tends  toward  a  development  in  this 
direction.  Recall  the  last  stage  of  the  Panama  Canal  affair,  and 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  75 

recall  more  especially  the  Magdalena  Bay  incident.  It  is  clear 
that  such  a  claim  as  "America  for  the  Americans,  economically 
as  well  as  politically"  would  meet  with  an  opposition  and  attack 
far  more  violent  than  any  which  the  political  Monroe  Doctrine 
has  ever  aroused.  It  is  probable  that  these  attacks  would  come 
not  only  from  the  non-American  camp,  but  also  from  American 
and  even  from  the  United  States  itself. 

It  is  difficult  to  formulate  a  decided  opinion  as  to  the  attitude 
of  European  diplomacy  toward  the  Monroe  Doctrine.  Available 
material,  necessary  for  that  purpose,  is  lacking.  One  fact,  how- 
ever, is  certain,  viz.,  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  to  the  present  time, 
has  not  been  expressly  recognized  as  a  rule  of  international  law 
by  any  country. 

The  question  as  to  whether  it  has  been  internationally  recog- 
nized as  a  political  principle  of  the  United  States  is  of  no  great 
importance.  Since  it  is,  in  fact,  a  political  principle  of  the  United 
States  which  has  been  in  practice  for  almost  a  century,  such  a 
recognition  would  be  only  the  acknowledgment  of  an  existing 
fact,  and  as  such  would  have  no  real  significance.  It  is  of  much 
greater  importance  to  note  that  the  other  states  evidently  reckon 
with  the  doctrine  as  a  factor  which  must  be  taken  into  con- 
sideration. 

The  last  instance  in  which  a  European  state  questioned  the 
validity  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  was  the  controversy  between 
England  and  the  United  States  as  to  the  boundary  between 
Venezuela  and  British  Guiana,  commonly  known  as  the  "Vene- 
zuelan boundary  dispute."  In  the  settlement  of  this  dispute  the 
United  States  won  its  most  brilliant  diplomatic  victory  for  the 
doctrine.  The  victory  was  so  complete  that  the  affair  has  re- 
peatedly given  occasion  for  the  assertion  that  England,  by  her 
attitude,  actually  recognized  the  Monroe  Doctrine  as  a  principle 
of  international  law. 

Since  the  time  of  the  Venezuelan  boundary  dispute  there  has 
been  only  one  dubious  example  of  a  disregard  for  the  great 
American  doctrine — the  Magdalena  Bay  incident  with  Japan  in 
1912.  Even  here  the  Japanese  government  did  not  contend  that 
the  Monroe  Doctrine  could  not  hinder  the  acquisition  by  a  Jap- 
anese syndicate  of  a  concession  of  land  from  Mexico  in  lower 
California,  to  which  the  United  States  objected,  but  simply  denied 
that  such  a  transaction  was  being  carried  out. 


76  SELECTED  ARTICLES  ON 

The  case  of  the  Venezuelan  debts  of  1901-1904  gave  the  Ger- 
man government  occasion  for  the  celebrated  declaration  "that 
under  no  circumstances  do  we  consider  in  our  proceedings  the 
acquisition  or  the  permanent  occupation  of  Venezuelan  territory," 
a  declaration  which  some,  incorrectly,  have  construed  as  a  recog- 
nition of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  by  that  government. 

It  is  even  reported  that  during  the  recent  Mexican  troubles 
some  European  governments  have  directly  applied  to  the  United 
States  to  act  as  intermediary  in  seeking  redress  for  the  injustice 
which  their  subjects  have  suffered  in  Mexico  (consider  in  this 
connection  the  Benton  case).  Should  these  reports  prove  true 
it  would  be  such  a  perfect  acquiescence  in  the  doctrine,  of  the 
governments  concerned,  that  the  jurist  would  have  to  consider 
seriously  the  question :  Have  not  these  powers  actually  conceded 
such  a  position  to  the  United  States  on  the  American  continent, 
that  she  is  entitled  to  the  general  observance  of  the  principle  that 
the  Monroe  Doctrine  proclaims? 

Annals  of  the  American  Academy.  54:66-83.  July,  1914 

Monroe  Doctrine  and  Latin  America.    Joseph  Wheless 

The  single  purpose  which  moves  me  to  a  discussion  of  the 
phase  of  this  subject  indicated  by  the  title  of  this  paper  is  to 
endeavor  to  clear  away  the  obscuring  mists  of  misunderstanding 
which  have  been  blown  up  around  the  Monroe  Doctrine  in  its 
immediate  relation  to  Latin  America.  "Ye  shall  know  the 
truth,  and  the  truth  shall  make  you  free,"  is  the  inspired  text 
of  the  evangel  of  better  understanding  which  I  come  to  preach. 
It  is  the  same  high  desire  as  actuated  Mr.  Calhoun  in  his  great 
speech  in  the  Senate  on  the  same  subject — "I  remove  a  false 
interpretation,  which  makes  safe  and  .proper  declarations 
improper  and  dangerous."  To  accomplish  this,  I  shall  rely  not 
upon  arguments  of  mine  own,  and  but  a  few  North  American 
interpretations,  but  shall  appeal  to  the  best  accredited  utterances 
of  the  most  authoritative  statesmen  and  publicists  of  our 
neighboring  states  of  Latin  America. 

That  a  false  interpretation  and  misunderstanding  of  the 
Monroe  Doctrine,  and  of  the  policy  of  the  United  States  there- 
under, do  exist,  and  have  been  responsible  for  no  little  ill- 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  77 

feeling  and  irritation,  is  unfortunately  true  and  cannot  be 
ignored.  This  fact  was  regarded  by  President  Roosevelt  as  of 
such  importance  as  to  be  made  the  subject  of  special  comment 
in  a  message  to  Congress.  In  his  message  of  December,  1905, 
he  refers  to  this  fact,  and  seeks  to  dispel  the  error  underlying 
it  in  emphatic  language: 

In  many  parts  of  South  America  there  has  been  much  misunderstanding 
of  the  attitude  and  purposes  of  the  United  States  towards  the  •ther  Ameri- 
can republics.  An  idea  has  become  prevalent  that  our  assertion  of  the 
Monroe  Doctrine  implied,  or  carried  with  it,  an  assumption  of  superiority, 
and  of  a  right  to  exercise  some  kind  of  protectorate  over  the  countries  to 
whose  territory  that  doctrine  applies.  Nothing  could  be  further  from  the 
truth.  Yet  that  impression  continued  to  be  a  serious  barrier  to  good  under- 
standing, to  friendly  intercourse,  to  the  introduction  of  American  capital 
and  the  extension  of  American  trade.  The  impression  was  so  widespread 
that  apparently  it  could  not  be  reached  by  any  ordinary  means. 

Certainly  no  one  has  been  more  earnest  or  used  more 
emphasis  than  has  Mr.  Roosevelt,  in  proclaiming  the  true  gospel 
of  the  policy  and  mission  of  the  United  States  in  respect  to 
the  American  nations,  and  in  striving  to  allay  the  baseless  fears 
of  aggression  and  aggrandizement  which  many  profess  to  feel 
towards  the  government  at  Washington.  The  truth  of  his  so 
often  repeated  declarations  of  the  good  will  and  peaceful  designs 
of  the  United  States  regarding  Latin  America  cannot  be  gain- 
said. From  his  repeated  utterances  on  the  subject  two  repre- 
sentative and  official  statements  may  be  cited.  In  his  message 
to  Congress  of  December  3,  1901,  the  President  said : 

The  Monroe  Doctrine  is  a  declaration  that  there  must  be  no  territorial 
aggrandizement  by  any  non-American  power  at  the  expense  of  any  Ameri- 
can power  on  American  soil.  It  is  in  no  wise  intended  as  hostile  to  any 
nation  in  the  Old  World.  .  .  .  This  doctrine  has  nothing  to  do  with 
the  commercial  relations  of  any  American  power,  save  that  it  in  truth 
allows  each  of  them  to  form  such  as  it  desires. 

Again  in  the  message  of  December,  1904,  President  Roose- 
velt states  strongly  his  views  of  the  policy  and  duty  of  the 
United  States: 

It  is  not  true  that  the  United  States  f^els  any  land  hunger  or  enter- 
tains any  projects  as  regards  other  nations  of  the  western  hemisphere  save 
such  as  are  for  their  welfare.  All  that  this  country  desires  is  to  see  the 
neighboring  countries  stable,  orderly  and  prosperous.  Any  country  whose 
people  conduct  themselves  well  can  count  upon  our  hearty  friendship. 


78  SELECTED  ARTICLES  ON 

One  of  the  most  friendly  critics  of  the  Latin-American 
policy  of  the  United  States  is  Senor  Alejandro  Alvarez,  of 
Chile,  whose  work,  "Le  Droit  International  Americain,"  is  a 
luminous  study  of  this  and  kindred  subjects.  Frequently,  in 
this  and  other  published  works,  he  calls  the  Monroe  Doctrine 
"the  political  gospel  of  the  New  World."  But  this  same  writer 
expresses  the  further  truth  that  there  exists  in  the  minds  of 
many  per^ms,  even  statesmen  and  writers  on  -international  law, 
a  serious  confusion  of  ideas  as  to  what  is  the  Monroe  Doctrine ; 
they  confuse  with  it  and  attribute  to  it  every  action  and  policy 
of  the  United  States  having  any  relation  to  Latin  America. 
Senor  Alvarez  goes  directly  to  the  root  of  the  matter,  saying : 
"Distinctions  should  be  made  between  (i)  the  Monroe  Doctrine 
in  its  primitive  form ;  (2)  the  hegemony  of  the  United  States 
on  the  American  continent;  and  (3)  the  imperialistic  policy  of 
that  nation."  Failure  to  make  these  very  obvious  distinctions, 
due  to  confusion  of  thought  or  to  inadequate  knowledge  of 
American  history  as  it  relates  to  Latin  America,  is  responsible 
for  the  whole  unfortunate  crop  of  hostile  criticisms  of  the 
Monroe  Doctrine  •  and  of  ill-will  towards  the  United  States  as 
sponsor  for  that  doctrine,  except  such  part  of  these  attacks  as 
is  due  wholly  to  the  ignorance  or  malevolence  of  their  authors. 
This  fact  is  clearly  recognized  by  Senor  Alvarez,  who  says : 
"Publicists  have  not  only  failed  to  see  the  real  origin  and 
nature  of  the  doctrine,  but  have  disfigured  its  true  meaning*" 
and  he  adds:  "For  the  majority  of  persons,  it  is  the  basis  of  the 
policy  of  hegemony  which  the  United  States  is  developing  on 
the  American  .continent."  Further,  on  this  latter  point  he  says : 

These  points  of  view  are  inadmissible,  since  the  idea  of  hegemony  does 
not  grow  out  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  nor  is  its  development  dependent 
upon  it;  and  the  same  objection  may  be  made  to  the  attempt  to  include 
within  the  category  of  "hegemony"  every  step  taken  by  the  United  States 
in  international  policy  in  the  American  continent. 

The  hegemony  of  the  United  States  is  the  fruit  of  the  prodigious  and 
rapid  development  attained  by  that  country,  outdistancing  the  other  Ameri- 
can republics,  and  the  de  facto  recognition  of  this  circumstance  not  only 
by  the  states  of  -Europe  but  also  by  those  of  America. 

The  United  States  as  the  most  powerful  of  the  states  of  America  be- 
comes the  natural  spokesman  of  the  continent  and  charges  itself  with  the 
duty  of  making  its  ideas  respected,  to  the  mutual  advantage  of  all. 

This  "confusion  of  ideas"  in  respect  to  the  Monroe  Doctrine, 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  79 

and  the  very  prevalent  disposition  to  make  it  a  .sort  of  scapegoat 
for  all  the  manifestations  of  the  policy  of  the  United  States, 
which  are  regarded  by  our  neighbors  as  acts  of  "hegemony" 
and  of  "imperialism,"  has  had  a  recent  striking  exemplification. 
This  was  the  failure  of  the  gracious  and  just  act  contemplated 
in  the  Fourth  Pan- American  Conference  looking  to  an  expres- 
sion of  appreciation  of  the  benefits  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  to 
Latin  America.  The  Latin-American  delegations  feared,  as 
expressed  by  Senor  Alvarez,  that  "while  approving  it,  they 
might  sanction  along  with  it  many  acts  of  hegemony  committed 
by  'the  United  States  by  which  more  than  one  country  had  felt 
its  sovereign  dignity  to  have  been  wounded." 

This  state  of  facts  should  give  sober  pause  to  all  those  in 
the  United  States  who  are  charged  with  the  important  and 
delicate  task  of  shaping  the  relations  between  our  country 
and  our  neighbors  of  Latin  America.  The  latter,  it  will  be 
.seen,  cordially  approve  "the  principles  which  properly  belong 
to  the  Monroe  Doctrine,"  while  they  have  taken  offence  at  and 
cherish  resentment  of  "certain  trends  of  policy  which  are 
foreign  to  it,"  but  which  they  undiscerningly  confuse  with  the 
Monroe  Doctrine,  to  its  disparagement  and  to  the  detriment 
of  the  good  relations  which  it  is  our  desire  and  our  duty  to  culti- 
vate with  our  sister  republics.  It  behooves  us  then,  who  desire 
to  steer  our  course  along  the  safe  and  pleasant  paths  of  inter- 
national -friendship  and  goodwill,  to  do  our  utmost  to  dispel 
the  misunderstanding,  at  home  and  abroad,  of  the  true  import 
of  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  and  by  future  considerate  conduct 
avoid  all  offensive  "acts  of  hegemony"  which  are  complained 
of,  even  by  friendly  critics,  as  having  wounded  the  sensibilities 
and  the  sovereign  dignity  of  our  neighbors. 

The  most  succinct,  as  well  as  authoritative,  statement  of  the 
Monroe  Doctrine  is  found,  naturally,  in  the  text  of  President 
Monroe's  historic  message  of  December  2,  1823.  It  embraces 
two  separate  but  correlated  propositions,  the  essential  words  of 
which  are : 

1.  ...      the  American  continents      .      .      .      are  henceforth  not  to 
be  considered  as  subjects  for  future  colonization  by  any  European  Powers. 

2.  ...     we  could  not  view  any  interposition  for  the  purpose  of 
oppressing  them,  or  controlling  in  any  other  manner  their  destiny,  by  any 


SELECTED  ARTICLES  ON 

European  Power,   in  any  other  light  than  as  the  manifestation  of  an  un- 
friendly disposition  towards  the  United  States. 

In  the  Annals  of  this  Academy  for  May,  1911,  Senor  Alva- 
rez makes  an  analysis  of  President  Monroe's  Message,  and 
deduces  the  generally  accepted  estimate  of  its  political  content. 
He  thus  summarizes : 

The  declarations  of  an  international  character  contained  in  this  docu- 
ment may  be  reduced  to  three: 

1.  No  European  country  may  gainsay  the  right  gained  by  the  nations 
of  the  New  World  to  their  independence  and  sovereignty. 

2.  The  right  is  recognized  of  these  same  American  nations  to  organize 
such  forms  of  government  as  best  suit  their  interests  without  the  interven- 
tion of  any  European  country  in  the  affairs  relating  to  internal  regulation; 
and 

3.  European  nations  are  prohibited  acquiring  by  occupation  any  part  of 
the    American    continent. 

The  foregoing  simple  propositions  are  the  "whole  of  the 
law  and  the  prophets"  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine.  As  Senor 
Alvarez  proceeds  to  say:  '"These  declarations,  by  their  precise- 
ness  and  definiteness,  became  henceforth  the  political  creed  of 
all  the  nations  of  the  new  world.  .  .  .  And  this  is  so  true 
that  all  those  nations  strove  for  the  solemn  proclamation  of  the 
Monroe  Doctrine  at  the  American  International  Congress  which 
met  at  Panama  in  1826."  No  candid  mind  can  justly  discover 
in  any  of  the  propositions  of  this  traditional  American  policy 
any  broader  scope  or  ulterior  purpose  than  those  stated. 

In  view  of  the  carping  criticism  of  our  American  patriots- 
at-large  in  aid  and  comfort  of  its  ill-advised  maligners  abroad, 
we  must  discover  what  really  is  the  status  of  the  Monroe  Doc- 
trine in  Latin  America,  officially  and  among  those  whose  opin- 
ion is  authoritative. 

With  the  utmost  enthusiasm  and  gratitude  was  the  message 
hailed  by  the  South  American  states,  whose  independence  was 
forever  assured  by  the  policy  declared  by  President  Monroe; 
their  governments,  and  the  heroes  of  their  independence, 
declared  their  hearty  approbation  of  its  principles.  Bolivar 
proposed  it  for  general  ratification  at  his  projected  Panama 
Congress;  and  from  that  date,  says  Senor  Alvarez,  "all  the 
Latin  states  have  not  only  striven  to  proclaim  it  solemnly  but 
also  to  unite  to  make  it  respected" — for,  he  says,  it  "expressed 
the  aspirations  of  all  America."  A  distinguished  Spanish  pub- 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  81 

licist,  Exmo.   Sefior  Alejo  Garcia  Moreno,  in  a  study  of  "The 
Monroe  Doctrine,"  in   1909,   says: 

These  principles  proclaimed  by  Monroe  were  accepted  universally,  in  the 
first  place,  in  the  opinion  of  the  people  of  the  United  States,  and  then  in 
that  of  the  other  American  republics,  and  the  Monroe  Doctrine  was  thus 
converted  into  a  principle  of  American  public  law,  which  received  its 
solemn  consecration  in  the  Congress  of  the  States  of  the  South,  reunited 
in  Panama  in  1826. 

The  highest  and  most  authoritative  men  of  the  states  of 
Latin  America  are  outspoken  in  approval  and  praise  of  the 
Monroe  Doctrine,  which  has  indeed  long  been  an  acknowledged 
Pan-American  principle.  Sefior  A.  de  Manos-Albas,  called  by 
the  late  William  T.  Stead  "one  of  the  shrewdest  and  ablest 
public  men  to  whom  Latin  America  has  given  birth  in  our  time," 
says :  "There  was  an  element  of  prophetic  inspiration  in  the 
declaration  of  President  Monroe,  uttered  in  1823.  It  rang 
through  the  world  like  a  peal  of  thunder;  it  paralyzed  the 
Holy  Alliance,  and  denned,  once  and  for  all  time,  as  far  as 
Europe  is  concerned,  the  international  status  of  the  newly 
constituted  American  republics."  The  brilliant .  Peruvian, 
Garcia-Calderon,  in  his  justly  celebrated  new  work,  "Les  Demo- 
craties  Latines  de  I'Amerique,"  says,  in  grudging  admission  of 
the  truth:  "The  United  States  proclaimed  the  autonomy  of  the 
continent  and  contributed  to  the  preservation  of  the  originality 
of  southern  America,  by  forbidding  the  formation  of  colonies 
within  their  vacant  territories,  by  defending  republican  and 
democratic  states  against  reactionary  Europe."  Before  the 
Fourth  Pan-American  Conference,  Dr.  Victoriano  de  la  Plaza, 
Argentine  minister  of  foreign  affairs,  recognized  the  same  truth : 
"This  condition  of  precarious  autonomy  and  liberty  of  action, 
and  the  constant  danger  of  being  subjugated  or  suffering  the 
mutilation  of  their  territory,  would  have  continued  among  those 
weak  states  but  for  the  wise  and  famous  declarations  of  Presi- 
dent Monroe,  to  which  we  ought  to  render  due  homage."  I 
present  a  final  citation  from  the  highest  authority,  the  eminent 
Argentine,  Senor  Luis  M.  Drago,  whose  words  are  commended 
especially  to  those  who  persist  in  a  misconception  of  the  spirit 
and  purpose  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine.  In  his  famous  note,  in 
1902,  formulating  the  "Drago  Doctrine,"  he  appealed  to  the 
saving  grace  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  as  against  European 


82  SELECTED  ARTICLES  ON 

aggression  in  Venezuela;  elsewhere  he  calls  it  "the  formula  of 
foreign  policy  of  the  new  world."  In  a  recent  exposition  of 
his  own  celebrated  doctrine,  he  uses  these  measured  and  weighty 
words  : 

The  Monroe  Doctrine  is  in  fact  a  formula  of  independence.  It  imposes 
no  dominion  and  no  superiority.  Much  less  does  it  establish  protectorates 
or  relation  of  superior  to  inferior.  It  creates  no  obligations  and  no  re- 
sponsibilities between  the  nations  of  America,  but  simply  calls  upon  all  of 
them,  with  their  own  means  and  without  foreign  aid,  to  exclude  from  within 
their  respective  frontiers  the  jurisdiction  of  European  Powers.  Proclaimed 
by  the  United  States  in  the  interest  of  their  own  peace  and  security,  the 
other  republics  of  the  continent  have  in  their  turn  proceeded  to  adopt  it 
with  an  eye  alone  to  their  own  individual  welfare  and  internal  tranquillity. 
This  moral  consort  of  intentions  and  tendencies  constitutes  in  itself  alone 
a  great  force  without  need  of  treaties  or  formal  alliances  or  definite 
obligations.  Thus  understood,  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  which  in  the  end  is 
nothing  more  than  the  expression  of  the  will  of  the  people  to  maintain  their 
liberty,  assures  the  independence  of  the  states  of  that  continent  in  respect 
to  one  another  as  well  as  in  relation  to  the  Powers  of  Europe. 

Such  illuminating  statements  of  the  principles  which  inspire 
the  policy  known  as  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  and  its  hearty 
acceptance  in  Latin  America,  should  have  the  happy  effect  of 
dissipating  the  misunderstanding  of  that  doctrine  which  is  so 
prevalent  among  many  not  only  in  Latin  America  and  Europe, 
but  among  some  in  the  United  States  who  should  better  under- 
stand their  government  and  its  historic  polity.  It  may  be  added, 
that  every  nation  of  Latin  America,  admitted  through  the  action 
of  the  United  States  to  the  last  "Parliament  of  Mankind"  at 
The  Hague,  has,  in  concert  with  all  the  other  nations  of  the 
world,  given  its  express  assent  to  the  Monroe  Doctrine  as  an 
essential  Pan-American  principle. 

The  last  word  of  authoritative  interpretation  was  uttered 
but  the  other  day  by  ex-President  Roosevelt  in  his  address  before 
the  University  of  Buenos  Aires,  in  which  he  declared: 

The  Monroe  Doctrine  is  meant  to  express  the  fact  that  the  western 
hemisphere  is  not  to  be  treated  as  Africa  or  mid-Asia  is  treated,  as  a  sub- 
ject for  conquest  by  any  old  world  power.  It  is  a  doctrine  which  the 
United  States  promulgated,  partly  as  a  matter  of  policy  in  its  own  interest, 
partly  as  a  matter  of  policy  in  the  interest  of  all  the  republics  of  the  New 
World. 

And  in  expression  of  a  very  patent,  but  often  perversely 
unrecognized  truth,  he  added : 

But  as  rapidly  as  any  other  republic  grows  to  possess  the  stability,  the 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  83 

self-respecting  insistence  upon  doing  right  to  others  and  exacting  right  from 
others,  just  so  soon  that  country  becomes  itself  a  sponsor  and  guarantor  of 
the  Monroe  Doctrine  with  which  the  United  States  of  the  North  no  longer 
has  any  concern,  so  far  as  the  doctrine  relates  to  it.  ...  As  far  as 
you  (of  the  Argentina)  are  concerned,  we  have  no  more  concern  with  the 
Monroe  Doctrine  about  you  than  you  have  about  us.  If  ever  it  became 
vitally  necessary  to  enforce  it,  each  would  help  the  other. 

The  Monroe  Doctrine,  in  its  pristine  significance,  is  thus 
seen  to  stand  accredited,  approved,  and  adopted  by  all  America; 
it  has  won  universal  acceptance  on  its  merits,  and  needs  no 
defender  or  apologist.  It  will  endure  as  an  active  principle 
until  its  protective  and  civilizing  mission  is  accomplished  with 
the  emergence  of  all  the  American  countries  into  self-sustaining 
nationality ;  until,  in  the  eloquent  words  of  Exmo.  Senor 
Bermejo  in  his  closing  address  before  the  Fourth  Pan- American 
Conference, — "the  day  when  America  entire  shall  have  finished 
her  institutional  evolution  in  the  sense  of  forming  'an  indestruc- 
tible union  of  indestructible  states,'  as  runs  the  phrase  conse- 
crated by  the  most  authoritative  Areopagus  on  earth."  Then 
only  may  the  Monroe  Doctrine  be  dubbed,  by  irreverent  school- 
men, an  "obsolete  shibboleth" ;  but  it  will  be  cherished  by  the 
emancipated  nations  as  of  blessed  memory  through  all  coming 
time. 

As  a  ward  against  European  aggression,  the  Monroe  Doc- 
trine is  not  yet  "obsolete."  Those  who  so  passionately  demand 
that  we  "abandon  the  Monroe  Doctrine,"  show  that  in  their  zeal 
they  reck  not  the  lessons  of  history  and  that  they  "ignore  the 
plain  facts  of  the  present."  Senor  Alvarez  recognizes  that  it  is 
still  the  welcome  shield  and  buckler  of  Latin  American  inde- 
pendence and  integrity,  saying:  "These  states  not  only  do  not 
reject  it,  but  have  sought  and  always  will  seek  protection  under 
it  whenever  it  may  operate  for  their  benefit."  The  Peruvian, 
Senor  Calderon,  who  virulently  assails  the  United  States  because 
of  his  own  "confusion  of  ideas"  respecting  the  Monroe  Doctrine, 
terrified  by  the  spectre  which  he  raises  before  himself  of  a 
Japanese  invasion  and  conquest  of  Latin  America,  "to  erect 
there  a  new  Japan,"  takes  comfort  to  his  fears,  exclaiming: 
"The  Monroe  Doctrine,  which  liberated  Latin  America  from 
the  tutelage  of  the  Holy  Alliance,  is  perhaps  destined  to  protect 
it  also  against  the  Orient."  He  begins  his  chapter  "Le  Danger 
Allemand,"  with  the  fearsome  words:  "The  Teutonic  invasion 


84  SELECTED  ARTICLES  ON 

disquiets  the  Hispano-American  writers.  The  tutelary  protec- 
tion of  the  United  States  does  not  suffice  to  make  them  forget 
the  European  peril."  Elsewhere  he  dwells  upon  the  fact  that 
tenacious  Teutonic  colonizers"  flow  into  Brazil,  Chile,  and 
other  countries  of  South  and  Central  America, — "the  German 
danger  remains."  As  for  Japan,  he  says:  "her  statesmen  and 
publicists  consider  that  Peru,  Chile  and  Mexico  are  lands  for 
Japanese  expansion,"  and  he  gloomily  predicts  <fa  struggle 
between  half-breed  America  and  stoical  Japan,  in  which  the 
former  will  lose  its  autonomy  and  its  traditions." 

History  has  been  a  long  record  of  expansion  of  active  and 
populous  nations  into  the  territories  of  weaker  and  less  popu- 
lated states.  There  is  nothing  to  indicate  that  this  movement 
has  reached  its  final  period.  Indeed,  the  struggle  for  expansion 
for  over-flowing  populations  is  reaching  its  most  acute  stage. 
The  possibility  of  a  "scramble  for  South  America"  does  not 
exist  alone  in  the  fears  of  some  South  American  theorists. 
Practical  men  of  state  openly  express  them,  and  some  of  the 
land-hungry  have  been  frank  to  avow  their  annoyance  with  the 
restraints  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine.  An  English  writer  in  the 
Nineteenth  Century  Magazine,  December,  1896,  speaks  cynically 
and  covetously  of  the  alluring  possibilities  in  a  "scramble  for 
South  America,"  and  says,  "if  it  once  begins,  neither  the  latent 
resources  nor  the  moral  influence  of  the  United  States  will 
avail  to  protect  its  clients  without  the  display  of  effective 
military  strength." 

Again  an  English  writer,  Mr.  Somers  Somerset,  in  the  same 
magazine,  for  April,  1903,  at  the  time  of  the  Venezuela  troubles, 
defines  the  ''new  economic  necessities"  which  look  towards 
Latin  America  for  a  solution,  and  says : 

In  proportion  as  the  available  surface  of  the  earth  that  is  suitable  for 
colonization  decreases,  it  becomes  more  and  more  evident  that  not  only  is 
there  no  time  to  be  lost  in  founding  an  empire,  but  that  the  price  which  a 
people  may  be  able  to  allow  itself  to  pay  for  the  acquisition  of  that  territory 
is  greatly  rising.  The  constant  pressure  of  the  peoples  of  Europe,  the  com- 
mercial struggle,  and  the  natural  desire  for  national  aggrandizement  are 
bound  to  be  powerful  factors;  and  the  consideration  of  "now  or  never" 
will  very  soon  mark  the  policy  of  various  European  chancelleries.  We 
have  already  seen  that  the  Old  World  offers  few  attractions — there  remains 
only  the  New  World  to  be  considered. 

The   veto  of  the   Monroe   Doctrine,    in    the   opinion   of   this 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  85 

writer,  has  up  to  this  time  saved  the  American  countries  from 
European  aggression ;  but  he  adds :  "it  must  be  remembered 
that  during  that  time  the  world  afforded  many  opportunities  for 
colonization  in  other  regions,  and  that  that  period  is  drawing 
to  its  close,  and  it  is  scarcely  to  be  expected  that  a  mere 
formula  or  opinion  will  continue  to  protect  those  countries  for 
long."  That  this  is  a  real  condition,  and  not  a  theory,  is  the 
belief  of  the  most  accredited  Latin  American  statesmen.  The 
events  in  Venezuela,  says  Dr.  Juan  A.  Garcia,  are  not  isolated 
facts,  measures  of  policy,  or  reparation  of  wrongs,  "but  the 
opportunity  which  materialized  a  tendency  latent  in  Europe 
since  the  middle  of  the  past  century  which  in  the  last  years  has 
been  emphasized  and  fortified  by  the  new  economic  necessities." 
This  subject  is  treated  at  length  and  very  seriously  by  Dr.  Luis 
M.  Drago,  in  a  recent  explanation  of  his  action,  in  1902,  in 
appealing  to  the  protection  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  in  behalf 
of  Venezuela  as  against  the  aggression,  of  England,  Germany 
and  Italy.  His  note  pointed  out,  he  says: 

A  danger  that  lay  very  near  and  it  aimed  to  forestall  it.  At  the  time 
when  it  was  transmitted  everything  combined  to  inspire  the  greatest  alarm. 
There  was  rife  in  political  and  diplomatic  circles  a  constant  agitation  which 
was  dominant,  and  was  disseminated  by  the  greatest  newspapers  of  the 
world,  the  most  important  and  best  accredited  reviews  and  the  books  of 
thoughtful  men,  and  which  pointed  out  these  countries  as  the  best  fields 
for  the  colonial  expansion  of  the  great  powers,  once  the  doors  of  Africa 
and  the  Orient  were  closed. 

Thinkers  of  the  highest  rank  have  suggested  the  advisability  of  turning 
in  this  direction  the  great  efforts  which  the  principal  Powers  of  Europe  have 
hitherto  made  for  the  conquest  of  sterile  regions,  with  rigorous  climate, 
lying  in  the  most  distant  corners  of  the  world.  There  are  also  many  Euro- 
pean writers  that  point  out  the  countries  of  South  America  and  their  great 
wealth,  with  their  sunny  skies  and  propitious  climates,  as  the  natural  theatre 
where  the  great  Powers  with  their  arms  and  instruments  prepared  for  con- 
quest have  yet  in  the  course  of  this  century  to  dispute  dominion.  . 
The  act  of  coercion  attempted  against  Venezuela  seemed  consequently  to 
be  the  beginning  of  the  hostilities  predicted  against  America. 

Writing  about  a  year  ago  in  the  English  Review  of  Reviews 
Sefior  A.  de  Manos-Albas  calls  Latin  America  "a  tempting 
field  for  expansion,"  and  frankly  states  the  incentives  which  the 
American  El  Dorado  offers  to  the  avidity  of  the  land-grabbing 
expansionists  of  Europe : 

The  territorial  responsibilities  of  the  Latin-American  nations  are  greatly 
in  excess  of  their  respective  populations.  The  seventeen  republics  from 


86  SELECTED  ARTICLES  ON 

Mexico  to  Cape  Horn,  with  an  area  seyeral  times  that  of  Central  Europe, 
contain  at  best  seventy  million  inhabitants,  who  could  be  comfortably  housed 
in  any  one  of  the  larger  republics,  leaving  the  immense  remaining  territory 
available  for  European  expansion.  Can  Tripoli  compare  with  the  broad 
and  fertile  plains  of  Northern  Venezuela,  bordering  on  the  Caribbean?  Or 
Morocco  with  the  Atlantic  coast  section  of  Colombia?  Can  the  Congo 
compare  favorably  with  the  Amazon,  or  Madagascar  or  West  Africa  with 
the  inner  lands  of  Peru,  of  Bolivia,  or  of  Ecuador? 

The  consideration  of  such  possibilities  implies  no  wanton  spirit  of 
alarmism.  If  Tripoli  has  been  thought  worth  Italy's  present  effort,  and 
Morocco  France's  recent  venture,  why  should  not  the  infinitely  richer 
Caribbean  coast  fare  likewise?  No  one  in  his  senses,  surely,  would  outrage 
the  Powers  by  supposing  that  their  abstention  has  been  prompted  by  moral 
considerations;  their  reputation  is  too  well  established. 

From  the  foregoing,  which  are  but  a  few  of  many  similar 
expressions  of  covetous  desire  towards  the  teeming  possibilities 
of  Latin  America,  may  be  better  appreciated  the  significance  of 
the  avowal  of  Senor  Alvarez  when  he  frankly  declares  the 
reality  of  these  fears  and  the  only  hope  of  salvation,  saying: 
"The  Monroe  Doctrine,*  far  from  being  a  thing  of  the  past,  as 
some  publicists  pretend,  is  still  of  present  importance  in  the 
sense  that  it  denies  the  existence  of  territories  'nullius'  which 
could  be  acquired  through  occupation  by  European  countries." 

It  is  needful  to  consider  briefly  that  "confusion  of  ideas" 
which  associates  the  welcome  and  approved  Monroe  Doctrine 
with  so-called  "acts  of  hegemony  and  imperialism,"  of  which 
complaint  is  made,  and  which  are,  rightly  or  mistakenly,  the 
cause  of  existing  suspicion  and  ill-will.  Knowing  the  truth 
and  justice,  or  otherwise,  of  these  charges,  we  may  better  be 
able  to  make  any  proper  amende  honorable  for  the  past  by  more 
considerate  action  in  the  future. 

The  writer  who  most  formally  makes  these  charges  and 
formulates  the  specifications  of  grievance,  is  Senor  Calderon, 
in  his  recent  "Les  Democraties  Latines  de  I'Amerique."  He 
opens  his  chapter  entitled  "Le  Peril  Nord-Americain"  with  these 
ominous  words : 

In  order  to  defend  themselves  against  Yankee  imperialism,  the  American 
democracies  would  almost  accept  a  German  alliance  or  the  aid  of  Japanese 
arms;  everywhere,  the  Americans  of  the  North  are  feared.  In  the  Antilles, 
in  Central  America,  the  hostility  against  the  Anglo-Saxon  invaders  as- 
sumes the  character  of  a  Latin  crusade. 

It  is  well  to  examme  for  a  moment  his  catalogue  of  griev- 
ances, which  he  reiterates  as  reasons  for  what  he  calls  "an 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  87 

accumulation  of  hates"  against  the  United  States,  and  because 
of  which,  he  declares,  "the  statesmen  of  the  South  refuse  to 
believe  in  the  friendship  of  the  Yankees."  After  citing  the 
"incessant  territorial  expansion"  of  the  United  States,  from  the 
Louisiana  purchase  to  the  Panama  Canal  Zone,  he  concatenates 
every  cause  of  complaint  which  he  can  conjure  to  his  imagina- 
tion, as  follows : 

Interventions  become  more  frequent  with  the  expansion  of  frontiers: 
in  the  territory  of  Acre,  in  order  to  found  there  a  republic  of  rubber- 
hunters;  in  Panama,  to  develop  a  province  and  construct  a  canal;  in  Cuba, 
under  the  cover  of  the  Platt  amendment,  to  maintain  internal  order;  in 
Santo  Domingo,  to  supervise  the  customs;  in  Nicaragua,  to  sustain  civiliz- 
ing revolutions  and  overthrow  tyrants;  in  Venezuela  and  in  Central  Amer- 
ica, to  impose  on  those  nations,  torn  by  intestine  discords,  the  political 
and  financial  tutelage  of  the  imperial  democracy.  In  Guatemala,  in  Hon- 
duras, the  loans  closed  with  the  monarchs  of  North  American  finance 
reduce  the  peoples  to  a  new  slavery.  Supervision  of  customs,  expeditions 
of  pacificatory  fleets  which  defend  the  interests  of  the  North  Saxon,  forced 
tranquillity  and  peace,  such  are  the  means  employed  .  .  .  The  fortifi- 
cation of  the  Panama  Canal,  the  possible  acquisition  of  the  Galapagos 
Islands  in  the  Pacific,  are  new  manifestations  of  this  imperialistic  progress. 

A  quite  similar  catalogue  is  set  out  in  the  open  letter 
addressed  recently  to  President  Wilson  by  Sefior  Manuel  Ugarte, 
the  foremost  apostle  of  the  proposed  Pan-Latin  crusade  against 
the  "colossus  of  the  North."  True,  neither  Sefior  Calderon  nor 
Senor  Ugarte  shows  wherein  Latin  America  is  wronged  by  any 
of  the  acts  recited ;  none  of  the  acquisitions  of  territory,  for 
over  half  a  century,  has  been  at  the  expense  of  any  country  of 
Latin  America ;  and  every  "intervention"  has  been  in  signal  bene- 
fit of  the  country  concerned  and  of  civilization.  The  United  States 
has  expanded,  in  obedience  to  its  "manifest  destiny,"  until  it 
fills  out  its  continental  domain;  that  is  an  accomplished  fact, 
and  justified  by  national  necessity  and  by  civilization.  However, 
and  far  from  a  spirit  of  recrimination,  but  in  justice  to  the  truth 
of  history,  which  is  now  past,  and  never,  it  is  to  be  hoped,  to 
be  repeated,  must  it  be  said,  that  if  any  of  the  events  instanced 
have,  indeed,  tended  to  give  occasion  for  the  irritation  attrib- 
uted to  them,  the  acts  complained  of  have  been  abundantly  pro- 
voked. The  United  States,  in  all  conscience,  has  been  far 
"more  sinned  against  than  sinning."  The  truth  of  this  is  wit- 
nessed by  the  Hon.  James  Bryce,  who  very  justly  says: 

United  States  statesmen  found  themselves  from  time  to  time  annoyed  by 


88  SELECTED  ARTICLES  ON 

the   perversity   or  shiftiness   of  military   dictators   ruling  Spanish-American 

countries.     The  big  nation  has,  however,  generally  borne  such  provocations 

with   patience,   abusing  its   strength   less   than   the   rulers  of  the   little   ones 
abuse  their  weakness. 

One  further  citation  of  complaint  from  Senor  Calderon.  He 
quotes  the  eloquent  and  earnest  words  of  Secretary  Root,  at 
the  Third  Pan-American  Conference,  where,  "before  assembled 
America  the  lay  preacher  of  the  new  evangel"  said:  "We  wish 
for  no  victories  except  those  of  peace;  for  no  territory  except 
our  own ;  for  no  sovereignty  except  the  sovereignty  over  our- 
selves. We  deem  the  independence  and  equal  rights  of  the 
smallest  and  weakest  member  of  the  family  of  nations  entitled 
to  as  much  respect  as  those  of  the  greatest  empire.  We  neither 
claim  nor  desire  any  rights,  or  privileges,  or  powers  that  we  do 
not  freely  concede  to  every  American  republic."  Over  against  these 
golden  words,  which  Senor  Calderon  calls  "the  solemn  declara- 
tions of  a  Puritan  politician,"  he  sets,  misquoted  and  out  of  its 
context,  the  language  of  Secretary  Olney  to  Lord  Salisbury, 
in  defense  of  Venezuela  against  Great  Britain,  to  the  effect  that 
"the  United  States  is  practically  sovereign  on  the  American 
continent" ;  and  Senor  Calderon  asks  "Where  is  the  truth,  in 
the  imperialistic  declaration  of  Mr.  Olney  or  in  the  idealism  of 
Mr.  Root?"  I  cannot  stop  to  demonstrate  the  fallacy  of  this 
mis-quotation,  as  I  have  done  in  my  book  on  this  subject;  I 
will  only  say  that  these  words,  well  qualified,  were  used  in  a 
"deft"  to  Great  Britain,  and  to  define  the  attitude  of  the  United 
States  under  the  Monroe  Doctrine  as  towards  Europe,  and  not 
as  respects  Latin  America,  as  a  reading  of  his  note  shows. 
And  in  1907,  before  the  American  Society  of  International  Law, 
Mr.  Olney  himself  clearly  defined  the  relations  of  the  Monroe 
Doctrine  to  Latin  America,  declaring: 

The  United  States  under  the  Monroe  Doctrine  assumes  no  protectorate 
over  any  other  American  state;  attempts  no  interference  with  the  external 
any  more  than  with  the  internal  affairs  of  such  a  state;  asserts  no  right  to 
dictate  the  domestic  or  foreign  policy  of  such  a  state;  and  claims  no  right 
to  use  force  in  the  affairs  of  such  a  state  except  as  against  its  enemies  and 
to  aid  it  in  defending  its  political  and  territorial  integrity  as  against  any 
European  aggression. 

To  persist,  after  reading  the  foregoing  words  of  Mr.  Olney, 
in  appealing  to  his  "practical  sovereign"  talk  to  Lord  Salisbury, 
either  to  bolster  up  baseless  attacks  or  to  create  prejudice. 


•'HE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  89 

would  savor  much  of  the  trick  of  a  shyster  lawyer  in  citing  to  a 
court  an  obiter  dictum  from  a  case  which  he  knows  to  have 
been  overruled.  All  fears  of  imperialistic  expansion  of  the 
United  States,  at  the  expense  of  Latin  America,  should  be 
considered  as  foreclosed  by  the  emphatic  and  official  utterances 
of  President  Wilson,  at  Mobile :— "The  United  States  will  never 
seek  one  additional  foot  of  territory  by  conquest."  Further 
more,  whatever  may  have  been  the  modicum  of  justified  com- 
plaint in  the  past,  the  present  is  very  pregnant  with  roseate 
prospects  for  a  happier  era  of  good  feeling  and  better  relations 
for  the  future.  In  this  regard  the  earnest  words  of  President 
Wilson  in  his  Mobile  address  to  Latin  America  are  of  propi- 
tious augury,  and  should  find  hearty  response  with  every  good 
American : 

The  future  is  going  to  be  very  different  for  this  hemisphere  from  the 

past.     These  states  lying  to  the  south   of  us,  which  have  always  been  our 

neighbors,    will    now   be    drawn   closer    to    us   by   innumerable    ties,    and,    I 

hope,    chief    of   all,    by   the    tie    of   common    understanding    of    each    other. 

It  is  a  spiritual  union  which  we  seek. 

While  the  Monroe  Doctrine  protects  Latin  America  from 
Europe,  some  of  our  neighbors  cherish  the  fear  that  it  is  not  a 
sufficient  guaranty  of  protection  against  its  own  champions. 
Quis  custodiet  custodem?  queries  Seiior  Calderon.  And  while 
Senor  de  Manos-Albas  says  that  the  Monroe  Doctrine  was  like 
a  gift  in  the  cradle  of  the  nascent  nationalities,  the  latter  have 
acquired  the  classic  superstition  expressed  in  Timeo  Danaos  et 
dona  ferentes.  A  remedy  to  remove  such  fears,  and  to  realize 
the  auspicious  avowal  that  "the  future  is  going  to  be  very 
different  for  this  hemisphere  from  the  past,"  I  feel  will  be  very 
welcome. 

To  broaden  the  Monroe  Doctrine  from  a  North  American 
policy  into  a  genuine  Pan-American  principle  is  the  easy  and 
welcome  solution.  Happily  this  is  one  of  the  most  manifest 
tendencies  of  the  times,  as  is  witnessed  by  many  authoritative 
acts  and  utterances  in  North  and  South  America.  As  early  as 
1862,  in  a  note  addressed  by  the  foreign  minister  of  Costa  Rica 
to  the  Colombian  government,  this  "old,  old  story  but  yet 
forever  new,"  of  fears  of  the  United  States,  is  recited,  together 
with  some  suggestions  of  current  significance: 

If  our  republics  could  have  the  guaranty  that  they  had  nothing  to  fear 


90  SELECTED  ARTICLES  ON 

from  the  United  States  of  North  America,  it  is  indubitable  that  no  other 
nation  could  be  more  useful  and  favorable  to  us.  .  .  .  The  idea  has 
occurred  to  my  government  that  a  new  compact  might  be  drafted  by  which 
the  United  States  should  bind  themselves  solemnly  to  respect,  and  cause 
others  to  respect,  the  independence,  sovereignty,  and  territorial  integrity 
of  the  sister  republics  of  this  continent.  .  .  .  Resting  upon  a  treaty 
of  this  kind,  our  republics  would  admit  without  diffidence,  and  without 
preoccupations  in  regard  to  the  future,  the  idea  of  an  intimate  alliance 
with  the  North  American  people;  they  would  feel  as  if  they  had  entered 
into  a  new  life,  and  be  possessed  of  greater  strength;  they  would  get  rid 
of  the  serious  and  just  fears  which  our  race  has  felt;  they  would  march 
together  with  a  firm  step  towards  such  a  unity  of  institutions  and  interests 
as  would  change  the  face  of  the  American  nations,  and  lay  the  strongest 
foundation  of  our  great  continental  alliance. 

Seiior  Manos-Albas,  writing  on  this  subject  in  the  English 
Review  of  Reviews,  stated  his  plea  for  "a  new  declaration  of 
Pan-American  policy"  in  very  earnest  words,  from  which  I 
briefly  quote: 

The  means  to  accomplish  unity  of  sentiment  and  to  dispel  the  mis- 
givings between  the  United  States  and  the  Latin-American  -republics  is  not 
far  to  seek.  It  is  only  required  to  amplify  the  Monroe  declaration  to  the 
full  extent  of  its  logical  development.  ...  If  the  United  States  should 
declare  that  the  era  of  conquest  on  the  American  continent  has  been  closed 
to  all  and  forever,  beginning  with  themselves,  the  brooding  storm  of  distrust 
will  disappear  from  the  Latin-American  mind,  and  an  international  cordiality 
of  incalculable  possibilities  will  ensue,  not  only  for  the  welfare  of  the 
American  nations,  but  universally  for  the  cause  of  freedom  and  democracy. 

Commenting  on  this,  which  he  calls  "3,  masterly  presentation 
of  a  plea  for  taking  a  forward  step  towards  the  world's  peace," 
Mr.  Stead  says : 

As  there  is  not  a  citizen  of  the  United  States  who  desires  to  make  any 
such  conquest,  the  acceptance  of  such  a  formula  by  the  Government  at 
Washington  would  have  as  its  first  and  immediate  result  the  removal  of  the 
one  great  obstacle  which  hinders  the  extension  of  the  influence  and  the 
interests  of  the  United  States  in  Latin  America. 

Practical  recognition  of  the  wisdom-  and  desirability  of  a 
co-operative  policy,  and  practical  steps  towards  its  realization, 
have  been  taken,  and,  as  I  have  said,  mark  one  of  the  most 
manifest  tendencies  of  our  international  relations.  In  the  first 
Pan-American  Conference  at  Washington,  in  1889,  a  resolution 
was  unanimously  adopted  "That  the  principle  of  conquest  shall 
not  .  ..  .be  recognized  as  admissible  under  American  pub- 
lic law."  At  the  present  time  there  is  pending  in  Congress, 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  91 

twice  favorably  reported  by  the  House  foreign  affairs  committee, 
a  resolution  of  which  Mr.  Slayden,  of  Texas,  is  the  author, 
reciting  that  "the  peace  and  commercial  development  of  the 
American  continent  would  be  more  certainly  and  speedily 
assured  if  the  various  South,  Central  and  North  American 
governnients  were  reasonably  assured  against  the  forced  perma- 
nent loss  of  territory  as  the  consequence  of  war  or  otherwise," 
and  resolves,  "that  the  President  of  the  United  States  be 
requested  to  enter  into  negotiations  for  the  making  of  a  treaty 
that  will  forever  quiet  the  territorial  titles  of  the  various  Ameri- 
can states."  It  is  understood  that  the  executive  branch  of  the 
government  heartily  approves  the  principle  of  this  resolution 
and  is  working  towards  the  end  suggested. 

Another  step,  already  begun,  and  the  ideal  of  Pan-American 
confraternity  is  happily  consummated.  The  republics  of  Latin 
America  have  long  been  silent  partners,  and  indeed  the  chief 
beneficiaries  of  the  North  American  doctrine ;  that  they  would 
welcome  being  invited  into  full  partnership,  sharing  in  both  its 
benefits  and  responsibilities,  is  evidenced  by  many  tokens. 
Taking  as  an  instance  a  possible  intervention  to  secure  the 
establishment  of  peace  and  order  in  Mexico,  Mr.  Sherrill,  late 
Minister  to  Argentina,  well  expresses  the  advantage  of  a  sort 
of  American  concert  of  powers,  suggesting  that,  rather  than 
action  by  the  United  States  alone,  that  Argentina,  Brazil  or 
some  other  American  country  be  invited  to  join  with  us.  The 
effect  of  such  joint  action  he  says,  in  the  case  instanced,  as  well 
as  whenever  "an  occasion  for  armed  intervention  in  this  hemis- 
phere arises,"  would 

have  two  marked  tendencies,  both  of  which  would  be  highly  desirable. 
First,  it  would  entirely  remove  any  idea  among  our  South  American 
neighbors  that  our  purpose  was  land-grabbing.  .  .  .  Furthermore  it 
would  be  the  best  and  most  convincing  form  of  invitation  to  Latin  America 
to  participate  equally  with  us  in  the  responsibilities  and  development  of 
the  Monroe  Doctrine.  The  great  Doctrine  would  at  once  become  conti- 
nental, and  cease  to  be  unilateral,  which  is  today  its  one  great  defect. 

Precedents  for  joint  action,  with  Jhe  happiest  results,  may  be 
cited.  A  signal  example  was  the  cooperation,  in  1907,  of  the 
United  States  and  Mexico  in  bringing  order  out  of  chaos  in 
Central  America,  resulting  in  the  notable  series  of  treaties 
signed  at  Washington  between  the  five  republics.  Later,  in  1911, 


92  SELECTED  ARTICLES  ON 

the  United  States,  Argentina,  and  Brazil  by  their  joint  repre- 
sentations, prevented  the  outbreak  of  war  between  Peru, 
Ecuador  and  Chile.  These  instances,  as  said  by  Dr.  Blakeslee, 
"show  that  the  United  States  has  already  made  a  beginning 
of  working  in  unison  with  Latin-American  states  in  enforcing 
the  police  power  of  the  continent.  It  only  remains,"  he  justly 
remarks,  "to  extend  this  occasional  cooperation  into  a  definitely 
formulated  and  generally  accepted  policy.  The  new  Monroe 
Doctrine,"  as  he  terms  it,  "would  accomplish  everything  that 
the  present  Monroe  Doctrine  accomplishes,  and  much  more.  It 
would  create  a  genuine  Pan-Americanism." 

The  advantages  of  such  an  international  entente  for  the 
welfare  of  a  hemisphere,  inestimable  in  making  for  peace, 
friendship  and  civilization  in  America,  are  admirably  stated  by 
ex-Secretary  Olney  in  a  recent  public  address : 

That  an  American  concert  of  purely  American  states  would  occupy  a 
position  in  America  practically  equivalent  to  that  of  the  European  concert 
in  Europe;  that  it  would  tend  to  avert  wars  between  states  as  well  as 
insurrections  and  revolutions  within  states;  that  it  would  do  much  to  further 
trade  and  commerce  and  intercourse  of  all  kinds  between  the  various  Ameri- 
can states;  and  that  the  United  States,  as  a  leading  member  of  the  concert, 
might  be  counted  upon  as  an  agency  for  good  even  more  potent  than  if 
acting  in  the  invidious  role  of  sole  and  supreme  dictator,  seem  to  be 
tolerably  sure  results. 

In  South  America  there  exists  a  great  league  and  confedera- 
tion between  its  three  leading  powers,  Argentina,  Brazil  and 
Chile,  popularly  known  as  "The  A  B  C  of  South  America." 
These  great  powers,  among  the  most  friendly  to  the  United 
States,  mignt  readily  be  won  into  such  a  peace-making  concert. 
These  three  great  countries  occupy  much  more  than  half  the 
extent  of  the  South  American  continent,  and  contain  much  more 
than  half  its  population.  The  language  of  Secretary  Elaine,  in 
1882,  in  reference  to  Brazil,  is,  a  fortiori,  much  more  significant 
if  applied  to  the  great  ABC  league : 

Brazil   holds,    in   the    South,    much    the   same    relationship    to   the   other 

countries  that  the  United  States  does  in  the  North.     Her  domanial  extent, 

•  her    commerce,    and   her    advancement    in    the    path    of    successful    progress 

exerts  a  beneficial  and  lasting  influence  in   South  America.      .      .      .      All 

this  tends  to  make  that  empire  as  necessary  a  factor  in  securing  peace  and 

harmony  in  America  as  the  United  States  itself,  while  its  interests  in  the 

great  and  humane  results  proposed  are  fully  commensurate  with  our  own. 

What,   then,   is   more   natural   than   that  these   two   great   Powers 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  93 

should  earnestly  unite  in  a  movement  which,  it  is  hoped,  will  mark  an 
historical  epoch  in  South  America,  and  exert  its  influence  on  countries 
beyond  the  seas,  and  on  generations  yet  unborn. 

Such  an  invitation  to  an  American  co-partnership,  extended 
to  the  partners  of  the  ABC  league,  together  with  several  of 
the  other  stable  republics,  would,  no  doubt,  be  welcome  and 
cordially  accepted.  The  United  States  exchanges  Ambassadors 
with  Brazil  and  Mexico,  thus  recognizing1  them  as  equals  on  the 
highest  plane  of  international  society.  A  like  exchange  with 
Argentina  and  Chile  would  signalize  our  deserved  respect  for 
these  potent  nationalities  and  their  welcome  into  the  new 
American  concert ;  a  congress  of  these  American  ambassadors 
could  readily  consummate  the  ."spiritual  union"  which  President 
Wilson  assures  that  we  seek  with  the  nations  of  America.  The 
basis  of  such  a  union  would  be  recognized  friendly  equality, 
and  would  necessarily  carry  the  pledge  of  respect  for  their 
sovereignty  and  territorial  integrity,  so  much  desired  by  our 
neighboring  republics.  As  said  by  the  well-known  Argentine 
political  writer,  Senor  Leopoldo  Lugones,  in  the  Revue  Sud- 
Americaine: 

Never  has  the  realization  of  Pan-Americanism  been  more  necessary  in 
the  New  World  than  now.  .  .  .  But  Pan-Americanism  means  nothing 
without  the  United  States,  which  represents  in  America  the  realization  of 
the  right  to  independence  and  the  triumph  of  democracy.  The  first  form- 
ula of  Pan-Americanism,  limited  to  the  needs  of  the  policy  of  defence, 
is  the  Monroe  Doctrine.  Its  declarations  constitute  the  most  significant 
and  decisive  act  towards  guaranteeing  the  independence  of  the  Latin- 
American  states.  Thanks  to  the  Monroe  Doctrine  our  territorial  integrity 
has  been  preserved — and  that  in  itself  is  enough  to  insure  the  United 
States  our  everlasting  gratitude.  ...  If  the  Monroe  Doctrine  guar- 
antees to  these  states  the  integrity  of  their  territories  and  their  institu- 
tions, Latin  Americans  have  nothing  to  fear,  .  .  .  secure  in  the  belief 
that  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  which  yesterday  assured  our  independence,  will 
preserve  it  to  us  tomorrow. 

I  wish  to  close  by  quoting  the  eloquent  words  of  Hon.  John 
Barrett,  Director  General  of  the  Pan-American  Union,  in  a 
recent  address  which  I  heard  him  deliver  in  Washington: 

I  believe  that  the  time  has  come  when  there  can  be  evolved  from  the 
Monroe  Doctrine  itself  as  a  principle,  and  there  can  be  substituted  for 
the  "Monroe  Doctrine"  as  a  phrase,  the  principle  and  phrase  of  a  "Pan- 
American  policy."  .  .  .  The  Pan-American  policy  would  adopt,  absorb 
and  enlarge  the  Monroe  Doctrine  as  an  original  policy  of  the  United  States 


94  SELECTED  ARTICLES  ON 

into  a  greater  and  "All-American"  policy,  where  each  nation  would  have 
the  same  rights  of  attitude,  the  same  dignity  of  position,  and  the  same 
sense  of  independence  as  the  United  States  now  has.  .  .  .  By  the 
substitution  of  "Pan-American"  for  "Monroe"  and  thus  including  all  the 
American  nations  as  sponsors;  and  by  the  substitution  of  "policy"  for 
"Doctrine,"  and  thus  removing  the  hard,  unyielding,  dictatorial  and  didactic 
suggestions  of  the  word  "doctrine,"  a  long  step  will  be  taken  towards  a 
new  era  of  Pan-American  comity  and  confidence.  .  .  .  Then  we  will 
have  achieved  that  ideal,  unselfish  and  fraternal  relationship  of  the  Ameri- 
can governments  and  peoples  which  will  give  a  new,  worthy  and  perma- 
nently accepted  significance  to  Pan-American  relationship,  Pan-American 
accord  and  Pan  American  Union. 

I  have  sought  to  present  a  consensus  of  American  opinion 
as  to  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  its  past  signal  services,  its  present 
significance  and  its  high  potentiality  to  the  future  welfare  of  all 
America.  I  trust  to  see  the  early  transmutation  of  the  Monroe 
Doctrine  into  a  Pan-American  policy. 


American  Society  of  International  Law.  Proceedings.   1914: 
217-29 

Should  the   Monroe   Doctrine   Continue  to   Be  a  Policy   of  the 
United  States?     George  H.  Blakeslee 

'During  the  past  year  there  has  been  an  epidemic  of  discus- 
sion regarding  the  Monroe  Doctrine.  This  has  been  due  probably 
to  the  dawning  consciousness  in  the  minds  of  the  people  of  this 
country  that  there  exist  strong,  stable  nations  in  South  America, 
which  no  longer  need  the  protection  of  this  traditional  foreign 
policy,  and  which  keenly  resent  its  supposed  spirit  of  guardian- 
ship. The  problem  whether  it  should  be  continued  unchanged, 
or  be  modified  or  abandoned,  has  been  a  live  issue  in  our  news- 
papers and  periodicals ;  it  has  been  debated  in  schools,  colleges 
and  universities  in  all  parts  of  the  United  States;  it  has  fre- 
quently, at  least  in  New  England,  been  the  topic  at  economic 
clubs;  and,  finally,'  it  has  been  studied  from  nearly  every  aspect 
at  three  recent  conferences  of  those  especially  interested  in  our 
foreign  relations. 

Yet  there  exists  a  certain  feeling  that  this  questioning  of  the 
infallibility  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  is  merely  a  temporary  fad, 
that  it  represents  nothing  substantial,  and  that  it  will  soon  be 
past,  leaving  the  traditional  American  policy  unchanged  and  tin- 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  95 

shaken.  This  view  was  expressed  only  the  other  day  by  the 
Honorable  Champ  Clark,  who  said,  ''Every  now  and  then  some- 
body rises  up  and  solemnly  informs  us  that  the  Monroe  Doctrine 
is  dead.  I  answer  such  people  as  those  in  the  words  of  Grover 
Cleveland.  .  .  .  Cleveland  said,  'We  are  sovereign  on  this  conti- 
nent.' "  Mr.  Clark  added  in  a  tone  of  absolute  finality,  "And 
we  are."  This  idea  that  the  Monroe  Doctrine  has  still  an  unshak- 
able hold  on  the  American  people  is  shown  further  by  the  recent 
words  of  a  British  essayist.  "To  the  Americans,"  he  says,  "the 
Monroe  Doctrine  is  like  God  or  religion  to  a  small  child — some- 
thing fearful,  something  to  inspire  awe,  something,  if  necessary, 
to  fight  for."  Is  the  keen  British  essayist  correct?  Is  the  Mon- 
roe Doctrine,  after  all,  like  God  to  the  American  people?  Are  we 
still  content  to  accept  as  a  matter  of  faith,  without  a  question 
or  a  doubt,  the  inspiring  and  all-sufficient  creed,  "We  are  sover- 
eign on  this  continent?" 

In  order  to  answer  such  queries  as  these  it  seemed  very 
desirable  to  secure  some  definite  evidence  regarding1  the  general 
attitude  of  thoughtful  men  in  this  country  towards  the  Monroe 
Doctrine.  But  how  might  this  attitude  be  discovered?  Whose 
opinions  should  be  asked?  It  was  finally  decided  to  obtain,  first 
of  all,  if  possible,  the  judgment  of  the  lecturers  on  international 
law  and  American  diplomacy  in  our  colleges  and  universities, 
since  these  form  almost  the  only  body  of  men,  all  of  whom  as  a 
class  have  given  this  subject  professional  study  and  whose  opin- 
ions at  the  same  time  are  almost  entirely  uninfluenced  by  political 
or  party  considerations.  The  writer  therefore  took  the  liberty 
of  sending  to  each  of  these  a  set  of  questions.  None  were  sent 
to  any  out  of  this  class  in  order  that  no  possible  suspicion  of 
personal  bias  in  making  the  selection  might  affect  the  result  of 
the  canvass. 

The  questionnaire  read : 

'  I.  Should  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  as  now  generally  under- 
stood and  interpreted  in  the  United  States  and  in  Latin  America, 
be  continued  without  either  modification  or  further  definition? 

II.  Does  it  need  clearer  interpretation? 

(a)  For  the  people  of  the  United  States? 

(b)  For  the  people  of  Latin  America? 

III.  Should    the    stable    Latin-American    states    (at    present 


96  SELECTED  ARTICLES  ON 

Argentina,  Brazil  and  Chile)   be  regarded  by  the  United  States 
as  supporters  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine? 

(a)  Should  this  support  be  limited  to  the  defense  of 
their  own  lands    from  European  conquest;  or 

(b)  Should    they    be    invited    to    cooperate    with    the 
United  States  in  interpreting  and   enforcing  the   Monroe 
Doctrine  wherever  it  may  apply  on  this  hemisphere? 

IV.  Should  it  be  abandoned? 
(a)     Entirely? 

(b)'    Below  the  Equator?  or 

(c)  Only  so  far  as  concerns  the  stable  Latin-American 
states  (Argentina,  Brazil  and  Chile)  ? 

V.  Other  views,  comments  and  reasons,  if  any. 

One  hundred  and  forty-six  replied,  representing  nearly  all  of 
our  leading  colleges  and  universities,  and  including  seemingly 
the  larger  number  of  those  best  known  as  leaders  in  this  field. 

A  study  of  these  returns  shows  that  certain  general  conclu- 
'sions  are  agreed  upon  by  a  very  large  majority.  These  are : 
First,  the  present  status  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  is  unsatisfac- 
tory; of  the  total  number  who  voted,  only  thirteen  believe  that 
it  should  be  continued  substantially  as  it  now  exists,  that  is, 
with  its  meaning  somewhat  indefinite  and  its  interpretation  and 
enforcement  dependent  upon  this  country  alone.  Second,  it 
should  nevertheless  not  be  abandoned;'  only  nine  wish  to  give 
up  the  policy  entirely.  Third,  it  should  be  more  clearly  explained 
and  decidedly  modified  in  certain  respects.  The  form  of  modi- 
fication favored  by  a  notably  large  majority  is  one  which  will 
recognize  in  some  way  the  importance  of  at  least  such  sister 
American  republics  as  Argentina,  Brazil,  Chile  and  possibly 
Peru.  It  is  held,  five  to  one  (104  to  20),  that  the  United  States 
should  share  with  these  stable  republics  the  responsibility  of  en- 
forcing the  doctrine  by  adopting  one  of  the  three  following  poli- 
cies, (i)  complete  cooperation  with  them,  or  (2)  abandonment  of 
the  policy  south  of  the  Equator,  or  (3)  abandonment  so  far  as 
the  stable  states  themselves  are  concerned.  It  is  complete  co- 
operation with  them,  however,  which  is  generally  favored;  the 
large  majority,  eighty-five  against  thirty,  believe  that  the  stable 
Latin-American  state  should  be  invited  to  cooperate  with  the 
United  States  in  both  interpreting  and  enforcing  the  Monroe 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  97 

Doctrine  wherever  it  may  apply  on  this  hemisphere.  This  strong 
sentiment  in  favor  of  cooperation  in  its  widest  possible  extent  is 
the  more  surprising  and  the  more  significant  in  view  of  the  fact 
that  the  doctrine  has  always  been  regarded  as  a  policy  to  be 
interpreted  and  enforced  by  the  United  States  alone. 

These  then  are  the  views  of  a  body  of  Americans  who  have 
made  this  subject  a  special  study:  the  Monroe  Doctrine  should 
not  be  abandoned,  but  it  should  be  more  clearly  explained,  and 
it  should  be  modified  so  as  to  rest  upon  a  basis  formed  by  the 
cooperation  of  all  stable  American  republics. 

In  addition  to  this  general  summary,  it  will  be  valuable  to 
consider  the  several  propositions  more  in  detail.  First  in  import- 
ance is  the  question  whether  the  Monroe  Doctrine  should  be 
continued  or  abandoned.  Typical  comments  from  those  who 
would  renounce  it  entirely  are  as  follows :  "Not  needed  by 
United  States ;  not  desired  by  Latin  America ;"  "The  basis  of 
the  doctrine  is  gone,  for  we  are  in  a  world  age  and  not  a  hemi- 
sphere age;"  and  "It  is  costly  and  dangerous;  likely  to  embroil 
us  in  war ;  makes  South  America  suspicious  of  our  territorial 
cupidity  and  unfriendly.  ...  It  implies  an  insult  to  a  spirited 
people  who  do  not  ask  for  it  or  acknowledge  it."  Others  would 
abandon  the  name,  but  retain  the  principle.  "The  words  'Monroe 
Doctrine'  and  "Monroeism/  "  one  writes,  "have  come  to  have 
such  a  disagreeable  connotation  among  our  neighbors  that  our 
policy  towards  Latin  America  ought  to  receive  some  other  name." 

Those  who  believe  that  the  doctrine  should  be  continued  rest 
their  contention,  for  the  most  part,  so'  far  as  they  have  expressed 
their  reasons,  upon  the  belief  that  there  is  still  danger  of  Euro- 
pean or  Asiatic  acquisition  of  territory  in  this  hemisphere.  Some 
of  the  comments  are:  "No;  it  should  not  be  abandoned,  for  the 
weaker  states  of  South  America  would  be  seized  and  colonized 
by  foreign  Powers  before  half  a  decade;"  "We  should  maintain 
the  doctrine  as  it  is,  or  strengthened,  for  another  one  hundred 
years,  or  until  the  danger  of  European  invasion  is  past;"  and 
"The  greater  danger  after  all  lies  rather  in  the  possibility  of  a 
sale  to  some  great  Power  by  some  South  or  Central  American 
state.  Therein  lies  the  strongest  argument  for  maintaining  the 
general  position  of  the  doctrine."  A  particularly  forceful  state- 
ment of  this  view  comes  from  a  former  diplomat,  who  says: 

As   one   formerly   engaged  in   the   application   of  the   Monroe   Doctrine 


98  SELECTED  ARTICLES  ON 

.  I  am  tremendously  concerned  over  the  present  tendency  to  dis- 
credit the  Doctrine  as  entirely  useless.  We  are  practically  inviting  trouble 
with  Europe  by  such  an  attitude.  We  do  not  want  another  African 
scramble.  .  .  .  There  are  European  nations  which  are  allowing  big 
indebtedness  on  the  part  of  certain  rich  states  of  Spanish  America  to  grow 
up,  in  order  to  have  a  greater  reason  for  intervention  when  the  opportune 
moment  should  arise.  It  would  seem  criminal  for  us  to  scuttle  out  at  this 
time. 

On  this  question,  whether  or  not  the  Monroe  Doctrine  should 
be  given  up  entirely,  nine  favor  abandonment;  123  oppose  it. 

But  if  it  is  not  to  be  abandoned,  it  should,  it  is  believed,  be 
more  definitely  explained.  That  a  clearer  interpretation  is  needed 
for  the  people  of  Latin  America,  is  asserted  by  107,  only  twenty 
dissenting;  while  an  only  slightly  smaller  majority  (94  against 
32)  maintain  that  it  is  needed  also  for  the  people  of  the  United 
States.  "No  one  knows  what  it  means,"  writes  one.  "The  his- 
tory of  its  applications,"  replies  another,  "would  seem  to  indicate 
that  it  means  what  the  existing  administration  would  like  to 
have  it  mean."  Still  another  says,  "it  means  anything  and  every- 
thing. It  is  a  cry  to  stampede  the  people  when  there  need  be  no 
real  alarm.  We  are  even  trying  to  believe  with  Champ  Clark 
that  to  repeal  the  Panama  Canal  toll  bill  is  to  abandon  the  Mon- 
roe Doctrine."  For  Latin  America  it  is  held  that  the  doctrine 
should  be  interpreted  in  such  a  way  as  to  exclude  from  it  all 
idea  of  territorial  covetousness  and,  if  possible,  all  claim  of 
political  sovereignty  and  tutelage.  This  view  is  shown  by  the 
following  comments :  "It  should  be  made  clear  that  the  Monroe 
Doctrine  is  no  part  of  any  policy  of  political  aggrandizement  by 
the  United  States ;"  "It  should  be  further  defined  so  as  to  make 
it  apparent  that  the  United  States  has  no  desire  to  interfere  in 
Spanish-American  affairs ;"  and  "The  Latin  Americans  con- 
sider it  an  unnecessary  and  at  present  indefinable  assumption 
of  superiority  and  of  guardianship  on  the  part  of  the  United 
States." 

One  suggestion  as  to  the  modification  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine, 
urged  by  many,  is  that  we  should  return  to  the  simple,  strictly 
defensive  policy  of  President  Monroe.  The  following  replies 
explain  this  position:  "Very  important  to  rid  the  doctrine  of 
some  of  the  modern  interpretations;"  "There  is  grave  danger 
of  our  being  dragged  into  a  policy  of  imperialism  if  we  retain 
it  as  it  is;"  "We  ought  to  return  to  the  original  construction. 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  99 

.  .  .  To  assume  the  position  taken  by  recent  Presidents  of 
a  kind  of  guardianship  over  all  South  America,  including  Mexico 
and  Central  America,  seems  to  be  a  piece  of  arrogance,  and  is 
productive  of  infinite  future  trouble ;"  and,  "The  original  Monroe 
Doctrine  was  clearly  justified.  .  .  .  The  Polk-Freling- 
huysen-Olney-Cleveland-Roosevelt-Lodge  version  of  it  is  a  con- 
stant source  of  irritation  to  the  South  American  republics  and 
is  a  menance  to  the  peace  of  the  world.  .  .  .  It  is  antiquated, 
worn  out,  and  in  its  present  form  ought  to  be  abandoned." 
How  widely  this  view  is  held  it  is  impossible  to  say,  since  no 
definite  question  was  asked  regarding  it  which  would  bring  out 
a  general  expression  of  opinion. 

Another  suggestion  as  to  the  modification  of  the  doctrine  is 
that  the  United  States  should  abandon  it  either  south  of  the 
region  marked  in  general  by  the  Equator  or  the  Orinoco,  or  else 
so  far  as  the  stable  South  American  republics  are  concerned. 
Of  those  who  hold  this  view  some  favor  absolute  and  unquali- 
fied abandonment,  as  is  shown  in  the  following  statement: 
''What  transpires  in  Argentina  is  oi  no  more  concern  to  us  than 
what  happens  in  Africa."  Others  oppose  absolute  abandonment, 
but  would  give  over  the  enforcement  of  the  policy  in  lower 
South  America  to  the  stable  republics  and  would  remove  from  it, 
so  far  as  this  region  is  concerned,  all  idea  of  sovereignty,  pro- 
tection and  guardianship.  This  is  shown  in  the  following 
replies :  "Yes,  it  should  be  abandoned  in  so  far  as  it  implies  a 
protectorate  over  them;"  "Not  abandoned,  but  suspended  as 
long  as  the  policy  and  conduct  of  these  states  show  them  to  be 
supporters  of  the  Doctrine;"  and  "The  Monroe  Doctrine  should 
be  abandoned  with  reference  to  Brazil,  Argentina,  and  Chile, 
save  to  protect  them  from  European  conquest."  The  summary 
of  opinions  shows  that  nine  would  abandon  the  doctrine  south 
of  the  Equator,  while  twenty-seven  would  abandon  it  in  Argen- 
tina, Brazil  and  Chile;  thus  making  thirty-six  who  favor  giving 
up  the  policy  for  part  of  South  America. 

Whether  or  not  the  doctrine  is  thus  abandoned  locally,  a 
very  strong  sentiment  is  shown  that  in  any  case  a  sharp  dis- 
tinction should  be  made  by  our  government,  in  its  application 
of  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  between  the  Panama  Canal  region,  on 
the  one  hand  (Mexico,  Central  America,  the  West  Indies, 
Venezuela  and  Colombia),  and,  on  the  other,  the  region  of  the 


ioo  SELECTED  ARTICLES  ON 

stable  republics  of  South  America.  This  view  is  shown  by  such 
quotations  as  these:  "Over  the  Caribbean  state,  Mexico  to 
Venezuela,  our  position  should  be  that  of  a  protecting  power, 
with. treaty  rights  wherever  possible,  to  support  stable  govern- 
ments ;"  "The  doctrine  should  be  extended  and  made  more 
positive  for  the  Caribbean  countries;"  and  "As  to  territory 
between  the  Rio  Grande  and  the  Panama  Canal  the  United 
States  must  act  alone  and  be  practically  paramount."  Some- 
what more  than  forty  of  those  who  answered  the  questionnaire 
went  out  of  their  way  to  express  their  opinion  in  one  form  or 
another  that  there  should  be  a  marked  difference,  in  the  applica- 
tion of  our  policies,  between  these  two  sections. 

The  modification  of  the  M'onroe  Doctrine  which  appeals 
most  strongly  to  the  body  of  men  whose  opinions  we  are  dis- 
cussing, is,  as  has  been  said,  some  form  of  cooperation.  There 
are  those  who  oppose  cooperation,  however,  on  the  ground,  that, 
"We  are  sovereign  on  this  hemisphere,"  and  should  play  the 
part.  Others  oppose  it  from  the  fear  that  it  would  lead  to  a 
hard  and  fast  alliance  in  which  the  United  States  might  be 
out-voted  in  questions  of  vital  concern,  especially  in  the  Panama 
region.  As  one  of  these  critics  writes,  "If  such  a  policy  were 
adopted  the  Latin  Powers  would  dominate  the  affairs  of  the 
new  world." 

Representative  opinions  of  those  favoring  cooperation  are  as 
follows:  "The  Monroe  Doctrine  should  take  in  all  America  and 
all  America  both  North  and  South,  should  unite  in  upholding 
it;"  "The  Monroe  Doctrine  should  be  turned  into  a  mutual 
association  of  equal  states,  supporting  one  another  for  the  com- 
mon welfare  of  the  Americas  and  operating  for  the  development 
and  prosperity  of  each  and  all;"  "Unless  we  can  obtain  their 
support  the  doctrine  is  futile;"  "We  should  not  excite  the 
sensibilities  of  the  Latin  American  states  by  claims  of  superi- 
ority and  of  sovereignty  in  this  hemisphere,  but  join  with  the 
well  behaved  states  in  guiding  the  weak  ones;"  and  "The  trend, 
seems  to  me,  is  toward  a  world's  concert  of  the  great  nations, 
but  as  long  as  there  is  a  Concert  of  Europe,  let  us  have  an 
American  concert  of  nations,  the  United  States  and  the  three 
more  stable  of  the  South  American  republics,  and  other  Ameri- 
can nations  as  fast  as  they  prove  their  fitness." 

If  the  writer  might  hazard  a  further  explanation  of  the  kind 


y. 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE1  101 


of  cooperation  which  is  generally  desired,  he  would  suggest 
that  it  is  in  the  nature  of  an  understanding  rather  than  of  any 
definite  alliance.  While  cooperation  should  take  place  in  the 
sense  of  a  mutual  exchanging1  of  views;  joint  agreements,  so 
far  as  possible,  upon  questions  of  interpretation  and  defense; 
and  occasionally  joint  military  operations;  yet,  in  the  ordinary 
course,  such  stable  states  as  Argentina,  Brazil,  Chile  and  pos- 
sibly Peru  would  naturally  take  the  lead  in  enforcing  the 
Monroe  Doctrine  in  their  own  section,  and  the  United  States 
would  expect  a  like  leadership  in  the  region  about  the  Caribbean 
Sea. 

In  one  of  the  letters  received  in  answer  to  the  list  of  ques- 
tions sent  out,  a  university  professor  wrote:  ''Your  summary 
will  be  most  interesting.  .  .  .  Will  it,  however,  represent 
the  American  people?  There  seems,"  he  said,  "a  considerable 
disposition  among  those  of  us  who  fill  academic  positions  to 
discard  or  deprecate  the  Doctrine."  To  anticipate  such  an 
implied  criticism  as  this,  it  should  be  stated  that  no  claim  is 
made  that  this  summary  of  the  views  of  the  lecturers  upon 
international  law  represents  the  ordinary  thought  of  "the  man 
on  the  street."  It  is  believed,  however,  that  it  is  an  excellent 
test  of  the  attitude  of  the  best  informed  and  of  the  most 
advanced  public  opinion  of  the  nation,  as  well  as  of  the  judg- 
ment towards  which  this  country  as  a  whole  is  rapidly  tending. 

But  the  writer  wished  also  to  gauge  the  feelings  of  "the 
American  people,"  as  the  letter  has  expressed  it,  and  so  sent 
this  same  set  of  questions  to  a  carefully  selected  list  of  news- 
papers and  periodicals.  From  the  replies  received,  and  from  a 
few  recent  editorials  in  which  one  or  more  phases  of  the  doc- 
trine are  discussed,  answers  or  opinions  upon  some  or  all  of 
the  questions  submitted  have  been  obtained  from  forty-seven 
leading  publications. 

The  first  impression  is  that  the  foremost  newspapers  and 
periodicals,  instead  of  being  enthusiastic  supporters  of  the 
present  Monroe  Doctrine,  as  it  was  expected  they  would  be, 
are  sorriewhat  hazy  in  their  views  regarding  the  various  aspects 
of  the  policy.  The  editor  of  the  Omaha  Bee  writes,  "I  doubt 
whether  the  sentiment  of  our  general  public  is  crystallized  on  the 
subject  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine,"  and  he  adds,  "Speaking  briefly 
of  my  own  views,  and  which  I  think  reflect  the  views  of  many 


'102  'SELECTED  ARTICLES  ON 

with  whom  I  come  in  contact,  I  would  say  that  the  Monroe 
Doctrine  needs  redefinition." 

But  the  important  fact  regarding  the  opinions  of  the  press, 
so  far  as  they  have  been  obtained,  is  that  they  accord  substan- 
tially with  those  of  the  college  and  university  professors  of 
international  law  and  diplomacy.  There  is  a  general  feeling 
of  dissatisfaction  with  the  Doctrine  in  its  present  form,  a  belief 
that  it  should  be  more  clearly  explained,  and  that  it  should  be 
modified  in  certain  respects.  Only  four  publications  definitely 
give  full  approval  to  the  Doctrine  as  it  was  generally  interpreted 
at  the  present  time.  One  of  these  is  the  Kansas  City  Star, 
which  states,  "The  Kansas  City  Star  always  upholds  the  Presi- 
dent on  matters  of  foreign  policy,  including  his  interpretation 
of  the  Monroe  Doctrine."  Two  of  the  others  are  the  Springfield 
Republican  and  the  Brooklyn  Eagle. 

On  the  other  hand,  there  is  a  general  conviction  that  the 
Doctrine  should  not  be  given  'up  entirely;.  The  Louisville 
Courier  Journal  seems  to  be  the  only  paper  to  favor  complete 
abandonment. 

As  to  constructive  changes,  a  large  majority,  thirty  to  seven, 
believe  that  the  Doctrine  needs  clearer  interpretation,  especially 
for  Latin  America.  The  modification  of  the  Doctrine  which  the 
press  believe  is  needed,  is  the  same  suggested  by  such  a  large 
majority  of  the  university  world,  cooperation  with  at  least  the 
stable  American  republics.  So  far  as  definite  views  have  been 
expressed  on  this  point,  thirty  favor  cooperation  of  some  form, 
while  only  six  show  that  they  are  definitely  opposed  to  it. 
Twenty-five  believe  in  the  most  complete  cooperation,  that  is, 
in  joint  action  by  the  Stable  Latin- American  countries  and  the 
United  States  in  both  interpreting  and  enforcing  the  Monroe 
Doctrine  wherever  it  may  apply  on  this  hemisphere. 

A  few  direct  quotations  from  various  papers  will  show  the 
general  dissatisfaction  with  this  policy  in  its  present  form. 
"The  Monroe  Doctrine  is  as  elastic  as  India  rubber  and  as  com- 
prehensive as  all  outdoors"  (New  York  Sun)  ;  "That  vague 
thing  known  as  the  Monroe  Doctrine"  (New  York  'Evening 
Post)  ;  "The  whole  world  would  be  grateful  for  some  depend- 
able definition"  (Detroit  Free  Press)  ;  "The  doctrine  should  be 
abandoned  or  emphatically  restated"  ( Harrisburg  Telegraph); 
"The  time  has  clearly  come  for  revaluing  the  Monroe  Doctrine" 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  103 

(Boston  Herald)  ;  "The  Monroe  Doctrine,  President-made  in  the 
first  place,  has  been  made  over  and  over  again  until  its  own 
father  wouldn't  know  his  child"  (The  New  York  Press)  ;  "It 
means  just  what  we  wish  it  to  mean,  and  is  to  be  applied  only 
when  we  think  it  wise.  It  has  been  modified  to  death."  (The 
Nation.) 

Some  papers  strongly  favor  a  return  to  the  original  meaning 
of  Monroe,  as  shown  by  the  following  comments :  "It  should 
be  continued  as  stated  by  Monroe."  (Omaha  World-Herald)  ; 
"In  principle  it  should  be  continued.  The  interpretation  of  the 
Doctrine  in  late  years  is  an  unwarranted  extension  of  the 
responsibility  of  the  United  States"  (Wilkes-Barre  Record)  ; 
"The  Monroe  Doctrine  should  be  construed  strictly  by  the 
terms  of  its  early  formulation.  The  United  States  by  adher- 
ence to  it  assumes  no  office  of  policing  South  and  Central 
American  countries"  (The  State,  Columbia,  S.  C.)  ;  "As  it  is 
now  interpreted  here  and  elsewhere,  the  Monroe  Doctrine 
becomes  not  only  a  menace  to  our  peace  and  safety  but  fails 
utterly  in  its  benevolent  purpose  as  regards  the  southern  repub- 
lics" (New  York  World)  ;  the  Monroe  Doctrine  "does  not  make 
us  the  guardian  and  wet-nurse  of  Latin  American  republics. 
.  .  .  There  is  great  need  that  the  Latin  American  nations, 
European  nations,  and  especially  this  nation  should  understand 
thoroughly  what  the  Doctrine  does  mean  and  does  not  mean" 
(The  Duluth  Herald). 

There  is,  further,  a  widely  held  conviction  that  the  Monroe 
Doctrine  should  be  changed  from  a  unilateral  to  a  Pan-Ameri- 
can basis.  Several  of  the  pubications  gave  their  reasons  for 
this  belief  and  their  comments,  some  of  which  are  as  follows: 
"It  should  mean  that  all  stable  republics  should  unite  to  prevent 
aggression  or  colonies  representing  European  or  Asiatic 
Powers"  (The  Philadelphia  Public  Ledger)  ;  "It  is  only  through 
the  frankest '  cooperation  .  .  .  that  the  Monroe  Doctrine 
can  be  prevented  from  becoming  a  source  of  offense  between 
the  United  States  and  the  other  nations  of  the  new  world" 
(Detroit  Free  Press)  ;  "The  remedy  ...  is  a  complete 
abandonment  of  our  pretensions  to  any  special  influence  in  the 
policies,  government  and  destinies  of  any  American  nation 
except  our  own,  and  inviting  all  well  established  American  gov- 
ernments to  join  with  us  in  the  formulation  and  enforcement  of 


104  SELECTED  ARTICLES  ON 

a  Pan  American  policy  (San  Francisco  Chronicle)  ;  "We  believe 
that  thorough  cooperation  with  South  American  republics,  stable 
or  unstable,  will  convince  them  of  'the  wisdom  of  the  Monroe 
Doctrine.  There  is  doubt  if  it  should  be  enforced  unless  it  has 
their  thorough  cooperation"  (Tacoma  Daily  News)  ;  "The 
doctrine  which  Roosevelt  is  preaching  in  South  America  to  the 
effect  that  the  stable  governments  be  invited  to  cooperate  with 
the  United  States  in  enforcing  the  Monroe  Doctrine  wherever 
it  may  appear  to  be  necessary  hereafter,  meets  with  my  personal, 
views  on  the  matter"  (Editor  of  The  Los  Angeles  Express). 
Of  the  periodicals,  The  Outlook  says :  "We  emphatically  believe 
that  whenever  the  United  States  has  occasion  to  interpret  and 
enforce  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  the  United  States  should  take  for 
granted  that  it  has  the  approval  of  Argentina,  Brazil  and  Chile, 
and  in  any  instance  which  involves  or  may  involve  intervention, 
the  United  States  ought  to  invite  their  cooperation."  The  Inde- 
pendent expresses  a  similar  but  slightly  different  view  which 
is  held  by  several,  that  there  should  be  complete  cooperation 
in  South  American  matters  but  unilateral  enforcement  of  the 
Monroe  Doctrine  by  the  United  States  in  the  Caribbean  region, 
and  adds,  "In  our  concern  for  the  well-being  of  the  peoples  of 
the  Western  Hemisphere,  ...  we  must  be  their  partner, 
not  their  patron." 

The  majority  of  the  press,  then,  agree  with  the  majority  of 
the  experts,  that  the  present  status  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  is 
unsatisfactory,  that  the  policy  should  be  clarified  by  a  clearer 
interpretation  of  its  meaning  and  that  it  should  be  broadened 
and  strengthened  by  being  placed  upon  a  Pan  American  founda- 
tion. 

Annals  of  the  American  Academy.  54: 1-4.  July,  1914 

Pan-American     Policy:     The     Monroe     Doctrine     Modernized. 
John  Barrett 

I  sometimes  feel  that  all  this  discussion  of  the  Monroe  Doc- 
trine is  entirely  in  vain,  that  there  is  nobody  who  is  an  ultimate 
court  upon  the  subject — nobody  who  can  decide  just  what  is  its 
interpretation  or  its  meaning  or  its  significance.  I  know  that  I 
would  not  for  a  moment  pretend  that  any  views  which  I  have 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  105 

upon  the  subject  are  final.  I  had  at  first  decided  I  would  not 
make  any  remarks,  but  I  will  briefly  summarize  some  thoughts 
which  I  have  been  going  over  in  my  mind  for  many  years  in  my 
association  with  Latin  America.  In  my  humble  experience  as 
minister  in  three  American  republics  and  during  the  seven  years 
that  I  have  had  the  honor  of  being  the  Director  General  of  the 
Pan-American  Union,  I  have  striven  earnestly  to  get  what  I 
call  the  Pan-American  viewpoint  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine.  Now 
I  do  not  ask  anyone  to  accept  what  I  say  as  final,  but  perhaps  I 
look  at  this  subject  from  a  viewpoint  a  little  different  from  that 
of  many  persons,  because  I  have  the  rather  unique  position  and 
experience  of  being  the  only  Pan-American  officer  in  America — 
not  only  one  who  is  an  officer  of  the  United  States  but  who  is  in 
every  respect  equally  an  officer  of  the  other  Latin-American 
countries.  Each  day  it  is  one  of  the  duties  of  the  members  of  my 
staff  to  lay  before  me  the  consensus  of  opinion  of  the  news- 
papers of  every  important  capital  of  the  western  hemisphere ; 
and  therefore  while  I  am  actually  in  this  country,  I  am  able  to 
follow  closely  the  views  of  the  peoples  of  other  lands  upon  this 
subject  under  discussion. 

As  one  who  has  been  intimately  associated,  officially  and  pri- 
vately, for  nearly  fourteen  years  with  Latin  America  and  Latin 
Americans,  I  may  be  permitted  to  make  a  few  humble  sugges- 
tions, which,  if  followed,  might  affect  the  permanent  status  of 
the  Monroe  Doctrine  among  the  American  nations,  and  might 
not! 

I  believe  the  time  is  coming  when  there  may  be  evolved  from 
the  Monroe  Doctrine  itself  as  a  principle  and  phrase,  and  there- 
upon substituted  for  the  Monroe  Doctrine  as  a  principle  and 
phrase,  the  principle  and  phrase  of  a  "Pan-American  policy." 
(These  ideas,  to  some  extent,  I  developed  last  fall  at  a  meeting 
in  Washington  of  the  Society  for  Judicial  Settlement  of  Inter- 
national Questions.  What  I  am  saying  here  is  really  a  sublimated 
form  of  what  I  said  at  that  time.)  By  that  I  mean  a  Pan-Ameri- 
can policy  acceptable  to  and  approved  by  not  only  the  United 
States,  but  all  the  American  republics,  a  policy  belonging  to 
each  and  all  on  the  same  basis  of  attitude  and  action,  protecting 
alike  the  sovereignty  and  governments  of  each — which  is,  after 
all,  the  delicate  point — without  the  offensive  suggestion  of  pre- 
ponderance, dictation  or  domination  of  one  nation  like  the  United 


166  SELECTED  ARTICLES  ON 

States.  It  is  a  common  error  among  some  of  the  statesmen  and 
essayists  of  the  United  States,  whenever  they  speak  or  write 
anything  about  the  southern  republics,  to  patronize  them.  This 
is  a  fatal  error — always  thus  reminding  them  of  the  power  and 
mightiness  of  the  United  States,  as  if  the  United  States  were 
both  "papa"  and  "mamma,"  and  they  a  group  of  little 'children 
playing  in  the  back  yard.  Coupled  with  this  are  the  equally 
common  errors :  First,  that  of  not  recognizing  the  extraordinary 
greatness  and  progress  of  some  of  the  republics,  even  if  others 
are  not  so  progressive;  and  secondly,  of  classing  them  all  as 
having  revolutionary  tendencies,  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  two- 
thirds  of  Latin  America,  in  area  and  population,  has  known  no 
serious  revolution  whatever  in  the  last  twenty-five  years. 

This  Pan-American  policy  would  adopt,  absorb  and  enlarge 
the  Monroe  Doctrine  as  an  original  policy  of  the  United  States 
into  a  greater  and  all-American  policy,  where  each  nation  would 
Shave  the  same  rights  of  attitude,  the  same  dignity  of  position 
and  the  same  sense  of  independence  as  the  United  States  now 
has.  By  eliminating  the  attitude  of  absolute  dictation  and  cen- 
tralized power,  which  the  Monroe  Doctrine  has  been  interpreted 
in  Latin  America  as  applying  to  the  relations  of  the  nations  of 
the  western  hemisphere,  by  the  substitution  of  "Pan-American" 
for  "Monroe" — thus  including  all  the  American  nations  as  spon- 
sors— and  by  the  substitution  of  "policy"  for  "doctrine"  and  thus 
removing  the  hard,  unyielding,  dictatorial  and  didactic  sugges- 
tion of  the  words  "Monroe  Doctrine,"  about  which  every  Latin 
American  is  a  little  sensitive,  a  long  step  will  be  taken  towards  a 
new  era  of  Pan-American  comity  and  Pan-American  confidence. 

It  is  not  the  Monroe  Doctrine  itself  as  a  principle,  but  the 
interpretation — and  mark  my  word — the  interpretation  thereof, 
as  indicated  in  the  recently  published  opinions  of  many  prominent 
Latin  Americans  on  this  subject,  that  is  not  acceptable  to  the 
majority  of  Latin-American  countries  and  statesmen.  This  is 
a  point  that  has  been  clearly  overlooked  by  the  critics  of  the 
Monroe  Doctrine  in  the  United  States.  If  its  haphazard  inter- 
pretation can  be  supplanted  with  responsible  and  reasonable 
judgment,  the  majority  of  arguments  against  the  doctrine  in 
Latin  America,  and  also  in  the  United  States,  in  describing  it 
as  obsolete  will  fail  absolutely  in  their  purpose  and  logic. 

A  distinguished  Yale  professor,  for  whom  I  have  profound 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  107 

regard,  leaving  the  safe  fields  of  archaeological  study,  and  ven- 
turing into  the  complex  relations  of  international  politics,  calls 
the  Monroe  Doctrine  an  "obsolete  shibboleth."  How  in  the  world 
any  one  man  can  assume  to  pass  that  judgment  upon  a  great 
policy  or  doctrine,  I  cannot  possibly  understand.  I  fear  that  in 
his  academic  viewpoint  he  has  exaggerated  the  importance  which 
the  Latin-American  countries  attach  to  the  Monroe  Doctrine, 
and  he  has  attributed  to  that  much  assailed  and  suffering  Doc- 
trine all  kinds  of  faults  which  are  due  to  entirely  other  and 
different  causes,  such  as  North  American  ignorance  and  lack 
of  appreciation  of  South  America. 

In  conclusion,  the  Monroe  Doctrine  in  its  final  analysis,  in 
my  opinion,  and,  as  I  say,  I  do  not  for  a  minute  state  these 
things  in  a  didactic  way  and  my  judgment  may  be  entirely  wrong, 
will  continue  to  be  a  great  international  principle  only  to  the 
degree  that  it  is  evolved  into  this  greater  Pan-American  policy ; 
and  from  a  doctrine  of  the  United  States  alone  into  a  policy  of 
all  the  American  republics,  and  now,  if  you  follow  me,  though  it 
is  a  little  complicated,  to  the  degree  that  it  is  evolved  from  being 
subjective  on  the  part  of  the  United  States  alone  towards  all 
the  other  American  republics  as  objective,  to  being  subjective  on 
the  part  of  each  towards  each  and  all  the  others  as  objective. 
That  is,  making  each  and  every  American  republic  feel  that  it  is 
part  of  its  policy  towards  each  and  every  other  American  repub- 
lic, instead  of  being  just  the  policy  of  the  United  States  alone 
towards  all  these  other  countries.  To  be  still  clearer  in  my  idea 
I  would  say  that  I  mean  to  evolve  the  Monroe  Doctrine  from 
being  subjective  on  the  part  of  the  United  States  towards  the 
other  American  republics  in  an  objective  position,  to  being  sub- 
jective on  the  part  of  each  and  all  towards  in  turn  each  and  all 
as  objective. 

Then  we  will  have  achieved,  in  my  opinion,  that  ideal,  unsel- 
fish, fraternal  relationship  of  the  American  governments  and 
peoples  which  will  give  a  new  worth  and  a  permanent,  acceptable 
significance  to  Pan-American  relationship,  Pan-American  accord, 
and  the  status  of  the  Pan-American  Union. 


io8  SELECTED  ARTICLES  ON 

American  Society  of  International  Law.  Proceedings.   1914: 

155-69 

Monroe  Doctrine :   National   or  International  ?     William  I.  Hull 

The  Monroe  Doctrine  has  been,  during  the  past  twelve 
months,  the  subject  of  such  animated  and  far-reaching  debate 
that  it  may  be  well  at  this  point  to  observe  the  example  of 
Daniel  Webster,  who  began  his  reply  to  'Senator  Hayne  with 
the  words: 

Mr.  President,  When  the  mariner  has  been  tossed  for  many  days  in 
thick  weather,  and  on  an  unknown  sea,  he  naturally  avails  himself  of  the 
first  pause  in  the  storm,  the  earliest  glance  of  the  sun,  to  take  his  latitude 
and  ascertain  how  far  the  elements  have  driven  him  from  his  "true  course. 
Let  us  imitate  this  prudence  and,  before  we  float  further  on  the  waves  of 
this  debate,  refer  to  the  point  from  which  we  departed,  that  we  at  least 
may  be  able  to  conjecture  where  we  now  are. 

We  Americans  in  discussing  the  Monroe  Doctrine  appear  to 
be  concerned  chiefly  with  the  growth  and  present  scope  of  the 
doctrine  itself,  and  seldom  if  ever  pause  to  consider  the  reasons 
why  the  United  States  undertook  and  continues  to  enforce  it 
by  its  own  unsupported  sanction.  It  is  the  object  of  this  con- 
tribution to  the  great  debate  to  consider  chiefly  the  major 
premise  of  the  accepted  conclusion,  and  to  examine  the  Monroe, 
or  national,  sanction  of  the  Doctrine,  rather  than  the  Doctrine 
itself.  In  other  words,  the  writ  of  quo  warranto  having  been 
issued  against  the  United  States,  let  us  frankly  respond  to  the 
summons  to  show  why  our  country  alone,  rather  than  the  family 
of  nations  as  a  whole,  or  several  members  of  it,  at  the  least, 
should  be  bearing  the  burden  in  our  own  and  the  world's  behoof. 

As  a  preliminary  to  this  discussion,  it  is  essential  to  state  as 
concisely  as  possible  the  present  status  of  the  Doctrine.  In  the 
first  place,  its  terminus  ad  quern  has  been  changed  or  greatly 
broadened.  Directed  at  first  against  Spain  and  the  Holy  Alliance 
it  has  become  a  warning  to  the  governments  of  Europe,  Asia,  and 
Latin  America  as  well, — for  the  whole  world,  indeed,  to  heed  and 
obey. 

From  the  territorial  point  of  view,  it  began  with  an  assertion 
of  America's  territorial  integrity  against  European  acquisitions 
either  by  force  or  by  colonization ;  but  it  how  prevents  the  volun- 
tary transfers  of  American  soil  by  old-world  Powers  to  other 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  iog 

old-world  Powers,  by  new-world  Powers  to  old-world 
Powers,  and  doubtless,  if  the  case  should  arise,  by  new-world 
Powers  to  other  new-world  Powers.  In  these  days  of  large 
corporations,  also,  it  has  been  made  to  forbid  any  foreign  cor- 
poration subsidized  or  controlled  by  an  old-world  government  to 
acquire  land  in  the  Americas  which  is  so  situated  as  to  menace 
the  safety  or  communications  of  the  United  States.  At  present, 
the  interpretation  or  extension  of  the  Doctrine  in  this  direction 
has  not  gone  far  enough  to  exclude  all  foreign  corporations  from 
doing  business  on  the  soil  of  the  Americas ;  but  there  is  sufficient 
elasticity  in  such  phraseology  for  indefinite  expansion  in  the 
future,  and  already  some  foreigners  are  complaining  that  such 
is  the  logical  outcome  of  President  Wilson's  Mobile  declaration 
against  Latin  American  "concessions." 

From  the  point  of  view  of  American  self-government,  the 
Doctrine  began  with  a  declaration  against  the  restoration  to  Latin 
America  of  the  monarchical  government  of  Spain.  Its  author 
condemned,  however,  any  intervention  on  the  part  of  the  United 
States  in  favor  of  a  republican  form  of  government;  and  this 
condemnation  was  repeated  by  his  successors,  even  including 
President  Polk, — who  in  most  matters  far  out-Monroed  Monroe. 
But  within  the  past  two  decades,  our  self-restraint  in  this  par- 
ticular has  been  cast  to  the  winds.  One  of  our  most  highly 
esteemed  Secretaries  of  State, — intoxicated,  possibly,  by  the 
exuberance  of  a  temporary  pugnacity, — declared  that  "the  United 
States  is  practical  sovereign  on  this  continent  and  its  fiat  is  law 
upon  the  subject  to  which  it  confines  its  interposition."  Every 
administration  since  that  time  has  made  popular  government  of 
the  fiat  variety  one  of  its  specialties  in  dealing  with  Latin 
America. 

In  President  McKinley's  administration,  the  Platt  Amendment 
was  applied  to  Cuba  to  protect  the  new  republic  against  any 
hankering  on  its  part  after  the  fleshpots  of  Spain  or  other  Euro- 
pean monarchies,  by  providing  that  Cuba  should  make  no  treaties 
with  foreign  governments  tending  to  destroy  its  independence 
or  territorial  integrity  and  should  contract  no  public  debts  dis- 
proportionate to  its  ordinary  revenue,  and  that  the  United  States 
should  or  might  intervene  to  protect  Cuban  independence  and  to 
maintain  a  government  adequate  for  the  protection  of  life,  prop- 
erty and  individual  liberty. 


i  io  SELECTED  ARTICLES  ON 

In  President  Roosevelt's  administration,  we  insisted  that  a 
province  of  Colombia  should  exercise  the  divine  right  of  revolu- 
tion, at  the  same  time  we  prevented  the  mother  country  from 
exercising  its  right  of  coercion  over  its  recalcitrant  daughter,  and 
we  speedily  recognized  and  permanently  guaranteed,  for  a  sub- 
stantial quid  pro  quo,  the  independence  of  the  new  republic.  In 
the  same  administration,  also,  the  Big  Stick  was  raised  to  con- 
serve popular  government  in  the  Dominican  Republic,  this  time 
by  preventing1  revolutionists  from  looting  the  custom-houses  for 
their  sinews  of  war,  and,  after  the  rebellion  was  suppressed,  by 
collecting  and  distributing  the  revenues  so  as  to  prevent  other 
revolts  and  to  forestall  foreign  Shylocks  from  demanding  their 
pound  of  flesh  in  the  form  of  Dominican  lands. 

In  President  Taft's  administration,  the  Roosevelt  policy  in  the 
Dominican  Republic  was  continued,  one  revolt  was  suppressed 
and  another  prevented,  one  president  was  compelled  to  resign  and 
his  successor  was  sustained, — contrary  to  Napoleon's  dictum, — on 
the  points  of  American  bayonets,  while  American  appointees  con- 
tinued to  collect  and  administer  the  customs.  Nicaragua's  popu- 
lar government,  also,  was  the  recipient  of  President  Taft's  par- 
ticular attention.  One  president  was  forced  to  resign;  his 
successor,  whom  the  people  thought  they  had  elected,  was 
refused  recognition,  and  a  revolt  against  him  was  supported  by 
2>35°  United  States  marines,  who  drove  him  into  exile,  placed 
a  third  president  in  the  chair,  captured  five  of  the  republic's 
towns,  suppressed  another  revolt,  distributed  food  supplies  to 
the  victims  of  the  war,  and  left  four  hundred  marines  "on 
guard"  in  the  republic's  capital  city.  All  this  was  justified  on 
the  plea  of  "the  protection  of  the  life  and  property  of  United 
States  citizens  and  the  influencing  in  all  appropriate  ways  the 
restoration  of  lawful  and  orderly  government." 

In  the  present  administration,  a  treaty  is  said  to  be  pending 
between  the  United  States  and  Nicaragua  which,  if  ratified, 
would  make  the  latter  republic  a  veritable  "protectorate"  of  our 
own  and  a  base  of  naval  operations,  also,  against  domestic 
revolts,  foreign  land-grabbers,  and  European  creditors  in  the 
other  Central  American  republics.  The  enforcement  of  a  fair 
trial  of  political  offenders  in  Cuba,  the  "supervision"  of  Domini- 
can elections,  and  the  refusal  to  recognize  Huerta,  an  enforced 
presidential  election,  and  the  rejection  of  the  electoral  returns, 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  in 

in  Mexico,  are  all  too  recent  to  need  more  than  a  mere  mention. 
In  view  of  such  achievements  as  these  by  an  administration 
only  one  year  of  age,  we  must  all  recognize  grave  significance  in 
President  Wilson's  declaration  in  his  first  annual  message  that 
"we  are  the  friends  of  constitutional  government  in  America; 
we  are  more  than  its  friends,  we  are  its  champions." 

Thus,  not  only  in  our  own  dependencies,  Porto  Rico,  Hawaii, 
and  the  Philippines,  but  in  our  neighboring  republics,  which  are 
nominally  independent,  our  government  has  become  the  school- 
master in  the  science  and  art  of  popular  government.  Jeffer- 
son's and  Monroe's  confidence  in  democracy  has  grown  into  a 
determination  that  our  neighbors  in  the  western  world  shall 
enjoy  for  themselves,  nolens  volens,  the  blessings  of  constitu- 
tional government,  even  if  we  are  obliged  to  blow  these  blessings 
upon  them  from  the  guns  of  super-dreadnoughts. 

When  it  is  suggested  that  this  enterprise  upon  which  we  are 
engaged  is  a  rather  quixotic  one,  that  it  is  in  fact  a  superlatively 
and  preposterously  altruistic  one  for  a  mere  government  to  be 
engaged  in,  the  reply  which  has  hitherto  proved  sufficient  is,  that 
popular  government  and  financial  solidity  are  essential  to  Latin 
America's  political  stability,  that  political  stability  is  the  sine  qua 
non  of  its  territorial  integrity,  and'  that  its  territorial  integrity 
is  imperatively  demanded  by  the  Monroe  Doctrine  for  the 
safety  and  peace  of  the  United  States. 

We  Americans  who  have  grown  restive  under  the  heavy 
burden  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  have  sought  for  some  means  of' 
evading  or  lessening  our  country's  responsibility,  and  sundry 
alternatives  have  been  suggested.  Some  have  roundly  denounced 
it  as  an  "obsolete  shibboleth"  and  demanded  that  the  United 
States  throw  it  overboard  from  its  ship  of  state,  leaving  Latin 
America  to  shift  for  itself,  on  its  own  resources,  or  with  such 
defensive  alliances  as  it  can  make  in  the  new  world  or  the 
old.  But  in  the  present  state  of  world  politics,  this  policy  of 
scuttle  is  rejected  by  the  majority  of  Americans  as  fraught  with 
certain  peril  to  Latin  America  and  to  the  United  States  as  well. 
Not  only  is  the  specter  of  old  world  territorial  aggrandize- 
ment in  the  new  world, — with  its  military  consequences  to 
ourselves, — seen  in  this  policy  of  relinquishment,  but  the  hope 
of  efficient  popular  government  throughout  Latin  America  would 
be  relinquished  with  it.  If  left  entirely  to  themselves,  it  appears 


112  SELECTED  ARTICLES  ON 

too  optimistic  to  hope  for  most  of  these  republics,  as  President 
Wilson  said  of  Mexico  in  his  first  annual  message :  "And  then, 
when  the  end  comes  [after  civil  war  has  ceased],  we  shall  hope 
to  see  constitutional  order  restored  in  distrest  Mexico  by  the 
concert  and  energy  of  such  of  her  leaders  as  prefer  the  liberty 
of  their  people  to  their  own  ambitions."  Ambition,  ignorance 
and  lack  of  political  training  would  long  continue  to  retard  the 
permanent  adoption  of  constitutional  government. 

If,  then,  say  other  sincere  critics,  the  United  States  must 
continue  to  bear  the  burden  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  let  us  at 
least  repress  it  within  the  straight-jacket  of  its  modest  original. 
The  prevention  of  old  world  conquest  or  colonization,  and 
the  prevention  of  the  restoration  of  monarchical  government,  in 
Latin  America,  are  surely  sufficient  for  the  safety  of  the  United 
States  and  are  as  much  as  Latin  America  can  expect  at  our 
hands.  But  nulla  vestigia  retrorsum  is  the  law  here  as  else- 
where in  national  development ;  and  in  these  days  of  complex 
civilization,  conquest,  colonization  and  monarchical  government 
assume  such  subtle  forms  that  eternal  vigilance  or  constant 
watchful  waiting  on  the  part  of  the  United  States  is  held  to  be 
the  price  of  America's  freedom  from  them.  Through  the 
doorways  of  national  bonds,  of  industrial  concessions,  of  land 
companies,  and  of  special  privileges  of  many  kinds,  may  come 
those  old  enemies  of  the  Holy  Alliance  era  whom  Jefferson  and 
Monroe  so  valiantly  resisted. 

Let  us,  then,  say  a  third  class  of  critics,  bargain  with  those 
old-world  Powers  from  whom,  in  our  enforcement  of  the 
Monroe  Doctrine,  we  are  supposed  to  have  most  to  fear, — Ger- 
many and  Japan,  for  example, — and  secure  their  formal  recogni- 
tion of  the  Doctrine,  not  as  a  mere  national  policy,  but  as  genuine 
international  law.  We  have  secured  partial  and  sporadic 
recognition  of  it  by  some  of  the  European  Powers;  let  us 
induce  them,  by  giving  them  some  suitable  quid  pro  quo, — such 
as  the  Philippines,  or  tariff  concession, — to  yield  it  once  for  all 
their  formal  acceptance.  But  students  of  the  history  of  our 
country  need  -not  be  reminded  that  our  chief  national  charac- 
teristics and  instincts  are  opposed  -to  such  international  bargain- 
ing; while  students  of  the  history  of  international  law  need  not 
be  reminded  that  so-called  international  law  which  is  based  on 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  113 

such  partial  and  selfish  agreements  is  as  unstable  as  the  shifting 
sand  of  the  desert  or  the  shore. 

Let  us,  then,  say  still  other  critics,  make  a  direct  alliance 
with  the  Great  Powers  of  Europe, — Great  Britain,  Germany  and 
France, — for  the  enforcement  of  the  Doctrine.  If  we  can  not 
make  it  genuine  international  law,  let  us  continue  it  as  a 
national  policy  and  make  an  alliance  for  its  support  with  those 
European  Powers  which  are  most  interested  in  it  and  which  are 
best  able  to  render  support  to  it.  The  advocates  of  this  plan 
are  not  Americans  alone.  A  member  of  the  British  House  of 
Commons  who  is  travelling  in  our  country  at  the  present  time 
has  recently  said:  "We  are  one  people  and  of  one  blood.  Our 
King  came  from  Germany ;  and  I  hope  to  see  an  alliance 
between  England,  Germany  and  the  United  States,  with  the 
entente  with  France  maintained."  These  are  friendly  senti- 
ments ;  but  aside  from  the  probable  cost  of  such  alliances  as 
these,  they  run  counter  to  our  national  antipathy,  which  has 
been  firmly  rooted  ever  since  Washington's  Farewell  Address, 
to  entangling  alliances;  and  they  run  counter  to  that  strong 
and  ever  increasing  current  of  world-wide  internationalism 
which  is  so  marked  a  characteristic  of  our  era,  and  which  is 
opposed  to  partial  alliances  of  every  kind  and  degree. 

Again,  it  is  suggested  with  growing  insistency  that,  if  not 
with  the  strongest  of  the  old-world  Powers,  then  surely  with 
the  strongest  and  most  stable  of  the  new-world  Powers,  "the 
A.  B.  C,"  for  example,  we  can  make  an  alliance  for  the 
enforcement  of  a  distinctively  American  policy.  This  sugges- 
tion is  a  revival  of  President  Jefferson's  plan  of  1808  to  form, 
through  General  Wilkinson,  an  alliance  between  the  United 
States,  Spanish  America,  and  Brazil.  It  is  a  revival  under 
greatly  changed  and  more  favorable  circumstances,  of  course; 
but  it  would  be  in  this  twentieth  century  an  example  of  atavism, 
of  reversion  to  the  barbarous  diplomacy  of  the  Middle  Ages. 
For  the  very  reason  that  the  Monroe  Doctrine  is  a  policy  which 
vitally  concerns  all  of  the  twenty-one  American  republics,  its 
interpretation  and  enforcement  may  not  justly  be  left  to  any 
partial  "concert"  of  a  few  of  them.  The  injustice  to  the  weaker 
Powers,  and  the  lack  of  harmony  among  the  allied  Powers 
themselves,  which  must  be  anticipated  from  any  such  "American 


ii4  SELECTED  ARTICLES  ON 

Concert,"  may  be  estimated  from  the  history  of  the  "Holy 
Alliance"  and  the  "Concert  of  Europe."  With  the  growth  of 
the  Latin  American  Powers,  such  a  course  would  lead  in  time 
to  the  institution  in  this  hemisphere  of  the  precarious  and 
portentous  condition  of  affairs  in  the  old  world  with  its  triple 
and  dual  alliances,  and  its  ententes  which  are  cordial  only 
toward  their  own  members  and  inimical  and  menacing  toward 
all  outsiders.  Again,  such  a  "Concert  of  America"  would 
necessarily  be  on  equal  terms,  or  it  would  be  dominated  by  the 
United  States.  If  on  equal  terms,  its  object  would  be  inevitably 
frustrated,  by  disagreement  both  as  to  what  should  be  done  and 
as  to  who  should  do  it.  The  recognition  of  Maximilian's  govern- 
ment in  Mexico  by  Brazil,  and  Chile's  impression  of  the  meaning 
of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  in  the  United  States'  collection  of  the 
Alsop  claim,  are  two  out  of  many  illustrations  of  the  inevitable 
disagreements  which  would  ensue  under  any  such  quadruple 
alliance.  If  the  "concert"  be  dominated  by  the  United  States, 
even  though  only  for  the  sake  of  prompt  decision  and  effective 
enforcement,  the  A.  B.  C.  Powers  would  naturally  regard  it  as 
only  one  more  and  the  most  galling  of  all  the  evidences  of  the 
"Yankee  Peril"  which  the  A.  B.  C.  was  formed  primarily  to 
combat. 

Foreign  nations  would  inevitably  regard  the  alliance  of  the 
United  States  with  a  selected  few  of  its  Latin- American  neighbors 
as  an  illustration  of  the  lion  and  the  lamb  lying  down  together, — • 
with  the  lamb  inside, — and  much  to  the  detriment  of  the  lion's 
digestion  and  prestige  among  the  other  beasts  of  the  jungle.  A 
distinguished  London  journalist,  who  is  a  representative  of  his 
paper  in  this  country,  has  frankly  declared  that  such  a  sugges- 
tion is  rank  cowardice,  a  confession  of  weakness  which  a  great 
nation  like  ours  has  no  right  to  make ;  and  he  assured  his 
audience  that  Great  Britain  would  never  be  dictated  to  by  Latin 
Americans,  even  though  allied  with  the  United  States. 

The  distinguished  Director  General  of  the  Pan-American 
Union  has  broadened  the  A.  B.  C.  suggestion  to  include  all  of 
Latin  America  and  to  substitute  the  "Pan-American,"  for  the 
"Monroe,"  Doctrine.  This  is  a  revival  of  Bolivar's  dream  of  a 
Pan-American  amphictyonic  council,  sitting  at  Panama,  and 
checking  the  nefarious  designs  of  the  Holy  Alliance.  Pan- 
Hellenism,  Pan-Germanism,  Pan-Slavism  are  thus  to  be  fol- 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  115 

lowed  by  Pan- Americanism.  But  if  too  much  lamb  might 
impair  the  lion's  digestion,  what  might  be  expected  from  the 
addition  of  so  many  mice,  and  mice  of  a  peculiarly  tough  and 
indigestible  quality?  The  Latin  Americans  themselves  would 
probably  object  to  the  achievement  of  such  a  meal:  "But  not  on 
us,"  the  oysters  said  (in  response  to  the  supper  invitation  of  the 
walrus),  "And  they  shed  a  salty  tear."  For  the  relations  of  our 
republic  toward  many  of  its  neighbors  in  the  past  have  partaken 
too  much  of  that  policy  which  has  been  graphically  described 
as  "a  quick  succession  of  kicks  and  kindness,"  to  make  such  a 
proposal  acceptable  in  entire  confidence.  Mexico,  Colombia, 
Cuba,  Nicaragua,  the  Dominican  Republic,  Chile,  even  Haiti, 
might  be  suspicious  of  entering  into  an  alliance  on  unequal 
terms  with  the  American  eagle,  whose  talons  have  been  felt 
more  than  once  on  their  soil ;  and  to  an  alliance  with  them  on 
equal  terms, — it  would  seem  better  to  throw  the  Monroe  Doc- 
trine overboard  at  once  and  invite  Chaos  to  climb  on  board  and 
thus  avoid  the  long  and  poignant  agony  which  would  inevitably 
intervene  before  that  goddess  eventually  took  control. 

What  alternative,  then,  is  left?  If  the  Monroe  Doctrine  is 
not  to  be  declared  obsolete  and  to  be  utterly  discarded,  if  it  can 
not  now,  in  face  of  the  imperative  demands  of  twentieth  cen- 
tury civilization,  be  repressed  within  the  straight- jacket  of  its 
modest  original;  if  no  attempt  should  be  made  to  induce  the 
great  Powers  of  Europe  to  give  their  formal  assent  to  the  United 
States'  enforcement  of  it,  and  if  no  alliance  with  them  should 
be  made  to  aid  the  United  States  in  its  enforcement ;  if  an 
"American  Concert,"  including  the  United  States  and  the  A.  B. 
C.  Powers,  be  impracticable  and  undesirable,  and  even  more 
impracticable  and  undesirable  a  Pan-American  Concert;  what 
other  refuge  is  there? 

There  are  two  alternatives  left,  namely,  the  strictly  national, 
and  the  genuinely  international,  or  what  I  have  ventured  else- 
where to  call  the  supranational,  sanction. 

The  advocates  of  the  strictly  national  enforcement  of  the 
Mpnroe  Doctrine,  of  its  enforcement  by  the  United  States  alone, 
form  very  probably  at  present  the  great  majority  of  our  fellow- 
countrymen;  but  this  majority  is  daily  decreasing  as  the  logic 
of  accumulating  events  is  brought  irresistibly  home  to  them. 
Of  course,  "we've  got  the  ships,  we've  got  the  men,  we've  got 


ii6  SELECTED  ARTICLES  ON 

the  money  too ;"  and  if  put  to  it  we  can  still,  doubtless,  "lick 
all  creation." 

But  the  process  of  keeping  constantly  prepared  for  so  ani- 
mated a  struggle  is  found  to  be  increasingly  expensive,  and  a 
resort  to  an  income  tax  in  a  time  of  profound  peace  for  the  pur- 
pose of  enabling  us  to  expend  two-thirds  of  the  annual  revenue 
on  military  objects  is  not  greatly  relished  by  the  large  and  intel- 
ligent part  of  our  citizenship  upon  whom  the  tax  falls. 

Our  merchants  and  financiers  who  deal  with  Latin  America 
are  increasingly  aware  that  the  United  States'  individual  respon- 
sibility for  the  enforcement  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  lies  like  a 
lion  across  the  path  of  their  future  opportunities  for  doing  an 
increasing  business  with  our  rapidly  developing  neighbors;  and 
they  find,  too,  that  their  old-world  competitors  in  these  fields 
are  utilizing  the  unpopularity  of  our  government's  policy  to 
secure  the  lion's  share  of  railroad  and  other  concessions  and 
of  the  foreign  commerce.  The  growing  importance  of  a  foreign 
market  as  a  stimulus  and  outlet  for  our  domestic  industry  is 
being  appreciated  so  keenly  by  our  chambers  of  commerce  that 
they  are  making  their  voice  heard  in  favor  of  the  repeal  of  the 
Panama  tolls  exemption  clause ;  the  light  of  a  similar  experi- 
ence may  be  expected  to  dawn  upon  them  in  no  distant  future 
from  the  problem  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  as  well. 

Meanwhile,  the  upper  branch  of  our  Congress,  less  sensitive 
at  present  to  changes  in  public  opinion  than  is  the  lower  branch, 
advances  the  necessity  of  preserving  sacred  the  Monroe  Doc- 
trine as  a  reason  for  rejecting  any  such  policy  of  "truckling" 
to  Great  Britain  and  the  other  commercial  nations  of  the  old 
world  as  is  discovered  in  the  repeal  of  the  tolls  exemption 
clause.  Still  more  menacing  to  our  responsibility  for  the  Mon- 
roe Doctrine  were  considered  the  general  arbitration  treaties  of 
1911  with  Great  Britain  and  France,  and  the  Senate  accordingly 
rejected  them. 

Unfortunately,  the  Senate's  determination  that  no  degree  of 
arbitration, — not  even  the  compromise  clause  in  greatly  restricted 
general  treaties, — shall  be  permitted  to  infringe  upon  our 
monopoly  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  persists  side  by  side  with, 
and  is  the  prime  cause  of,  the  suspicion  and  ill-will  which  bursts 
forth  from  time  to  time  between  our  country  and  such  natural 
and  traditional  friends  as  Germany  and  Japan. 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  117 

This  sensitiveness  as  to  the  safety  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine 
has  not  brought  -with  it  a  corresponding  backwardness  in  claim- 
ing all  the  rights  and  privileges  pertaining  to  it.  For  example, 
neither  old-world  Powers,  nor  other  American  republics, 
besides  the  one  sole  champion  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  may  be 
permitted  to  share  in  the  building,  ownership  or  control  of  any 
canal  between  the  Atlantic  and  the  Pacific.  The  right  of  forti- 
fying the  Panama  Canal  has  been  followed  by  the  assertion  that 
we  have  also  the  right  to  discriminate  in  favor  of  our  own  ships 
passing  through  it, — the  diplomatic  history  of  seventy  years  and 
the  existence  of  a  precise  treaty  to  the  contrary  notwithstanding. 
"A  leetle  country  never  misconstrues  a  treaty  with  a  big  one," 
says  the  Albany  philosopher ;  "that  is  contrary  to  self-preserva- 
tion and  the  law  of  nations.  A  leetle  country  allus  construes  a 
treaty  with  a  big  one  jest  the  same  from  fust  to  last,  strictly  in 
accordance  with  its  original  meanin'  an'  intent ;  but  a  big  nation 
ain't  so  gol  blamed  hide-bound  ner  bigoted,  not  by  a  long  sight. 
If  we  ever  want  anything  down  in  Guatemala  that  we  can't  git 
except  with  the  aid  of  a  handful  o'  blue-jackets  an'  a  marine 
band;  we'll  discover  a  reason  fer  landin'  'em  [and  that  will 
probably  be  the  Monroe  Doctrine]  ;  we'll  dig  up  a  reserve 
clause  in  a  peace  protocol  [or  the  Monroe  Doctrine]  that  can 
only  be  interpreted  one  way  in  the  light  of  human  progress." 

Since  we  insist  on  the  exclusive  possession  of  the  rights 
entailed  by  the  Doctrine,  the  old  world  naturally  demands  that 
we  shall  assume  the  corresponding  duties.  Its  governments 
accordingly  invoke  our  protection  for  the  lives  and  property  of 
their  citizens  in  the  not  infrequent  times  of  Latin-American 
revolt  and  disorder;  its  corporations  make  a  similar  demand; 
its  merchants  insist  that  we  shall  suppress  civil  warfare  in  the 
interest  of  neutral  commerce;  and  its  peoples  assume  that  it  is 
our  duty  to  put  an  end  to  the  inhumanity  which  may  be  dis- 
covered in  the  rubber-fields  of  Peru  or  Bolivia.  The  Latin- 
American  governments,  .also,  have  kept  us  tolerably  busy  in 
defending  their  only  available  assets,  namely,  their  custom- 
houses and  territory,  from  the  pressing  claims  of  the  old-world 
creditors ;  and  even  our  own  industrial  corporations  are  demand- 
ing that  our  government  shall  intervene  in  their  behalf  against 
their  old-world  rivals,  lest  the  latter  should  infringe  upon  the 
Monroe  Doctrine  by  securing  concessions  from  Latin  American 

10 


n8  SELECTED  ARTICLES  ON 

governments  which  might  place  those  governments  under  foreign 
control,  or  which  might  prevent  valuable  deposits  of  oil  from 
rinding  their  natural  destiny  in  the  tanks  of  United  States  war- 
ships, the  chief  object  of  which  is  to  enforce  the  Monroe 
Doctrine,  largely  in  Latin  America's  behalf.  Thus  runs  the 
argument  in  its  vicious  circle. 

So  elastic  has  this  Doctrine  become  under  the  strain  of 
twentieth  century  cosmopolitanism  that  so  good  a  friend  of  our 
country  as  the  President  of  the  Argentine  Republic  has  char- 
acterized it  as  being  made  of  gutta  percha.  So  indefinite  has  it 
become  in  consequence  of  our  country's  attempt  to  make  it 
apply  to  every  new  international  emergency  that  no  jurist  or 
publicist  outside  of  our  own  country  can  satisfactorily  define  it; 
and  it  is  much  to  be  doubted  if  we  can  do  so  ourselves.  When 
it  is  finally  laid  to  rest,  its  epitaph  may  well  be :  Here  lies  one 
whose  name  was  writ  in  water. 

From  the  point  of  view  of  our  own  republican  form  of 
government, — of  our  own  constitution, — the  assumption  by  our 
government  of  the  exclusive  enforcement  O'f  the  Doctrine  is  open 
to  serious  question.  The  American  Revolution  was  due  to 
Great  Britain's  adoption  of  an  exaggerated  Monroe  Doctrine  in 
dealing  with  its  colonies.  The  Declaration  of  Independence  is 
opposed  to  the  claim  of  one  nation  to  coerce  the  political  status 
of  another.  Senator  Hoar  declared  in  a  memorable  address : 
"I  maintain  that  holding  in  subjection  an  alien  people,  governing 
them  against  their  will  for  any  fancied  advantage  to  them,  is 
not  only  not  an  end  provided  for  by  the  Constitution,  but  it  is 
an  end  prohibited  therein."  The  Constitution  established  a  gov- 
erment  of,  by,  and  for  the  people  of  the  United  States,  and 
certainly  did  not  provide  for  a  paternalistic  government  of 
foreign  peoples.  Article  IV,  Section  4,  of  the  Constitution  was 
never  designed  to  read:  "The  United  States  shall  guarantee  to 
every  State  in  this  Hemisphere  a  Republican  Form  of  Govern- 
ment, and  shall  protect  each  of  them  agarist  invasion;  and  on 
application  of  the  Legislature,  or  of  the  Executive  (when  the 
Legislature  can  not  be  convened),  or  even  without  such  applica- 
tion, it  shall  protect  them  against  domestic  violence."  Our  first 
President's  strict  appeal  for  obedience  to  the  Constitution  was 
so  far  forgotten  by  a  recent  President  that,  as  he  himself 
admits:  "I  took  the  Canal  Zone  and  left  Congress  to  debate, 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  119 

not  the  Canal,  but  me;"  and  again:  'The  Constitution  did  not 
explicitly  give  me  power  to  bring  about  the  necessary  agreement 
with  Santo  Domingo  [to  collect  and  administer  that  republic's 
revenues]  ;  but  the  Constitution  did-  not  forbid  my  doing  what 
I  did.  I  put  the  agreement  into  effect,  and  I  continued  its 
execution  two  years  before  the  Senate  acted. — The  Senate 
adjourned  without  any  action  at  all. — I  went  ahead  and  admin- 
istered the  proposed  treaty  anyhow,  considering  it  a  simple 
agreement  on  the  part  of  the  Executive  which  would  be  con- 
verted into  a  treaty  whenever  the  Senate  acted."  Thus  near 
the  verge  of  imperialism,  at  home  as  well  as  abroad,  has  the 
Monroe  Doctrine  and  our  exclusive  administration  of  it  brought 
us.  It  is  small  wonder  that  the  Senate  should  have  struggled 
with  the  Executive  so  ardently  under  President  Roosevelt's 
administration  and  that  similar  acts  on  the  part  of  his  successor 
caused  the  late  Democratic  chairman  of  the  Committee  on 
Foreign  Relations  to  introduce  a  resolution  in  the  Senate  for- 
bidding the  use  of  the  United  States'  military  forces  in  lands 
not  subject  to  the  jurisdiction  of  the  United  States. 

Such  are  the  insuperable  and  increasing  difficulties,  the  fun- 
damental objections,  to  the  strictly  national,  or  the  United 
States  go-it-alone,  policy  of  enforcing  the  Monroe  Doctrine. 
This  solution  of  the  problem  is  no  longer  tolerable,  either  in 
itself  or  in  its  consequences.  The  hand-writing  on  the  wall, 
predicting  its  relinquishment,  and  the  advancing  shadow  of  its 
successor,  are  already  to  be  seen.  Not  that  the  eternal  prin- 
ciples of  right  and  justice  which  underlie  the  doctrine  are 
passing;  but  that  the  enforcement  of  these  principles  on  the 
sole  responsibility  of  a  single  one  of  the  forty-six  members  of 
the  family  of  nations  is  tottering  to  its  fall.  Le  roi  cst  mort; 
vive  le  roi!  The  preservation  of  the  integrity  of  national  terri- 
tory and  the  maintenance  of  popular  government  can  never  be 
surrendered ;  but  they  can  and  must  be  placed  under  the  aegis 
of  the  entire  family  of  nations  and  of  a  truly  international  court 
of  justice. 

One  splendid  move  was  made  by  the  United  States  itself  in 
the  direction  of  sharing  with  the  rest  of  the  family  of  nations  a 
portion  of  the  responsibility  and  burden  of  the  Monroe  Doc- 
trine when  it  secured  the  adoption  by  the  Second  Hague  Con- 
ference of  that  proposition  to  which  the  name  of  our  own 


120  SELECTED  ARTICLES  ON 

General  Porter  has  been  given.  This  provides  for  the  obligatory 
arbitration  of  contractual  debts  before  a  resort  is  had  to  force 
for  their  collection;  and  it  was  intended  to  apply  especially  to 
Latin  American  indebtedness  to  European  creditors.  But  the 
collection  of  contractual  indebtedness  is  only  one  of  the  multi- 
tudinous ways  in  which  an  attack  on  Latin-American  territory 
or  self-goverment  may  invoke  the  application  of  the  Monroe 
Doctrine ;  and  hence  it  represents  only  the  first  step  in  the 
journey  which  must  be  made.  The  neutralization  of  Latin 
America  by  the  Third  Hague  Conference,  or,  better  still,  a 
guarantee  by  that  Conference  of  the  territorial  integrity  of  all 
the  members  of  the  family  of  nations,  would  not  only  relieve 
our  country  of  the  burden  of  sustaining  this  principle  of  the 
Monroe  Doctrine,  but  would  apply  that  just  and  righteous  prin- 
ciple to  the  entire  world.  The  institution  of  the  Court  of  Arbi- 
tral Justice  would  be  greatly  facilitated  by  such  a  measure; 
for  the  smaller  members  of  the  family  of  nations  would  be  more 
willing  to  constitute  the  court  on  some  one  of  the  plans  pro- 
posed, if  they  could  be  assured  that  this  important  element  of 
their  sovereignty  could  not  be  brought,  before  the  bar  of  a 
court  on  which  they  may  not  have  absolute  equality  of  repre- 
sentation. The  ratification  of  treaties  of  general  and  even  uni- 
versal arbitration  would  also  be  greatly  facilitated,  as  was 
shown  in  the  Senate's  debate  on  the  treaties  of  1911,  by  this 
world-wide  application  of  the  first  principle  of  the  Monroe 
Doctrine. 

The  world-wide  application  of  the  second  principle  of  the 
Doctrine,  namely,  the  guarantee  of  a  constitutional  government, 
although  more  difficult,  is  not,  in  my  humble  judgment,  impos- 
sible. With  the  triumphant  march  of  constitutional  government 
around  the  world,  it  represents  already  nine  points  of  national 
law,  and  the  burden  of  proof  against  it  would  be  placed  by  any 
international  court  of  our  time  upon  the  opposing  party. 
National  courts  are  daily  grappling  with  far  more  difficult  cases 
in  equity  than  would  be  brought  before  the  international  court 
by,  for  example,  the  present  political  problem  in  Mexico. 

Two  precedents  have  already  been  created  in  this  field  of 
international  law,  and  although  they  were  set  up  on  a  relatively 
small  and  obscure  part  of  the  international  stage,  they  were 
established  under  exceedingly  difficult  circumstances  and  were 


THE-  MONROE  DOCTRINE  121 

wholly  effective.  These  were,  first,  the  arbitration  of  the  revo- 
lutionary struggle  between  Presidents  Bonilla  and  Davila,  of 
Honduras,  in  191 1,  which  resulted  in  the  resignation  of  the  lat- 
ter, the  election  of  the  former,  and  the  end  of  the  civil  war; 
and,  second,  the  issue  of  an  interlocutory  decree  by  the  Central 
American  Court  of  Justice,  in  1909,  which  put  an  end  to  a 
revolutionary  movement  in  Honduras  by  fixing  the  status  quo, 
and  by.  enjoining  the  neighboring  republics  of  Guatemala  and 
Salvador  from  giving  aid  and  comfort  to  the  rebellion. 

The  sanction  back  of  such  an  award  by  the  court  of  all  the 
nations  at  The  Hague,  including  as  it  would  all  the  vis  maxima 
of  the  twentieth  century's  diplomacy,  commerce,  finance,  and 
international  public  opinion,  not  to  mention,  if  necessary,  an 
international  police  force,  would  be  ample  for  its  enforcement. 

The  crux  of  this  problem,  of  course,  is  the  getting  of  such 
cases  into  court.  But,  as  the  United  States  knows  only  too  well, 
the  modern  world  is  bound  too  closely  together,  and  is  too  much 
under  the  dominion  of  the  ideals  of  civilization,  to  permit  the 
indefinite  running  of  an  open  sore  in  the  body  politic  of  any 
member  of  the  international  family.  This  fact  would  supply  the 
motive  force  to  bring  such  cases  into  the  international  court; 
while  the  medium  through  which  it  could  be  done  might  well 
be  supplied  by  some  such  development  of  the  international  com- 
missions of  inquiry  as  is  recommended  by  the  Taft  arbitration 
treaties,  which  development  I  have  had  the  honor  of  discussing 
elsewhere  under  the  name  of  "The  International  Grand  Jury." 

This,  then,  Mr.  Chairman  and  gentlemen,  is  the  solution  of 
the  problem  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  which  I  venture  to  submit 
to  you,  believing  as  I  do  that  it  will  be  the  final  and  wholly 
desirable  solution  of  a  problem  which  is  already  difficult  and 
potentially  impossible  if  left  to  the  solution  of  the  United  States 
alone,  or  of  any  partial  alliances  between  it  and  the  other 
Powers,  great  or  small. 


AFFIRMATIVE  DISCUSSION 

American  Society  of  International   Law.  Proceedings.   1914: 

6-22 

Real  Monroe  Doctrine.    Elihu  Root 

It  is  undoubtedly  true  that  the  specific  occasions  for  the 
declaration  of  Monroe  no  longer  exist.  The  Holy  Alliance,  long 
ago  disappeared.  The  nations  of  Europe  no  longer  contemplate 
the  vindication  of  monarchical  principles  in  the  territory  of  the 
new  world.  France,  the  most  active  of  the  Allies,  is  herself  a 
republic.  No  nation  longer  asserts  the  right  of  colonization  in 
America.  The  general  establishment  of  diplomatic  relations  be- 
tween the  Powers  of  Europe  and  the  American  republics,  if 
not  already  universal,  became  so  when,  pursuant  to  the  formal 
assent  of  the  Powers,  all  the  American  republics  were  received 
into  the  Second  Conference  at  The  Hague  and  joined  in  the  con- 
ventions there  made,  upon  the  footing  of  equal  sovereignty,  en- 
titled to  have  their  territory  and  independence  respected  under 
that  law  of  nations  which  formerly  existed  for  Europe  alone. 

The  declaration,  however,  did  more  than  deal  with  the  specific 
occasion  which  called  it  forth.  It  was  intended  to  declare  a 
general  principle  for  the  future,  and  this  is  plain  not  merely  from 
the  generality  of  the  terms  used,  but  from  the  discussions  out  of 
which  they  arose  and  from  the  understanding  of  the  men  who 
took  part  in  the  making  and  of  their  successors. 

When  Jefferson  was  consulted  by  President  Monroe  before 
the  message  was  sent  he  replied : 

The  question  presented  by  the  letters  you  have  sent  me  is  the  most 
momentous  which  has  ever  been  offered  to  my  contemplation  since  that 
of  independence.  That  made  us  a  nation;  this  sets  our  compass  and  points 
the  course  which  we  are  to  steer  through  the  ocean  of  time  opening  on  us. 
And  never  could  we  embark  upon  it  under  circumstances  more  auspicious. 
Our  first  and  fundamental  maxim  should  be,  never  to  entangle  ourselves 
in  the  broils  of  Europe;  our  second,  never  to  suffer  Europe  to  inter- 
meddle with  cisatlantic  affairs. 

Three  years  later  Daniel  Webster  declared  that  the  Doctrine 


124  .        SELECTED  ARTICLES  ON 

involved  the  honor  of  the  country.     He  said  in  the  House  of 
Representatives : 

I  look  upon  it  as  a  part  of  its  treasures  of  reputation;  and,  for  one,  I 
intend  to  guard  it.  ...  I  will  neither  help  to  erase  it  nor  tear  it  out; 
nor  shall  it  be,  by  any  act  of  mine,  blurred  or  blotted.  It  did  honor  to 
the  sagacity  of  the  government,  and  will  not  diminish  that  honor. 

Mr.  Cleveland  said  in  his  Message  of  December  17,  1895 : 

The  doctrine  upon  which  we  stand  is  strong  and  sound  because  its 
enforcement  is  important  to  our  peace  and  safety  as  a  nation,  and  is  essen- 
tial to  the  integrity  of  our  free  institutions  and  the  tranquil  maintenance 
of  our  distinctive  form  of  government.  It  was  intended  to  apply  to 
every,  stage  of  our  national  life  and  cannot  become  obsolete  while  our 
republic  endures. 

As  the  particular  occasions  which  called  it  forth  have  slipped 
back  into  history,  the  Declaration  itself,  instead  of  being  handed 
over  to  the  historian,  has  grown  continually  a  more  vital  and 
insistent  rule  of  conduct  for  each  succeeding  generation  of  Amer- 
icans. Never  for  a  moment  have  the  responsible  and  instructed 
statesmen  in  charge  of  the  foreign  affairs  of  the  United  States 
failed  to  consider  themselves  bound  to  insist  upon  its  policy. 
Never  once  has  the  public  opinion  of  the  people  of  the  United 
States  failed  to  support  every  just  application  of  it  as  new  oc- 
casion has  arisen.  Almost  every  President  and  Secretary  of 
State  has  restated  the  Doctrine  with  vigor  and  emphasis  in  the 
discussion  of  the  diplomatic  affairs  of  his  day.  The  Governments 
of  Europe  have  gradually  come  to  realize  that  the  existence  of 
the  policy  which  Monroe  declared  is  a  stubborn  and  continuing 
fact  to  be  recognized  in  their  controversies  with  American 
countries.  We  have  seen  Spain,  France,  England,  Germany,  with 
admirable  good  sense  and  good  temper,  explaining  beforehand 
to  the  United  States  that  they  intended  no  permanent  occupation 
of  territory,  in  the  controversy  with  Mexico  forty  years  after 
the  Declaration,  and  in  the  controversy  with  Venezuela  eighty 
years  after.  In  1903  the  Duke  of  Devonshire  declared  "Great 
Britain  accepts  the  Monroe  Doctrine  unreservedly."  Mr.  Hay 
coupled  the  Monroe  Doctrine  and  the  Golden  Rule  as  cardinal 
guides  of  American  diplomacy.  Twice  within  very  recent  years 
the  whole  treaty-making  power  of  the  United  States  has  given 
its  formal  approval  to  the  policy  by  the  reservations  in  the  signa- 
ture and  in  the  ratification  of  the  Arbitration  Conventions  of 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  125 

The  Hague  Conferences,  expressed  in  these  words  by  the  Senate 
resolution  agreeing  to  ratification  of  the  Convention  of  1907 : 

Nothing  contained  in  this  convention  shall  be  so  construed  as  to  require 
the  United  States  of  America  to  depart  from  its  traditional  policy  of  not 
intruding  upon,  interfering  with,  or  entangling  itself  in  the  political  ques- 
tions of  policy  or  internal  administration  of  any  foreign  state,  nor  shall 
anything  contained  in  the  said  convention  be  construed  to  imply  a  re- 
linquishment  by  the  United  States  of  its  traditional  attitude  towards  purely 
American  questions. 

It  seems  fair  to  assume  that  a  policy  with  such  a  history  as 
this  has  some  continuing  and  substantial  reason  underlying  it; 
that  it  is  not  outworn  or  meaningless  or  a  purely  formal  relic 
of  the  past,  and  it  seems  worth  while  to  consider  carefully  what 
the  Doctrine  is  and  what  it  is  not. 

No  one  ever  pretended  that  Mr.  Monroe  was  declaring  a  rule 
of  international  law  or  that  the  Doctrine  which  he  declared  has 
become  international  law.  It  is  a  declaration  of  the  United 
States  that  certain  acts  would  be  injurious  to  the  peace  and  safety 
of  the  United  States,  and  that  the  United  States  would  regard 
them  as  unfriendly.  The  Declaration  does  not  say  what  the 
course  of  the  United  States  will  be  in  case  such  acts  are  done. 
That  is  left  to  be  determined  in  each  particular  instance.  Mr. 
Calhoun  said,  in  the  Senate  debate  on  the  Yucatan  Bill,  in  1848: 

Whether  you  will  resist  or  not  and  the  measure  of  your  resistance — 
whether  it  shall  be  by  negotiation,  remonstrance,  or  some  intermediate 
measure  or  by  a  resort  to  arms;  all  this  must  be  determined  and  decided 
on  the  merits  of  the  question  itself.  This  is  the  only  wise  course. 
There  are  cases  of  interposition  where  I  would  resort  to  the  hazard  of  war 
with  all  its  calamities.  Am  I  asked  for  one?  I  will  answer.  I  designate 
the  case  of  Cuba. 

In  particular  instances,  indeed,  the  course  which  the  United 
States  would  follow  has  been  very  distinctly  declared,  as  when 
Mr.  Seward  said,  in  1865 : 

It  has  been  the  President's  purpose  that  France  should  be  respectfully 
informed  upon  two  points:  namely,  first,  that  the  United  States  earnestly 
desires  to  continue  and  to  cultivate  sincere  friendship  with  France.  Sec- 
ondly, that  this  policy  would  be  brought  in  imminent  jeopardy  unless 
France  could  deem  it  consistent  with  her  honor  to  desist  from  the  prosecu- 
tion of  armed  intervention  in  Mexico  to  overthrow  the  domestic  republican 
government  existing  there  and  to  establish  upon  its  ruins  the  foreign 
monarchy  which  has  been  attempted  to  be  inaugurated  in  the  capital  of 
that  country. 


126  SELECTED  ARTICLES  ON 

So  Secretary  Buchanan  said,  in  1848 : 

The  highest  and  first  duty  of  every  independent  nation  is  to  provide 
for  its  own  safety;  and  acting  upon  this  principle,  we  should  be  compelled 
to  resist  the  acquisition  of  Cuba  by  any  powerful  maritime  State,  with  all 
means  which  Providence  has  placed  at  our  command. 

And  Secretary  Clayton  said,  in  1849 : 

The  news  of  the  cession  of  Cuba  to  any  foreign  Power  would  in  the 
United  States  be  the  instant  signal  for  war.  No  foreign  Power  would  at- 
tempt to  take  it  that  did  not  expect  a  hostile  collision  with  us  as  an 
inevitable  consequence. 

The  Doctrine  is  not  international  law,  but  it  rests  upon  the 
right  of  self-protection,  and  that  right  is  recognized  by  inter- 
national law.  The  right  is  a  necessary  corollary  of  independent 
sovereignty.  It  is  well  understood  that  the  exercise  of  the  right 
of  self-protection  may  and  frequently  does  extend  in  its  effect 
beyond  the  limits  of  the  territorial  jurisdiction  of  the  State 
exercising  it.  The  strongest  example  probably  would  be  the 
mobilization  of  an  army  by  another  power  immediately  across 
the  frontier.  Every  act  done  by  the  other  power  may  be  within 
its  own  territory.  Yet  the  country  threatened  by  the  state  of 
facts  is  justified  in  protecting  itself  by  immediate  war.  The 
most  common  exercise  of  the  right  of  self-protection  outside  of 
a  state's  own  territory  and  in  time  of  peace  is  the  interposition 
of  objection  to  the  occupation  of  territory,  of  points  of  strategic 
military  or  maritime  advantage,  or  to  indirect  accomplishment  of 
this  effect  by  dynastic  arrangement.  For  example,  the  objection 
of  England  in  1911  to  the  occupation  of  a  naval  station  by  Ger- 
many on  the  Atlantic  Coast  of  Morocco;  the  objection  of  the 
European  Powers  generally  to  the  vast  force  of  Russia  extending 
its  territory  to  the  Mediterranean;  the  revision  of  the  Treaty 
of  San  Stefano  by  the  Treaty  of  Berlin;  the  establishment  of 
buffer  states;  the  objection  to  the  succession  of  a  German  prince 
to  the  throne  of  Spain;  the  many  forms  of  the  Eastern  Question; 
the  centuries  of  struggle  to  preserve  the  balance  of  power  in 
Europe — all  depend  upon  the  very  same  principle  which  underlies 
the  Monroe  Doctrine;  that  is  to  say,  upon  the  right  of  every 
sovereign  state  to  protect  itself  by  preventing  a  condition  of 
affairs  in  which  it  will  be  too  late  to  protect  itself.  Of  course 
each  state  must  judge  for  itself  when  a  threatened  act  will  cre- 
ate such  a  situation.  If  any  state  objects  to  a  threatened  act  and 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  127 

the  reasonableness  of  its  objection  is  not  assented  to,  the  efficacy 
of  the  objection  will  depend  upon  the  power  behind  it. 

It  is  doubtless  true  that  in  the  adherence  of  the  American 
people  to  the  original  Declaration  there  was  a  great  element 
of  sentiment  and  of  sympathy  for  the  people  of  South  America 
who  were  struggling  for  freedom,  and  it  has  been  a  source 
of  great  satisfaction  to  the  United  States  that  the  course  which 
it  took  in  1823  concurrently  with  the  action  of  Great  Britain 
played  so  great  a  part  in  assuring  the  right  of  self-government 
to  the  countries  of  South  America.  Yet  it  is  to  be  observed 
that  in  reference  to  the  South-American  governments  as  in  all 
other  respects,  the  international  right  upon  which  the  Declara- 
tion expressly  rests  is  not  sentiment  or  sympathy  or  a  claim  to 
dictate  what  kind  of  government  any  other  country  shall  have, 
but  the  'safety  of  the  United  States.  It  is  because  the  new  gov- 
ernments cannot  be  overthrown  by  the  allied  Powers  "without 
endangering  our  peace  and  happiness" ;  that  "the  United  States 
cannot  behold  such  interposition  in  any  form  with  indifference." 

We  frequently  see  statements  that  the  Doctrine  has  been 
changed  or  enlarged;  that  there  is  a  new  or  different  Doctrine 
since  Monroe's  time.  They  are  mistaken.  There  has  been  no 
change.  One  apparent  extension  of  the  statement  of  Monroe 
was  made  by  President  Polk  in  his  messages  of  1845  and  1848, 
when  he  included  the  acquisition  of  territory  by  a  European 
Power  through  cession  as  dangerous  to  the  safety  of  the  United 
States.  It  was  really  but  stating  a  corollary  to  the  Doctrine  of 
1823  and  asserting  the  same  right  of  self-protection  against  the 
other  American  states  as  well  as  against  Europe. 

This  corollary  has  been  so  long  and  uniformly  agreed  to  by 
the  Government  and  the  people  of  the  United  States  that  it  may 
fairly  be  regarded  as  being  now  a  part  of  the  Doctrine. 

But,  all  assertions  to  the  contrary  notwithstanding,  there  has 
been  no  other  change  or  enlargement  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine 
since  it  was  first  promulgated.  It  must  be  remembered  that  not 
everything  said  or  written  by  Secretaries  of  State  or  even  by 
Presidents  constitutes  a  national  policy  or  can  enlarge  or  modify 
or  diminish  a  national  policy. 

.It  is  the  substance  of  the  thing  to  which  the  nation  holds,  and 
that  is  and  always  has  been  that  the  safety  of  the  United  States 
demands  that  American  territory  shall  remain  American. 


128  SELECTED  ARTICLES  ON 

The  Monroe  Doctrine  does  not  assert  or  imply  or  involve 
any  right  on  the  part  of  the  United  States  to  impair  or  control 
the  independent  sovereignty  of  any  American  state.  In  the 
lives  of  nations,  as  of  individuals,  there  are  many  rights  unques- 
tioned and  universally  conceded.  The  assertion  of  any  particular 
right  must  be  considered,  not  as  excluding  all  others,  "but  as  coin- 
cident with  all  others  which  are  not  inconsistent.  The  funda- 
mental principle  of  international  law  is  the  principle  of  inde- 
pendent sovereignty.  Upon  that  all  other  rules  of  international 
law  rest.  That  is  the  chief  and  necessary  protection  of  the 
weak  against  the  power  of  the  strong.  Observance  of  that  is 
the  necessary  condition  to  the  peace  and  order  of  the  civilized 
world.  By  the  declaration  of  that  principle  the  common  judg- 
ment of  civilization  awards  to  the  smallest  and  weakest  state  the 
liberty  to  control  its  own  affairs  without  interference  from  any 
other  power,  however  great. 

The  Monroe  Doctrine  does  not  infringe  upon  that  right.  It 
asserts  the  right.  The  declaration  of  Monroe  was  that  the 
rights  and  interests  of  the  United  States  were  involved  in  main- 
taining a  condition,  and  the  condition  to  be  maintained  was  the 
independence  of  all  the  American  countries.  It  is  "the  free  and 
independent  condition  which  they  have  assumed  and  maintained" 
which  is  declared  to  render  them  not  subject  to  future  coloniza- 
tion. It  is  "the  governments  who  have  declared  their  inde- 
pendence and  maintained  it  and  whose  independence  we  have  on 
great  consideration  and  on  just  principles  acknowledged"  that 
are  not  to  be  interfered  with.  When  Mr.  Canning's  proposals 
for  a  joint  declaration  were  under  consideration  by  the  Cabinet 
in  the  months  before  the  famous  message  was  sent,  John  Quincy 
Adams,  who  played  the  major  part  in  forming  the  policy,  de- 
clared the  basis  of  it  in  these  words : 

Considering  the  South  Americans  as  independent  nations,  they  them- 
selves and  no  other  nation  had  the  right  to  dispose  of  their  condition.  We 
have  no  right  to  dispose  of  them  either  alone  or  in  conjunction  with  other 
nations.  Neither  have  any  other  nations  the  right  of  disposing  of  them 
without  their  consent. 

In  the  most  critical  and  momentous  application  of  the  Doctrine 
Mr.  Seward  wrote  to  the  French  Minister : 

France  need  not  for  a  moment  delay  her  promised  withdrawal  of  mili- 
tary forces  from  Mexico  and  her  putting  the  principle  of  non-intervention 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  129 

into  full  and  complete  practice  in  regard  to  Mexico  through  any  appre- 
hension that  the  United  States  will  prove  unfaithful  to  the  principles 
and  policy  in  that  respect  which  on  their  behalf  it  has  been  my  duty  to 
maintain  in  this  now  very  lengthened  correspondence.  The  practice  of 
this  government  from  its  beginning  is  a  guarantee  to  all  nations  of  the 
respect  of  the  American  people  for  the  free  sovereignty  of  the  people  in 
every  other  state.  We  received  the  instructions  from  Washington.  We 
applied  it  sternly  in  our  early  intercourse  even  with  France.  The  same 
principle  and  practice  have  been  uniformly  inculcated  by  all  our  states- 
men, interpreted  by  all  our  jurists,  maintained  by  all  our  Congresses,  and 
acquiesced  in  without  practical  dissent  on  all  occasions  by  the  American 
people.  It  is  in  reality  the  chief  element  of  foreign  intercourse  in  our 
history. 

In  his  message  to  Congress  of  December  3,  1906,  President 
Roosevelt  said: 

In  many  parts  of  South  America  there  has  been  much  misunderstanding 
of  the  attitude  and  purposes  of  the  United  States  toward  the  other  Ameri- 
can republics.  An  idea  had  become  prevalent  that  our  assertion  of  the 
Monroe  Doctrine  implied  or  carried  with  it  an  assumption  of  superiority 
and  of  a  right  to  exercise  some  kind  of  protectorate  over  the  countries  to 
whose  territory  that  Doctrine  applies.  Nothing  could  be  farther  from  the 
truth. 

He  quoted  the  words  of  the  Secretary  of  State  then  in  office 
to  the  recent  Pan-American  Conference  at  Rio  Janeiro : 

We  deem  the  independence  and  equal  rights  of  the  smallest  and  weakest 
member  of  the  -family  of  nations  entitled  to  as  much  respect  as  those  of 
the  greatest  empire,  and  we  deem  the  observance  of  that  respect  the  chief 
guarantee  of  the  weak  against  the  oppression  of  the  strong.  We  neither 
claim  nor  desire  any  rights  or  privileges  or  powers  that  we  do  not  freely 
concede  to  every  American  republic. 

And  the  President  then  proceeded  to  say  of  these  statements: 

They  have  my  hearty  approval,  as  I  am  sure  they  will  have  yours,  and 
I  cannot  be  wrong  in  the  conviction  that  they  correctly  represent  the  senti- 
ments of  the  whole  American  people.  I  cannot  better  characterize  the  true 
attitude  of  the  United  States  in  its  assertion  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  than 
in  the  words  of  the  distinguished  former  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  of 
Argentina,  Doctor  Drago,  "...  the  traditional  policy  "of  the  United 
States,  without  accentuating  superiority  or  seeking  preponderance,  con- 
demned the  oppression  of  the  nations  of  this  part  of  the  world  and  the 
control  of  their  destinies  by  the  great  Powers  of  Europe." 

Curiously  enough,  many  incidents  and  consequences  of  that 
independent  condition  itself  which  the  United  States  asserted  in 
the  Monroe  Doctrine  have  been  regarded  in  some  quarters  as 


130  SELECTED  ARTICLES  ON 

infringements  upon  independence  resulting  from  the  Monroe 
Doctrine.  Just  as  the  personal  rights  of  each  individual  free 
citizen  in  the  state  are  limited  by  the  equal  rights  of  every  other 
free  individual  in  the  same  state,  so  the  sovereign  rights  of  each 
independent  state  are  limited  by  the  equal  sovereign  rights  of 
every  other  independent  state.  These  limitations  are  not  impair- 
ments of  independent  sovereignty.  They  are  the  necessary  con- 
ditions to  the  existence  of  independent  sovereignty.  If  the 
Monroe  Doctrine  had  never  been  declared  or  thought  of,  the 
sovereign  rights  of  each  American  republic  would  have  been 
limited  by  the  equal  sovereign  rights  of  every  other  American 
republic,  including  the  United  States.  The  United  States  would 
have  had  a  right  to  demand  from  every  other  American  state 
observance  of  treaty  obligations  and  of  the  rules  of  international 
law.  It  would  have  had  the  right  to  insist  upon  due  protection 
for  the  liv.es  and  property  of  its  citizens  within  the  territory  of 
every  other  American  state,  and  upon  the  treatment  of  its  citi- 
zens in  that  territory  according  to  the  rules  of  international  law. 
The  United  States  would  have  had  the  right  as  against  every 
other  American  state  to  object  to  acts  which  the  United  States 
might  deem  injurious  to  its  peace  and  safety,  just  as  it  had  the 
right  to  object  to  such  acts  as  against  any  European  Power, 
and  just  as  all  European  and  American  Powers  have  the  right 
to  object  to  such  acts  as  against  one  another.  All  these  rights 
which  the  United  States  would  have  had  as  against  other  Ameri- 
can states  it  has  now.  They  are  not  in  the  slightest  degree 
affected  by  the  Monroe  Doctrine.  They  exist  now  just  as  they 
would  have  existed  if  there  had  been  no  Monroe  Doctrine.  They 
are  neither  greater  nor  less  because  of  that  Doctrine.  They  are 
not  rights  of  superiority;  they  are  rights  of  equality.  They  are 
the  rights  which  all  equal  independent  states  have  as  against  one 
another.  And  they  cover  the  whole  range  of  peace  and  war. 

It  happens,  however,  that  the  United  States  is  very  much 
bigger  and  more  powerful  than  most  of  the  other  American  re- 
publics. And  when  a  very  great  and  powerful  state  makes  de- 
mands upon  a  very  small  and  weak  state  it  is  difficult  to  avoid 
a  feeling  that  there  is  an  assumption  of  superior  authority  in- 
volved in  the  assertion  of  superior  power,  even  though  the 
demand  be  based  solely  upon  the  right  of  equal  against  equal. 
An  examination  of  the  various  controversies  which  the  United 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  131 

States  has  had  with  other  American  Powers  will  disclose  the 
fact  that  in  every  case  the  rights  asserted  were  rights  not  of 
superiority,  but  of  equality.  Of  course,  it  cannot  be  claimed  that 
great  and  powerful  states  shall  forego  their  just  rights  against 
smaller  and  less  powerful  states.  The  responsibilities  of  sov- 
ereignty attach  to  the  weak  as  well  as  to  the  strong,  and  a  claim 
to  exemption  from  those  responsibilities  would  imply  not  equality, 
but  inferiority.  The  most  that  can  be  said  concerning  a  question 
between  a  powerful  state  and  a  weak  one  is  that  the  great  state 
ought  to  be  especially  considerate  and  gentle  in  the  assertion 
and  maintenance  of  its  position ;  ought  always  to  base  its  acts 
not  upon  a  superiority  of  force,  but  upon  reason  and  law;  and 
ought  to  assert  no  rights  against  a  small  state  because  of  its 
weakness  which  it  would  not  assert  against  a  great  state  notwith- 
standing its  power.  But  in  all  this  the  Monroe  Doctrine  is  not 
concerned  at  all. 

The  scope  of  the  Doctrine  is  strictly  limited.  It  concerns 
itself  only  with  the  occupation  of  territory  in  the  New  World 
to  the  subversion  or  exclusion  of  a  pre-existing  American  gov- 
ernment. It  has  not  otherwise  any  relation  to  the  affairs  of 
either  American  or  European  states.  In  good  conduct  or  bad, 
observance  of  rights  or  violations  of  them,  agreement  or  contro- 
versy, injury  or  reprisal,  coercion  or  war,  the  United  States  finds 
no  warrant  in  the  Monroe  Doctrine  for  interference.  So  Secre- 
tary Cass  wrote,  in  1858 : 

With  respect  to  the  causes  of  war  between  Spain  and  Mexico  the 
United  States  have  no  concern,  and  do  not  undertake  to  judge  them.  Nor 
do  they  claim  to  interpose  in  any  hostilities  which  may  take  place.  Their 
policy  of  observation  and  interference  is  limited  to  the  permanent  sub- 
jugation of  any  portion  of  the  territory  of  Mexico,  or  of  any  other  Ameri- 
can state,  to  any  European  Power  whatever. 

So  Mr.  Seward  wrote,  in  1861,  concerning  the  allied  opera- 
tions against  Mexico : 

As  the  undersigned  has  heretofore  had  the  honor  to  inform  each  of  the 
plenipotentiaries  now  addressed,  the  President  does  not  feel  at  liberty  to 
question,  and  does  not  question,  that  the  sovereigns  represented  have  un- 
doubted right  to  decide  for  themselves  the  fact  whether  they  have  sus- 
tained grievances,  and  to  resort  to  war  against  Mexico  for  the  redress 
thereof,  and  have  a  right  also  to  levy  the  war  severally  or  jointly. 

So  when  Germany,  Great  Britain,  and  Italy  united  to  compel 
by  naval  force  a  response  to  their  demands  on  the  part  of  Ven- 


132  SELECTED  ARTICLES  ON 

ezuela,  and  the  German  Government  advised  the  United  States 
that  it  proposed  to  take  coercive  measures  to  enforce  its  claims 
for  damages  and  for  money  against  Venezuela,  adding,  "We 
declare  especially  that  under  no  circumstances  do  we  consider 
in  our  proceedings  the  acquisition  or  permanent  occupation  of 
Venezuelan  territory,"  Mr.  Hay  replied: 

That  the  Government  of  the  United  States,  although  it  regretted  that 
European  Powers  should  use  force  against  Central  and  South  American 
countries,  could  not  object  to  their  taking  steps  to  obtain  redress  for  in- 
juries suffered  by  their  subjects,  provided  that  no  acquisition  of  territory 
was  contemplated. 

Quite  independently  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  however,  there 
is  a  rule  of  conduct  among  nations  under  which  each  nation 
is  deemed  bound  to  render  the  good  offices  of  friendship  to  ihe 
others  when  they  are  in  trouble.  The  rule  has  been  crystallized 
in  the  provisions  of  The  Hague  Convention  for  the  pacific  set- 
tlement of  international  disputes.  Under  the  head  of  "The  Main- 
tenance of  General  Peace"  in  that  Convention  substantially  all 
the  Powers  of  the  world  have  agreed: 

With  a  view  to  obviating  as  far  as  possible  recourse  to  force  in  the 
relations  between  states,  the  Contracting  Powers  agree  to  use  their  best 
efforts  to  insure  the  pacific  settlement  of  international  differences. 

In  case  of  serious  disagreement  or  dispute,  before  an  appeal  to  arms, 
the  Contracting  Powers  agree  to  have  recourse,  as  far  as  circumstances 
allow,  to  the  good  offices  or  mediation  of  one  or  more  friendly  Powers. 

Independently  of  this  recourse,  the  Contracting  Powers  deem  it  ex- 
pedient and  desirable  that  one  or  more  Powers,  strangers  to  the  dispute, 
'should,  on  their  own  initiative  and  as  far  as  circumstances  may  allow, 
offer  their  good  offices  or  mediation  to  the  states  at  variance. 
The  exercise  of  this  right  can  never  be  regarded  by  either  of  the  parties 
in  dispute  as  an  unfriendly  act. 

The  part  of  the  mediator  consists  in  reconciling  the  opposing  claims 
and  appeasing  the  feelings  of  resentment  which  may  have  arisen  between 
the  states  at  variance. 

The  United  States  has  frequently  performed  this  duty  in  con- 
troversies between  American  republics  among  themselves  and 
between  American  republics  and  European  states.  So  in  the 
controversy  last  referred  to,  the  United  States  used  her  good 
offices  to  bring  about  a  series  of  arbitrations  which  superseded 
the  resort  to  force  determined  upon  by  the  allied  Powers  against 
Venezuela.  She  did  this  upon  the  request  of  Venezuela.  She 
did  it  in  the  performance  of  no  duty  and  the  exercise  of  no  right 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  133 

whatever  except  the  duty  and  the  right  of  friendship  between 
equal  sovereign  states.  The  Monroe  Doctrine  has  nothing  what- 
ever to  do  with  acts  of  this  description ;  yet  many  times  cen- 
sorious critics,  unfamiliar  with  the  facts  and  uninstructed  in  the 
customs  and  rules  of  action  of  the  international  world,  have 
accused  the  United  States  in  such  cases  of  playing  the  role  of 
schoolmaster,  of  assuming  the  superiority  of  guardianship,  of 
aiming  at  a  protectorate. 

As  the  Monroe  Doctrine  neither  asserts  nor  involves  any 
right  of  control  by  the  United  States  over  any  American  nation, 
it  imposes  upon  the  United  States  no  duty  toward  European 
Powers  to  exercise  such  a  control.  It  does  not  call  upon  the 
United  States  to  collect  debts  or  coerce  conduct  or  redress  wrongs 
or  revenge  injuries.  If  matters  ever  come  to  a  point  where  in 
any  American  country  the  United  States  intervenes  by  force 
to  prevent  or  end  an  occupation  of  territory  to  the  subversion 
or  exclusion  of  an  American  government,  doubtless  new  rights 
and  obligations  will  arise  as  a  result  of  the  acts  done  in  the 
course  of  the  intervention.  Unless  such  a  situation  shall  have 
arisen  there  can  be  no  duty  on  the  part  of  the  United  States 
beyond  the  exercise  of  good  offices  as  between  equal  and  inde- 
pendent nations. 

There  are,  indeed,  special  reasons  why  the  United  States 
should  perform  that  duty  of  equal  friendship  to  the  full  limit 
of  international  custom  and  international  ethics  as  declared  in 
The  Hague  Convention,  whenever  occasion  arises  in  controversy 
between  American  and  European  Powers.  There  is  a  motive 
for  that  in  the  special  sympathy  and  friendship  for  the  gradually 
developing  republics  of  the  South  which  the  American  people 
have  always  felt  since  the  days  of  Monroe  and  John  Quincy 
Adams  and  Richard  Rush  and  Henry  Clay.  There  is  a  motive 
in  the  strong  desire  of  our  Government  that  no  controversy  be- 
tween a  European  and  an  American  state  shall  ever  come  to  the 
point  where  the  United  States  may  be  obliged  to  assert  by  force 
the  rule  of  national  safety  declared  by  Monroe.  And  there  is  a 
motive  in  the  proper  desire  of  the  United  States  that  no  friendly 
nation  of  Europe  or  America  shall  be  injured  or  hindered  in  the 
prosecution  of  its  rights  in  any  way  or  to  any  extent  that  can 
possibly  be  avoided  because  that  nation  respects  the  rule  of  safety 
which  Mr.  Monroe  declared  and  we  maintain.  None  of  these 

11 


134  SELECTED  ARTICLES  ON 

reasons  for  the  exercise  of  the  good  offices  of  equality  justifies, 
nor  do  all  of  them  together  justify,  the  United  States  in  infring- 
ing upon  the  independence  or  ignoring  the  equal  rights  of  the 
smallest  American  state. 

Nor  has  the  United  States  ever  in  any  instance  during  the 
period  of  almost  a  century  which  has  elapsed  made  the  Monroe 
Doctrine  or  the  motives  which  lead  us  to  support  it  the  ground 
or  excuse  for  overstepping  the  limits  which  the  rights  of  equal 
sovereignty  set  between  equal  sovereign  states. 

Since  the  Monroe  Doctrine  is  a  declaration  based  upon  this 
nation's  right  of  self-protection,  it  cannot  be  transmuted  into  a 
joint  or  common  declaration  by  American  states  or  any  number 
of  them.  If  Chile  or  Argentina  or  Brazil  were  to  contribute  the 
weight  of  her  influence  toward  a  similar  end,  the  right  upon 
which  that  nation  would  rest  its  declaration  would  be  its  own 
safety,  not  the  safety  of  the  United  States.  Chile  would  declare 
what  was  necessary  for  the  safety  of  Chile  Argentina  would 
declare  what  was  necessary  for  the  safety  of  Argentina.  Brazil, 
what  was  necessary  for  the  safety  of  Brazil.  Each  nation  would 
act  for  itself  and  in  its  own  right,  and  it  would  be  impossible 
to  go  beyond  that  except  by  more  or  less  offensive  and  de- 
fensive alliances.  Of  course,  such  alliances  are  not  to  be  con- 
sidered. 

It  is  plain  that  the  building  of  the  Panama  Canal  greatly 
accentuates  the  practical  necessity  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  as 
it  applies  to  all  the  territory  surrounding  the  Caribbean  or  near 
the  Bay  of  Panama.  The  plainest  lessons  of  history  and  the 
universal  judgment  of  all  responsible  students  of  the  subject 
concur  in  teaching  that  the  potential  command  of  the  route 
to  and  from  the  Canal  must  rest  with  the  United  States,  and 
that  the  vital  interests  of  the  nation  forbid  that  such  command 
shall  pass  into  other  hands.  Certainly  no  nation  which  has 
acquiesced  in  the  British  occupation  of  Egypt  will  dispute  this 
proposition.  Undoubtedly,  as  one  passes  to  the  south  and  the 
distance  from  the  Caribbean  increases  the  necessity  of  maintaining 
the  rule  of  Monroe  becomes  less  immediate  and  apparent.  But 
who  is  competent  to  draw  the  line?  Who  will  say,  "To  this 
point  the  rule  of  Monroe  should  apply;  beyond  this  point,  it 
should  not"?  Who  will  say  that  a  new  national  force  created 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  135 

beyond  any  line  that  he  can  draw  will  stay  beyond  it  and  will 
not  in  the  long  course  of  time  extend  itself  indefinitely? 

The  danger  to  be  apprehended  from  the  immediate  proximity 
of  hostile  forces  was  not  the  sole  consideration  leading  to  the 
Declaration.  The  need  to  separate  the  influences  determining 
the  development  and  relation  of  states  in  the  New  World  from 
the  influences  operating  in  Europe  played  an  even  greater  part. 
The  familiar  paragraphs  of  Washington's  Farewell  Address  upon 
this  subject  were  not  rhetoric.  They  were  intensely  practical 
rules  of  conduct  for  the  future  guidance  of  the  country. 

Europe  has  a  set  of  primary  interests  which  to  us  have  none,  or  a  very 
remote,  relation.  Hence,  she  must  be  engaged  in  frequent  controversies, 
the  causes  of  which  are  essentially  foreign  to  our  concerns.  Hence,  there- 
fore, it  must  be  unwise  in  us  to  implicate  ourselves,  by  artificial  ties,  in  the 
ordinary  vicissitudes  of  her  politics,  or  the  ordinary  combinations  and  col- 
lisions of  her  friendships  or  enmities.  Our  detached  and  distant  situation 
invites  and  enables  us  to  pursue  a  different  course. 

It  was  the  same  instinct  which  led  Jefferson,  in  the  letter  to 
Monroe  already  quoted,  to  say: 

Our  first  and  fundamental  maxim  should  be,  never  to  entangle  ourselves 
in  the  broils  of  Europe;  our  second,  never  to  suffer  Europe  to  intermeddle 
with  cisatlantic  affairs. 

The  concurrence  of  Washington  and  Hamilton  and  Jefferson 
in  the  declaration  of  this  principle  of  action  entitles  it  to  great 
respect.  They  recalled  the  long  period  during  which  every  war 
waged  in  Europe  between  European  Powers  and  arising  from 
European  causes  of  quarrel  was  waged  also  in  the  new  world. 
English  and  French  and  Spanish  and  Dutch  killed  and  harried 
one  another  in  America,  not  because  of  quarrels  between  the 
settlers  in  America,  but  because  of  quarrels  between  the  Euro- 
pean Powers  having  dominion  over  them.  Separation  of  influ- 
ences as  absolute  and  complete  as  possible  was  the  remedy  which 
the  wisest  of  Americans  agreed  upon.  It  was  one  of  the  primary 
purposes  of  Monroe's  Declaration  to  insist  upon  this  separation, 
and  to  accomplish  it  he  drew  the  line  at  the  water's  edge.  The 
problem  of  national  protection  in  the  distant  future  is  one  not 
to  be  solved  by  the  first  impressions  of  the  casual  observer,  but 
only  by  profound  study  of  the  forces  which,  in  the  long  life 
of  nations,  work  out  results.  In  this  case  the  results  of  such  a 


136  SELECTED  ARTICLES  ON 

study  by  the  best  men  of  the  formative  period  of  the  United 
States  are  supported  by  the  instincts  of  the  American  democracy 
holding  steadily  in  one  direction  for  almost  a  century.  The  prob- 
lem has  not  changed  essentially.  If  the  Declaration  of  Monroe 
was  right  when  the  message  was  sent,  it  is  right  now.  South 
America  is  no  more  distant  to-day  than  it  was  then.  The  tre- 
mendous armaments  and  international  jealousies  of  Europe  afford 
little  assurance  to  -those  who  think  we  may  now  abandon  the 
separatist  policy  of  Washington.  That  South  American  states 
have  become  too  strong  for  colonization  or  occupation  is  cause 
for  satisfaction.  That  Europe  has  no  purpose  or  wish  to  colon- 
ize American  territory  is  most  gratifying.  These  facts  may  make 
it  improbable  that  it  will  be  necessary  to  apply  the  Monroe  Doc- 
trine in  the  southern  parts  of  South  America;  but  they  furnish 
no  reason  whatever  for  retracting  or  denying  or  abandoning  a 
declaration  of  public  policy,  just  and  reasonable  when  it  was 
made,  and  which,  if  occasion  for  its  application  shall  arise  in 
the  future,  will  still  be  just  and  reasonable. 

A  false  conception  of  what  the  Monroe  Doctrine  is,  of  what 
it  demands  and  what  it  justifies,  of  its  scope  and  of  its  limits, 
has  invaded  the  public  press  and  affected  public  opinion  within 
the  past  few  years.  Grandiose  schemes  of  national  expansion 
invoke  the  Monroe  Doctrine.  Interested  motives  to  compel  Cen- 
tral or  South  American  countries  to  do  or  refrain  from  doing 
something  by  which  individual  Americans  may  profit  invoke  the 
Monroe  Doctrine.  Clamors  for  national  glory  from  minds  too 
shallow  to  grasp  at  the  same  time  a  sense  of  national  duty  invoke 
the  Monroe  Doctrine.  The  intolerance  which  demands  that  con- 
trol over  the  conduct  and  the  opinions  of  other  peoples  which  is 
the  essence  of  tyranny  invokes  the  Monroe  Doctrine.  Thoughtless 
people  who  see  no  difference  between  lawful  right  and  physical 
power  assume  that  the  Monroe  Doctrine  is  a  warrant  for  inter- 
ference in  the  internal  affairs  of  all  weaker  nations  in  the  New 
World.  Against  this  supposititious  doctrine  many  protests  both 
in  the  United  States  and  in  South  America  have  been  made,  and 
justly  made.  To  the  real  Monroe  Doctrine  these  protests  have 
no  application. 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  137 

Independent.  76:540-4.  December  18,  1913 

Monroe  Doctrine:  Its  Limitations  and  Implications. 
William  H.  Taft 

It  Has  Made  for  Peace 

The  original  declaration  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  was  prompted 
by  England's  wish,  when  Canning  was  Foreign  Minister,  that 
England  and  the  United  States  should  make  a  joint  declaration 
of  such  a  policy.  Since  its  announcement  by  President  Monroe 
there  have  been  frequent  intimations  by  English  statesmen  while 
in  office  that  they  do  not  object  to  its  maintenance.  Whether 
the  other  governments  of  Europe  have  acquiesced  in  it  or  not, 
it  is  certain  that  none  of  them  have  insisted  upon  violating  it 
when  the  matter  was  called  to  their  attention  by  the  United 
States.  Every  one  admits  that  its  maintenance  until  recently 
has  made  for  the  peace  of  the  world,  has  kept  European  govern- 
ments from  intermeddling  in  the  politics  of  this  hemisphere,  and 
has  enabled  all  the  various  Latin-American  republics  that  were 
offshoots  from  Spain  to  maintain  their  own  governments  and 
their  independence.  While  it  may  be  truly  said  that  it  has  not 
made  for  peace  between  them,  still  that  was  not  within  the  scope 
of  its  purpose.  It  has,  however,  restrained  the  land-  hunger  and 
the  growing  disposition  for  colonization  by  some  European  gov- 
ernments, which  otherwise  would  certainly  have  carried  them 
into  this  hemisphere.  The  very  revolutions  and  instabilities  of 
many  of  the  Latin- American  republics  would  have  offered  fre- 
quent excuse  and  opportunity  for  intervention  by  European  gov- 
ernments which  they  would  have  promptly  improved. 

It  Does  not  Forbid  War 

The  second  great  limitation  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  is  that 
it  does  not  contemplate  any  interference  on  our  part  with  the 
right  of  an  European  government  to  declare  and  make  war  upon 
any  American  government,  or  to  pursue  such  course  in  the  vindi- 
cation of  its  national  rights  as  would  be  a  proper  method  under 
the  rules  of  international  law.  This  was  expressly  declared  to 
be  a  proper  term  in  the  statement  of  the  Doctrine  by  Mr.  Seward 
during  our  Civil  War,  when  Spain  made  war  against  Chile.  He 


138  SELECTED  ARTICLES  ON 

announced  our  intention  to  observe  neutrality  between  the  two 
nations  and  he  laid  down  the  proposition  that  the  Doctrine  did 
not  require  the  United  States,  in  a  consistent  pursuit  of  it,  to 
protect  any  government  in  this  hemisphere,  either  by  a  defensive 
alliance  against  the  attacking  European  Power  or  by  interfering 
to  prevent  such  punishment  as  it  might  inflict,  provided  only  that 
in  the  end  the  conquering  power  did  not  force  its  own  govern- 
ment upon  the  conquered  people,  or  compel  a  permanent  transfer 
to  it  of  their  territory,  or  resort  to  any  other  unjustly  oppressive 
measures  against  them.  And  Mr.  Roosevelt  in  his  communica- 
tions to  Congress  has  again  and  again  asserted  that  maintenance 
of  the  Doctrine  does  not  require  our  Government  to  object  to 
armed  measures  on  the  part  of  European  governments  to  collect 
their  debts  and  the  debts  of  their  nationals  against  governments 
in  this  continent  that  are  in  default  of  their  just  obligations, 
provided  only  that  they  do  not  attempt  to  satisfy  those  obligations 
by  taking  over  to  themselves  ownership  and  possession  of  the 
territory  of  the  debtor  governments,  or  by  other  oppressive  meas- 
ures. It  may  be  conceded  that  Mr.  Olney  used  language  that 
was  unfortunate  in  describing  the  effect  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine 
upon  the  position  of  the  United  States  in  this  hemisphere.  It 
is  .not  remarkable  that  it  has  been  construed  to  be  the  claim  of 
suzerainty  over  the  territory  of  the  two  American  continents. 
Our  fiat  is  riot  law  to  control  the  domestic  concerns  or  indeed 
the  internal  policies,  or  the  foreign  policies  of  the  Latin-American 
republics,  or  of  other  American  governments,  nor  do  we  exercise 
substantial  sovereignty  over  them.  We  are  concerned  that  their 
governments  shall  not  be  interfered  with  by  European  govern- 
ments;  we  are  concerned  that  this  hemisphere  shall  not  be  a 
field  for  land  aggrandizement  and  the  chase  for  increased  political 
power  by  European  governments,  such  as  we  have  witnessed  in 
Africa  and  in  China  and  Manchuria,  and  we  believe  that  such 
a  condition  would  be  inimical  to  our  safety  and  interests.  More 
than  this,  where  a  controversy  between  an  European  government 
and  a  Latin-American  republic  is  of  such  a  character  that  it  is 
likely  to  lead  to  war,  we  feel  that  our  earnest  desire  to  escape 
the  possible  result  against  which  the  Monroe  Doctrine  is  aimed, 
is  sufficient  to  justify  our  mediating  between  the  European  Power 
and  the  Latin-American  republic,  and  bringing  about  by  negotia- 
tion, if  possible,  a  peaceable  settlement  of  the  difference.  This 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  139 

i 

is  what  Mr.  Roosevelt  did  in  Venezuela  and  in  Santo  Domingo. 
It  was  not  that  the  use  of  force  or  threatened  force  to  collect 
their  debts  by  the  European  Powers  constituted  a  violation  of  the 
Monroe  Doctrine  that  induced  Mr.  Roosevelt  to  act,  but  only  a 
general  desire  to  promote  peace  and  also  a  wish  to  avoid  circum- 
stances in  which  an  invasion  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  might 
easily  follow. 

"A  National  Asset" 

It  is  said — and  this  is  what  frightened  peace  advocates  from 
the  Monroe  Doctrine — that  it  rests  on  force,  and  ultimately  on 
the  strength  of  our  army  and  our  navy.  That  is  true,  if  its  en- 
forcement is  resisted.  Its  ultimate  sanction  and  vindication  are 
in  our  ability  to  maintain  it;  but  our  constant  upholding  and 
assertion  of  the  Doctrine  have  enabled  us,  with  the  conflicting 
interests  of  European  Powers  and  the  support  of  some  and  the 
acquiescence  of  others,  to  give  effect  to  that  Doctrine  for  now 
nearly  a  century,  and  that  without  the  firing  of  a  single  shot. 
This  has  given  the  Doctrine  a  traditional  weight  that  assertion  of 
a  new  policy  by  the  United  States  never  could  have.  It  is  a 
national  asset,  and,  indeed,  an  asset  of  the  highest  value  for  those 
who  would  promote  the  peace  of  the  world.  The  mere  fact  that 
the  further  successful  maintenance  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  in 
the  improbable  event  that  any  European  Power  shall  deliberately 
violate  it  will  require  the  exercise  of  force  upon  our  part,  is  cer- 
tainly not  a  reason  for  the  most  sincere  advocate  of  peace  to 
insist  upon  sacrificing  its  beneficent  influence  and  prestige  as  an 
instrument  of  peace  to  prevent  European  intermeddling  in  this 
hemisphere  which  a  century  of  successful  insistence  without 
actual  use  of  force  has  given  it. 

Much  as  the  Doctrine  may  be  criticized  by  the  Continental 
press  of  Europe,  it  is  an  institution  of  one  hundred  years'  stand- 
ing, it  is  something  that  its  age  is  bound  to  make  Europe  respect. 
It  was  advanced  at  a  time  when  we  were  but  a  small  nation  with 
little  power,  and  it  has  acquired  additional  force  and  prestige  as 
our  nation  has  grown  to  the  size  and  strength  and  international 
influence  that  it  now  has. 

Were  we  to  abandon  the  Doctrine  and  thus  in  effect  notify  the 
European  governments  that  so  far  as  our  remonstrance  or  inter- 
position was  concerned,  they  might  take  possession  of  Santo 


140  SELECTED  ARTICLES  ON 

Domingo,  of  Haiti,  or  of  any  of  the  Central  American  republics, 
or  of  any  South  American  republics  that  might  be  disturbed  by 
revolution,  and  that  might  give  them  some  international  excuse 
for  intervention,  it  would  be  but  a  very  short  time  before  we 
would  be  forced  into  controversies  that  would  be  much  more 
dangerous  to  the  peace  of  this  hemisphere  than  our  continued 
assertion  of  the  Doctrine  properly  understood  and  limited. 

Should  We  Invite  Their  Cooperation? 

But  it  is  said  that  we  ought  to  invite  in  these  so-called  A.  B.  C. 
powers  of  South  America  to  assist  us  in  upholding  the  Doctrine 
and  also  in  doing  what  the  Doctrine,  as  well  as  neighborhood 
interests,  may  lead  us  to  do  with  nearby  countries  around  the 
Gulf  of  Mexico  and  the  Caribbean  Sea,  and  that  we  ought  to 
establish  some  sort  of  relationship  with  these  great  powers  as 
members  of  a  kind  of  hegemony  to  decide  upon  Latin-American 
questions  and  participate  in  intervention  to  help  along  the  smaller 
countries,  and  thus  put  such  powers  on  an  equality  with  us  in 
our  American  policy  and  give  assurance  of  our  disinterestedness. 
If  we  could  do  this,  I  would  be  glad  to  have  it  done,  because 
it  would  relieve  us  of  part  of  a  burden  and  would  give  greater 
weight  to  the  declaration  of  the  policy.  I  would  be  glad  to  have 
an  effort  tactfully  made  to  this  end  and  I  don't  want  to  dis- 
courage it ;  but  I  fear  we  should  find  that  these  powers  would  be 
loath  to  assume  responsibility  or  burden  in  the  matter  of  the 
welfare  of  a  government  like  one  of  the  Central  American  re- 
publics, or  Haiti  or  Santo  Domingo  so  remote  from  them  and  so 
near  to  us.  We  attempted  in  case  of  disturbance  in  the  Central 
American  governments  once  or  twice  to  interest  Mexico,  when 
Mexico  had  a  responsible  government  and  was  very  near  at  hand, 
but  President  Diaz  was  loath  to  take  any  part  with  the  United 
States  in  such  an  arrangement,  and  we  found  that  whatever 
had  to  be  done  had  to  be  done  largely  on  the  responsibility  of 
the  United  States. 

If  action  in  respect  of  any  republic  of  South  America  were 
necessary  under  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  the  joining  of  the  A.  B.  C. 
powers  with  the  United  States  might  involve  suspicion  and  jeal- 
ousy on  the  part  of  other  South  American  republics  not  quite 
so  prosperous  or  so  stable  as  the  A.  B.  C.  powers.  Thus,  instead 
of  helping  the  situation,  the  participation  of  part  of  the  South 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  141 

American  governments  might  only  complicate  it.  I  know  some- 
thing about  the  character  of  those  countries  myself,  not  from 
personal  observation,  but  from  a  study  of  the  character  of  Span- 
ish descended  civilizations  and  societies,  and  I  venture  to  say 
that  sensitive  as  they  all  may  be  in  respect  to  suspected  encroach- 
ments of  the  United  States,  they  are  even  more  sensitive  as  be- 
tween themselves  and  their  respective  ambitions.  During  my 
Administration,  Mr.  Knox,  the  Secretary  of  State,  tendered  the 
good  offices  of  the  United  States  as  between  South  American 
governments  who  were  bitter  against  each  other  over  boundaries 
and  other  disputes,  and  successfully  brought  them  to  a  peaceful 
solution,  but  in  those  controversies  it  was  quite  apparent  that 
whatever  then  might  be  the  general  feeling  against  the  United 
States,  their  suspicions  of  each  other,  when  thejr  interests  were  at 
variance,  were  quite  as  intense.  Indeed  it  is  not  too  much  to  say 
that  the  fear  in  the  hearts  of  the  less  powerful  peoples  of  South 
America  of  a  South  American  hegemony  is  more  real  than  any 
genuine  fear  they  may  have  of  the  actual  suzerainty  of  our  Gov- 
ernment. My  belief,  therefore,  is  that  unless  we  could  organize 
a  union  of  all  the  countries  of  two  continents,  which  would  be 
so  clumsy  as  to  be  entirely  impracticable,  the  influence  of  the 
United  States  can  probably  be  exerted  in  support  of  the  Monroe 
Doctrine  more  effectively  and  much  less  invidiously  alone  than  by 
an  attempt  to  unite  certain  of  the  South  American  Powers  in  an 
effort  to  preserve  its  successful  maintenance.  I  hope  my  fear  in 
this  respect  will  prove  to  be  unfounded  and  that  the  plan  sug- 
gested may  be  successful. 


Craftsman.  25:311-4.  January,  1914 

Vitality  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine.    W.  Carman  Roberts 

This  doctrine  which  for  ninety  years  has  been  a  cardinal 
principle  of  our  foreign  policy  has  not  merely  held  its  own  dur- 
ing this  period,  but  has  proved  its  vitality  by  gradually  extending 
its  scope  under  succeeding  administrations.  Thus  under  Presi- 
dent Cleveland  it  was  interpreted  to  mean  that  any  European 
Power  owning  land  in  the  Western  Hemisphere  must  arbitrate 
its  boundary  disputes  with  its  neighbors.  President  Roosevelt 
went  further  than  his  predecessors  in  accepting  for  Uncle  Sam 


142  SELECTED  ARTICLES  ON 

under  the  Monroe  Doctrine  the  role  of  benevolent  policeman, 
"the  big  brother  with  a  stick,"  who,  as  Professor  Hiram  Bingham 
of  Yale  puts  it,  "would  keep  intruders  from  annoying  the  little 
fellows,  and  who  would  also  see  to  it  that  the  little  fellow  did 
not  annoy  the  neighbors."  Under  President  Taft  the  Lodge 
resolution,  passed  by  the  Senate  but  not  signed  by  the  President, 
undertook  to  carry  Monroeism  still  further  by  denying  the  right 
of  American  republics  to  sell  harbor  rights  to  foreign  cor- 
porations. 

But  the  most  remarkable  development  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine 
is  that  formulated  by  President  Wilson  within  very  recent  weeks 
and  involving  the  proposition  that  the  United  States  will  not 
countenance  the  establishment  of  any  foreign  financial  control 
over-  the  weaker  Latin-American  countries  of  a  sort  that  would 
in  effect  control  their  government.  Speaking  at  Mobile  recently 
the  President  said:  "States  that  are  obliged  to  grant  concessions 
are  in  this  condition — that  foreign  interests  are  apt  to  dominate 
their  domestic  affairs,  a  condition  always  dangerous  and  apt  to 
become  intolerable.  What"  these  states  are  going  to  see  is  an 
emancipation  from  this  subordination  which  has  been  inevitable 
to  foreign  enterprises.  The  United  States  must  regard  it  as  one 
of  the  duties  of  friendship  to  see  that  from  no  quarter  are  ma- 
terial interests  made  superior  to  human  liberty  and  national  op- 
portunity." This  was  prefaced  by  an  emphatic  statement  that 
never  again  would  the  United  States  acquire  a  foot  of  territory 
by  conquest.  An  almost  immediate  sequel  to  this  warning  to 
the  foreign  concessionaires  was  the  abandonment  by  a  powerful 
British  syndicate  of  gigantic  oil  project  in  Colombia  and  Ecuador. 
These  projects,  if  consummated,  would  have  put  certain  ports 
in  the  neighborhood  of  the  Panama  Canal  practically  under 
British  control — a  situation  in  direct  conflict  with  the  Monroe 
Doctrine  as  elaborated  in  the  Lodge  resolution.  Moreover,  since 
oil  is  likely  to  supersede  coal  as  naval  fuel,  an  oil  port  is  virtually 
the  equivalent  of  a  coaling  station. 

Thus,  despite  repeated  assertions  that  it  is  dead  or  obsolete, 
the  Monroe  Doctrine  not  only  remains  a  controlling  factor  in 
our  foreign  relations,  but  is  proving  its  vitality  by  constant 
growth  in  meaning  and  scope.  Moreover,  it  is  and  always  has 
been  a  popular  doctrine  with  the  American  people.  Even  the 
weaker  of  the  Latin-American  nations  are  now  beginning  to 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  143 

understand  that  it  does  not  mean  "the  Americas  for  the  United 
States,"  but,  "the  Americas  for  the  Americans."  They  begin  to 
see  that  if  the  "big  brother"  has  sometimes  been  "bossy,"  his 
motive  has  not  been  one  of  arrogance  but  of  helpfulness.  And 
as  an  aid  to  this  understanding  they  have  the  assurance  of  Presi- 
dent Wilson  that  "we  are  the  friends  of  constitutional  govern- 
ment in  America ;  we  are  more  than  its  friends,  we  are  its  cham- 
pions;  because  in  no  other  way  can  our  neighbors,  to  whom  we 
would  wish  in  every  way  to  make  proof  of  our  friendship,  work 
out  their  own  development  in  peace  and  liberty." 

Journal  of  Race  Development.  4:359-69.  January,  1914 

Modern  Meaning  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine.    J.  M.  Callahan 

It  is  unfair  to  say  that  the  Monroe  Doctrine  was  a  mere  pro- 
nunciamento  based  on  provincialism  and  selfishness,  and  that  it 
has  never  served  any  useful  purpose. 

True,  one  of  its  earlier  basic  ideas  was  the  natural  separation 
between  the  old  and  the  new  world — an  idea  of  two  separate 
spheres  which  was  unwarranted  however,  much  it  may  have 
seemed  desirable  to  Jefferson  in  the  Napoleonic  period  of  "eternal 
war"  in  Europe.  This  idea  of  isolation  was  never  a  vital  prin- 
ciple of  the  doctrine.  The  United  States  was  a  world  power 
from  the  beginning  and  early  felt  the  need  of  naval  bases  in  the 
Mediterranean.  As  a  world  power  it  has  rights  in  Europe,  Africa 
and  Asia. 

True,  the  Doctrine  was  largely  due  to  self  interest,  together, 
with  the  feeling  that  the  United  States  was  logically  the  political 
leader  among  the  American  powers.  Secretary  Adams  in  his 
instructions  to  Rush,  on  November  29,  1823,  said:  "American 
affairs,  whether  of  the  northern  or  southern  continent,  can  hence- 
forth not  be  excluded  from  the  interference  of  the  United  States. 
All  questions  of  policy  relating  to  them  have  a  bearing  so  direct 
upon  the  rights  and  interests  of  the  United  States  that  they  can- 
not be  left  to  the  disposal  of  European  Powers  animated  and 
directed  exclusively  "by  European  principles  and  interests." 

The  United  States,  beginning  with  the  transfer  of  Louisiana 
from  Spain  to  France  in  1801  and  the  apprehended  transfer  of 
Florida  from  Spain  to  some  other  European  Power  in  1811,  has 


144  SELECTED  ARTICLES  ON 

steadily  opposed  any  European  acquisition  of  American  territory 
which  as  a  European  colony  might  prove  dangerous  to  American 
peace  and  security.  The  Monroe  Doctrine,  based  upon  this  prin- 
ciple, has  been  preeminently  a  doctrine  of  peace — especially  se- 
cured by  freeing  the  Americans  from  the  contests  of  European 
diplomacy  and  politics.  In  1905,  President  Roosevelt  said  the 
doctrine  as  gradually  developed  and  applied  to  meet  changing 
needs  and  conditions,  and  as  accepted  by  other  nations,  was  one 
of  the  most  effective  instruments  for  peace  in  the  western 
hemisphere. 

Although  its  policy  was  based  on  self  interest,  the  American 
government  under  Monroe  gave  proper  consideration  to  the  in- 
terests of  Latin  America.  Although  in  recognizing  the  inde- 
pendence of  Spanish  American  countries,  it  had  issued  a  declara- 
tion of  neutrality,  Secretary  Adams  later  (October,  1823),  in- 
formed the  Russian  minister  that  this  declaration  "had  been  made 
under  the  observance  of  like  neutrality  by  all  the  European 
Powers"  and  might  be  changed  by  change  of  circumstances.  The 
Monroe  Doctrine  which  followed  was  directly  caused  by  the 
belief  in  the  right  of  free  peoples  to  determine  their  destinies — 
and  by  it  the  United  States,  with  unusual  courage,  became  a 
protector  of  liberty  and  self  government  in  the  western  hemi- 
sphere. Its  high  purpose  and  convenient  usefulness  was  properly 
recognized  at  the  time  by  the  weak  Latin-American  republics. 
It  was  the  outgrowth  of  the  sympathy  felt  for  Latin-American 
peoples  who  were  struggling  to  free  themselves  from  conditions 
imposed  by  European  politics  and  who  had  been  recognized  as 
independent  nations  by  the  United  States.  Monroe,  who  pre- 
viously as  secretary  of  state  was  familiar  with  Latin- American 
conditions,  at  first  contemplated  a  bold  stand  to  prevent  Euro- 
pean interference  in  Spain  itself.  After  the  decision  to  limit  the 
scope  of  active  opposition  to  the  threatened  European  interven- 
tion in  American  affairs,  he  appointed  a  special  secret  repre- 
sentative to  visit  Europe,  to  watch  the  operations  of  European 
congresses  and  to  furnish  reports  as  a  basis  of  determination  of 
American  policy.  Luckily  he  was  successful  in  blocking  interven- 
tion without  resort  to  more  active  measures. 

The  Doctrine  has  prevented  the  partition  of  Latin  America, 
and  without  any  request  of  remuneration  for  the  service  rendered. 
Its  unselfish  purpose  and  unusual  daring,  in  face  of  what  seemed 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  145 

a  serious  peril,  gave  it  a  well  deserved  popularity  in  the  United 
States  and  in  Latin- American  countries — many  of  which  have  in 
many  instances  since  endeavored  to  secure  treaty  stipulations 
based  upon  its  principles,  or  have  invited  the  United  States 
actively  to  intervene  to  protect  them  from  the  apprehended  inter- 
vention of  European  Powers  or  from  despots  who  might  prepare 
the  way  for  European  intervention. 

In  spite  of  apparent  lapses  of  consistency,  illustrated  in  the 
case  of  the  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty  (which  was  supported  as  a 
measure  which  was  expected  to  free  an  important  part  of  the  con- 
tinent from  European  intervention),  the  basic  principles  of  the 
Doctrine,  interpreted  with  proper  elasticity  to  meet  changing  con- 
ditions, were  asserted  with  success  in  other  later  cases.  The  most 
notable  cases  were  the  termination  of  French  intervention  in  Mex- 
ico in  1867,  and  the  settlement  of  the  Venezuelan  boundary  dis- 
pute with  England  in  1895-96 — after  the  famous  Cleveland-Olney 
interpretation  which  resulted  in  a  triumph  of  the  American  de- 
mand for  arbitration,  awakened  the  entire  world  to  the  modern 
meaning  of  the  "menaces  of  Monroe,"  and  caused  someone  to  re- 
gard the  Doctrine  as  an  international  impertinence.  Although 
originally  a  mere  declaration  of  Monroe,-  nobody  since  the  action 
of  the  United  States  in  the  Venezuelan  affair  can  surely  say  it 
has  never  had  the  sanction  of  Congress. 

The  Doctrine,  although  based  primarily  upon  the  right  of 
Latin  American  states  to  govern  themselves,  has  been  sometimes 
erroneously  regarded  as  a  doctrine  of  American  expansion.  It 
is  not  based  on  territorial  conquest-*-although  over  half  a  century 
ago  it  was  sometimes  associated  with  that  idea.  It  expresses 
a  duty  and  a  sympathy  toward  Latin  America  and  not  a  desire 
for  territory.  Americans,  who  logically  in  their  early  history 
established  their  boundaries  on  the  gulf,  for  a  half  century  have 
not  been  inclined  to  encroach  upon  the  territories  of  their 
neighbors. 

It  is  true  that  much  Latin- American  suspicion  of  American 
territorial  designs  was  justified  in  the  decade  before  the  American 
Civil  War,  when  under  the  influence  of  American  leaders  of  the 
southern  states,  the  shibboleth  of  "Manifest  Destiny"  was  added 
to  the  doctrine  of  national  security.  In  January,  1855,  Marcoleta 
of  the  Nicaragua  legation  protested  against  the  projects  of  the 
self-styled  "Central  American  Land  and  Mining  Company"  to 


146  SELECTED  ARTICLES  ON 

encourage  immigration  to  Central  America,  and  especially  against 
the  nature  of  the  "schemes  devised  against  Central  America  by 
these  modern  Phoenicians  who  assume  military  titles  .  .  . 
and  grasp  the  sword  and  musket  instead  of  the  ploughshare  and 
ax  and  shepherd's  crook,  thinking  to  make  conquest  of  the  golden 
fleece  which  they  believe  to  be  hung  and  secreted  amidst  the 
briars,  forests,  thickets  and  swamps  .  .  .  under  the  by  no 
means  attractive  and  seductive  influence  of  a  pestiferous  and 
fever-giving  atmosphere."  Suspicion  was  doubtless  increased  in 
1856  by  plans  for  an  American  protectorate  over  the  Isthmus  of 
Panama,  formulated  in  a  treaty  (between  the  United  States  and 
New  Granada)  whose  ratification  was  prevented  by  a  change  of 
administration  in  the  United  States  and  a  revolution  in  New 
Granada.  These  suspicions  were  prominent  in  producing  the 
project  of  a  Latin-American  Confederacy  of  1856 — a  proposed 
alliance  which  was  regarded  as  antagonistic  to  the  United  States, 
and  which  caused  Dana,  the  American  minister  to  Bolivia,  to 
propose  to  the  Buchanan  administration  early  in  1857  a  clear 
statement  of  American  foreign  policy  based  upon  the  Monroe 
Doctrine,  non-expansion  in  Latin  America,  and  treaties  of  alli- 
ance with  the  Latin-American  states,  in  order  to  sustain  self- 
government  in  both  Americas.  In  1858,  in  connection  with  the 
policy  of  the  American  government  to  secure  a  neutral  transit 
route  across  Central  America,  Nicaragua  issued  a  manifesto 
against  apprehended  filibustering  expeditions  from  the  United 
States,  and  by  demanding  a  European  protectorate  indicated  a 
line  of  policy  which  Secretary  Cass  promptly  warned  her  that 
the  United  States  had  long  opposed  and  would  resist  by  all 
means  in  her  power,  for  reasons  "founded  on  the  political  circum- 
stances of  the  American  continent  which  has  interests  of  its  own." 
It  is  true  that,  after  the  Gadsden  purchase,  persistent  efforts 
were  made  under  the  administrations  of  Pierce  and  Buchanan, 
not  only  to  extend  American  influence  and  domain  in  the  West 
Indies,  but  also  to  solve  the  Mexican  problem  by  additional  re- 
duction of  Mexican  territory — or  by  -.the  establishment  of  an 
American  protectorate  which  was  expected  to  result  in  new  acqui- 
sitions to  the  stronger  country.  These  efforts,  largely  based  on 
the  danger  of  European  influence  and  apprehended  European 
intervention  in  Mexico,  closed  with  the  beginning  of  the  Ameri- 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE.  147 

« 

can  Civil  War  and  with  the  arrival  of  the  long-predicted  Euro- 
pean intervention  in  Mexico. 

Under  Seward,  the  American  government  sought  only  to  pre- 
serve Mexico  from  the  Confederates  and  from  permanent  Euro- 
pean occupation,  and  the  American  senate  refused  to  enter  into 
any  arrangement  by  which  a  proposed  mortgage  on  lands  of 
Mexico  might  have  resulted  in  new  annexations.  Later,  although 
Mexico  feared  American  expansion  toward  the  southwest  and 
hesitated  to  cooperate  in  the  construction  of  railroads  across  the 
international  boundary,  the  United  States  government  remained 
true  to  the  assurances  of  Seward  in  Mexico  after  the  expulsion 
of  Maximilian.  It  sought  no  acquisition  of  territory  in  Mexico ; 
and  much  less  did  it  desire  territory  in  Latin  America  farther 
south,  except  in  connection  with  the  later  projects  for  the  con- 
struction of  the  interoceanic  canal  whose  benefits  would  be  shared 
by  Latin  America  and  the  entire  world. 

The  part  taken  by  the  United  States  in  Cuba  and  in  the 
Venezuelan  controversy  with  the  European  allies  has  revealed 
to  Latin  America  the  true  feeling  of  the  government  of  the 
United  States.  It  has  shown  them  that  the  mother  republic  is 
sincerely  and  earnestly  interested  in  the  success  of  republican 
government  throughout  this  hemisphere.  It  has  shown  that  the 
purpose  of  the  older  republic  in  relations  with  Latin  America  is 
not  one  of  conquest,  but  one  of  sympathy,  cooperation,  and  as- 
sistance. The  true  policy  of  the  American  government  since  the 
Civil  War  was  recently  expressed  by  Secretary  Root,  and  more 
recently  by  President  Wilson  in  his  Mobile  speech. 

The  idea  of  an  American  interoceanic-isthmian  canal,  which 
possibly  was  considered  as  a  minor  factor  in  producing  the  origi- 
nal declaration  of  Monroe,  was  later  a  prominent  factor  in  caus- 
ing the  United  States  government  to  assert  a  status  of  "paramount 
interest,"  which  is  now  emphasized  as  a  cardinal  point  of  Ameri- 
can foreign  policy  growing  from  the  basic  principle  of  the  policy 
of  Monroe  and  Adams.  Seward  steadily  acting  under  the  doc- 
trine of  the  larger  influence  and  interest  of  the  United  States  in 
American  affairs,  in  1864  began  to  assert  it  in  a  series  of  negotia- 
tions and  treaties  with  Central  America  and  Colombia  in  regard 
to  the  proposed  isthmian  canal.  His  successor,  under  Grant's 
administration,  hopefully  expecting  the  future  "voluntary  de- 


148  SELECTED  ARTICLES  ON 

parture  of  European  government  from  this  continent  and  the 
adjacent  islands,"  in  1870-77  favored  the  acquisition  of  San  Do- 
mingo, as  a  measure  of  national  protection  to  prevent  the  appre- 
hended danger  of  its  control  as  a  possession  or  a  protectorate  of 
a  European  Power,  and  to  secure  a  "just  claim  to  a  controlling 
influence"  over  the  future  commercial  traffic  across  the  isthmus. 
Later,  he  endeavored  to  negotiate  with  Colombia  a  treaty  by 
which  he  sought  for  the  L^nited  States  a  greater  privileged  status 
and  more  extensive  rights  of  intervention  on  the  isthmus — a 
treaty  which  Colombia  refused  to  ratify.  In  1880,  Secretary 
Evarts  asserted  the  doctrine  of  American  "paramount  interest" 
in  projects  of  interoceanic  canal  communication  across  the  isth- 
mus, and  the  right  to  be  a  principal  party  to  any  political  ar- 
rangements affecting  this  American  question.  This  doctrine 
received  new  meaning  in  1881  after  the  occupation  of  Egypt  by 
Great  Britain  which  already  owned  a  controlling  majority  of  the 
stock  of  the  Suez  Canal,  and  again  after  the  events  of  the  Ameri- 
can intervention  in  Cuba  which  brought  new  opportunities,  new 
duties  and  new  responsibilities  to  the  United  States.  The  con- 
struction of  the  canal  under  American  control  was  the  logical 
conclusion  of  a  long  series  of  events ;  and  the  wisdom  of  the 
diplomacy  and  policy  which  seized  opportunity  by  the  forelock, 
and  terminated  the  long  period  of  discussion  and  delay,  can 
safely  be  submitted  to  the  test  of  time. 

Although  changed  conditions  in  both  hemispheres,  and  of 
motive  power  on  the  ocean,  have  modified  the  earlier  meaning  of 
the  Monroe  Doctrine,  and  may  still  further  modify  it,  its  main 
basic  principle  for  America  has  not  been  abandoned.  This  prin- 
ciple is  not  obsolete.  It  has  been  retained  on  the  broad  ground 
of  national  welfare,  in  spite  of  the  defects  in  Latin  American 
governments  so  frequently  resulting  in  troubles  due  to  unpaid 
claims;  and  European  Powers  have  recently  shown  a  readiness 
to  accept  it  at  the  Hague  Conference  and  in  connection  with  the 
Venezuelan  debt  question  of  1902.  The  latter  incident,  according 
to  leaders  in  England,  gave  the  Monroe  Doctrine  an  immensely 
increased  authority.  Mr.  Balfour,  approving  the  American  policy, 
suggested  that  the  United  States  should  more  actively  enter  into 
an  arrangement  by  which  constantly-occurring  difficulties  between 
European  Powers  and  certain  states  in  Latin  America  could  be 
avoided. 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  149 

Unless  we  have  reached  the  conclusion  that  all  Latin  America 
might  be  better  under  European  control,  and  that  this  control 
would  not  seriously  threaten  the  peace  and  permanent  interests 
of  the  United  States,  at  least  one  important  principle  of  the 
Doctrine  should  still  be  retained  as  a  fundamental  part  of  Ameri- 
can foreign  policy.  Under  whatever  name,  and  however  modified 
to  suit  the  conditions  and  needs  of  American  foreign  policy,  it 
is  still  a  useful  principle.  It  may  fitly  be  called  the  doctrine  of 
national  defense,  which  in  its  results  may  be  regarded  also  as  a 
doctrine  of  Pan-American  defense.  In  America  the  United 
States  government  has  duties  and  responsibilities  which  can  not 
be  abandoned  to  the  mercy  of  trans-oceanic  powers,  nor  sub- 
mitted to  the  decision  of  international  conferences  or  tribunals. 
It  must  attend  to  the  larger  interests  of  the  United  States — with- 
out any  unnecessary  interference  with  the  larger  interests  of  other 
powers.  Certainly,  in  Mexico  at  present,  the  United  States  has 
a  larger  interest  than  that  of  any  European  Power.  She  has  a 
far  greater  interest  than  any  other  power  in  the  restoration  of 
peace  and  the  establishment  of  a  government  that  has  proper 
basis  or  permanency  in  its  method  of  selection  and  in  its  policies 
for  adjustment  of  problems  that  press  for  solution.  Peace  in 
America,  on  the  basis  of  good  government,  is  more  important  to 
the  United  States  than  it  is  to  Europe,  and  more  important  to 
the  United  States  than  peace  in  Europe. 

The  present  basis  of  policy  is  the  paramount  interest  of  the 
United  States  in  American  affairs — a  special  interest  which, 
especially  in  the  Caribbean,  can  be  shared  with  no  other  power, 
and  perhaps  would  be  questioned  by  no  European  Power.  After 
the  war  for  the  relief  of  the  Cuban  situation  in  1898 — a  war 
which  made  the  United  States  an  Asiatic  power  and  brought  it 
in  contact  with  European  politics  in  the  far  East — American 
paramount  interests  in  the  West  Indies,  and  in  the  Caribbean, 
were  greatly  increased  and  especially  found  expression  in  the 
messages  of  President  Roosevelt  and  in  various  acts  of  the 
American  government — including  the  construction  of  the  Panama 
Canal  which  has  clearly  increased  the  importance  of  maintaining 
around  the  Caribbean  the  American  policy  against  the  interfer- 
ence of  European  Powers.  In  this  region  the  United  States  has 
duties  and  responsibilities  which  it  may  not  willingly  share  with 
any  European  Power. 

12 


150  SELECTED  ARTICLES  ON 

Farther  south,  the  assertion  and  maintenance  of  the  doctrine 
of  non-intervention  has  been  rendered  less  necessary  by  the 
growth  of  several  more  perfect,  orderly  and  stable  governments, 
which  themselves  are  the  best  guarantors  of  the  Doctrine.  The 
larger  Latin  American  republics,  in  which  governments  have 
reached  sure  bases  of  permanence,  may  properly  be  invited  by  the 
United  States  to  cooperate  or  participate  in  the  consideration 
of  mutual  larger  interests  in  America,  and  to  share  the  responsi- 
bilities incident  to  the  American  principle  of  defense  of  American 
nationalities.  Doubtless  by  such  a  continental  extension  of  the 
means  of  safeguarding  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  Latin  American 
neighbors  through  the  sobering  effect  of  actual  responsibility 
would  cease  to  misinterpret  the  motives  of  the  mother  republic 
in  the  Caribbean  and  on  the  Isthmus. 

Whether  we  admit  Olney's  declaration  that  "the  United  States 
is  practically  sovereign  on  this  continent,"  it  seems  clear  that 
as  a  result  of  its  geographic  situation  it  has  a  "paramount  inter- 
est" in  the  western  hemisphere  which  imposes  certain  rules  of 
policy  toward  Latin-American  neighbors — especially  toward  those 
in  the  Caribbean  and  round  its  shores.  This  doctrine  was  at  the 
basis  of  the  Cuban  intervention,  of  the  construction  of  the 
Panama  canal  under  American  control,  of  the  declaration  of 
policy  to  Germany  in  connection  with  the  blockade  of  Venezuelan 
ports,  of  the  policy  in  Santo  Domingo,  of  the  recent  policy  in 
Nicaragua,  and  of  the  present  Mexican  policy.  The  essential 
idea  is  to  prevent  the  danger  of  European  intervention  which 
might  result  in  the  acquisition  of  territory. 

North  American  Review.  176: 185-99.  February,  1903 

Monroe  Doctrine — Its  Origin  and  Import.     William  L.  -Scruggs 

It  has  been  said  that  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  even  as  thus  limited 
and  understood,  has  never  received  the  assent  of  Europe,  nor 
even  the  sanction  of  our  own  Congress;  consequently,  that  it  has 
no  legal  validity.  It  seems  to  me  that  such  an  assumption,  totally 
unsupported  as  it  is  by  either  fact  or  law,  scarcely  needs  refuta- 
tion. Even  if  the  facts  were  as  alleged,  they  would  not  warrant 
the  conclusion  drawn  from  them.  But  since  the  facts  are  not  as 
alleged,  the  conclusion  is  doubly  erroneous. 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  151 

As  a  matter  of  fact,  there  has  never  been  a  formal  protest 
against  the  Monroe  Doctrine  by  any  European  Power.  On  the 
contrary,  all  have  passively  acquiesced  in  it  for  nearly  a  whole 
century,  and  passive  acquiescence  is  tantamount  to  assent.  And, 
whilst  our  national  legislature  has  never  specifically,  and  in  so 
many  words,  reaffirmed  it,  that  body  has  many  times  either  taken 
its  validity  for  granted  or  constructively  affirmed  it.  Every  reso- 
lution or  other  measure  bearing  upon  it  that  has  ever  been  intro- 
duced into  either  House  of  Congress,  has  been  in  support  of  it; 
never  has  there  been  one  against  it.  That  of  1824,  by  Mr.  Clay, 
was  never  called  up,  because,  under  the  change  of '  circumstances 
which  soon  followed,  the  measure  was  deemed  superfluous.  That 
of  1864,  which  passed  both  Houses  without  a  dissenting  vote, 
took  the  validity  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  for  granted,  and  re- 
sulted, as  everybody  knows,  in  the  almost  immediate  evacuation 
of  Mexico  by  the  French.  That  of  1879  was  never  reported 
from  the  Committee  on  Foreign  Affairs — possibly  because  the 
occasion  for  it  had  already  passed.  That  of  1880  was  unani- 
mously sustained  by  the  Foreign  Affairs  Committee,  but  the  ses- 
sion closed  before  it  could  be  acted  upon.  That  of  1895-6,  in 
relation  to  the  Anglo-Venezuelan  question,  passed  both  Houses 
without  a  dissenting  voice,  and  led  to  the  settlement  of  the  dispute 
by  arbitration. 

The  Resolution  of  1826,  relative  to  the  proposed  Panama  Con- 
gress, constitutes  no  exception..  In  the  first  place,  it  was  not 
germane  to  the  case  at  all.  Its  passage  turned  upon  totally  differ- 
ent issues,  as  is  manifest  from  the  very  words  of  the  Resolution 
itself.  It  merely  expressed  the  opinion  that  the  United  States 
ought  not,  under  the  then  existing  circumstances,  to  be  repre- 
sented in  that  particular  conference  "except  in  a  purely  diplo- 
matic character;"  that  we  ought  not,  at  that  particular  time,  to 
form  "any  alliance  with  all  or  any  of  the  Spanish-American 
states,"  but  be  left  free  to  act,  in  any  crisis  that  might  arise,  in 
"such  manner  as  our  feelings  of  friendship  towards  our  sister 
republics  and  our  own  honor  and  traditional  policy  may  at  the 
time  dictate."  In  the  next  place,  viewed  at  this  distance  of  time, 
it  is  easy  to  see  just  why  that  Congress  failed.  Not  the  Monroe 
Doctrine,  but  Negro  Slavery  was  the  rock  on  which  it  was 
wrecked.  One  of  the  questions  proposed  for  discussion  by  the 
Congress  was  "the  consideration  of  means  to  be  adopted  for  the 


152  SELECTED  ARTICLES  ON 

entire  abolition  of  the  African  slave  trade."  Cuba  and  Porto 
Rico,  then  slave-holding  provinces  of  Spain,  we're  certain  to  be 
made  subjects  of  discussion;  Hayti,  already  a  Negro  republic, 
would  be  represented ;  and  there  were  then  over  four  millions  of 
negro  slaves  in  the  United  States,  right  of  property  in  which  was 
guaranteed  by  our  fundamental  law.  Here,  then,  was  an  awk- 
ward dilemma  to  be  avoided ;  and  in  avoiding  it — in  yielding  to 
the  necessity  of  preserving  a  class  of  vested  interests  in  our 
slave-holding  States — we  lost  the  opportunity  of  giving  perma- 
nent direction  to  the  political  and  commercial  connections  of  the 
newly  enfranchised  South-American  republics,  and  the  bulk  of 
their  trade  passed  into  other  hands.  But  the  'principles  of  the 
Monroe  Doctrine  were  not,  in  any  manner,  abridged  or  modified 
thereby. 

Again,  it  has  been  said  that  the  so-called  "Clayton-Bulwer 
Treaty,"  of  1850,  was  a  material  modification,  if  not  a  virtual 
abandonment,  of  the  principles  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine.  That 
that  compact  was  a  monumental  diplomatic  blunder,  cannot  be 
denied.  Even  British  statesmen  could  not  conceal  their  amaze- 
ment at  our  short-sightedness  in  entering  into  such  a  one-sided 
agreement.  It  kept  us  on  the  stool  of  repentance  for  nearly  half 
a  century.  But  there  were  no  circumstances  connected  with  its 
negotiation,  nor  anything  in  the  Treaty  itself  as  ratified  by  the 
Senate,  to  warrant  an  inference  that  it  contemplated  the  aban- 
donment, or  even  a  modification,  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine.  The 
primary  object  was  to  obtain  from  Great  Britain  a  solemn  pledge 
never  to  attempt  to  colonize  any  alleged  "unoccupied"  portions 
of  Central  America.  The  secondary  object  was  to  stimulate  in- 
vestment of  foreign  capital  in  a  great  American  enterprise,  at  a 
time  when  capital  for  such  purposes  was  difficult  to  obtain.  The 
blunder  consisted  in  overlooking  a  covert  (and  perhaps  doubtful) 
recognition  of  a  British  colony  already  illegally  established  in 
Central  America.  But  aside  from  this,  and  the  incautious  "agree- 
ment to  agree"  (in  Article  VIII)  relative  to  the  control  and 
management  of  some  possible  future  isthmian  canal,  the  Treaty 
could  not  be  construed  as,  in  any  way,  derogatory  of  the  Monroe 
Doctrine.  Moreover,  the  Treaty  itself,  as  finally  proclaimed, 
was  of  very  doubtful  legality.  It  lacked  the  Senate's  concur- 
rence in  Mr.  Clayton's  incautious  assent  to  certain  written  con- 
structions of  it  by  the  British  Government,  presented  for  the 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  153 

first  time  at  the  exchange  of  ratifications,  which  materially  altered 
its  meaning  as  understood  by  the  slender  majority  of  Senators 
who  had  ratified  it.  It  never  had  much  real  vitality,  even  before 
our  Government  formally  denounced  it  in  1881 ;  it  had  still  less 
after  England  abandoned  her  pretended  "Protectorate"  in 
Nicaragua,  fourteen  years  later;  and  it  has  now  happily  ceased 
to  have  even  a  nominal  existence. 

Strangely  enough,  the  intervention  by  the  United  States  in  the 
Anglo- Venezuelan  case,  in  1895-6,  already  alluded  to,  has  been 
cited  as  an  instance  in  which  we  disregarded  the  principles  of 
the  Monroe  Doctrine.  The  contention  is  that,  since  the  contro- 
versy was  over  a  disputed  divisional  line  between  a  long  estab- 
lished and  duly  recognized  European  colony  and  a  free  American 
state,  our  interests  were  in  nowise  involved;  and  that  our  inter- 
position, contrary  to  the  expressed  wish  of  one  of  the  parties  to 
the  dispute,  even  with  the  laudable  purpose  of  bringing  it  to 
friendly  arbitration,  was  at  once  a  violation  of  our  traditional 
policy  of  neutrality  and  of  our  pledge  not  to  interfere  with  Euro- 
pean colonies  "already  established."  But  this  is  a  total  miscon- 
ception of  the  facts  in  the  case,  as  well  as  of  the  real  principles 
involved.  The  important  feature  of  that  controversy  was,  Eng- 
land's assertion  of  right  to  extend  the  area  of  her  colony  in 
Guiana  over  adjacent  "unoccupied  territory;"  for  she  claimed 
sovereignty  in  virtue  of  alleged  "British  settlements"  made  as 
late  as  1881,  and  she  furthermore  claimed  eminent  domain,  even 
beyond  those  "settlements,"  in  virtue  of  alleged  "treaties  made 
with  the  native  Indian  tribes."  It  needs  no  argument  to  show 
that  both  of  these  contentions  were  wholly  untenable — one  being 
a  palpable  violation  of  a  well  settled  principle  of  international 
law,  the  other  being  in  open  defiance  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine. 
If  either  of  them  were  once  conceded  with  respect  to  a  particular 
region  in  South  America,  it  would  have  to  apply  to  others ;  and, 
if  applied  to  South  America  in  general,  it  would  have  to  be  ad- 
mitted with  respect  to  North  America  as  well.  It  was  precisely 
this  "covert,  but  ever  present,  feature  of  the  case  which  gave  it 
such  international  importance.  Hence,  so  far  from  being  a  viola- 
tion of  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  our  interposition  was  directly  and 
affirmatively  in  support  of  it. 

Nor  was  that  interposition  an  attempt  to  "expand"the  Monroe 
Doctrine,  as  has  been  thoughtlessly  charged.  England  had  seized 


154  SELECTED  ARTICLES  ON 

and  forfeited  whole  districts  hitherto  acknowledged  to  be  Vene- 
zuelan territory.  She  had  done  this  in  defiance  of  repeated  re- 
monstrances and  formal  protests;  and  had  persistently  refused 
to  evacuate  those  places,  or  to  submit  her  claim  of  title  to  impar- 
tial arbitration.  Under  such  circumstances,  her  acquisition  in- 
volved either  an  act  of  war  or  an  act  of  piracy;  and,  in  either 
case,  it  was  as.  much  a  violation  of  the  principles  of  the  Monroe 
Doctrine  as  if  those  districts  had  been  seized  by  British  troops 
or  covered  by  British  guns.  The  situation,  therefore,  presented 
one  of  two  alternatives — either  the  enforcement  of  the  Monroe 
Doctrine,  or  its  total  abandonment. 

Finally,  as  every  one  knows,  or  is  presumed  to  know,  the  great 
body  of  what  we  call  international  law,  like  that  of  the  English 
common  law,  is  made  up  of  precedent  sanctioned  by  usage.  In 
its  last  analysis,  it  is,  as  Lord  Chief-Justice  Russell  once  aptly 
expressed  it,  "little  more  than  crystallized  public  opinion."  And 
I  think  it  has  been  sufficiently  shown  that  the  principles  of  the 
Monroe  Doctrine  are  precedents  as  old  as  our  Government  itself. 
They  have  been  sanctified  by  unbroken  usage,  and  have  given 
direction  to  our  foreign  policy  for  more  than  a  century.  Every 
one  of  our  Presidents,  from  the  first  to  the  present,  who  has  ever 
had  occasion  to  refer  to  it,  has  specifically  reaffirmed  it.  Every 
one  of  the  Latin- American  republics  has,  at  one  time  or  another, 
and  in  some  form  or  other,  affirmatively  supported  it.  Not  one 
of  the  European  Powers  has  ever  entered  formal  protest  against 
it;  on  the  contrary,  all  have  acquiesced  in  it,  and  thus  tacitly  as- 
sented to  it.  It  is,  therefore,  a  valid  part  of  the  public  law  of 
this  continent ;  and  until  abandoned  by  us,  or  until  formally  chal- 
lenged by  Europe,  or  until  modified  or  abrogated  by  public  treaty, 
it  will  continue  to  be  recognized  as  part  of  the  modern  interna- 
tional code  of  the  Christian  world. 

Outlook.  70:371-4.  February  8,  1*902 

Moral   Aspects   of   the   Monroe    Doctrine.      Edward    Stanwood 

The  Monroe  Doctrine  is  the  one  political  principle  which 
has  been  and  is  accepted  by  American  statesmen  of  every  party. 
Every  President  in  whose  administrative  term  any  question  in- 
volving the  principle  has  arisen  has  repeated,  enforced,  and  if 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  155 

necessary  extended  the  Doctrine,  and  has  been  applauded  by  his 
political  opponents  for  so  doing.  There  seems  at  present  no 
reason  to  anticipate  a  change  of  view  on  the  part  of  any  con- 
siderable number  of  influential  public  men.  Nevertheless,  the 
occasions  for  maintaining  the  Doctrine,  and  for  making  a  semi- 
warlike  demonstration  in  enforcing  it  have  lately  been  frequent. 
To  one  who  reasons  from  the  occurrences  in  Africa  and  Asia 
to  what  may  take  place  in  South  America,  large  possibilities 
loom  up  in  the  not  distant  future.  Should  it  become  necessary 
for  this  Government  not  only  to  make  a  display  of  force,  but 
also  to  use  force  to  uphold  the  Doctrine,  we  may  be  sure  that 
timid  and  ultraconservative  men  will  seek  reasons  for  abandon- 
ing the  time-honored  principle.  In  the  search  they  will  be  as- 
sisted by  those  who  carry  to  the  extreme  logical  limit  the  princi- 
ples denominated  by  its  adherents  anti-imperialism.  They  hold — 
an  anonymous  writer  lately  published  the  opinions — that  the  Mon- 
roe Doctrine  is  a  chip  on  the  shoulder  of  a  bully;  that  it  has  no 
foundation  in  international  law  or  equity;  that  we  are  in  no 
danger  of  foreign  aggression ;  that  our  interference  is  unwelcome 
to  those  in  whose  behalf  it  is  made ;  and  that  the  Doctrine  men- 
aces seriously  the  peace  and  prosperity  of  the  world. 

It  seems  worth  while  to  anticipate  a  discussion  that  is  likely 
to  arise,  and  to  consider  if  objections  of  the  class  just  noted  are 
fair  and  sound ;  in  other  words,  leaving  out  of  sight  altogether 
the  question  of  the  relation  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  to  our  Na- 
tional security,  to  examine  the  moral  basis  of  the  doctrine.  We 
are  not  to  inquire  whether  or  not  any  vestige  of  the  original 
reasons  for  promulgating  the  Doctrine  still  remains,  nor  whether 
or  how  far  the  Doctrine  has  been  modified  in  the  course  of  time. 
All  that  concerns  us  is  to  know  if  the  Doctrine  in  its  present 
form  and  in  its  modern  application  represents  a  policy  that  can 
be  defended  as  one  justifies  his  individual  conduct  toward  his 
neighbors,  a  policy  that  makes  for  the  peace  of  the  world,  a 
policy  that  conduces  to  the  independence  of  the  nations  affected 
by  it,  a  policy  that  is  generous,  humane,  and  benevolent  on  the 
part  of  the  Government  which  maintains  it — or  the  contrary. 

One  answer  of  these  questions  is  furnished  by  history.  This 
Government  has  upheld  the  Doctrine  for  eighty  years,  and  has 
asserted  it  on  many  occasions.  In  one  case  of  its  application  it 
frustrated  the  attempt  of  the  Emperor  of  the  French  to  wrest  the 


156  SELECTED  ARTICLES  ON 

Government  of  Mexico  from  the  inhabitants  of  the  country,  and 
to  set  up  an  empire  as  the  next-door  neighbor  of  the  United  States. 
On  another  occasion  it  protected  Venezuela  from  a  forcible  an- 
nexation of  territory  by  Great  Britain,  and  secured  for  it  a  peace- 
able hearing  before  a  duly  constituted  tribunal.  When  De  Les- 
seps's  scheme  for  constructing  the  Panama  Canal  was  about  to 
be  put  in  force,  so  mildly  disposed  and  peace-loving  a  President 
as  Rutherford  B.  Hayes  sent  a  message  to  the  Senate  in  which 
he  took  the  ground  that  the  smallest  measure  of  political  control 
or  protection  of  the  proposed  canal  by  "any  European  Power  or 
any  combination  of  European  Powers"  was  inadmissible;  and 
his  Secretary  of  State,  Mr.  Evarts,  secured  from  the  French 
Government  a  'disclaimer  of  any  attempt  to  give  the  enterprise 
support,  either  direct  or  indirect.  Still  later  the  action  of  the 
American  navy  in  preventing  a  blockade  of  the  port  of  Rio  de 
Janeiro  broke  up  a  plot,  to  which  the  commanders  of  several 
European  squadrons  were  consenting,  to  restore  the  imperial 
government  of  Brazil. 

These  are  the  most  conspicuous,  but  by  no  means  all,  of  the 
occasions  when  the  United  States  has  acted  upon  the  Monroe 
Doctrine.  In  every  case,  not  only  in  those  mentioned  but  in  every 
other,  this  Government  has  intervened  not  to  destroy  but  to 
preserve  the  sovereignty  of  the  weak  members  of  the  American 
family  of  republics.  It  has  never  exacted  or  claimed  a  penny  of 
indemnity,  nor  has  it  ever  asked  or  taken  an  inch  of  territory 
from  any  country  whose  sovereignty  it  has  defended. 

If  all  or  any  of  the  acts  were  acts  of  a  bully  among  nations, 
then  our  dictionaries  must  be  revised.  The  bully  threatens  and 
terrorizes  those  who  are  weaker  than  himself.  Our  Government 
in  every  case  has  taken  the  side  of  the  weaker  party  against 
the  stronger  and  has  brought  the  schemes  of  the  bully  to  naught. 
It  has  sometimes  refused  to  interfere  for  the  protection  of  the 
Spanish-American  republics  any  further  than  it  has  lately  signi- 
fied its  intention  to  do  in  the  case  of  Venezuela.  A  debt  is 
justly  due  to  Germany;  Venezuela  ought  to  pay;  this  Govern- 
ment declines  to  ask  more  from  Germany  than  that  it  refrain 
from  exacting  territorial  indemnity.  The  present  dictator  of 
Venezuela  is  extremely  unfriendly  to  the  United  States,  and  has 
taken  especial  pains  to  let  his  unfriendliness  be  known.  Yet  our 
Government  not  only  overlooks  his  childish  hostility,  but  seeks 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  157 

and  obtains  from  his  powerful  adversary  an  agreement  not  to 
overthrow  the  sovereignty  nor  to  encroach  on  the  territory  of 
Venezuela. 

We  may  answer  our  questions  in  another  way  quite  as  con- 
vincingly— although  what  would  have  happened  in  other  circum- 
stances can  never  be  known  so  certainly  as  what  has  happened. 
During  the  last  twenty  years  substantially  the  whole  of  the  conti- 
nent of  Africa  has  been  partitioned  among  the  Powers  of  Europe. 
France  picked  a  quarrel  with  Madagascar  and  took  the  whole  of 
that  island  to  redress  its  grievances.  It  found  another  cause  of 
complaint,  or  rather  a  series  of  them,  in  southern  Asia;  and 
has  Annam,  Cochin-China,  and  Tonking  as  a  reward  of  its 
activity  in  pressing  its  complaints.  Germany,  England,  and  Russia 
enjoy  the  possession  of  slices  of  China  to  soothe  and  heal  the 
wounds  inflicted  by  the  warlike  and  aggressive  Chinese.  If  there 
are  any  islands  in  the  Pacific  that  have  not  been  annexed  by  the 
colonizing  countries  of  Europe,  information  regarding  them  will 
be  thankfully  received  and  suitably  rewarded  at  London,  Paris, 
or  Berlin. 

During  the  time  all  this  appropriation  of  territory  in  every 
other  part  of  the  world  has  been  going  on,  the  continents  of 
America  have  been  wholly  free  from  the  exploits  of  European 
enterprise  against  native  governments.  Was  it  because  Central 
and  South  America  offer  less  enticing  fields  for  such  enter- 
prises? By  no  means.  There  is  not  on  the  globe  a  region  not 
already  controlled  by  Great  Britain  of  more  importance  to  the 
Government  which  enjoys  the  sea-power  of  the  world  than  the 
strip  of  territory  between  Mexico  and  Venezuela.  The  coloniza- 
tion of  Germans  in  southern  Brazil  and  northern  Argentina — 
in  a  country  abounding  in  resources  and  opportunities — is  more 
than  suggestive  of  aspirations  that  might  be  realized  were  there 
no  other  obstacle  than  native  governments  to  be  overcome.  In 
the  event  of  a  beginning  of  the  partition  of  South  America, 
who  can  doubt  that  France  and  perhaps  Italy  would  demand  and 
receive  a  share  of  the  territory? 

But,  says  an  objector  at  this  point,  the  world,  would  be  better 
and  civilization  would  be  advanced  if  we  were  to  withdraw  our 
pretensions  and  to  allow  Great  Britain  and  Germany  and  the 
other  countries  to  enter  Central  and  South  America  and  develop 
the  country.  Would  it  be  right,  then,  for  the  European  Powers 


158  SELECTED  ARTICLES  ON 

to  brush  aside  the  native  governments  and  annex  all  that  is 
worth  annexing?  Of  course  not,  replies  our  objector;  but  it  is 
not  for  us  to  say  them  nay.  This  position  means  that  although 
we  hold  to  the  principle  that  the  independent  sovereignty  of  a 
nation  and  its  right  to  self-government  should  be  inviolable,  we 
have  a  moral  right  to  stand  by,  indifferent  spectators,  while  both 
are  being  destroyed.  The  United  States  is  the  only  country  that 
can  defend  those  countries  from  aggression,  the  only  one  that  is 
disposed  to  do  so.  If  the  duty  rests  anywhere,  it  rests  here. 
Moreover,  the  suggestion  that  the  progress  of  civilization 
which  might — and  might  not — result  from  an  abandonment  of 
the  republics  to  their  fate  excuses  us  from  the  duty  of  protect- 
ing them  raises  the  question  whether  it  would  be  excusable  to 
remain  passive  if  a  government — say  that  of  China,  to  put  an 
extreme  case —  were  to  assail  Mexico.  Again,  if  Great  Britain 
is  to  be  justified  in  seizing  Colombia  on  the  ground  that  it  would 
give  the  Isthmian  republic  better  government,  how  can  the  ac- 
ceptance of  the  Philippine  Islands  from  Spain  be  regarded  as 
criminal,  unless  it  be  held  that  this  country  is  incapable  of  im- 
proving upon  Spanish  administration  or  Filipino  self-govern- 
ment? Any  argument  founded  upon  the  ability  of  European 
Governments  to  ameliorate  the  condition  of  the  South  American 
nations  involves  the  person  who  uses  it  in  inextricable  difficulties 
and  inconsistencies. 

'  In  point  of  fact,  no  such  consideration  can  enter  into  the 
argument.  It  is  not  disputed  by  any  one  that  the  Governments 
of  Central  and  South  America  are  justly  established.  It  is  uni- 
versally admitted  that  the  people  of  those  countries  have  a  right 
to  preserve  or  to  modify  or  to  overthrow  their  governments. 
The  Monroe  Doctrine  forbids  that  right  to  foreign  powers  across 
the  seas.  It  is  not  for  us  to  decide  that  Great  Britain  or  Ger- 
many might  make  the  world  better,  or  that  Spain  might  make 
the  world  worse,  by  taking  over  one  or  more  of  the  turbulent 
republics ;  and  that  we  should  interfere  or  not  interfere,  accord- 
ing to  our  judgments  as  to  the  respective  merits  of  governments 
having  designs  upon  them.  Our  policy  must  be  a  consistent  one — 
of  interference  or  of  non-interference. 

But  has  this  country  a  right  to  constitute  itself  the  guardian 
of  these  republics?  and  if  so,  how  has  it  arisen?  We  may 
answer  that,  so  far  as  it  exists,  it  has  arisen  in  the  same  way  that 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  159 

all  civil  government  has  been  evolved  from  original  chaos.  It 
all  rests  ultimately  upon  an  original  usurpation.  In  the  primitive 
community  every  individual  enjoys  absolute  freedom,  but  only 
on  condition  that  he  is  strong  enough  to  maintain  it.  Cain  kills 
Abel,  and  asks  with  all  the  candor  when  he  is  questioned  about 
the  matter,  "Am  I  my  brother's  keeper?"  In  order  to  put  an 
end  to  anarchy — a  condition  in  which  the  rights  of  any  individ- 
ual are  secure  only  so  far  as  the  individual  is  able  to  beat  down 
the  neighbor  who  covets  his  possessions — the  strong  man  as- 
sumes power ;  he  is  gradually  aided  by  others  who  adopt  his  view 
that  anarchy  should  be  replaced  by  order;  civil  government  is 
organized,  and  the  new  situation  is  liberty  regulated  by  law. 

The  primitive  situation  has  prevailed  and  to  a  certain  extent 
still  prevails,  in  respect  of  national  governments.  International 
law,  concert  of  powers,  arbitration  tribunals,  and  the  like  are 
much  more  difficult  to  establish  than  civil  government  over  com- 
munities. But  are  we  so  sure  of  that?  Who  knows  how  many 
centuries  of  absolute  lawlessness  elapsed,  after  man  appeared  on 
the  earth,  before  the  beginning  of  civil  government?  We  do 
know  that  two  centuries  have  not  passed  since  the  first  principles 
of  international  law  began,  not  to  be  enunciated,  but  to  be  ac- 
c,epted,  by  so-called  enlightened  governments.  Before  that  time 
each  and  every  sovereign  nation  was  a  law  unto  itself.  Out  of 
the  disorder  and  lawlessness  a  semblance  of  international  gov- 
ernment has  been  evolved.  Nations  recognize  the  binding  force 
of  certain  rules,  some  of  which  have  the  sanction  of  general  and 
formal  agreement.  In  some  cases — as,  for  example,  in  1878,  after 
the  war  between  Russia  and  Turkey — two  sovereign  combatants 
have  not  been  allowed  to  arrange  terms  of  peace,  but  have  been 
forced — morally,  if  not  physically — to  accept  a  settlement  pro- 
posed by  a  council  of  powers.  Thus,  gradually,  a  system  among 
nations  corresponding  to  civil  government  is  establishing  itself. 
It,  also,  had  its  origin  in  usurpation ;  but  as  man  becomes  better, 
his  international  agreements  have  a  deeper  foundation  in  his 
moral  nature;  his  international  laws  are  more  and  more  con- 
ceived with  a  view  to  securing  the  individual  rights  of  nations 
great  and  small,  and  to  preventing  a  resort  to  the  duello  method 
of  settling  disputes;  and  the  authority  of  international  opinion 
is  strengthened. 


i6o  SELECTED  ARTICLES  ON 

Annals  of  the  American  Academy.  54:20-7.  July,  1914 

Present  Status  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine.     Colby  N.  Chester 

The  Monroe  Doctrine  is  the  cardinal  principle  of  the  foreign 
policy  of  the  United  States.  It  has  been  so  construed  for  nearly 
one  hundred  years  of  our  national  history,  and  it  so  remains  to- 
day, in  spite  of  some  statements  that  have  been  made  to  the  con- 
trary. "It  is,"  as  Jefferson  said,  "  the  offspring  of  the  American 
revolution  and  the  most  momentous  question  offered  to  my  con- 
templation since  the  Independence."  When  promulgating  the 
doctrine  as  the  basis  of  our  foreign  policy,  President  Monroe 
said  in  his  message  to  Congress,  December  2,  1823 : 

It  is  impossible  that  the  allied  Powers  (of  Europe)  should  extend  their 
political  system  to  any  portion  of  either  continent  without  endangering 
our  peace  and  happiness,  nor  can  anyone  believe  that  our  southern  brethren, 
if  left  to  themselves,  would  adopt  it  of  their  own  accord.  .  .  .  We 
owe  it,  therefore,  to  candor  and  to  the  amicable  relations  existing  between 
the  United  States  and  those  Powers  to  declare  that  we  should  consider 
any  attempt  on  their  part  to  extend  their  system  to  any  portion  of  this 
hemisphere  as  dangerous  to  our  peace  and  safety. 

Two  distinct  and  far  reaching  principles  are  laid  down  in 
the  Monroe  Doctrine.  The  first  is  the  principle  of  "self-defense." 
Self-preservation  is  the  first  law  of  nature,  and  it  is  the  first 
law  of  nations.  In  the  case  of  the  United  States  the  national 
defense  required,  when  the  doctrine  was  enunciated,  that  the 
country  should  hold  a  protectorate  throughout  the  entire  western 
continent.  The  second  principle  is  that  South  American  repub- 
lics, which  followed  our  lead  in  declaring  their  independence, 
should  have  our  protection  in  maintaining  this  doctrine  for 
themselves.  As  Secretary  Bayard  once  said :  "The  United  States 
proclaimed  themselves  the  protector  of  the  western  world  in 
which  she  was  the -strongest  Power,"  as  "it  was  manifest,"  said 
his  successor  Mr.  Olney,  "that  it  was  the  only  power  on  this 
hemisphere  capable  of  enforcing  the  doctrine." 

The  first  principle  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine — self-preservation 
— is  axiomatic  and  immutable,  and  all  other  considerations  must 
give  way  to  it.  The  second  principle,  like  the  constitution  of  a 
country,  is  amenable  to  changes  or  amendments  that  will  bring 
it  into  accord  with  new  conditions  that  may  arise  in  the  country. 
The  question  now  is,  therefore,  do  the  same  conditions  prevail 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  161 

on  the  western  continent  today,  that  existed  at  the  time  Presi- 
dent Monroe  sent  his  message  to  Congress  in  1823? 

There  have  been  'so  many  different  interpretations  placed 
upon  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  by  theorists  and  others,  who  know 
but  little  of  its  practical  applications,  that  it  is  necessary  to  recall 
a  little  of  its  history  in  order  to  obtain  a  clear  understanding  of 
the  subject.  In  the  early  twenties  of  the  last  century,  the  whole 
of  Europe  became  alarmed  at  the  unsettled  political  outlook 
caused  by  the  American  and  French  revolutions,  which  had 
shaken  every  throne  on  the  continent,  and  bid  fair  to  undermine 
monarchical  government.  Three  of  the  Great  Powers,  Russia 
Prussia  and  France  (once  again  a  kingdom),  then  formed  what 
is  known  as  the  "Holy  Alliance,"  on  account  of  their  common 
religious  affiliation,  for  the  purpose  of  staying  the  tide  of  free- 
dom which  threatened  to  overwhelm  them.  They  then  prepared 
to  recapture  the  South  and  Central  American  republics,  which 
had  recently  severed  their  connection  with  Spain,  and  make 
them  appendages  to  European  monarchies.  England  was,  at 
the  time,  the  only  constitutionally  governed  country  in  Europe, 
a^nd  fearing  that  the  "balance  of  power"  between  the  European 
states  might  again  be  disturbed  by  such  a  combination,  she,  with 
no  desire  to  promote  republican  institutions,  however,  proposed 
an  alliance  with  the  United  States.  Naturally  neither  country 
could  harmonize  its  views  on  such  a  matter,  and  no  political  com- 
bination was  formed,  but  an  understanding  was  reached  that 
England  would  not  interfere  with  any  action  that  America 
might  take  in  the  matter,  thus  giving  her  quasi  approval  to  the 
message  sent  to  Congress  by  President  Monroe.  Had  it  become 
necessary  for  the  United  States  to  take  any  overt  action,  at 
that  time,  in  support  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  this  country  would 
have  had  the  moral  support  at  least  of  the  British  government; 
but  we  now  could  hope  for  no  aid  from  that  country,  and  it  is 
doubtful,  indeed,  if  we  could  count  on  the  approval  of  the  Latin 
Americans,  for  whom,  more  than  for  ourselves,  the  doctrine  was 
established,  unless  we  harmonize  some  of  our  conflicting  interests 
with  them. 

We  should  not  fail  to  remember  that  the  South  American 
republics  were  in  their  infancy  at  the  time  the  Monroe  Doctrine 
was  declared,  and  were  struggling  for  freedom  against  great 
odds,  The  United  States  proclaimed  herself  the  protector  of  the 


162  SELECTED  ARTICLES  ON 

western  world  as  a  matter  of  necessity,  for  without  her  aid  the 
newly  formed  republics  were  helpless  to  battle  against  the  great 
odds  opposing  them.  The  declaration  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine 
constituted,  therefore,  the  most  significant  and  decisive  act  to- 
wards guaranteeing  the  independence  of  all  the  American  states 
that  could  have  been  devised.  It  produced  the  prompt  recogni- 
tion of  the  infant  republics  of  South  America  by  the  English 
in  1823,  and  performed  a  service  for  Great  Britain  herself,  of 
which  Canning,  the  secretary  of  British  foreign  affairs,  said: 
"I  have  brought  out  a  new  world  in  order  to  reestablish  the 
equilibruim  of  the  old." 

The  question  today,  as  far  as  our  own  national  defense  is 
concerned  is,  would  it  be  a  menace  to  interests  centered  so  far 
away  as  the  United  States,  if  a  European  Power,  whose  politi- 
cal and  even  religious  aspirations  may  be  the  same  as  our  own 
should  attempt  to  acquire  territory  in  Argentina  for  instance? 
Such  an  assault  would  of  course  affect  the  interests  of  that 
-country,  but  should  the  United  States  attempt  to  interfere  in  the 
matter  unless  asked  by  Argentina  to  aid  her  in  throwing  off  the 
menace  that  assailed  her?  In  case  of  assisting  her  we  would 
become  her  ally,  and  probably  one  of  many  powers  that  might 
join  with  her  in  resisting  the  attack.  It  would  seem,  now  that  the 
continent  is  cut  in  twain  by  the  construction  of  the  Panama 
Canal  neutralizing  if  not  destroying  the  value  of  the  old  trade 
route  between  the  Atlantic  and  Pacific  oceans  via  Cape  Horn, 
that  it  would  have  no  material  effect  on  the  "vital"  interests  of 
the  United  States,  if  a  forcible  attempt  should  be  made  by  some 
European  Power  to  take  one  of  the  Argentine  islands,  situated 
at  the  extreme  end  of  the  continent.  It  is  such  changed  condi- 
tions in  the  political  relations  with  our  South  American  brethren 
as  this,  that  call  for  some  new  arrangements  concerning  the 
application  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine. 

The  principle  that  the  affected  country  had  paramount  impor- 
tance in  its  own  affairs,  unless  they  related  to  interests  of  a  com- 
bination of  which  she  was  a  part,  was  admitted  by  President 
Cleveland,  in  his  celebrated  message  sent  to  Congress  in  1895, 
commonly  known  as  the  "Venezuela  case."  In  this  message  he 
stated  (with  some  logical  defect,  I  think,  as  far  as  Venezuela  is 
concerned,  as  I  shall  endeavor  to  show  later  on),  that  if  that 
country  wished  to  sell  any  portion  of  her  territory  to  Great 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  163 

Britain,  she  had  a  perfect  right  to  do  so,  and  the  United  States 
had  no  right  to  interfere  in  the  matter.  This  principle  might 
apply  to  Argentina,  at  the  present  time,  but  such  an  act  of  selling 
a  portion  of  her  territory  to  a  European  state  would  not  have  been 
tolerated  by  the  United  States  in  1823,  under  any  circumstances ; 
for  Mr.  Monroe  then  said  in  no  uncertain  words,  that,  "any 
attempt  on  their  part  (Europeans)  to  extend  their  system  to  any 
portion  of  this  hemisphere  (would  be)  dangerous  to  our  peace 
and  safety." 

On  account  of  changed  conditions  in  South  America  at  the 
present  time,  there  is  a  growing  disposition  on  the  part  of  some 
well  informed  Americans  to  limit  the  territorial  extent  to  which 
the  Monroe  Doctrine  should  apply  to  the  states  that  lie  to  the 
northward  of  the  Amazon  River ;  but  such  a  limitation  would 
be  met  with  difficulties  surpassing1,  in  my  opinion,  those  we  should 
attempt  to  escape.  By  holding  a  protectorate  over  this  restricted 
field  only,  we  throw  out  of  consideration  all  fellowship  with  the 
states  to  the  southward  of  this  line  of  demarcation,  at  once 
causing  jealousies  among  the  larger  and  more  important  of  the 
South  American  republics,  making  them  enemies  of  our  defensive 
policy  as  selfish  in  its  nature,  and  would  most  likely  tend  to  add 
their  moral  support  to  our  many  commercial  rivals  and 
antagonists. 

Leading  statesmen  of  Brazil  and  other  South  American  repub- 
lics have  declared  that  the  Monroe  Doctrine  is  discredited  in  the 
republics  for  whose  benefit  it  was  devised,  not  that  they  do  not 
appreciate  the  good  intentions  of  the  United  States,  but  they 
deny  the  right  of  this  nation  to  appoint  itself  a  guardian  over 
their  welfare.  A  doctrine  founded  upon  the  principle  laid  down 
by  James  Monroe,  but  giving  the  right  of  a  protectorate  to  the 
powers  in  general  and  not  to  any  country  in  particular,  would  be 
the  ideal  doctrine,  in  the  belief  of  the  people  of  Latin  America. 

As  exemplifying  the  interests  and  aspirations  of  the  South 
Americans  in  this  connection  I  would  relate  the  following: 

On  the  isth  day  of  November,  1894,  the  fifth  year  of  the  foundation  of 
the  republic  of  Brazil,  in  the  presence  of  the  representatives  of  the  principal 
American  republics,  including  the  United  States,  was  laid  in  the  city  of 
Rio  de  Janeiro,  the  corner  stone  of  a  monument  to  American  solidarity. 
Under  this  stone  this  official  record  lies:  "The  monument  which  will  be 
erected  on  this  spot  in  which  this  stone  is  laid,  and  which  will  symbolize 
the  political  union  of  the  different  nations  of  the  continent  of  Columbus, 


164  SELECTED  ARTICLES  ON 

will  be  surmounted  by  the  figure  of  James  Monroe,  author  of  the  celebrated 
doctrine  known  by  his  name,  which  teaches  that  the  nations  of  the  new 
continent  should  unite  for  the  purpose  of  preventing  any  undue  interference 
of  the  nations  of  Europe  in  the  internal  affairs  of  America.  Around  the 
principal  figure  will  be  grouped  the  great  national  liberators  of  America, 
Washington,  Jefferson,  Juarez,  Toussaint  L'Ouverture,  Bolivar,  Jose  Boni- 
facio and  Benjamin  Constant." 

I  give  you  this  incident  and  picture  to  study  in  contrast  with 
another  view  depicting  the  scowling  faces  of  many  South  Ameri- 
cans, from  whom  we  are  just  now  seeking  commercial  advan- 
tages, who  spurn  the  foreign  policy  of  the  United  States  as  it 
now  stands,  shun  its  commercial  policy  and  belittle  its  domestic 
policy. 

No,  it  were  better  in  my  opinion,  to  maintain  the  original 
jurisdiction  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  but  to  recognize  the  fact 
that  many  of  the  twenty  other  American  republics  are  no  longer 
the  weaklings  they  were  when  the  policy  was  formulated,  unable 
to  defend  themselves,  but  are  now  strong  enough  to  share  in  the 
common  defense  of  the  continent,  and  act  in  consonance  with 
them  in  maintaining  the  political  rights  of  all. 

We  cannot,  however,  with  propriety  form  an  "alliance,"  for 
that  word  has  been  tabooed  by  an  unwritten  law  of  the  land ;  but 
we  can  engage  in  an  "entente,"  as  foreigners  call  it,  with  the 
republics  of  South  America  that  will  give  them  a  share  in  the 
responsibility  of  maintaining  a  policy  which  looks  to  the  general 
good  of  all  parties  concerned. 

Let  us  form  then,  not  an  alliance,  but  a  "concert  of  action" 
after  the  principles  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  similar  to  that 
established  in  Europe  for  the  support  of  the  doctrine  known, 
there,  as  "the  balance  of  power,"  which  will  show  that  all  the 
states  interested  hold  the  same  opinion  regarding  this  doctrine. 
The  moral  effect  of  such  an  "entente"  will  be  sufficient  to  stay 
the  hand  of  any  European  nation,  which  may  seek  political 
annexation  of  American  territory. 

Aside  from  all  considerations  of  our  own  self-interests,  should 
the  United  States  arrogate  to  herself  the  right  to  dictate  a  policy 
to  the  Latin-American  states,  which  concerns  their  vital  interests 
quite  as  much  as  our  own,  and  which  they  resent  as  "bossism," 
now  so  universally  abhorred,  and  which  is  belittling  to  their  self- 
respect?  Should  we  not,  on  the  other  hand,  urge  such  powerful 
nations  as  Argentina,  Brazil  and  Chile,  and  such  others  as  may 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  165 

be  useful  to  the  cause,  whenever  they  may  be  able  to  maintain 
stable  governments  for  a  sufficient  length  of  time  to  warrant  it, 
to  join  with  us  in  carrying  out  a  general  policy  that  is  of  mutual 
advantage  to  all  republics  on  the  continent?  Call  this  part  of  our 
international  policy  by  the  name  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  if  you 
will,  or  by  the  term  "America  for  the  Americans,"  which  will 
probably  better  please  our  confreres  in  the  south,  and  at  the 
same  time  be  in  accord  with  the  general  principle  of  the  Monroe 
Doctrine. 

Having  made  a  compact  with  the  South  American  republics 
as  suggested  the  United  States  would  be  in  a  better  position  to 
devote  attention  to  those  matters  which  more  especially  affect 
her  interests  at  home  and  in  nearby  states,  where  foreign  aggres- 
sion would  jeopardize  its  vital  interests. 

There  is  a  field,  in  which  the  interests  of  the  United  States  as 
far  as  they  relate  to  the  basic  principle  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine — 
"self-preservation"  are  paramount,  the  protection  of  which  can- 
not be  shared  with  any  other  nation.  This  district  comprises  the 
countries  lying  contiguous  or  adjacent  to  our  own,  bordering  on 
the  Caribbean  Sea  or  the  Gulf  of  Mexico.  The  right  of  the 
United  States  to  protect  these  countries  from  foreign  aggression 
has  been  recognized  in  many  ways  by  European  countries,  and 
the  protection  of  "the  father  of  republics"  has  been  called  for, 
and  accepted  so  many  times,  as  to  establish  this  policy  of  the 
American  government  as  an  inalienable  right.  Notable  instances 
were  when  the  United  States  drove  the  French  out  of  Mexico  in 
1865,  and  again  when  Spain  was  forced  to  give  up  her  control,  in 
Cuba  in  1898. 

But  aside  from  the  fact  that  "self-protection,"  the  basic  prin- 
ciple of  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  compels  the  United  States  to  take 
cognizance  of  the  political  affairs  of  Mexico,  the  Central  and 
South  American  countries  bordering  on  the  Gulf  of  Mexico  and 
the  Caribbean  Sea,  we  have  assumed  an  obligation  here  in  behalf 
of  the  interests  of  the  whole  world,  that  makes  it  imperative  that 
these  countries  and  seas  shall  be  under  the  supervision  of  the 
United  States,  and  we  have  also  by  treaty  stipulated  that  no  other 
country  shall  share  in  this  protectorate.  By  the  Hay-Pauncefote 
treaty,  and  the  one  recently  made  with  Panama  confirming  its 
main  features,  the  United  States  agrees,  not  only  that  the  Ameri- 
can "canal  shall  be  free  and  open  to  the  vessels  of  commerce  and 

13 


i66  SELECTED  ARTICLES  ON 

of  war  of  all  nations,"  but,  guarantees  that  "the  canal  shall  never 
be  blockaded  nor  shall  any  right  of  war  be  exercised  nor  any 
hostility  be  committed  within  it.  The  United  States,  however, 
shall  be  at  liberty  to  maintain  such  military  police  along  the  canal 
as  shall  be  necessary  to  protect  it  against  lawlessness  and  dis- 
order." This  is  a  most  sweeping  assumption  of  responsibility, 
and  the  fact  is  the  United  States  cannot  protect  the  world's 
interests  in  the  Panama  Canal,  without  maintaining  naval  control 
of  the  seas  that  wash  her  shores  on  the  south,  as  well  as  holding 
supervision  of  the  foreign  relations  of  the  countries  bordering  on 
those  seas. 

The  Caribbean  Sea  holds  the  base  of  the  American  fleet  at 
Guantanamo,  Cuba,  and  its  advance  base  at  Culebra,  Porto  Rico. 
In  fact  all  the  essentials  for  properly  defending  the  canal  lie  in 
the  region  covered  by  its  waters  and  those  of  the  Gulf  of  Mexico. 
For  all  military  purposes,  therefore,  these  seas  must  be  considered 
"The  greater  Panama  Canal  Zone,"  and  the  naval  policy  of  the 
United  States  the  only  guide  to  perfect  peace  within  their  limits. 

In  defending  the  continental  policy  of  "America  for  the  Ameri- 
cans" the  United  States  will  have  ample  cause  for  keeping  up  an 
efficient  navy,  and  to  protect  the  seven  thousand  miles  of  coast 
line,  including  "the  greater  Panama  Canal  Zone,"  she  will  need 
every  ship  that  our  non-military  people  will  authorize  to  be  con- 
structed. 

It  has  been  well  said  that  the  Monroe  Doctrine  is  as  strong 
as  the  navy  of  the  United  States,  and  in  view  of  the  fact  that 
our  countrymen  insist  on  maintaining  but  a  small  navy  as  com- 
pared with  those  that  might  be  brought  against  it  in  combination, 
our  people  should  avoid  creating  enemies,  who  might  be  tempted, 
in  order  to  protect  their  own  interests,  to  form  an  alliance  with 
more  power  than  we  could  bring  to  bear  against  them.  In  this 
connection  I  would  recall  the  visit  of  Senator  Root  to  'South 
America  in  1906,  which,  at  the  time,  produced  a  friendly  feeling 
between  the  North  and  South  Americans,  that  lately  has  been 
greatly  augmented  by  the  forceful  presence  of  his  then  chief, 
President  Roosevelt,  in  that  country.  The  sojourn  of  these  two 
greatest  of  American  statesmen  in  the  South,  has  done  more  to 
cement  the  ties  of  fellowship  between  the  two  sections  of  the 
continent  than  anything  that  has  occurred  in  the  political  lives  of 
its  people  in  many  years.  Dr.  Edward  Everett  Hale  once  said  of 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  167 

the  first  visit,  that  it  was  the  most  important  event  that  had  taken 
place  in  the  history  of  the  country  during  the  first  decade  of  the 
century,  not  excepting1  the  peace  of  Portsmouth,  and  nothing  has 
yet  arisen  in  the  second  decade,  which,  I  believe,  will  have  greater 
influence  in  strengthening  this  feeling  than  the  expedition  of 
Colonel  Roosevelt  to  South  America.  As  this  last  occasion  took 
place  at  a  significantly  opportune  moment,  just  before  the  opening 
of  the  Panama  Canal,  when  we  are  about  to  inaugurate  a  new' 
departure  in  our  foreign  trade  relations,  its  commercial  value  is 
very  important. 

Let  the  United  States  follow  up  these  auspicious  visits  of  our 
countrymen  to  the  Southland,  and,  in  the  words  of  the  Hon.  John 
Barrett,  director  of  the  Pan-American  Union,  'take  advantage  of 
the  opening  of  the  Panama  Canal,  to  signalize  formally,  as  it 
were,  the  beginning  of  a  new  Pan-American  era  in  which  the 
Monroe  Doctrine,  which  represents  the  dictum  of  one  government 
in  the  family  of  nations,  shall  evolve  into  a  greater  Pan-Ameri- 
can doctrine,  which  shall  represent  the  mutual  interest  and  pro- 
tection of  all." 

It  is  better  to  make  friends  than  to  build  guns. 


Annals  of  the  American  Academy.  54:  28-56.  July,  1914 

Monroe  Doctrine  and  Its  Application  to  Haiti. 
William  A.  MacCorkle 

A  distinguished  writer  in  advocating  the  abrogation  of  the 
Monroe  Doctrine  speaks  of  it  as  if  all  danger  to  the  South  and 
Central  American  republics  was  over.  Permit  a  little  plain  speak- 
ing on  this  subject,  for  it  is  sometimes  helpful  in  the  great  as 
well  as  in  the  small  affairs  of  the  world.  I  believe  if  it  had  not 
been  for  the  promulgation  and  the  enforcement  of  the  Monroe 
Doctrine  by  this  republic,  there  would  not  today  be  on  the  conti- 
nent of  South  America,  or  in  Central  America  a  government 
independent  of  European  control.  Let  us  look  at  the  situation  of 
today  throughout  the  world,  and  ascertain  if  there  is  any  change 
in  the  desires  of  the  nations  since  the  promulgation  of  the  Monroe 
Doctrine.  The  earth  hunger  of  the  European  countries  is  fiercer 
than  ever  in  its  history.  Their  vastly  increasing  populations 
demand  an  enlargement  of  their  national  life,  and  the  peoples  of 


168  SELECTED  ARTICLES  ON 

the  European  governments  demand  more  food  and  more  labor 
than  their  countries  can  furnish.  The  great  new  markets  of  the 
world  are  South  and  Central  America,  China  and  some  parts  of 
Africa.  China  has  been  practically  delimited  into  the  spheres  of 
influence  by  the  European  and  the  Japanese  governments,  and 
Mongolia  has  been  raped  from  her  bosom.  The  gaunt  breast  of 
Africa  has  been  seized  and  marked  out  for  their  own  by  the 
European  governments.  The  whitening  bones  of  Italian,  Arab 
and  Turk  in  Tripoli,  the  fierce  anger  of  France  and  Germany  only 
last  year  over  Morocco,  the  busy  colonization  plans  of  Europe 
in  Northern  Africa,  the  strife  of  the  dying  Moslem  Empire,  the 
seizure  and  occupation  of  Egypt  by  England,  and  the  tremendous 
conflict  between  Russia  and  Japan,  which  in  its  last  analysis  was 
a  conflict  for  territory,  all  attest  that  today  the  earth  hunger  is 
not  satiated  by  the  peoples  of  Europe.  I  say  it  solemnly  and  with 
all  the  earnestness  with  which  I  can  express  it,  that  I  believe, 
were  it  not  for  the  power  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  within  ten 
years,  excepting  Argentine,  Brazil  and  Chili,  there  would  not  be  a 
free  and  independent  government  in  South  America.  Their  mar- 
velous natural  wealth,  their  splendor  of  climate,  their  richness  of 
flora  and  fauna,  and  their  wealth  of  precious  metals,  would  more 
surely  provoke  the  desire  of  the  European  nations  than  the 
gaunt,  fever  stricken  and  the  fierce  sunburned  wastes  of  Africa. 
Those  who  feel  that  the  Monroe  Doctrine  is  outworn  and  that 
it  should  .be  abrogated  evidently  do  not  remember  very  modern 
history.  My  meaning  is  illustrated  by  one  of  the  great  ABC 
nations  of  the  South  American  continent.  Many  of  us  remember 
the  incident  as  of  yesterday,  when  the  revolution  against  the 
republic  was  inaugurated  in  Brazil.  For  the  purpose  of  reestablish- 
ing the  empire  the  navy  of  Brazil  was  in  favor  of  the  overturning 
of  the  republic  and  the  restoration  of  the  Braganza  family  to 
the  head  of  an  imperial  Brazilian  government.  In  the  harbor 
of  Rio  Janeiro  was  congregated  an  assembly  of  the  warships  of 
the  monarchies  of  Europe  and  the  Republic  of  the  United  States. 
The  commanders  of  the  European  squadrons  were  in  sympathy 
with  the  revolutionists  and  unwilling  to  do  anything  which  would 
interfere  with  the  plans  of  the  Imperialists.  When  the  Imperial- 
ists attempted  to  establish  a  blockade,  to  carry  out  their  plans  of 
revolution,  the  American  commander,  acting  under  the  Monroe 
Doctrine,  by  direction  of  our  government  at  Washington,  was  the 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  i<% 

only  naval  commander  who  objected,  and  he  cleared  for  action 
and  forced  the  admiral  commanding  the  Imperial  forces  to  desist 
from  his  purposes.  It  must  be  remembered  that  this  was  only  in 
1893,  and  happened  to  the  great  republican  government  of  Brazil, 
our  friend  and  neighbor. 

Let  us  take  another  modern  and  well  known  application.  So 
late  as  1894,  the  British  government  attempted  to  force  a  situation 
with  Venezuela,  which  would  bring  about  British  control  of  the 
Orinoco  region  and  practically  shut  up  in  British  hands  the  con-' 
trol  of  one  of  the  greatest  rivers  of  commerce,  a  region  which  has 
imperial  potentialities  of  trade  and  commercial  life.  Had  it  not 
been  for  the  strong  hand  of  this  government,  acting  through  and 
under  the  provisions  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  today  an  important 
field  of  commerce,  a  vast  region  of  South  America,  a  great  por- 
tion of  an  independent  republic,  and  the.  control  of  a  mighty  river 
would  be  in  the  grasp  of  the  British  empire. 

The  question  of  European  interference  today  is  not  dead.  To 
every  one  who  reads,  there  arises  the  question  of  the  settlement 
of  the  position  of  the  great  foreign  colonies  in  South  America. 
Every  well  informed  student  of  public  affairs  and  international 
matters  is  looking  forward  to  the  time  when  friction  will  develop 
between  the  home  governments  of  these  colonists  and  the  repub- 
lics within  whose  territories  they  live. 

Secretary  Olney  says: 

The  people  of  the  United  States  have  learned  in  the  school  of  experi- 
ence to  what  extent  the  relations  of  states  to  each  other  depend,  not 
upon  sentiment  nor  principle,  but  upon  selfish  interest.  They  will  not  soon 
forget  that,  in  their  hour  of  distress,  all  their  anxieties  and  burdens  were 
aggravated  by  the  possibility  of  demonstrations  against  their  national  life 
on  the  part  of  the  Powers  with  whom  they  had  long  maintained  the  most 
harmonious  relations.  They  have  yet  in  mind  that  France  seized  upon 
the  apparent  opportunity  of  our  civil  war  to  set  up  a  monarchy  in  the 
adjoining  state  of  Mexico.  They  realize  that  had  France  and  Great  Britain 
held  important  South  American  possessions  to  work  from  and  to  benefit, 
the  temptation  to  destroy  the  predominance  of  the  Great  Republic  in  this 
hemisphere  by  furthering  its  dismemberment  might  have  been  irresistible. 
From  that  grave  peril  they  have  been  saved  in  the  past  and  may  be  saved 
again  in  the  future  through  the  operation  of  the  sure  but  silent  force  of 
the  doctrine  proclaimed  by  President  Monroe.  To  abandon  it,  on  the  other 
hand,  disregarding  both  the  logic  of  the  situation  and  the  facts  of  our 
past  experience,  would  be  to  renounce  a  policy  which  has  proved  both  an 
easy  defense  against  foreign  aggression  and  a  prolific  source  of  internal 
progress  and  prosperity. 


i;o  SELECTED  ARTICLES  ON 

We  desire  to  go  in  peace  and  equity  with  the  peoples  of  this 
hemisphere,  to  that  consummation  where  all  will  be  kindliness  and 
trust  between  this  republic  and  our  neighbors.  Still,  the  great 
thought  of  this  republic  is  that  it  is  best  for  all  to  maintain  the 
Monroe  Doctrine  in  all  its  virility.  With  our  President  we  ex- 
expressly  disclaim  any  desire  of  conquest,  nor  do  we  wish  any 
suzerainty  or  control  of  the  stable  nations  of  this  hemisphere. 
Here  is  where  the  correct  differentiation  is  lost  sight  of  in  the 
Latin  countries.  It  is  idle  to  speak  of  the  great  nations,  stable 
and  orderly  as  they  are,  as  standing  on  a  level  with  disorderly, 
revolution-ridden  despotisms,  such  as  have  been  discussed  and 
which  in  many  instances  obtain  in  Latin  America.  This  great 
doctrine  is  fundamentally  necessary  to  the  existence  of  the  peace 
and  safety  of  this  country,  yet  we  wish  the  help  and  the  assistance 
of  the  great  and  stable  nations  of  South  America  to  carry  it  to 
its  great  fruition. 

The  application  of  these  propositions  to  the  subject  under 
consideration  is  plain.  Whilst  this  government  has  no  desire  for 
conquest,  yet  the  great  advance  in  the  world  movement  and  in 
the  vital  commercial  affairs  of  the  globe,  demands  that  the  peace 
and  safety  of  this  hemisphere  shall  riot  be  needlessly  and  wickedly 
broken,  and  that  the  peace,  happiness  and  safety  of  this  nation 
and  the  commerce  of  the  world  within  the  bounds  of  our  govern- 
mental life  shall  not  be  imperiled  in  the  future  as  they  have  been 
in  the  past.  The  tremendous  impetus,  which  under  the  world 
movements  of  today,  has  been  so  potent  and  plain,  demands  order 
in  all  of  the  affairs  and  details  of  its  life.  The  conditions  of  the 
times  and  the  dependence  of  one  part  of  the  globe  upon  the  other, 
brought  about  by  the  easy  interchange  between  the  nations,  mean 
that  no  disorder  in  that  great  world  commerce  will  be  again 
lightly  tolerated. 

Under  the  plainest  and  fairest  interpretation  of  the  Monroe 
Doctrine  it  reaches  easily  the  subject  under  discussion.  Under 
its  original  application  it  will  not  allow  a  situation  to  obtain 
which  will  give  the  opportunity  for  foreign  nations  to  interfere 
in  the  governmental  life  of  countries  of  our  hemisphere.  Under 
the  fundamental  meaning  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  it  will  imperil 
the  peace,  safety  and  happiness  of  this  country  if  an  island,  lying 
at  our  doors,  within  touch  of  our  daily  life,  athwart  our  greatest 
line  -of  commerce,  shall  continue  its  life  of  disorder  in  the  future 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  171 

as  it  has  in  the  past.  This  position  of  our  country  should  breed 
no  distrust  among  our  self-respecting  and  stable  neighbors  on 
this  hemisphere.  We  will  go  along  with  them,  hand  in  hand,  and 
with  their  assistance  help  the  nations  which  are  weak,  and  do 
what  we  can  to  place  them  on  eternal  foundations  of  freedom, 
prosperity  and  order,  so  that  they  may  become  part  and  parcel  of 
this  great  free  brotherhood  on  the  western  hemisphere.  A  great 
writer  speaks  of  the  abrogation  of  the  doctrine,  and  voices  the 
distrust  and  suspicion  among  the  nations  of  the  southern  hemi- 
sphere. To  this  we  reply  with  the  pages  of  history,  and  ask 
under  what  government,  people,  or  system,  that  has  ever  existed 
since  history  began  to  write  its  pages,  have  there  been  preserved, 
in  their  freedom  and  governmental  life,  so  many  weak  nations  as 
have  existed  on  this  hemisphere,  side  by  side  with  this  powerful 
republic?  He  has  cited  as  cause  of  distrust  California  and 
Mexico.  These  were  life  movements,  absolutely  instinctive  in 
their  being,  and  demanded  by  the  very  existence  of  this  nation. 

Distinguished  writers  so  frequently  discuss  the  jealousy  of  the 
South  American  nations  toward  the  United  States  by  reason  of 
the  Monroe  Doctrine.  One  has  gone  so  far  as  to  give  in  detail 
the  size  and  strength  of  South  American  dreadnoughts,  and  to 
deal  with  immense  particularity  as  to  the  amount  of  beef  and 
wheat  raised  and  shipped  by  these  nations. 

It  is  true  that  some  jealousy  does  exist.  That  cannot  be 
avoided.  The  thinking  statesmen  of  the  South  American  countries, 
however,  do  not  believe  in  the  unjust  aggression  of  the  United 
States.  Those  of  them  who  know  the  situation  and  understand 
it  do  not  fear  the  Monroe  Doctrine  or  its  consequences.  There 
are  professional  politicians  in  South  America  who  fan  the  embers 
of  distrust  for  their  own  uprising  and  their  own  purposes,  but 
the  great  trend  of  sentiment  and  thought  on  the  part  of  the 
leaders  in  the  great  states  of  South  America  is  not  in  this 
direction. 

I  quote  the  statement  of  Senor  Zabellos  of  Argentina,  as  a  fair 
indication  of  the  thought  of  those  of  South  America  who  know 
the  real  feeling  of  our  country  towards  its  southern  neighbors : 

What  other  countries  of  America  have  the  same  world  problems  as 
Panama  and  Mexico,  the  latter  on  the  frontier  of  the  United  States,  and 
the  former  the  throat  of  the  continent  itself?  They  have  nothing  in  com- 
mon with  the  problems  of  the  River  Plata,  or  the  shores  of  Brazil,  or  the 
coast  of  Chili.  The  Monroe  Doctrine  is  necessary  today  to  the  United 


172  SELECTED  ARTICLES  ON 

States.  The  Caribbean  Sea  washes  the  coast  of  the  richest  part  of  the 
United  States,  and  it  is  necessary  that  it  be  dominated  by  them,  in  order 
to  guarantee  the  independence  and  security  of  the  United  States.  Under 
these  circumstances,  when  there  is  constant  danger  of  European  inter- 
vention, as  in  the  case  of  Venezuela,  the  United  States  said  to  the  Powers, 
in  accordance  with  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  "You  can  urge  your  claims  in 
accordance  with  international  procedure,  but  you  cannot  take  territory, 
because  if  you  do  you  will  have  to  deal  with  the  armed  forces  of  the  United 
States."  The  Powers  thereupon  became  less  aggressive  and  the  matter  was 
settled  by  arbitration.  This  action  of  the  United  States  emphasized  once 
more  the  doctrine  that  no  European  Power  will  be  permitted  to  acquire 
territory  on  the  continent  of  America. 

Thoughtful  men  do  not  agree  with  the  contention  in  'some 
directions  that  the  Monroe  Doctrine  should  be  enforced  under  an 
agreement  with  South  American  states.  It  seems  that  this  would 
be  impracticable.  The  Monroe  Doctrine  necessarily  is  an  emer- 
gency doctrine.  While  it  is  fundamental  the  demand  for  its 
action  is  immediate  and  decisive.  It  is  a  doctrine  which  demands 
absolute  and  direct  action  to  make  it  effective.  Very  many  seri- 
ous questions  arise  as  to  the  practicability  of  the  carrying  out  of 
any  such  agreement  between  the  states  of  South  America  and 
the  United  States. 

In  the  first  place,  the  interests  of  this  government  are  greater 
than  the  interests  of  any  other  government  on  this  hemisphere. 
What  relative  power  would  this  government  have  as  against  the 
other  contracting  powers?  The  Monroe  Doctrine  is  a  doctrine 
peculiarly  applying  to  the  United  States.  When  this  Doctrine  is 
divided,  so  that  it  applies  to  other  governments,  necessarily  the 
very  essence  of  this  Doctrine  is  done  away  with. 

Again,  it  has  been  the  history  of  international  affairs,  that 
agreements  between  nations,  diverse  in  thought,  life,  sentiment, 
situation,  and  race,  have  never  been  successful.  Here  would  be 
an  agreement  for  the  enforcement  of  the  Doctrine  between  the 
Anglo-Saxon  and  the  Latin  nations  absolutely  different  in  tem- 
perament, and  also  between  nations  whose  whole  financial  and 
local  situation  is  absolutely  different  from  that  of  the  United 
States. 

Suppose,  for  instance,  a  question  should  arise  between  Eng- 
land and  some  of  the  South  American  states,  and  that  the  con- 
tracting powers  for  the  maintentance  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine 
would  be  the  United  States,  Argentina,  Brazil  and  Chile.  Those 
who  know  the  situation  in  Argentina  would  not  suppose  for  a 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  173 

moment  that  Argentina  would  oppose  England  in  some  contro- 
versy as  to  some  minor  state,  which  would  be  important  to  the 
United  States,  but  relatively  unimportant  to  Argentina.  This  illus- 
tration applies  with  equal  force  as  to  the  other  South  American 
states.  The  money  with  which  these  great  states  are  being 
developed,  and  the  population  which  is  largely  engaged  in 
developing  them,  come  from  Europe  and  Europe  could  injure 
these  states  financially  if  they  opposed  European  interests  in 
and  about  the  enforcing  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine. 

This  is  a  mere  illustration  of  the  multitude  of  troubles  which 
would  come  by  an  agreement  that  the  Monroe  Doctrine  should 
be  enforced  by  a  joint  action  of  South  American  states  and  the 
United  States.  The  questions  are  so  absolutely  diverse  as 
between  the  United  States  and  these  countries,  that  no  unity  of 
action  could  be  brought  about  so  as  to  make  the  enforcement 
of  the  doctrine  effective.  While  this  is  true  the  Monroe  Doctrine 
should  not  be  enforced  with  a  strong  Hand,  but  should  be  car- 
ried out  in  justice,  in  courtesy  and  in  fairness  between  our 
country  and  the  countries  of  South  America.  This  honesty  and 
respect  obtain  aihong  nations  just  as  among  men  and  by  the 
immutable  laws  of  cause  and  effect,  and  the  action  of  this 
government  upon  a  high  plane  will  surely  obtain  and  hold  the 
respect  of  the  countries  of  South  America. 

The  Monroe  Doctrine  within  its  very  nature  is  a  doctrine 
which  is  fundamental  and  peculiar  to  the  United  States.  While 
it  should  be  carried  out  in  justice,  the  mode,  the  time,  the  place 
and  the  manner  of  its  operation  should  be,  and  \  believe  will 
be,  directed  and  controlled  absolutely  by  the  United  States.  To 
place  it  in  other  hands  would  be  the  destruction  of  the  Doctrine, 
which  has  been  vital  to  this  country  and  to  this  hemisphere, 
and  cause  the  weakening  of  the  hands  of  this  government  in 
the  direction  where  international  trade  and  life  will  demand 
that  our  hands  should  be  strong,  and  absolutely  free  to  act 
decisively  in  the  great  international  emergencies  which  arise  so 
unexpectedly  and  which  are  fraught  with  such  momentous 
consequences. 

The  doctrine  of  Monroe  is  a  doctrine  of  help  and  peace. 
It  is  true  that  those  who  love  our  country  believe  that  this 
Republic  "looks  hopefully  to  the  time  when  by  the  voluntary 
departure  of  European  governments  from  this  continent  and 


174  SELECTED  ARTICLES  ON 

the  adjacent  islands,  America  shall  be  wholly  American."  Still 
these  governments  and  their  systems  are  here  and  are  part  of 
the  life  of  this  hemisphere.  They  will  surely  demand  that  we 
preserve  order  and  conserve  the  safety  of  the  commerce  within 
our  sphere.  This  means  absolute  order.  To  bring  about  this 
order  this  government  will  not  hurt  the  self-respect  or  pride 
of  any  great  and  stable  nations  of  our  hemisphere.  We  will 
work  with  them  along  the  lines  of  mutual  respect  and  esteem. 
Touched  by  the  new  life,  which  is  making  them  so  vital  and 
important  a  part  of  the  world  affairs  of  the  day,  they  will 
understand  that  the  conditions  of  other  days  cannot  continue, 
and  that  the  responsibilities  brought  about  by  present  world 
conditions  demand  that  our  safety  and  peace,  as  well  as  theirs, 
compel  the  continued  existence  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  in  its 
full  virility.  When  this  is  understood  there  will  be  no  distrust. 
There  will  be  the  co-mingling  of  nations  with  the  same  govern- 
mental freedom.  It  will  be  a  great  brotherhood,  and  the  only 
one,  of  free  people  and  free  nations  marching  onward  hand  in 
hand  to  the  consummation  of  that  blessed  time  when  the  strong 
will  not  oppose  the  weak,  and  when  filled  with  mutual  esteem, 
confidence  and  regard,  and  touched  by  the  wondrous  vitalizing 
life  of  freedom,  the  nations  of  this  hemisphere,  great  and  little, 
Latin  and  Anglo-Saxon,  will  show  to  the  world  the  splendor  of 
freedom  in  its  highest  and  best  development. 

Bulletin   Pan  American  Union.  34:  790-800.  June,  1912 
Notable  Pan  American  Addresses 

At  the  meeting  of  the  American  Society  of  International  Law, 
held  on  the  morning  of  April  26,  Sr.  Don  Luis  Anderson,  former 
minister  of  foreign  affairs  of  Costa  Rica,  read  a  paper  dealing 
with  the  Monroe  Doctrine  and  its  relation  to  international  law. 

After  briefly  reviewing  the  circumstances  which  led  to  the 
famous  declaration  of  President  Monroe  in  1823,  and  quoting  the 
paragraph  of  his  message  which  was  later  to  constitute  the  Doc- 
trine bearing  his  name,  Sr.  Anderson  said :  Such  an  important 
and  solemn  declaration,  uttered  at  the  most  opportune  time,  was 
really  the  last  stone  to  complete  the  edifice  of  Spanish-American 
independence;  and  until  this  day  it  has  been  the  rock  against 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  175 

which  have  foundered  all  the  different  enterprises  of  reconquest 
and  domination  on  the  part  of  the  countries  of  the  old  world. 
Before  this  statement  the  vast  projects  entertained  at  Verona  by 
the  monarchs  united  in  the  Holy  Alliance  had  to  hold  themselves 
in  check  and  remain  reduced  to  nothing;  and  the  same  fate  was 
later  shared  by  the  unfortunate  adventures  of  Mexico,  the 
Chincha  Islands,  the  Dominican  Republic,  etc. 

To  avail  myself  of  the  happy  expression  of  our  illustrious 
colleague,  Don  Alejandro  Alarez,  "the  message  of  President  Mon- 
roe, although  it  was  not  its  purpose  to  declare  any  principle,  nor 
had  anything  in  view  beyond  the  immediate  interests  of  the 
United  States,  yet  it  formulated  with  such  a  precision  the  inter- 
national situation  of  the  new  world  with  respect  to  the  old, 
and  synthesized  so  exactly  the  aspirations  and  destinies  of  all 
America,  that  in  a  certain  manner  it  came  to  be  its  gospel." 

In  fact,  the  declaration  of  President  Monroe,  made  under 
trying  circumstances  and  at  the  most  proper  occasion,  was  for 
the  Iberian  Republics  of  America  the  fundamental  ground  for 
their  sovereignty  and  institutions ;  for  America  at  large  it  was, 
and  continues  to  be,  the  symbol  of  continental  solidarity  which 
united  the  English-speaking  and  the  Spanish-speaking  peoples, 
and  places  the  territory  and  the  institutions  of  every  American 
country  sheltered  from  violence  and  possible  foreign  interven- 
tion, assuring  them  their  national  life  as  organizations  which  shall 
never  be  disintegrated  by  any  expansionist  ambition. 

The  Monroe  Doctrine,  so  considered  and  understood,  consti- 
tutes the  corner  stone  of  our  existence  as  political  bodies  and 
is  in  fact  one  of  the  cardinal  principles  of  our  international  life. 
Proclaimed  and  maintained  in  the  most  energetic  way  by  the 
United  States,  but  sustained  with  no  less  decision  and  enthusiasm 
by  the  other  Republics  of  the  continent,  each  time  that  the  inde- 
pendence and  integrity  of  the  Latin  American  nations  have  been 
menaced,  the  Monroe  Doctrine  has  played  an  important  role  in 
the  incident  and  has  received  a  new  consecration.  Thus  it  is 
evident,  among  other  instances,  from  the  declaration  of  Secretary 
of  State  Buchanan  in  1848  in  regard  to  the  expedition  of  Flores 
to  Ecuador;  the  attitude  of  the  United  States  in  regard  to  the 
French  intervention  in  Mexico  in  1863-1866;  the  declaration  of 
Secretary  of  State  Seward  in  regard  to  the  war  of  Spain  with 
Chile  and  Peru;  the  protest  of  the  United  States  against  the 


176  SELECTED  ARTICLES  ON 

reincorporation  by  Spain  of  the  island  of  Santo  Domingo  in  1881 ; 
the  declaration  of  the  Government  of  the  United  States  in  view 
of  the  conflict  over  the  boundary  of  Guiana,  between  England 
and  Venezuela,  etc. 

It  is  necessary,  therefore,  to  admit  that  thanks  to  the  Monroe 
Doctrine,  maintained  by  the  diplomacy  of  the  United  States  with 
such  ability,  energy  and  constancy,  the  Latin-American  continent 
has  remained  until  now  immune  to  the  colonizing  tendency  which 
characterizes  the  policy  of  the  Great  Powers  of  Europe. 

But  will  this  policy  of  the  United  States  Government  be  suffi- 
cient in  coming  years  to  prevent  the  weak  nations  of  America 
from  attempts  at  conquest  by  the  strong  nations?  This  is  a  prob- 
lem with  which  we  may,  perhaps  we  shall,  be  confronted  in  the 
near  future ;  and  logic,  as  well  as  the  most  elementary  precaution, 
teaches  us  all  that  we  ought  to  foresee  the  events,  and  prepare 
ourselves  to  face  them,  seeking  from  now  on  satisfactory  solu- 
tions to  so  delicate  a  situation. 

This  is  not  a  pessimistic  point  of  view.  The  social  and  po- 
litical conditions  of  Europe  are  truly  exceptional  and  critical. 
The  powerful  armaments  by  sea  and  by  land,  those  great  armies 
which  of  themselves  are  a  heavy  burden  on  the  citizen,  against 
his  will  turned  from  the  home  to  serve  in  the  ranks,  make  neces- 
sary the  imposition  of  tremendous  taxation,  each  day  more  bur- 
densome and  oppressive  for  every  class ;  add  to  this  an  over- 
crowded population,  poverty  among  the  working  class,  together 
with  the  socialistic  tendencies  which  advance  everywhere  with 
the  onrush  and  persistence  of  the  tides,  and  which  are  already 
beginning  to  shake  the  political  and  social  structure,  and  you  shall 
see  how  near  is  the  realization  of  the  prophecy  of  Lord  Grey 
spoken  before  the  House  of  Commons  on  the  I3th  of  May  of 
last  year:  "Rebellion  will  not  come  until  the  taxes  oppress  di- 
rectly the  classes  of  society  for  whom  life,  even  in  the  better 
conditions,  is  a  constant  struggle.  When  hunger  begins  to  come 
by  reason  of  the  taxes,  and  it  will  arrive  sooner  or  later  in  every 
nation  if  the  actual  military  expenses  continue  increasing  as  at 
present,  then  a  rebellion  will  be  near  which  will  bring  an  end 
to  this  military  expense.  Such  is  the  end  to  which  the  great 
nations  to-day  are  sinking." 

The  Governments  of  the  Great  Powers  of  Europe  believe  they 
have  found  in  territorial  expansion  the  means,  if  not  to  prevent, 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  177 

at  least  to  delay  the  danger  with  which  they  are  confronted; 
and  thus,  we  have  seen  them,  during  the  last  few  years,  striving 
to  enlarge  at  any  cost  their  colonial  empire,  with  a  view  to  trans- 
fer beyond  the  seas  their  overflow  of  population  without  weaken- 
ing the  country  by  migration,  but  enlarging  their  frontiers  and 
acquiring  at  the  same  time  splendid  advantages  for  their  com- 
merce. With  no  limitations  other  than  those  which  they  them- 
selves have  been  willing  to  use  against  each  other  as  a  matter 
of  compensation  and  equilibrium,  the  European  Powers,  while 
rejoicing  at  the  peace  the  Continent  has  enjoyed  since  1871,  have 
been  bringing  war  into  the  regions  of  Africa,  Asia  and  the  Pacific 
Islands,  in  order  to  raise  here  and  there  the  flag  of  conqueror. 

But  this  colonial  policy  has  proved  nothing  more  than  a 
momentary  remedy,  as  the  disease  still  exists  while  the  medicine 
is  being  used  up ;  the  territories  appropriated  are  no  longer  suffi- 
cient, and  the  Old  Continent  offers  no  more  land  available  for 
colonization.  The  danger  as  an  ever  increasing  and  threatening 
wave  shows  itself  again,  and  the  Governments,  utterly  astounded, 
realize  that  the  colonial  policy  in  which  they  expected  to  find 
their  salvation  was  no  more  than  a  truce. 

New  fields  for  the  colonizing  and  adventurous  spirit  would 
perhaps  be  the  means  of  prolonging  that  truce,  to  set  aside  for 
a  longer  period  the  danger  which  is  now  imminent.  But  where 
are  these  new  fields?  It  is  not  difficult  to  see  that  the  answer 
should  be  found  on  this  side  of.  the  Atlantic.  I  read  in  an 
important  book,  written  not  long  ago  by  Dr.  Albert  Hale,  what 
follows : 

The  nations  of  Europe  are  crowded  and  South  America  offers  the  only 
available  land  on  earth  into  which  the  surplus  can  overflow.  Who  will 
occupy  this  virgin  soil?  When  and  how,  by  whom  and  under  what  in- 
fluences, will  its  productive  acres  be  used  for  the  sustenance  of  man? 

I  think  that  the  very  Monroe  Doctrine  would  be  sufficient  to 
meet  the  difficulty  if  only  all  the  American  countries,  without 
looking  at  past  events  but  with  eyes  cast  upon  their  future 
destinies,  would  resolve  to  carry  out  the  idea  of  President  Mon- 
roe in  all  its  logical  developments  and  conclusions  according  to 
what  the  spirit  of  the  times  demands.  If  they  unite  to  proclaim, 
as  they  should  do,  that  "conquest  shall  be  hereafter  absolutely 
prescribed  from  the  American  continent,  binding  each  and  all 
neither  to  undertake  nor  to  tolerate  conquest  of  American  terri- 


i;8  THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE 

tory,"  the  Monroe  Doctrine  would  thus  attain  its  highest  conse- 
cration, and  the  bonds  uniting  the  sister  republics  of  the  world 
of  Columbus  would  be  made  more  binding  and  become  real  and 
actual  ties  of  fraternal  friendship.  That  should  be  the  main  point 
and  the  most  important  subject  before  the  next  Pan  American 
Conference. 


NEGATIVE  DISCUSSION 

Journal  of  Race  Development.  4:334-58.  January,  1914 

Should  We  Abandon  the  Monroe  Doctrine?    Hiram  Bingham 

"The  Monroe  Doctrine,  or  the  doctrine  of  the  dual  political 
organization  of  the  nations  of  the  earth,  is  a  barbaric  stumbling- 
block  in  the  way  of  enlightened  international  policy."  So  wrote 
the  late  William  Graham  Sumner,  in  an  essay  on  "Earth  Hun- 
ger," in  1897. 

At  that  time,  very  little  attention  was  paid  to  his  remarks. 
Professor  Sumner  had  a  way  of -being  many  years  ahead  of 
public  opinion  in  his  attitude  toward  political  and  economic 
policies. 

During  the  past  few  months  the  number  of  people  who  have 
come  to  take  an  unfriendly  attitude  toward  the  Monroe  Doctrine 
has  very  greatly  increased.  True,  this  national  shibboleth  is 
still  a  plank  in  the  platforms  of  our  great  national  parties.  In 
many  quarters  it  is  still  a  rallying  cry.  A  great  chain  of  news- 
papers, extending  from  San  Francisco  to  Boston,  edited  by  the 
most  highly  paid  editorial  writer  of  the  day,  constantly  refers 
to  the  Monroe  Doctrine  as  something  sacred  and  precious,  like 
the  Declaration  of  Independence.  Other  powerful  newspapers, 
less  popular  in  their  appeal,  but  no  less  powerful  in  their  in- 
fluence, still  resent  any  attack  on  what  is  considered  by  them  the 
most  essential  feature  of  our  foreign  policy.  And  they  continue 
to  uphold  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  while  at  the  same  time  they  try 
to  explain  away  its  disagreeable  features. 

A  recent  editorial  in  a  journal  devoted  to  the  interests  of 
the  Army  and  Navy,  in  vigorously  denouncing  the  present  at- 
tacks being  made  on  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  and  calling  loudly 
on  patriotic  Americans  to  see  to.it  that  no  academic  sentimental- 
ists were  allowed  to  weaken  our  national  defenses,  declared  that 
without  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  we  could  not  hold  the  Panama 
Canal ! 

It  would  have  been  j  ust  as  logical  to  say  that  without  the 
Monroe  Doctrine  we  could  not  hold  Hawaii,  or  Key  West,  or 


i8o  SELECTED  ARTICLES  ON 

Boston  harbor.  The  Panama  Canal  is  one  of  the  possessions 
of  the  United  States.  Its  defense  is  a  national  right  and  a 
national  duty.  In  defending  the  Panama  Canal  as  in  defending 
Key  West  or  Boston  harbor,  we  have  back  of  us  the  most  uni- 
versally accepted  principles  of  international  law.  In  upholding 
the  Monroe  Doctrine,  on  the  other  hand,  we  are  merely  upholding 
what  has  been  believed  for  many  years  to  be  a  useful  foreign 
policy,  but  one  that  has  no  standing  in  international  law,  and  is, 
in  fact,  neither  law  nor  doctrine  but  merely  a  declaration  of  policy 
having  to  do  with  our  relations  with  foreign  nations. 

Consequently,  in  considering  the  question  as  to  whether  we 
should  abandon  the  Monroe  Doctrine  or  not,  we  must  first  clear 
our  minds  of  any  idea  that  the  maintenance  or  abandonment 
of  this  policy  is  in  any  way  synonymous  with  the  maintenance 
or  abandonment  of  our  national  defenses,  be  they  in  Hawaii, 
Boston  harbor,  or  the  Panama  Canal.  Of  course,  it  is  perfectly 
true  that  to  maintain  a  vigorous  foreign  policy  and  one  that  is  at 
all  unpopular,  means  the  maintenance  of  an  efficient  Army  and 
Navy.  But  without  any  vigorous  foreign  policy,  we  should,  at 
the  same  time,  need  an  Army  and  a  Navy,  and  both  ought  to  be 
efficient  for  the  same  reason  that  every  city  needs  an  efficient 
police  force. 

In  considering  the  advisability  of  abandoning  the  Monroe 
Doctrine,  let  us  attempt  to  get  clearly  in  mind  exactly  what  is 
meant  by  the  Monroe  Doctrine.  We  shall  find  that  at  different 
periods  of  our  history,  it  has  meant  very  different  things.  When 
it  was  promulgated  by  President  Monroe  in  1823,  it  meant  that 
we  were  afraid  that  the  rising  wave  of  monarchy  and  despotism 
in  Europe  might  overwhelm  the  struggling  republics  in  the  new 
world.  We  were,  in  a  sense,  in  the  position  of  the  big  brother 
on  the  edge  of  the  swimming  pool,  who  sees  his  little  brothers 
swimming  under  the  water  and  about  to  come  to  the  surface; 
and  who  also  sees  a  couple  of  bullies  getting  ready  to  duck  them 
before  they  can  get  their  breath.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  this  was 
the  only  republic,  at  that  time,  that  had  come  to  the  surface, 
scrambled  on  to  the  bank,  and  shown  itself  able  to  stand  on  its 
own  legs.  The  little  fellows  in  Spanish-America  were  swimming 
hard,  but  they  had  not  got  their  heads  above  water.  We  believed 
it  to  be  for  our  interests  to  see  that  they  had  a  square  deal  and 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  181 

were  not  interfered  with  as  they  came  to  the  surface.  We  pro- 
mulgated a  high-minded,  unselfish  policy,  without  a  thought  of 
gaining  prestige  or  power  in  Latin  America.  We  bravely  warned 
the  nations  of  the  continent  of  Europe  not  to  attempt  to  inflict 
their  system  of  government  on  any  land  in  the  western  hemi- 
sphere, where  a  democratic  or  republican  form  of  government 
had  established  itself. 

From  such  a  high-minded  and  altruistic  position  as  this,  it 
is  a  far  cry  to  the  connotation  which  goes  with  the  Monroe  Doc- 
trine in  the  minds  of  many  American  citizens  of  today.  Our 
people  have  been  taught  by  jingoistic  politicians,  like  the  heelers 
of  Tammany  Hall,  to  believe  that  the  Monroe  Doctrine  means 
that  it  is  our  duty  to  keep  America  in  order ;  that  it  is  our  policy 
to  allow  Europe  to  have  nothing  to  say  about  the  American  re- 
publics, and  that  it  would  be  a  national  disgrace,  almost  unthink- 
able, for  us  to  abandon  this  sacred  shibboleth.  It  was  a  Tam- 
many Hall  orator,  according  to  Professor  Hart,  who  said, 
"Tammany  Hall  is  a  benevolent  institution;  Tammany  Hall  is  a 
patriotic  institution ;  Tammany  Hall  has  the  honor  of  being  the 
first  to  propose  that  immortal  Monroe  Doctrine  which  blesses 
and  revivifies  the  world." 

And  it  was  a  former  Tammany  politician,  who,  on  being  ques- 
tioned in  regard  to  our  present  policy  with  Mexico,  stated,  a 
few  days  ago,  that  under  the  Monroe  Doctrine  it  was  our  duty 
to  go  in  and  annex  Mexico,  and  the  sooner  we  did  it,  the  better. 

It  is  a  far  cry  from  the  Monroe  Doctrine  of  1823  to  the 
Monroeism  of  our  politicians  and  newspapers  at  the  present  day. 
In  1823,  this  declaration  of  foreign  policy  made  a  profound  im- 
pression on  Europe,  and  won  us  the  gratitude  and  the  eulogies 
of  the  Latin-American  republics.  At  the  present  time,  there  is 
no  question  that  the  Monroe  Doctrine  is  a  cause  of  world-wide 
irritation  and  is  almost  universally  hated  throughout  Latin 
America.  In  the  words  of  a  careful  student  of  Pan-American 
affairs,  who  has  lived  many  years  in  various  parts  of  Spanish 
America,  "the  two  principal  results  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  are : 
intense  hatred  of  the  United  States  on  the  part  of  powerful  and 
self-respecting  South  American  nations,  able  and  willing  to  meet 
their  responsibilities  to  the  countries  to  whom  they  are  under 
obligations;  and  an  attempt  at  evasion  of  these  responsibilities 

X4 


182  SELECTED  ARTICLES  ON 

by  other  Latin-American  countries,  who,  while  using  the  Doctrine 
where  they  think  they  can  for  such  a  purpose,  equally  hate  the 
originators  of  it." 

Contrast  this  with  that  memorable  sentence  in  Mr.  Cleveland's 
message  to  Congress  regarding  the  Venezuela  boundary  .dispute, 
in  which  he  said  that  the  Monroe  Doctrine  "was  intended  to 
apply  to  every  stage  of  our  national  life,  and  cannot  become 
obsolete  while  our  republic  endures." 

This  was  quoted  by  the  editor  of  the  New  York  Times  in  a 
recent  article  in  the  Century,  in  which  the  part  played  by  the 
Monroe  Doctrine  in  the  Venezuela  dispute  was  carefully  brought 
out.  In  a  recent  number  of  the  Times,  in  an  editorial  discussion 
of  the  present  writer's  proposal  to  regard  the  Monroe  Doctrine 
as  obsolete,  it  was  admitted  that  the  Monroe  Doctrine  was,  as 
a  matter  of  fact,  a  purely  selfish  policy.  These  were  the  words 
used: 

The  Monroe  Doctrine  was  declared  by  us  with  reference  to  our  own 
interests,  and  is  maintained  for  no  other  reason.  It  was  not  declared 
with  direct  regard  or  thought  of  the  interests  of  the  weaker  republics 
of  the  continent,  and  it  will  be  maintained — or  abandoned — with  more 
thought  of  our  interests  than  of  theirs. 

If  that  is  the  ablest  defence  which  can  be  made  for  the  Doc- 
trine in  its  present  form,  it  is  not  surprising  that  we  find  so 
much  opposition  to  it  on  the  part  of  our  southern  neighbors. 
General  Reyes,  former  president  of  the  Republic  of  Colombia, 
said  recently: 

Having  for  many  years  closely  followed,  step  by  step,  the  development 
of  the  American  republics  and  the  convulsions  of  their  ardent  and  rexed 
democracies,  I  am  more  than  ever  convinced  that  unity  of  action  with 
the  United  States  is  necessary  to  initiate  the  advent  of  that  glorious  future 
to  which  they  are  so  manifestly  entitled.  But  that  unity  of  action  can  only 
be  accomplished  by  the  removal  of  the  causes  which  have  led  to  the  pre- 
vailing doubts,  jealousies,  and  suspicions. 

In  my  opinion,  the  Panama  Canal  will  solve  many  of  the  difficulties 
which  owe  their  existence  to  the  present  lack  of  intercourse  between  the 
people  of  the  north  and  those  of  the  south,  but  even  that  beneficial  change 
of  conditions  will  not  serve  by  itself  to  eradicate  the  evils  of  the  past. 
There  must  be  a  wider  recognition  of  the  fact  that  the  relations  of  the 
United  States  with  the  Latin  republics  are  those  of  a  friendly,  powerful 
neighbor,  with  no  other  objects  than  the  advantages  to  be  gained  from  the 
ties  of  sisterhood  and  the  extension  of  commerce.  There  must  be  a  saner 
propaganda  as  to  the  inalienable  sovereign  rights  and  complete  independence 
of  even  the  smallest  of  the  Latin  States.  There  must  be  no  "big  stick," 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  183 

and  no  such  use  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  as  to  make  it  an  instrument  of 
terror  to  the  smaller  republics,  and  a  subject  for  ridicule  in  the  greater 
countries  of  the  South. 

The  more  advanced  Latin  nations  appreciate  and  sympathize  with 
the  benevolent  designs  and  objects  of  that  doctrine,  as  is  shown  by  the 
formulation  of  their  own  doctrine,  intended  to  protect  the  smaller  states 
against  the  employment  of  armed  force  by  foreign  nations  for  the  collection 
of  contractual  debts.  But  they  resent  the  spirit  of  domination  and  tutelage 
which  implies  that  they  need  the  protection  of  the  United  States  against 
foreign  aggression.  (The  italics  are  mine.) 

It  is  easy  to  understand  the  cause  of  such  remarks  when  one 
calls  to  mind  the  thoughtless  jingoism  of  some  of  our  news- 
papers and  the  more  intelligent  selfishness  of  some  of  our  leading 
editorial  writers. 

It  would  be  easy  to  multiply  quotations  from  North  American 
writers  and  newspapers  which  justify  the  fears  and  hatred  of 
Latin  America.  And  it  would  be  equally  easy  to  gather  many 
'paragraphs  from  Spanish  and  French  authors  to  illustrate  what 
forms  this  distrust  and  hatred  take.  I  have  already  called  at- 
tention to  a  number  of  these  in  the  little  book  just  referred  to. 

Why  is  it  that  it  is  so  difficult  for  us  to  formulate  an  answer 
to  the  question  as  to  what  the  Monroe  Doctrine  really  means? 
Because  there  are  probably  no  two  words  in  American  history 
which  have  been  more  variously  interpreted,  which  have  meant 
more  things  to  more  people,  and  which  have  been  more  highly 
praised  by  some  and  more  bitterly  condemned  by  others.  What  is 
the  reason  of  this  confusion? 

I  believe  that  the  reason  is  that  these  two  words  "Monroe 
Doctrine"  have  come  to  be  used  by  us  in  place  of  two  other 
words  that  are  less  interesting  and  less  significant,  namely,  "for- 
eign policy."  Our  foreign  policy  is  the  Monroe  Doctrine.  What- 
ever our  foreign  policy  happens  to  be  for  the  moment,  it  is 
called  the  "Monroe  Doctrine."  Do  we  decide  to  intervene  in 
Cuba,  we  do  not  say  that  we  believe  it  to  be  for  our  best  inter- 
ests as  a  nation  to  overstep  the  bounds  of  international  law 
and  to  carry  our  intervention  into  a  neighboring  territory.  We 
wave  a  banner  and  call  it  the  Monroe  Doctrine.  Are  we  too 
busy  at  home  to  intervene  between  Spain  and  Chile  when  they 
go  to  war  and  when  Spain  bombards  the  port  of  Valparaiso?  We 
declare  that  the  Monroe  Doctrine  does  not  mean  that  we  shall 
interfere  in  any  righteous  war.  Do  we  wish  to  take  any  part  of 


184  SELECTED  ARTICLES  ON 

Spanish-American  territory  which  we  need  or  which  is  being 
badly  governed?  We  refer  our  actions  to  the  Monroe  Doctrine. 
It  is  no  wonder  that  Monroeism,  as  it  is  called  in  South  America, 
has  come  to  mean  -to  the  Latin-American  mind  interference,  inter- 
vention, tutelage  and  patronizing  insolence.  This  connotation 
does  us  infinite  harm. 

The  truth  is,  instead  of  facing  squarely  the  question  of  what 
is  the  best  foreign  policy  for  us  to  follow,  we  cloud  our  minds 
with  this  national  shibboleth;  we  remember  that  it  is  nearly 
one  hundred  years  old;  we  believe  that  it  has  done  a  great  deal 
of  good  in  keeping  Europe  from  crushing  the  life  out  of  incipient 
South  American  republics ;  we  feel  that  it  is  a  benevolent  institu- 
tion, and,  therefore,  wre  brand  whatever  selfish  or  unselfish  policy 
we  adopt  for  the  moment  with  the  words  "Monroe  Doctrine." 

It  would  seem  as  though  for  the  very  sake  of  clarifying  our 
own  ideas  and  placing  our  foreign  policy  on  a  logical  foundation, 
it  would  be  well  for  us  to  abandon  a  combination  of  words 
which  stands  for  so  many  different  things  to  so  many  different 
people. 

It  can  be  fairly  said  that  the  United  States  has  had  as  many 
ideals  and  has  fought  for  as  high  ideals  as  any  nation  in  history. 
The  calm  judgment  of  our  foreign  critics  sometimes  is  willing 
to  admit  that  we  have  been  more  idealistic  than  any  modern 
nation.  We  once  shed  a  vast  amount  of  blood  and  treasure  in 
order  to  suppress  an  economic  institution  called  slavery,  largely 
because  it  was  not  our  ideal  of  the  right  way  to  progress  toward 
higher  things.  We  went  to  war  with  Spain  largely  for  the  sake 
of  giving  Cuba  her  freedom,  and  then,  contrary  to  the  belief  of 
most  of  the  world  who  were  looking  on,  we  did  not  keep  Cuba, 
but  gave  her  independence.  Knowing  this  and  other  things  of 
a  similar  nature,  we  sometimes  flatter  ourselves  that  our  motives 
are  always  correct,  and  chiefly  idealistic.  And  the  worst  of  it  is, 
we  sometimes  so  blind  ourselves  with  the  dazzling  spectacle  of 
our  unselfishness  that  we  cannot  see  our  selfishness.  In  the  case 
of  Cuba,  for  instance,  we  were  so  pleased  with  our  unselfish 
sacrifices,  that  we  shut  our  eyes  to  the  fact  that  while  we  were 
giving  Cuba  freedom,  we  were  taking  Porto  Rico  and  the  Philip- 
pines and  Guam,  and  a  very  useful  naval  base  at  the  east  end  of 
Cuba,  and  putting  them  in  our  pockets.  The  world  did  not  say 
that  the  Spanish-American  war  gave  us  no  reward  for  our  pains. 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  185 

Before  deciding  whether  we  ought  to  abandon  the  Monroe 
Doctrine  and  considering  what  ought  to  be  our  policy  for  the 
future,  let  us  review  a  few  of  the  more  striking  features  of  our 
foreign  policy  since  1823. 

For  twenty  years  after  the  promulgation  of  the  Monroe  Doc- 
trine, we  were  regarded  with  extraordinary  friendliness  through- 
out Spanish-America.  Our  willingness  to  recognize  the  inde- 
pendence of  the  newly-fledged  republics;  our  willingness  to 
protect  them  from  European  aggression,  and  our  generous  non- 
interference with  them  in  the  time  of  their  greatest  weakness, 
earned  us  their  gratitude.  But  in  1846  came  the  war  with  Mexico, 
one  of  those  independent  republics  that  we  were  going  to  protect. 
We  had  stated  in  the  original  Monroe  Doctrine  that  it  was  the 
true  policy  of  the  United  States  to  leave  the  new  governments 
of  Spanish-America  to  themselves,  in  the  hope  that  other  powers 
would  pursue  the  same  course.  And  yet,  we  did  not  hesitate,  at 
the  conclusion  of  the  war  with  Mexico,  to  take  away  from  her 
nearly  one  half  her  area.  It  did  not  help  matters  that  a  year 
or  two  later,  gold  was  discovered  in  California.  It  did  not 
increase  our  popularity  in  Spanish- America  when  it  appeared  that 
we  were  getting  enormously  wealthy  out  of  the  gold  and  silver 
mines  in  California  and  Nevada,  which  we  had  so  recently  taken 
by  force  from  Mexico,  even  though  we  -had  paid  $15,000,000 
for  what  we  took.  It  may  be  replied  that  it  was  far  better  for 
California  and  Nevada  that  we  should  have  taken  them,  and  that 
we  could  afford  to  stand  the  unpopularity  that  this  engendered 
in  South  America.  Granting  for  the  sake  of  argument  that  this 
is  true,  why  not  admit  frankly  that  when  we  took  California 
and  Nevada,  we  went  contrary  to  the  principles  laid  down  by 
President  Monroe  in  his  famous  message  of  1823. 

In  1898,  we  went  to  war  with  Spain,  and  eventually  took  away 
all  her  American  possessions.  We  believed  ourselves  justified 
in  so  doing.  I  hold  no  brief  against  the  justification  of  that  war. 
It  was  undoubtedly  a  good  thing  for  Spain.  Many  Spaniards 
will  admit  this  today.  Their  country  has  been  stronger  and 
their  economic  condition  has  improved  since  they  lost  their  for- 
eign possessions.  But  President  Monroe  had  said  that  "With 
the  existing  colonies  or  dependencies  of  any  European  Power, 
we  have  not  interfered  and  shall  not  interfere."  Is  it  not  per- 
fectly evident  that  in  1898  we  regarded  the  Monroe  Doctrine 


r86  SELECTED  ARTICLES  Ol\ 

as  outgrown,  and  said  to  ourselves  that  we  could  afford  to  dis- 
regard one  of  the  most  positive  sentences  in  the  original  declara- 
tion of  President  Monroe?  Why  should  we  still  feel  that  there 
is  something  so  sacred  in  this  national  shibboleth  of  ours  that, 
although  we  have  repeatedly  gone  contrary  to  it  when  it  suited 
us  to  do  so,  we  must  still  cling  to  it  as  a  precious  thing,  without 
which  our  own  independence  would  be  in  danger  of  being  lost? 

In  1906,  Secretary  Root  made  his  well-known  tour  of  South 
America.  It  has  been  said  that  this  tour  was  made  necessary 
owing  to  the  fear  of  the  United  States  aroused  throughout  South 
America,  by  some  of  President  Roosevelt's  message  to  Congress, 
in  which  he  took  pains  to  reassert  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  and  in 
which  he  accepted,  quite  logically,  the  very  great  responsibilities 
which  the  maintenance  of  a  policy  of  "America  for  the  Ameri- 
cans" entailed  upon  us.  He  had  said  in  1905  : 

When  we  announce  a  policy,  such  as  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  we  thereby 
commit  ourselves  to  the  consequences  of  the  policy,  and  those  consequences 
from  time  to  time  alter.  It  is  out  of  the  question  to  claim  a  right  and  then 
to  shirk  the  responsibility  for  its  exercise.  Not  only  we,  but  all  American 
republics  who  are  benefited  by  the  existence  of  the  Doctrine,  must  recognize 
the  obligations  each  nation  is  under  as  regards  foreign  peoples  no  less 
than  -its  duty  to  insist  upon  its  own  rights. 

After  the  opening  of  the  third  session  of  the  Fifty-Eighth 
Congress,  Mr.  Roosevelt  had  said : 

Any  country  whose  people  conduct  themselves  well  can  count  upon 
our  hearty  friendship.  If  a  nation  shows  that  it  knows  how  to  act  with 
reasonable  efficiency  and  decency  in  social  and  political  matters,  if  it 
keeps  order  and  pays  its  obligations,  it  need  fear  no  interference  from  the 
United  States.  Chronic  wrongdoing,  or  an  impotence  which  results  in  a 
general  loosening  of  the  ties  of  civilized  society,  may  in  America,  as  else- 
where, ultimately  require  intervention  by  some  civilized  nation,  and  in  the 
western  hemisphere,  the  adherence  of  the  United  States  to  the  Monroe 
Doctrine  may  force  the  United  States,  however  reluctantly,  in  flagrant 
cases  of  such  wrongdoing  or  impotence,  to  the  exercise  of  an  international 
police  power. 

These  official  utterances  had  greatly  alarmed  and  annoyed  the 
South  American  republics,  and  it  was  no  small  part  of  Secretary 
Root's  visit  to  quiet  their  fears  and  assure  them  of  the  pacific 
quality  of  our  intentions.  So  well  did  Mr.  Root  do  this,  so  ably 
had  he  prepared  himself  by  the  study  of  South  American  history, 
so  favorable  an  impression  did  he  make  by  his  dignified  and 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  187 

courteous  bearing,  and  so  profound  a  conviction  did  his  words 
convey,  coming  as  they  did  from  the  actual  head  of  our  depart- 
ment of  foreign  affairs,  that  great  good  was  accomplished,  and 
an  era  of  friendship  and  good-will  was  ushered  in. 

The  most  striking  effect  of  this  was  to  be  seen  in  Chile. 
Owing  to  a  series  of  misunderstandings,  including  the  blunders 
of  an  over-zealous  diplomat,  the  wrong-headed  ideas  of  many 
American  newspapers,  and  the  seeming  interference  of  American 
warships  during  the  great  Chilean  civil  war  of  1891,  we  had 
become  extremely  unpopular  in  that  vigorous  republic  of  the 
South  Pacific.  Then  had  followed  the  deplorable  Baltimore  inci- 
dent, when  a  number  of  our  sailors  on  shore  leave  in  the  port  of 
Valparaiso,  got  into  trouble  with  some  of  the  rougher  elements 
of  the  port,  and  a  few  were  killed  and  several  more  wounded. 
We  had  lost  our  patience  with  what  we  termed  Chilean  dilatory 
conduct ;  we  took  the  law  into  our  own  hands,  and  eventually  we 
issued  an  ultimatum  to  Chile  demanding  financial  redress.  There 
was  nothing  for  her  to  do  but  to  grant  our  request.  But  the  scar 
was  long  in  healing,  and  it  may  fairly  be  said  that  we  had  less 
cordial  friends  in  Chile  than  in  any  other  American  republic, 
with  the  possible  exception  of  Colombia.  Mr.  Root's  visit  to 
South  America  and  his  able  exposition  of  our  foreign  policy, 
changed  the  attitude  of  the  Chileans  to  a  very  marked  degree. 
They  took  the  first  opportunity  of  showing  their  change  of  heart. 

The  Fourth  Latin-American  Scientific  Congress  was  due  to 
be  held  in  Santiago  in  December,  1908.  Former  congresses  of 
this  nature  had  been  held  in  Argentina,  Brazil,  and  Uruguay. 
The  organization  committee  for  the  fourth  congress  was  com- 
posed entirely  of  Chileans.  They  decided  that  in  consequence  of 
the  new  and  friendly  attitude  of  the  United  States,  it  would  be  an 
appropriate  thing  to  make  the  Congress  not  Latin-American,  but 
Pan-American,  and  to  invite  the  participation  of  the  American 
government,  and  of  universities  and  other  scientific  bodies  in  the 
United  States.  Secretary  Root  saw  the  advantages  that  would 
accrue  to  the  United  States  in  properly  accepting  such  an  invita- 
tion. In  accordance  with  his  ideas,  the  United  States  congress 
passed  a  suitable  appropriation  to  send  ten  delegates  from  this 
country  to  Chile.  These  delegates  were  received  with  the  utmost 
courtesy  and  given  the  best  of  everything.  It  was  with  difficulty 
that  they  avoided  offence  in  declining  a  few  of  the  many  honors 


i88  SELECTED  ARTICLES  ON 

showered  upon  them.  At  the  end  of  the  month  which  they  spent 
in  Chile,  it  is  safe  to  say  that  the  relations  between  Chile  and  the 
United  States  were  more  cordial  than  they  had  ever  been  before. 
Washington  was  selected  as  the  place  of  meeting  for  the  second 
Pan-American  Scientific  Congress,  and  October,  1912,  was  desig- 
nated as  the  proper  time  for  it  to  meet. 

It  has  not  met  yet.     (November,  1913.) 

The  United  States  congress  was  asked  by  Secretary  Knox 
for  a  small  appropriation  of  $50,000,  about  one-half  of  what  Chile 
had  appropriated  for  the  Scientific  Congress,  when  it  had  met 
in  Santiago,  to  provide  for  the  expenses  of  the  Congress  that 
should  meet  in  Washington  in  October,  1912.  Unfortunately, 
our  Congress  felt  too  poor  to  grant  this  request,  and  although 
the  appropriations  which  were  passed  footed  up  somewhere  in 
the  neighborhood  of  one  billion  dollars,  the  item  of  $50,000  for 
the  Scientific  Congress  was  struck  out,  and  our  national  obliga- 
tions to  provide  for  returning  the  hospitality  which  we  had  re- 
ceived, were  denied.  As  the  result  of  a  vigorous  protest  and  of 
public  sessions  of  the  House  Committee  on  Foreign  Affairs,  in 
the  next  session  of  Congress  the  same  amount  was  again  re- 
quested and  the  appropriation  of  this  amount  was  unanimously 
recommended  by  that  committee.  The  passage  of  the  appropria- 
tion, however,  was  lost  on  some  flimsy  technicality,  and  our  na- 
tional honor  in  regard  to  the  obligations  of  hospitality  still  re- 
mains under  a  cloud.  Apparently,  it  is  part  of  our  foreign  policy 
to  accept  invitations  to  Pan-American  congresses,  but  not  to  pro- 
vide suitably  for  such  congresses  when  they  have  to  meet  in  this 
country.  As  the  best-known  term  for  our  foreign  policy  through- 
out Latin-America  is  Monroeism,  this  appears  to  our  neighbors 
to  be  one  of  the  attributes  .of  the  Monroe  Doctrine. 

There  was  another  sequel  to  our  relations  with  Chile  even 
more  serious  than  not  providing  suitably  for  the  second  Pan- 
American  Scientific  Congress.  By  sending  an  ultimatum  demand- 
ing the  immediate  settlement  of  the  Alsop  claim,  Secretary  Knox 
destroyed  in  three  minutes  what  Secretary  Root  had  taken  three 
years  to  build  up.  The  delicate  edifice  of  good-will  and  friend- 
ship with  Chile,  which  had  arisen  from  the  ashes  of  the  Baltimore 
episode,  was  destroyed  because  a  Secretary  of  State  felt  that  the 
claim  of  a  private  citizen  for  $1,000,000  had  been  left  too  long 
unsettled.  This  is  not  the  place  to  go  into  the  details  of  the 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  189 

Alsop  claim.  Everyone  knows  that  Chile  inherited  this  debt 
from  Bolivia.  The  claim  was  recognized,  but  there  was  post- 
ponement in  its  settlement.  Chile  avoided  the  dire  effects  of 
Secretary  Knox's  ultimatum  by  depositing  $1,000,000  in  the  Bank 
of  England,  and  requesting  that  the  ownership  of  this  sum  be 
decided  by  the  Hague  Tribunal.  At  least,  so  it  was  reported  in 
the  newspapers.  Such  matters  are  too  recent  to  make  it  wise 
for  the  State  Department  to  allow  its  records  to  be  used  as  the 
basis  of  a  thorough  history  of  that  episode.  But  there  is  no 
question  about  the  results.  The  claimant  eventually  got  his 
money,  and  we  lost  the  cordial  friendship  of  Chile.  In  the  dis- 
cussion which  followed  in  the  Chilean  congress,  a  speech  was 
made  by  the  aged  Senator  Vincente  Reyes  on  July  26,  1911.  Said 
Senator  Reyes: 

It  seems  to  me  that  no  Chilean  is  to  blame  for  what  has  taken  place; 
everyone  has  endeavored,  in  the  role  that  corresponded  to  him,  to  further 
the  public  interests  in  the  most  convenient  manner.  The  fault,  the  real 
fault — and  it  is  necessary  to  declare  it  publicly,  and  I  can  say  it  better 
than  another  because  I  have  no  intervention,  either  in  the  acts  of  the 
government,  or  in  the  active  political  life,  from  which  I  am  removed  by 
reason  of  my  age,  so  that  in  pronouncing  my  opinion,  my  own  exclusive 
opinion,  I  compromise  nobody, — I  shall  say,  then,  that  the  fault  of  all  this  is 
owing  to  the  intemperance  of  the  United  States  government  that  has  made 
an  excessive  use  of  its  power,  treating  us  as  barbarous  tribes  were  treated 
in  past  times,  imposing  on  us  an  ultimatum  and  giving  us  ten  days  in 
which  to  perform  what  that  government  believed  we  ought  to  do. 

In  the  following  year,  on  August  2  of  1912,  a  resolution  was 
introduced  in  the  senate  of  the  United  States  by  Senator  Lodge 
of  Massachusetts,  which  has  been  regarded  throughout  Latin- 
America  as  a  still  further  extension  and  interpretation  of  the 
Monroe  Doctrine.  It  was  known  as  the  Magdalena  Bay  resolution. 

This  new  phase  of  our  foreign  policy  was,  as  might  be 
suspected,  treated  even  more  vehemently,  not  only  in  Latin- 
America,  but  also  in  Europe.  In  La  Revista  de  America  for 
September,  1912,  Sir  Jose  de  Astorga,  commented  as  follows 
(I  give  a  free  translation)  : 

The  Monroe  Doctrine  has  just  suffered  a  transformation  for  the  benefit 
of  Yankee  imperialism,  and  for  the  detriment  and  diminution  of  the 
sovereignty  of  the  Latin-American  republics,  in  .the  adoption  by  the  Senate 
at  Washington  of  the  Lodge  Resolution.  .  .  .  This  resolution,  reduced 
to  its  simplest  terms,  says  that  in  the  future  the  governments  of  the  Ibero- 
American  republics  are  prohibited  from  negotiating  with  any  foreign  com- 


IQO  SELECTED  ARTICLES  ON 

panics  for  the  cession  of  any  lands  for  the  purpose  of  merely  commercial 
or  industrial  ends,  without  the  previous  consent  of  the  White  House. 
Without  entering  into  any  discussion  of  the  motives  which, 
from  the  Yankee  point  of  view,  secured  the  adoption  of  the  Lodge  proposal 
by  a  nearly  unanimous  vote  [54  to  4]  of  the  North  American  Senate,  it 
is  perfectly  evident  that  this  proposal  cannot  lean  upon  the  so-called  Monroe 
Doctrine  as  originally  declared,  and  that,  furthermore,  it  involves  a  most 
odious  and  unwarranted  offense  against  the  sovereignty  and  the  inde- 
pendence of  the  Latin  republics  of  the  continent.  ...  If  the  republics 
which  occupy  the  territory  of  America  to  the  south  of  the  United  States 
are  independent  nations,  in  full  enjoyment  of  their  political  sovereignty, 
and  have  the  same  title  and  the  same  capacity  in  the  family  of  nations  as 
North  America  has,  then  neither  the  Senate  nor  the  government  at  Wash- 
ington has  the  power  to  proclaim  before  the  world,  as  a  rule  of  inter- 
national conduct  applicable  to  the  territories  of  foreign  sovereigns,  the 
Lodge  proposal. 

Anyhow,  the  importance  of  securing  concerted  movement  and  unanimity 
of  action  among  the  chancellaries  of  Latin-America  in  order  to  offset 
the  imperialistic  action  of  the  United  States,  is  urgent,  and  is  of  supreme 
importance.  The  protests  of  confraternity,  of  disinterestedness,  and  of 
respect  for  the  political  sovereignty  and  the  commercial  independence  of 
Latin-America,  which  the  government  of  the  United  States  sets  forth  so 
freely  on  every  occasion,  are  not  able  to  counteract  nor  to  lessen  the  elo- 
quence of  deeds,  and  these  are  the  deeds:  tutelage  over  Cuba;  the  abduction 
of  Panama;  the  embargo  on  the  custom  houses  of  Santo  Domingo;  eco- 
nomic and  military  intervention  in  Central  America;  the  "big  stick;"  dollar 
diplomacy,  and  the  Lodge  declaration. 

Here  we  have  the  Latin-American  judgment  on  the  Monroe 
Doctrine  in  a  nutshell.  We  can  on  occasion  make  charming 
speeches.  We  can  claim  that  our  foreign  policy  is  idealistic,  and 
we  can  point  to  the  Monroe  Doctrine  as  evidence  of  our  willing- 
ness to  protect  the  weaker  against  the  stronger.  Actions  speak 
louder  than  words.  The  fruits  of  our  foreign  policy  have  been 
the  acquisition  of  more  territory  and  direct  interference  in  the 
affairs  of  our  neighbors. 

One  of  the  questions  for  us  to  decide  is,  whether  it  is  worth 
while  to  pretend  adherence  to  a  shibboleth  which  has  so  often 
spelt  intervention,  and  which  means  to  our  neighbors  in  the  west- 
ern hemisphere  that  we  consider  it  our  duty  to  intervene  when- 
ever sufficient  occasion  arises. 

How  much  do  we  believe  in  intervention? 

One  of  our  most  distinguished  diplomats  and  statesmen,  the 
late  E.  J.  Phelps,  delivered  an  address  in  the  city  of  Brooklyn 
on  March  30,  1896,  which  dealt  with  the  Monroe  Doctrine  at  a 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  191 

time  when  we  had  been  drawn  dangerously  near  to  a  war  with 
Great  Britain  over  the  Venezuela  boundary.  That  distinguished 
publicist  treated  our  right  to  interfere  in  the  affairs  of  other 
nations  in  no  uncertain  terms.  The  fact  that  he  was  selected 
by  President  Cleveland  as  our  minister  at  the  Court  of  St.  James, 
and  that  he  rilled  that  post  with  marked  success,  is  sufficient 
excuse  for  quoting  him  at  the  present  time,  when  once  again 
wre  have  a  distinquished  Democrat  at  the  head  of  the  nation. 
Said  Mr.  Phelps : 

International  law  is  international  morality  and  justice,  formulated  by 
the  general  consent  of  civilized  men.  That  is  its  basis  and  its  sanction. 
The  claim  that  Americans  are  in  any  respect  above  or  beyond  this  law  of 
the  civilized  world,  or  that  we  are  invested  with  authority  to  interfere  in 
the  affairs  of  other  nations  in  which  we  are  in  no  way  concerned,  merely 
because  the  location  of  the  dispute  is  in  South  America,  are  propositions 
that  will  find  no  favor  among  just  or  thoughtful  men.  We  have  no  pro- 
tectorate over  South  American  nations,  and  do  not  assume  any  responsi- 
bility in  their  behalf.  Our  own  rights  there,  as  elsewhere,  it  is  to  be 
hoped,  we  shall  never  fail  to  maintain.  But  those  rights  have  their  founda- 
tion and  their  limit  in  the  settled  law  to  which  we  are  subject  as  all  other 
nations  are,  and  which  is  as  necessary  to  us  as  to  them. 

And  when  we  undertake  to  assert  that  we  are  not  bound  by  that 
law,  and  care  nothing  for  the  opinion  of  the  world;  that  we  are  Americans 
and  monarchs  of  all  we  survey;  and  that  we  are  going  to  control  the  part 
of  this  hemisphere  that  does  not  belong  to  us,  regardless  of  the  rights  of 
those  to  whom  it  does  belong,  merely  for  the  sake  of  doing  it,  and  because 
we  think  we  are  strong  enough,  we  adopt  the  language  of  the  bully,  and 
shall  certainly  encounter,  if  that  is  persisted  in,  the  bully's  retribution. 

Surely,  with  these  words  ringing  in  our  ears,  we  do  not  wish 
to  stand  by  a  policy  which  can  be  so  construed  as  as  to  spell 
interference  and  intervention. 

It  is  difficult  to  exaggerate  the  present  attitude  of  South 
America  towards  the  Monroe  Doctrine.  As  late  as  September  13, 
1913,  La  Presna,  one  of  the  leading  papers  of  Peru  and  the  prin- 
cipal supporter  of  the  present  government,  prints  in  the  most 
conspicuous  place  in  the  paper  a  letter  from  a  Chilean  newspaper 
correspondent  in  New  York.  The  headlines  are  as  follows : 
"Studying  the  Situation  in  Mexico."  The  Chilean  journalist, 
Montcalm,  speaks  from  New  York.  He  calls  on  Latin-America 
to  "unite  itself  against  Yankee  imperialism."  One  of  the  para- 
graphs reads :  "The  United  States  today  controls  Cuba,  Porto 
Rico,  and  Panama.  Tomorrow  it  is  going  to  control  Central 


192  SELECTED  ARTICLES  ON 

America.  It  has  commenced  to  control  Mexico.  Who  says  that 
it  will  not  continue  still  further?"  The  article  ends  with  a 
spirited  plea  to  the  Latin-American  republics  to  help  Mexico  out 
of  the  hole  into  which  she  has  got  herself  by  her  revolutionary 
civil  war. 

It  its  issue  of  September  15,  1913,  in  the  same  conspicuous 
position  under  the  heading,  "The  Voice  of  a  Mexican,"  La 
Presna  reprints  an  article  from  La  Revista,  of  Yucatan,  signed 
by  R.  De  Zayas  Enriques,  in  which  he  criticises  severely  our 
attitude  of  mentor  of  the  Latin-American  republics,  and  our 
pretention  of  being  the  only  arbiter  of  their  fate.  He  refers  to 
the  increasing  application  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  which,  he 
says,  is  already  too  ample,  and  refers  to  the  fact  that  European 
Powers  have  always  paid  better  respect  to  the  Doctrine  than 
the  American  peoples  themselves.  The  whole  trend  of  this  two- 
column  article  is  to  arouse  feeling  against  the  United  States. 

Recent  travelers  in  South  America,  and  several  of  our  re- 
cently returned  diplomats,  tell  the  same  story.  But  perhaps  no 
one  has  put  the  situation  more  clearly  than  the  recent  Ambassador 
from  England  to  the  United  States.  It  can  hardly  be  denied  that 
the  United  States  has  no  better  friend  than  Mr.  Bryc'e.  In  his 
"American  Commonwealth,"  he  has  shown  a  depth  of  sympathy 
and  a  keenness  of  appreciation  for  our  institutions  which  have 
never  been  surpassed.  His  residence  in  Washington  as  the  Brit- 
ish Ambassador  increased  his  already  great  popularity  in  this 
country.  His  advice  is  worth  heeding,  if  we  heed  the  advice  of 
our  friends  at  all.  In  his  recent  book  on  South  America,  he  says : 

As  regards  the  United  States  there  is  a  balance  between  attraction 
and  suspicion.  The  South  Americans  desire  to  be  on  good  terms  with  her, 
and  their  wisest  statesmen  feel  the  value  of  her  diplomatic  action  in  trying 
to  preserve  peace  between  those  of  their  republics  whose  smouldering 
enmities  often  threaten  to  burst  into  flame.  More  than  once  in  recent 
years  this  value  has  been  tested.  On  the  other  hand,  as  has  already  been 
observed,  they  are  jealous  of  their  own  dignity,  not  at  all  disposed  to  be 
patronized,  and  quick  to  resent  anything  bordering  on  a  threat,  even  when 
addressed  not  to  themselves,  but  to  some  other  republic.  It  is  as  the 
disinterested,  the  absolutely  disinterested  and  unselfish,  advocate  of  peace 
and  good-will,  that  the  United  States  will  have  most  influence  in  the 
western  hemisphere,  and  that  influence,  gently  and  tactfully  used,  may  be 
of  incalculable  service  to  mankind. 

Surely,   this  must  be  our  ultimate   aim.     We   do   desire  to 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  193 

influence  for  good  the  western  hemisphere.  We  are  beginning 
to  realize  that  there  are  several  states  in  South  America  that 
are  no  longer  infant  republics.  They  have  grown  up.  To  return 
to  our  former  metaphor — the  little  swimmers  have  got  their 
heads  well  out  of  water,  and  have  climbed  out  and  are  safely 
standing  on  their  own  legs.  They  naturally  resent  any  implied 
assertion  on  our  part  that  we  will  protect  them  from  Europe. 

If  the  Monroe  Doctrine  implies  this  we-will-protect-you-from- 
Europe  attitude,  if  it  is  disagreeable  and  irritating  to  those  whose 
friendship  is  most  worth  having  in  the  western  hemisphere,  if, 
as  a  matter  of  fact,  we  have  deliberately  broken  the  Monroe 
Doctrine  whenever  it  suited  us  to  do  so,  why  should  we  cling 
to  it  so  tenderly  and  so  tenaciously  any  longer?  What  possible 
good  can  it  do  us?  We  apparently  have  a  great  deal  to  lose  by 
maintaining  it.  What  have  we  to  gain  by  pretending  to  stick  to  it? 

The  chief  arguments  in  favor  of  retaining  the  Monroe  Doc- 
trine appear  to  be  three: 

The  first  is,  that  the  good  old  Doctrine  is  ninety  years  of 
age;  it  has  survived  and  flourished  nearly  a  century,  and  there 
must  be  something  in  it  to  have  given  it  such  a  long  life!  To 
such  an  argument  as  this,  it  is  only  necessary  to  reply  that  the 
same  notion  was  used  with  even  more  telling  effect  against 
Copernicus,  when  he  declared  that  the  world  revolved  on  its  axis. 
Furthermore,  it  sounds  suspiciously  like  the  defence  that  we 
made  of  slavery  in  the  middle  of  the  nineteenth  century.  It  is 
an  argument  that  need  not  be  treated  seriously. 

In  the  second  place,  it  is  claimed  that  the  Monroe  Doctrine 
should  be  maintained  because  we  have  more  interests  in  America 
than  has  Europe.  "We  are  remote  from  Europe;  we  are  close 
to  South  America."  Therefore,  it  is  natural  that  we  should 
have  more  interest  than  England  or  Germany  in  maintaining  a 
benevolent  protection  over  the  fortunes  of  the  Latin-American 
republics.  This  may  be  true  of  the  countries  in  the  vicinity  of 
the  Caribbean  Sea,  but  it  is  far  from  true  of  the  larger  republics 
of  South  America.  Their  great  cities  are  geographically  nearer 
Europe  than  they  are  to  the  United  States.  Their  population 
contains  at  least  a  million  Italian  immigrants,  and  many  hundreds 
of  thousands  of  Spanish,  Portuguese,  French,  Germans  and  Eng- 
lish. While  there  are  probably  fewer  French  than  those  of  any 
other  nationality,  the  French  actually  outnumber  the  citizens 


194  SELECTED  ARTICLES  ON 

of  the  United  States  who  are  living  in  the  larger  republics. 
Consequently,  if  there  is  any  weight  whatever  in  the  fact  that  a 
nation  has  interests  in  a  country  where  its  citizens  are  employed, 
our  interests  are  less  than  those  of  almost  any  one  of  the  larger 
European  countries.  So  far  as  investments  are  concerned,  there 
is  also  no  question  whatever  but  that  Europe  has  far  more  of  a 
claim  to  be  directly  interested  in  the  present  state  and  future 
of  the  South  American  republics  than  has  the  United  States. 
Compared  to  the  hundreds  of  millions  which  England  has  in- 
vested in  Argentina  and  Brazil,  for  instance,  our  own  invest- 
ments in  those  countries  are  ridiculously  small.  Consequently, 
this  argument  falls  of  its  own  weight,  for  to  it  we  can  reply  that 
the  larger  and  more  important  part  of  South  America  is  nearer 
in  miles,  nearer  in  days  of  traveling,  closer  in  ties  of  relationship, 
and  more  directly  interested  in  commercial  intercourse  with 
Europe  than  with  the  United  States. 

The  third  argument  is  that  the  Monroe  Doctrine  has  done 
South  America  a  great  deal  of  good  in  preventing  her  from  being 
partitioned,  as  was  Africa.  Therefore,  let  us  preserve  it  in  all 
its  pristine  strength !  It  is  quite  true  that  the  Monroe  Doctrine 
undoubtedly  protected  South  America  against  European  aggres- 
sion during  a  large  part  of  the  nineteenth  century,  when  such 
aggression  might  have  been  fatal  to  the  independence  of  several 
South  American  republics.  But  such  a  condition  of  affairs  no 
longer  exists,  and  if  it  should  arise,  that  is  to  say  if  Germany 
should  attempt  to  seize  part  of  Brazil,  for  instance,  or  if  Japan 
or  China  should  attempt  to  coerce  Peru  into  receiving  undesirable 
immigrants,  the  best  course  for  us  to  pursue  would  be,  not  to 
step  forth  single-handed  as  we  did  in  1823,  but  to  join  hands  with 
the  leading  nations  of  South  America  in  protecting  the  new 
world  from  the  aggression  of  the  old.  It  is  replied  by  some  that 
this  is  merely  a  modification  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine.  In  so  far 
as  it  aims  to  accomplish  certain  results,  that  is  true ;  in  so  far  as 
it  is  promulgated  in  a  different  spirit  and  with  a  direct  recogni- 
tion of  the  actual  state  of  our  southern  neighbors,  it  is  different. 
Taking  into  account  the  extremely  unpleasant  connotation,  in 
the  ears  of  our  southern  neighbors,  of  the  word  Monroeism,  we 
should  be  in  a  much  stronger  position  if  we  would  put  that  word 
aside,  and  adopt  a  new  one,  such  as  Pan-American  Defense, 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  195 

which  shall  have  for  its  connotation  America  for  Humanity,  and 
not  America  for  the  North  Americans. 

Having  considered  the  chief  arguments  for  retaining  the  Mon- 
roe Doctrine,  let  us  now  briefly  sum  up  the  reasons  why  we 
should  abandon  it.*  First,  the  original  Monroe  Doctrine  has 
been  disregarded  in  several  historical  instances,  notably  after 
our  war  with  Mexico  in  1847,  after  our  war  with  Spain  in  1898, 
and  in  our  dealings  with  Colombia,  Santo  Domingo,  and  Nica- 
ragua. Second,  owing  to  the  constitutional  changes  that  have 
taken  place  in  the  leading  European  nations  since  1823,  there  is 
no  danger  that,  in  the  words  of  President  Monroe,  the  allied 
Powers  will  "extend  their  political  system  to  any  portion  of  either 
continent."  The  world  has  advanced  since  then  and  the  Euro- 
pean nations  themselves  would  be  the  first  to  object  to  any  one 
of  their  number  seizing  a  Latin-American  republic,  or  setting  up 
a  monarchy  there.  Third,  several  of  the  South  American  states, 
notably  Argentina,  Brazil,  and  Chile,  having  attained  their  ma- 
jority are  no  longer  infants,  do  not  need  our  protection  and  will 
make  better  friends  and  stronger  allies  if  we  cease  to  hold  the 
Monroe  Doctrine  as  one  of  the  tenets  of  our  political  faith. 
Fourth,  their  friendship  is  worth  having.  They  are  already  build- 
ing super-dreadnoughts,  and,  with  our  more  extended  frontier, 
and  our  outlying  ports,  such  as  Panama  and  Honolulu,  we  need 
cordial  friends  in  the  western  hemisphere,  and  cannot  afford  to 
treat  them  in  such  a  way  as  to  estrange  their  sentiments.  Fifth, 
the  later  form  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  sometimes  known  as 
the  "Big  stick  policy,"  or  the  "American  policeman  idea,"  by 
which  we  say  to  Europe  that  we  cannot  allow  her  to  take  any 
active  interest  in  the  political  affairs  of  the  western  hemisphere, 
and  accept  the  corresponding  responsibility  to  look  after  her 
people  and  her  property  in  the  less  well  established  republics,  is 
a  policy  likely  to  involve  us  in  tremendous  difficulties  and  possibly 
in  costly  wars.  It  is  a  policy  from  which  we  have  nothing  to 
gain,  and  in  which  we  have  everything  to  lose.  It  is  a  policy 
which  is  likely  to  cost  us  the  friendship  not  only  of  our  American 
neighbors  but,  what  is  really  of  more  importance  to  us,  our 
European  neighbors.  Sixth,  we  should  give  up  the  Monroe  Doc- 
trine because  the  premises  on  which  it  was  founded,  and  on 
which  it  was  justified,  no  longer  exist. 


ip6  SELECTED  ARTICLES  ON 

Today  Europe  has  more  citizens  in  South  America  than  we 
have.  She  has  invested  a  far  larger  share  of  her  capital  in  South 
America  than  we  have.  She  is  bound  to  South  America,  not  only 
by  these  ties  of  brotherhood  and  of  property,  but  also  by  the 
racial  ties  which  bind  together  the  Latin  race. 

Geographically,  Europe  is  nearer  the  chief  cities  of  South 
America  than  is  the  United  States ;  racially,  she  is  closer ;  practi- 
cally, she  has  more  business  interests  there,  and  more  of  her 
sons  are  living  there ;  and,  finally,  Europe  has  no  intention  of 
enforcing  arbitrary  monarchy  and  despotism  on  American  states 
any  more  than  we  have. 

As  the  premises  on  which  the  Monroe  Doctrine  was  based 
no  longer  exist,  and  as  the  maintenance  of  our  adherence  to 
those  words  is  of  harm  rather  than  good  to  us,  it  must  be  evident 
that  the  time  has  arrived  for  us  to.  abandon  this  national  shib- 
boleth, and  to  clear  the  way  for  a  new  and  logical  foreign  policy. 

If  we  abandon  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  what  shall  we  adopt  to 
take  its  place?  The  answer  to  this  question  is  fairly  simple  if 
one  is  willing  to  admit  that  the  words  "Monroe  Doctrine" 
simply  stand  for  our  foreign  policy.  Under  President  Monroe, 
we  announced  it  as  our  foreign  policy  to  have  nothing  to  do 
with  Europe,  and  to  see  to  it  that  Europe  had  nothing  to  do  with 
America.  We  had  a  kind  of  splendid  isolation.  We  were  sepa- 
rated from  Europe  by  a  stormy  ocean,  which  could  be  crossed 
only  by  a  painful  journey  on  board  small  sailing  vessels.  We 
promulgated  a  doctrine  intended  to  keep  foreign  complications 
out  of  our  national  life,  and  to  enable  us  to  avoid  entangling 
alliances.  Today,  as  was  recently  said  in  an  editorial  in  the 
World's  Work,  this  very  Monroe  Doctrine  is  the  chief  breeder 
of  diplomatic  negotiations.  In  other  words,  it  is  a  trouble-maker. 
To  take  its  place,  let  us  adopt  a  more  rational  foreign  policy. 
We  have  already  begun  to  do  so.  President  Wilson,  in  his 
Mobile  declaration,  stated  clearly  that  the  United  States  did  not 
intend  to  take  another  foot  of  territory  by  conquest.  He  has 
declined  to  send  an  army  into  Mexico,  although  there  have  been 
loud  clamors  for  intervention,  and  many  of  these  clamors,  par- 
ticularly in  the  yellow  journals,  have  been  based  upon  the  so- 
called  "logic  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine."  But  we  must  go  a  few 
steps  further  if  we  would  make  our  friends  in  South  America 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  197 

believe  that  we  have  really  adopted  a  new  foreign  policy,  and 
that  we  have  outgrown  Monroeism. 

One  of  these  steps  was  recommended  by  Prof.  Theodore 
VVoolsey  in  an  able  article  in  Scribner's  Magazine  in  1909,  in 
which  it  was  proposed  that  we  invite  the  leading  powers  of  Latin- 
America  to  unite  with  us  whenever  intervention  became  neces- 
sary. This  principle  of  joint  intervention  attracted  little  attention 
at  that  time,  but  its  practibility  has  been  rapidly  gaining  force 
recently.  In  1911,  the  present  writer,  in  a  book  entitled  "Across 
South  America,"  suggested  that  the  time  had  come  to  "amend 
our  outgrown  Monroe  Doctrine,  as  has  already  been  suggested 
by  one  of  our  writers  on  international  law,  so  as  to  include  in 
the  police  force  of  the  western  hemisphere,  those  who  have 
shown  themselves  able  to  practice  self-control."  This  -suggestion 
was  given  favorable  notice*by  Mr.  Bryce  in  his  book  on  South 
America  just  referred  to.  It  was  again  called  to  public  atten- 
tion by  the  Hon.  Charles  Sherrill,  recently  our  Minister  to 
Argentina,  and  has  since  been  referred  to  many  times  both  in 
print  and  on  the  platform. 

Some  of  those  who  have  sanctioned  it,  feeling  that  it  was 
necessary  to  stick  to  the  words  of  our  ancient  shibboleth,  have 
felt  that  the  invitation  to  Argentina  or  Brazil  to  intervene  with 
us  in  Mexico,  should  come  under  the  cloak  of  the  Monroe  Doc- 
trine ;  but  it  seems  to  me  that  this  is  a  most  unfortunate  sug- 
gestion. It  is  to  our  interests, — it  is  in  the  interests  of  the  peace 
and  happiness  of  the  western  hemisphere,  that  we  get  as  far  away 
from  these  words  "Monroe  Doctrine"  as  possible,  and  that  we 
build  up  a  new  foreign  policy  that  is  abreast  of  the  times,  that 
recognizes  the  greatness  of  several  of  the  Latin-American  states, 
that  recognizes  that  some  of  them  are  weak,  and  need  the  pro- 
tection of  an  international  police,  and  that  gives  evidence  to  the 
world  that  our  foreign  policy  is  really  unselfish  and  is  based  on 
high  ideals.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  we  are  a  peaceful  nation.  Our 
desire  to  be  helpful  to  our  neighbors  is  sincere.  The  present 
administration  has  given  evidence  of  its  intention  to  discount 
revolution  and  to  give  the  aid  of  its  formal  recognition  only  to 
such  governments  as  are  constitutionally  elected.  We  are  not 
going  to  put  a  premium  on  revolution  by  promptly  recognizing 
any  government  that  comes  to  the  top  in  the  seething  cauldron 

15 


198  SELECTED  ARTICLES  ON 

of  unstable  conditions  in  any  Latin-American  country.  This  is  a 
doctrine  of  high  ideals.  It  has  nothing  whatever  to  do  with  the 
Monroe  Doctrine. 

Furthermore,  there  are  several  minor  things  of  practical  im- 
portance which  we  can  do  to  show  not  only  that  we  have  aban- 
doned the  Monroe  Doctrine,  but  that  we  have  adopted  a  legiti- 
mate new  foreign  policy.  In  the  first  place,  by  offering  to 
exchange  ambassadors  with  Argentina  and  Chile,  we  can  give 
them  evidence  that  we  realize  their  present  position  in  the  world 
today.  There  is  no  reason  why  we  should  have  ambassadors 
in  Brazil,  Mexico,  and  Turkey,  and  none  in  Argentina  and  Chile. 
»  In  the  second  place,  we  can  make  a  generous  appropriation 
for  the  second  Pan-American  Scientific  Congress.  We  can  at 
least  offer,  to  treat  our  international  guests  as  hospitably  as  Chile 
did.  In  fact,  in  order  to  make  up  for  lost  time  and  for  the  seem- 
ing insolence  due  to  our  negligence,  we  can  afford  to  do  better 
than  they  did.  And  we  ought  to  do  it  promptly. 

In  the  third  place,  we  can  show  our  personal  interest  in  our 
neighbors  by  visiting  them  more  frequently.  There  are  no  longer 
any  serious  handicaps  in  the  way  of  visiting  a  number  of  the 
states  of  South  America.  By  becoming  intimately  acquainted 
with  the  problems  of  Peru,  Chile,  Argentina,  and  Brazil,  we  can 
do  more  toward  aiding  in  the  formation  of  an  intelligent  foreign 
policy  than  might  appear  at  first  sight.  It  is  ignorance  that 
breeds  insults. 

Finally,  let  us  stop  using  the  words  "Monroe  Doctrine."  It 
would  be  well  if  a  formal  resolution  of  Congress  could  be  passed, 
but  since  Congress  has  never  formally  approved  of  the  Monroe 
Doctrine  in  so  many  words,  it  is  probable  that  it  would  be  suffi- 
cient if  our  great  parties  in  their  next  platforms  should  avoid 
the  repetition  of  those  phrases  supporting  the  doctrine  which  have 
been  customary  for  so  many  years. 

For  the  immediate  future,  let  us  adopt  a  policy  of  Pan- 
American  Defense.  Let  us  invite  to  the  round  table  of  discussion 
all  the  American  republics  who  can  show  clean  records  and  eco- 
nomic stability.  If  we  believe  that  any  American  republic,  by 
reason  of  civil  war  or  internal  discord,  is  endangering  the  peace 
of  its  neighbors,  if  we  believe  that  cause  for  interference  in  its 
affairs  is  arising,  let  the  matter  be  considered  at  the  round  table. 
Let  it  meet  in  some  one  of  the  American  capitals,  not  merely 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  199 

to  discuss,  as  Pan-American  conferences  have  done,  innocuous 
policies  regarding  Pan-American  railway  projects  and  interna- 
tional postal  regulations,  but  the  actual  business  in  hand.  In 
other  words,  let  these  Pan-American  conferences  not  represent  a 
formal  exchange  of  pleasantry  every  so  often,  but  let  them  be 
called  for  the  definite  object  of  settling  definite  and  difficult  prob- 
lems. If  there  is  to  be  any  intervention,  let  it  come  as  the  re- 
sult of  a  family  gathering,  and  not  as  the  decision  of  the  Ameri- 
can Department  of  State.  Let  us  remember  that  it  is  "as  the 
disinterested  advocate  of  peace  and  good-will  that  we  shall  have 
most  influence  in  the  western  hemisphere." 

If  Argentina,  Brazil  and  Chile  decline  to  meet  us  on  these 
terms,  then  let  us  go  to  The  Hague  and  call  a  council  of  all  civil- 
ized nations,  and  ask  for  an  expression  of  international  opinion, 
and  the  appointment  of  international  police.  Here  is  an  oppor- 
tunity for  a  truly  enlightened  international  policy. 

Meanwhile  let  us  not  forget  that  the  maintenance  of  the  Mon- 
roe Doctrine  involves  an  attitude  of  constant  suspicion  both  at 
home  and  abroad,  which  raises  barriers  against  the  progress  of 
international  good-will  and  diminishes  our  influence  both  in  Eu- 
rope and  America. 


Atlantic   Monthly.  95:567-73.  April,    1905 

Right  and  Wrong  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine.     Charles  F.  Dole 

Among  the  magical  words  that  hypnotize  men's  minds  and 
keep  them  from  asking  intelligent  questions,  the  Monroe  Doc- 
trine has  a  sovereign  charm  in  American  politics.  Secretary 
Hay  has  coupled  the  mention  of  this  Doctrine  with  the  Golden 
Rule.  Let  us  venture  to  ask  a  few  straight  questions,  and  not 
be  afraid  to  go  wherever  the  honest  answer  to  our  questions 
may  carry  us. 

First,  what  was  the  substance  of  the  original  Monroe  Doc- 
trine in  1823,  when  it  was  promulgated?  The  Spanish-American 
colonies  had  then  revolted,  and  we  had  recognized  their  inde- 
pendence. There  was  a  boundary  question  between  the  United 
States  and  Russia.  We  were  a  young  republic,  trying  a  great 
experiment  in  the  eyes  of  a  critical  and  unfriendly  world.  A 
"Holy  Alliance,"  organized  at  the  instance  of  Russia,  with  a 


200  SELECTED  ARTICLES  ON 

really  beautiful  program  for  the  good  order  of  Europe,  threat- 
ened to  be  turned  into  an  instrument  of  mischief  and  oppression 
and  even  to  help  Spain  recover  her  possessions  in  America. 
It  is  likely  that,  as  in  many  other  instances  of  human  alarm, 
nothing  dangerous  would  have  happened.  But  our  government 
naturally  felt  nervous,  and  raised  its  cry  of  warning  in  the  form 
of  the  Monroe  Doctrine.  This  was  merely  a  declaration,  made 
by  the  President  in  his  message  to-  Congress,  to  the  effect  that 
the  United  States  would  hold  it  unfriendly  in  the  European 
Powers  to  take  any  aggressive  action  in  this  continent.  Impor- 
tant as  the  subject  now  seems,  it  involved  no  vote  in  Congress, 
nor  the  careful  discussion  that  an  actual  vote  generally  involves. 
It  is  doubtful  whether  many  Americans  who  read  Monroe's 
message  gave  serious  thought  to  the  passages  which  were  des- 
tined to  give  his  name  prominence.  But  Americans  would  have 
generally  agreed  in  their  disinclination  to  see  monarchies  set 
up  in  the  new  world,  or  to  suffer  any  kind  of  undemocratic 
system  to  be  brought  over  here  from  Europe. 

It  is  noteworthy  that  the  bare  statement  of  the  attitude  of 
the  United  States,  without  any  show  of  force  or  preparation 
for  war,  was  sufficient  to  secure  respectful  treatment  from  the 
European  Powers.  President  Monroe  did  not  feel  called  upon 
to  ask  appropriations  for  an  increase  in  the  navy  in  order  to 
"back  up"  his  doctrine.  The  United  States  did  not  possesss  a 
formidable  navy  till  it  had  to  build  one  in  the  period  of  the 
Civil  War. 

It  should  also  be  remarked  that  England,  doubtless  for 
commercial  reasons,  forwarded  our  government  in  its  attitude 
in  behalf  of  the  independence  of  the  South  American  republics. 
Few  would  have  dreamed  at  that  time  that  the  Monroe  Doctrine 
would  ever  be  used  as  a  menace  against  England. 

See  now  what  enormous  political  changes  have  come  about 
within  eighty  years.  Except  Russia,  there  is  not  an  autocratic 
government  left  of  all  the  nations  who  composed  the  short-lived 
Holy  Alliance.  All  the  others,  even  Austria  and  Spain,  have 
adopted  constitutional  methods.  Their  people  have  everywhere 
been  given  more  or  less  democratic  representation.  Spain  does 
not  contemplate  winning  back  her  colonies.  We  possess  by 
amicable  purchase  the  very  territory  over  which  there  was  once 
risk  of  a  boundary  dispute  with  Russia.  So  far  from  fearing 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  •  201 

the  extension  of  autocratic  and  oppressive  governments  from 
Europe  to  America,  the  European  governments  are  daily  brought 
to  face  new  demands  on  the  part  of  the  people  in  the  direction 
of  democratic  experiments.  Autocratic  militarism  all  over  the 
world  stands  on  the  defensive.  It  is  becoming  recognized  as 
economically  and  politically  intolerable.  A  great  international 
court  has  been  established  on  purpose  to  put  an  end  to  war 
between  the  nations.  It  has  begun  to  be  used  and  respected. 

Meanwhile  the  world  has  become  one  in  geography  and 
international  relations.  We  are  practically  nearer  to  the  shores 
of  Europe  than  we  are  to  South  America.  We  have  larger  and 
closer  interests  with  China  and  Japan  than  we  have  with  Chile 
and  Guatemala. 

Let  us  try  now  to  find  what  European  Power,  if,  any, 
threatens  to  bring  the  methods  of  oppression  and  tyranny  to 
our  continent,  or  in  any  way  to  menace  the  welfare  of  the 
United  States.  Russia,  as  we  have  observed,  is  out  of  the  ques- 
tion, having  voluntarily  withdrawn  from  this  continent.  She 
allowed  her  proud  flag  to  be  hauled  down  in  Alaska  without 
the  slightest  loss  of  honor. 

England  is  our  best  friend  in  all  the  world.  Let  us  never 
admit  jealousy  or  suspicion  between  us.  For  three  thousand 
miles  our  territory  and  the  Dominion  of  Canada  march  together. 
By  mutual  consent  neither  of  us  has  a  ship  of  war  upon  the 
Great  Lakes.  Let  us  see  to  it  that  we  never  put  warships  there. 
We  are  obviously  safer  without  them.  Like  two  strong  men, 
dwelling  on  adjacent  farms,  we  are  mutually  safeguarded,  not 
by  building  suspicious  fences  against  each  other  and  purchasing 
weapons  in  view  of  the  possibility  of  our  wishing  to  fight,  but 
rather  by  assuming  that  we  shall  never  be  so  foolish  as  to  injure 
each  other.  If  we  ever  disagree,  we  do  not  purpose  to  degrade 
ourselves  by  fighting.  So  far  as  England  is  concerned,  we  may 
venture  boldly  to  declare  that  the  United  States  does  not  need 
a  fort  nor  a  battleship.  We  contemplate  her  time-honored 
naval  station  at  Halifax  as  complacently  as  travelers  views  the 
collection  of  ancient  armor  in  the  Tower  of  London.  More- 
over, as  regards  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  the  last  thing  which  Eng- 
land could  possibly  attempt,  with  her  own  popular  constitution, 
would  be  to  abridge  the  liberties  of  the  Americans,  either  North 
or  South. 


202  '    SELECTED  ARTICLES  ON 

Summon  now  the  Republic  of  France,  and  interrogate  her 
as  to  her  designs  and  ambitions  touching'  the  affairs  of  America. 
Probably  few  Americans  could  name  her  cis-Atlantic  possessions, 
so  inconspicuous  are  they.  They  are  costing  the  French  treasury 
a  steady  outgo.  No  intelligent  nation  would  take  the  gift  of 
them,  especially  of  Martinique,  with  its  tempestuous  volcanoes. 
France  has  had  little  experience  with  American  colonies  cheer- 
ful enough  to  stir  her  to  desire  the  risk  of  a  disagreement  with 
the  United  States  for  the  sake  of  gaining  more  territory. 
Nevertheless,  we  must  admit  that  we  had  rather  live  under  the 
rule  of  France  than  in  most  of  the  states  of  South  or  Central 
America.  From  no  point  of  view  does  France  threaten  to 
establish  a  tyranny  over  any  of  the  populations  in  the  New 
World. 

We  hear  of  Italians  in  South  America.  They  have  emi- 
grated to  the  Argentine  Republic.  Does  this  fact  make  the 
slightest  demand  upon  the  United  States  to  build  iron  ships  to 
guard  against  the  friendly  government  of  Victor  Emmanuel  ? 
On  the  contrary,  -the  more  Italians  in  the  Argentine  Republic, 
the  better  we  like  it.  They  are  more  enterprising  and  indus- 
trious than  either  the  Spaniards  or  the  natives,  and  there  is 
plenty  of  room  for  all  who  wish  to  go  there.  Is  it  conceivable 
that  Italy,  saddled  with  ruinous  debt  and  with  a  fearful  burden 
of  European  militarism,  should  undertake  a  war  of  conquest  in 
South  America?  If  this  were  conceivable,  does  any  one  suppose 
that  Italian  rule  down  there,  supposing  it  to  prevail,  would  be 
less  enlightened,  or  less  righteous,  than  Spanish-American  rule 
has  been  under  the  delusive  name  of  "republic"  ?  The  people  of 
the  United  States  cannot  know  Italy,  or  her  political  conditions, 
and  feel  the  slightest  apprehension  that  she  is  capable  of  extend- 
ing to  our  continent  methods  of  government  inimical  to  our 
peace. 

No  other  nation  in  Europe  remains,  about  whose  designs  in 
our  continent  the  American  people  have  the  need  to  lose  a  wink 
of  sleep,  except  Germany.  If  the  plain  truth  were  told  by  the 
alarmists,  Germany  is  very  nearly  the  one  power  in  Christen- 
dom on  whose  account  we  are  called  upon  to  pay  a  naval  "insur- 
ance fund"  of  a  hundred  millions  of  dollars  a  year.  The  talk 
about  a  "German  peril"  would  be  laughable,  if  millions  of  poor 
people  did  not  need  the  money  which  such  incendiary  talk  costs 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  203 

us ;  or,  worse  yet,  if  this  ceaseless  talk  about  possible  war  with 
a  great  nation  were  not  irritating  to  every  one  concerned,  and 
naturally  provocative  of  ill  feeling. 

Why,  indeed,  should  we  imagine  mischief  from  Germany? 
To  hear  certain  speakers  and  writers,  one  would  suppose  that 
Germany — instead  of  being  a  land  of  arts  and  laws,  of  univer- 
sities and  free  institutions,  with  a  vast  network  of  world-wide 
trade — was  overrun,  as  of  old,  by  barbarous  hordes  breathing 
violence  and  robbery.  Germany,  in  fact,  has  no  quarrel  or 
enmity  against  the  kindred  people  of  the  United  States.  Ger- 
many is  richer  every  day  by  reason  of  the  prosperity  of  our 
country.  The  export  and  import  trade  between  the  United 
States  and  Germany  amounted  in  1911  to  over  four  hundred 
and  fifty  millions  of  dollars.  The  trade  with  all  the  countries 
of  South  and  Central  America  for  the  same  year  was  only 
about  three  hundred  and  ten  millions.  The  trade  with  all  Asia, 
including  India  and  the  British  dependencies,  was  hardly  three 
hundred  millions.  The  boasted  "open  door"  into  the  Chinese 
Empire  only  allowed  the  passage  both  ways  of  about  fifty-four 
millions  of  dollars'  worth  of  products, — less  than  one-eighth  of 
our  trade  with  Germany.*  Does  any  one  think  that  Germany 
would  lightly  quarrel  with  the  source  of  so  much  bread  and 
butter?  For  what  possible  use?  She  could  not  conquer  and 
enslave  us,  nor  does  she  wish  to.  We  have  no  boundary  lines 
on  the  planet  to  make  friction  between  us.  We  may  say  again 
stoutly,  as  in  the  case  of  England,  we  are  safer  from  any 
possible  attack  from  Germany  without  a  ship  or  a  fort  than  we 
are  with  the  largest  navy  that  Admiral  Mahan  could  desire. 
For  in  the  one  case  we  should  be  sure  to  avoid  needless  dis- 
putes, and  should  be  more  than  willing  on  both  sides  to  put  any 
question  that  might  ever  arise  between  us  to  arbitration :  whereas 
in  the  other  case,  standing  with  loaded  guns  as  it  were,  some 
trifling  explosion  of  an  angry  man's  temper  might  involve  the 
two  nations  in  strife. 

It  may  be  asked  whether  there  is  not  grave  risk  that  Ger- 
many may  endeavor  to  plant  colonies  in  South  America  or  to 
interfere  in  some  way  with  the  affairs  of  the  South  American 
people.  We  hardly  need  more  than  to  repeat  the  paragraph 

*  The  value  of  the  total  trade  to  and  from  the  Philippine  Islands  in  the 
same  year  (about  thirty-seven  millions)  could  not  possibly  have  covered 
the  military  and  naval  cost  of  holding  the  Islands. 


204  SELECTED  ARTICLES  ON 

touching  this  kind  of  contingency  on  the  part  of  Italy.  Ger- 
mans are  doubtless  coming  in  considerable  numbers  into  the 
temperate  coutries  of  South  America.  They  are  a  most  desir- 
able kind  of  immigrant.  Wherever  they  go,  a  higher  civilization 
goes  with  .them.  Life  and  property  are  safer.  A  more  efficient 
type  of  government  is  demanded.  All  this  is  surely  for  the 
interest  of  the  United  States.  We  can  only  be  glad  for  any 
influences  which  will  tone  up  the  character  of  the  South  and 
Central  -  American  states.  If  they  were  all  Germanized,  the 
whole  world,  including1  the  United  States,  would  be  perma- 
nently richer.  In  fact,  the  ties  of  trade  and  friendship  between 
us  and  a  possible  Germanized  state  in  South  America  would 
normally  tend  to  be  closer  than  they  seem  likely  to  be  with  the 
Spanish-American  peoples. 

Neither  is  there  the-  slightest  evidence  that  Germany  would 
ever  threaten  to  introduce  tyrannical  forms  of  government  into 
South  America  or  to  oppress  the  native  peoples.  Indeed,  so 
far  as  it  is  good  for  the  United  States  to  govern  the  Philippine 
Islands  for  the  betterment  of  their  people,  the  same  argument 
holds  in  favor  of  any  reasonable  method  (for  example,  through 
purchase  or  by  the  final  consent  of  the  people)  for  the  extension 
of  German  law  and  political  institutions  into  ill-governed  South 
American  states.  I  do  not  care  to  press  this  argument,  which 
is  only  valid  for  those  Americans  who  believe  in  our  colonial 
experiment.  But  the  argument  is  far  stronger  for  possible 
German  colonies  than  it  is  for  the  United  States,  inasmuch  as 
South  America  is  a  natural  and  legitimate  field  for  German 
immigration,  being  largely  a  wilderness,  while  no  large  number 
of  Americans  will  ever  care  to  settle  in  the  Philippine  Islands. 
The  time  may  naturally  come  when  Germany  would  have  the 
same  kind  of  interest  in  the  welfare  of  her  people  beyond  the 
seas  that  England  has  in  that  of  the  Englishmen  in  South 
Africa.  There  can  be  no  good  reason  why  the  United  States 
should  look  upon  such  an  interest  with  jealousy  or  suspicion. 
For  we  are  unlikely  to  have  any  legitimate  colonial  interest  in 
the  southern  half  of  our  continent. 

Meanwhile,  the  whole  history  of  colonial  settlements  goes  to 
show  the  futility  of  holding  colonies  with  which  the  home 
government  is  not  bound  by  the  ties  of  good-will:  Thus  Canada 
and  Australia  uphold  the  British  Empire,  because  they  possess 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  205 

practical  freedom;  while  England  has  to  spend  hundreds  of 
millions  of  dollars  a  year,  badly  needed  by  her  own  poor  people, 
to  maintain  the  armaments  necessary  to  keep  her  hold  over 
India  and  other  dependencies  reluctant  to  her  rule.  All  prece- 
dents go  to  show  that  the  Empire  of  Germany  would  only 
weaken  herself  in  case  she  should  endeavor  to  meddle  in  South 
America  against  the  interests  and  the  good-will  of.  the  people 
there. 

Let  us  ask  another  question,  hitherto  too  little  considered. 
On  what  ground  of  right  is  the  United  States  justified  in  con- 
tinuing to  assert  the  Monroe  Doctrine?  We  may  warn  tres- 
passers off  our  own  land.  Have  we  the  right  to  bar  our  neigh- 
bors from  lands  to  which  we  have  no  shadow  of  a  title?  Sup- 
pose that  we  may  do  this,  as  the  stronger  people,  for  the  sake 
o'f  humanity,  to  protect  weaker  people  from  oppression.  It  is 
surely  a  dangerous  concession  to  permit  a  single  state,  however 
civilized  it  deems  itself,  to  assume  the  right  to  become  a  knight- 
errant,  to  adjust  wrongs  in  the  world,  and  incidentally  to  be 
sheriff,  judge  and  jury  on  its  own  motion.  But  grant  this 
concession  for  a  moment  in  favor  of  the  United  States.  While 
it  may  have  been  true  eighty  years  ago  that  the  American  people 
were  filled  with  sympathy  for  the  republics  which  revolted 
from  Spain,  it  would  be  hypocrisy  to  claim  today  that  our 
people  are  seriously  concerned  over  the  troubles  of  their  South 
American  neighbors.  We  are  rather  apt  to  say  that  they  are 
unfit  to  govern  themselves.  The  United  States  today  holds 
eight  millions  of  people  on  the  other  side  of  the  globe,  very 
like  the  South  Americans,  on  the  distinct  ground  that  they  are 
not  yet  fit  for  independence.  Our  own  course,  therefore,  bars 
us  from  sensitiveness  over  the  perils  which  South  America 
suffers  from  the  bare  possibility  of  the  interference  of  European 
states. 

Moreover,  we  have  shown  that  there  is  no  state  in  Europe 
which  has  a  mind  to  do  any  wrong  to  South  America.  So  far 
as  the  promise  of  higher  civilization  goes,  the  planting  of  bona 
fide  colonies  in  the  vast  areas  of  our  southern  continent  signifies 
good  to  humanity. 

We  must  fall  back  upon  a  totally  different  line  of  reason- 
ing in  order  to  find  the  only  legitimate  defense  of  our  Monroe 
Doctrine.  The  argument  is  this:  that  a  nation  has  the  right 


206  SELECTED  ARTICLES  ON 

to  safeguard  herself  against  the  menace  of  aggression.  Concede 
that  this  might  have  been  a  sound  argument  when  the  Monroe 
Doctrine  was  first  proclaimed.  Our  government  saw  a  peril 
in  the  setting  up  of  a  European  system  of  despotism  on  this 
continent.  We  have  made  it  clear,  however,  that  this  peril 
which  disturbed  our  fathers  appears  to  have  vanished  forever. 
No  one  can  show  what  actual  danger  to  our  liberties  is  threat- 
ened by  any  governmental  system  that  European  Powers  can  set 
up  in  South  America.  Let  us  not  even  imagine  that  we  are 
in  fear  of  such  a  chimerical  peril.  We  have  no  fear  that  Ger- 
many wishes  to  harm  us  while  she  stays  at  home  in  Europe. 
We  have  no  more  ground  for  fear,  if  Germany  were  by  some 
magic  to  fill  South  America  as  full  of  sturdy  German  people  as 
Canada  is  now  full  of  friendly  English,  Scotch  and  Frenchmen. 
The  better  civilized  our  neighbors  are,  the  less  peril  do  they 
threaten  to  our  liberties.  Let  us  then  disabuse  our  minds  of 
any  fear  of  European  aggression,  to  injure  American  liberties. 
But  it  may  be  urged  that  the  European  governments,  as  was 
shown  in  the  Venezuelan  episode,  may  prove  disagreeable  in 
their  efforts  to  collect  debts  due  to  their  subjects  or,  on  occasion, 
in  safeguarding  the  rights  of  their  colonists  in  the  disorderly 
South  American  states.  The  condition  of  these  states,  it  is 
urged,  offers  points  of  serious  friction  between  us  and  our 
European  neighbors.  The  class  of  issues  here  raised  stands  quite 
aside  from  the  original  intent  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine.  Here  is 
the  need  of  new  international  law,  of  the  services  of  the  Hague 
Tribunal,  very  likely  of  the  establishment  of  a  permanent  Con- 
gress of  Nations.  How  far  ought  any  nation  to  undertake  by 
warships  and  armies  to  collect  debts  for  venturesome  subjects 
who  have  speculated  in  the  tumultuous  politics  of  semi-civilized 
peoples?  How  far  is  the  real  welfare  of  the  world  served  by 
punitive  expeditions  dispatched  in  the  name  of  missionaries, 
travelers,  and  traders,  who  have  chosen  to  take  their  own  lives  in 
their  hands  in  the  wild  regions  of  the  world?  There  is  no  call  for 
a  Monroe  Doctrine  on  these  points.  The  issue  is  international,  not 
American.  The  question  is  not  so  much  whether  France  and 
England  may  send  a  fleet  to  take  the  customs  duties  of  a  dilapi- 
dated South  American  port  as  it  is  what  course  ought  any 
government  to  take  when  wily  promoters  ask  its  assistance  in 
carrying  out  their  schemes  in  Bogota  or  Caracas  or  Peking ;  or, 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  207 

again  (an  equally  pertinent  question),  what  remedy,  if  any, 
international  law  ought  to  give  when  one  of  our  own  cities  or 
states  defaults  its  bonds  held  in  Paris  or  Berlin. 

Grant  that  it  would  be  uncomfortable  to  our  traders  in  South 
America  to  see  European  sheriffs  holding  ports  where  we  wish 
to  do  business.  We  evidently  have  no  right  to  protest  against 
other  nations  doing  whatever  we  might  do  in  like  circumstances. 
If  we  can  send  armored  ships  to  South  America,  all  the  others 
can  do  so.  If  we  like  to  keep  the  perilous  right  to  collect  debts, 
we  must  concede  it  to  the  others.  We  may  not  like  to  see 
strangers,  or  even  our  own  neighbors,  taking  liberties  and  quar- 
reling in  the  next  field  to  our  own.  But  who  gives  us  the  right 
forcibly  to  drive  them  out  of  a  field  which  we  do  not  own?  The 
rule  here  seems  to  be  the  same  for  the  nation  as  for  the 
individual. 

Meanwhile  there  is  one  simple  proposition  the  adoption  of 
which  could  do  nothing  but  good.  The  DragO'  doctrine,  associ- 
ated with  the  name  of  an.  eminent  Argentine  statesman,  is  in  line 
with  the  general  trend  of  civilization  and  with  our  own  national 
spirit.  A  mild  and  tentative  approach  to  it  was  made  at  the 
Second  Hague  Conference,  under  the  lead  of  General  Porter, 
one  of  our  delegates.  So  far,  however,  the  agreement  only  looks 
to  the  use  of  an  obligation  to  arbitrate  claims  for  debts,  but  leaves 
open  the  menace  of  possible  war.  What  we  need  is  a  new  and 
complete  formulation  of  the  idea  of  the  Drago  doctrine,  in  such 
terms  that  no  nation  should  be  permitted  under  any  circumstances 
to  go  to  war  to  collect  her  subjects'  debts.  It  ought  to  be  made 
infamous  to  kill  innocent  people  merely  because  of  a  quarrel  over 
the  payment  of  debts,  presumably  incurred  under  dubious  political 
conditions. 

The  fact  is,  whatever  the  Monroe  Doctrine  historically  means, 
it  no  longer  requires  us  to  stand  guard  against  any  nation  in 
Europe,  with  a  show  of  force  to  maintain  it.  In  its  most  critical 
form,  when  it  meant  a  warning  against  despotism,  it  only  needed 
to  be  proclaimed,  and  never  to  be  defended  by  fighting  ships.  In 
the  face  of  governments  practically  like  our  own,  the  time  has 
come  to  inquire  whether  there  remains  any  reasonable  issue  under 
the  name  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  over  which  the  American 
people  could  have  the  least  justification  for  a  conflict  of  arms 
with  a  European  government.  The  interests  of  the  United  States 


208  SELECTED  ARTICLES  ON 

in  South  America  are  not  different  from  those  of  other  powers, 
like  England  and  Germany.  They  are  substantially  indentical 
interests;  they  are  all  obviously  involved  together  with  the 
improvement  of  material,  political  and  moral  conditions  in  the 
South  American  states. 

We  have  spoken  so  far  as  if  the  Monroe  Doctrine  had  refer- 
ence only  to  our  relations  with  European  nations.  The  last 
thing  that  any  one  dreamed  of  in  the  days  of  President  Monroe 
was  that  the  doctrine  would  ever  be  brought  to  bear  against  an 
Asiatic  power!  Japan  is  the  one  power  which  seems  to  cause 
certain  nervous  statesmen  and  builders  of  battleships  a  spasm  of 
anxiety.  What  if  Japan  should  establish  a  colony  on  our  conti- 
nent? Having  reached  our  own  hands  into  Asiatic  waters  to 
seize  territory  against  the  will  of  its  inhabitants,  we  are  now 
asked  to  contemplate  the  possibility  that  Japan  likewise  might 
reach  many  thousands  of  miles  after  American  territory.  Calmly 
considered,  however,  this  seems  to  be  a  purely  gratuitous  cause  of 
apprehension.  Those  who  know  Japan  best  assure  us  that  she 
harbors  no  hostile  intention  against  the  United  States.  She  is 
certainly  much  occupied  with  costly  enterprises  at  home  and  in 
Korea  and  Manchuria.  She  has  growingly  valuable  trade  rela- 
tions with  us,  which  tend  always  to  make  peace.  The  worst 
source  of  mischief  in  sight  between  Japan  and  us  is  really  what 
we  are  doing  ourselves  by  way  of  making  a  Gibraltar  in  Hawaii. 
What  is  this  but  to  show  fear  and  suspicion,  which  in  turn  excite 
the  like  uncivilized  passions.  Let  us  even  suppose  that  Japan 
desired  to  establish  a  colony  in  Mexico  or  some  other  state  in 
America.  How  could  she  possibly  do  this,  except  by  the  good- 
will and  agreement  of  the  people  by  whose  side  she  settled? 
Does  any  one  imagine  that  her  experience  in  Formosa  has  been  so 
cheap  and  easy  as  to  lead  her  to"  seek  a  hornet's  nest  on  the 
opposite  side  of  the  Pacific  Ocean  into  which  to  put  her  hands ! 
But  suppose  the  most  unlikely  thing,  that  Mexico  or  Chile  wished 
the  Japanese  colony.  Can  any  one  show  what  shadow  of  right 
the  United  States  would  have  to  forbid  this? 

We  have  sought,  so  far  such  an  interpretation  of  the  Monroe 
Doctrine  as  may  honorably  go  in  company  of  the  Golden  Rule, 
or,  in  other  words,  of  international  justice.  There  remains,  how- 
ever, a  possible  new  definition  of  the  doctrine,  which  should  be 
fairly  faced.  There  is  an  idea  in  the  air  that  the  United  States 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  209 

holds  a  certain  protectorate  or  suzerainty  over  the  whole  conti- 
nent of  America.  A  manifest  destiny  is  thought  to  be  working 
in  favor  of  the  dominion  or  suzerainty  of  a  single  power  from 
the  Arctic  Ocean  to  Patagonia.  Porto  Rico  is  ours.  Cuba  is 
almost  ours.  Many  believe  that  Canada  will  some  time  desire 
to  be  with  us.  No  people  to  the  south  of  us  shows  stable  promise 
of  what  we  call  good  government.  The  new  canal  at  Panama 
affords  additional  reasons  for  our  control  of  the  continent. 
Boundless  resources  are  yet  to  be  developed  in  the  virgin  con- 
tinent. We  are  the  people  who  can  provide  the  brains,  the  capital 
and  the  political  security  requisite  for  the  exploitation  of  prac- 
tically a  seventh  of  the  surface  of  the  earth. 

The  new  Monroe  Doctrine  comes  thus  to  mean,  frankly,  that 
we  want,  or  at  least  may  some  time  want,  all  America  for  our- 
selves. We  give  due  notice  in  advance  of  our  claim  of  pre- 
emption. What  else  does  the  Monroe  Doctrine  mean,  that  there 
should  be  the  pretense  of  a  necessity  to  fight  for  it?  What  else 
did  President  Roosevelt  mean  by  his  note  of  repeated  warning 
to  the  republics  of  South  and  Central  America  that  they  must 
"behave  themselves"  ?  Here  and  nowhere  else  looms  up  the  need 
of  new  battleships  and  a  hundred  millions  of  dollars  a  year  for 
the  navy.  It  is  in  regard  to  South  America,  and  for  the  exten- 
sion of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  to  a  control  over  the  continent, 
that  we  discover  in  the  political  horizon  all  manner  of  colossal 
foreign  responsibilities  and  the  possibilities  of  friction  and 
war. 

The  new  Monroe  Doctrine  may  kindle  the  imagination  and 
stir  the  ambition  of  thoughtless  people;  it  may  tempt  some  of 
them  with  a  glamour  of  power  and  wealth.  We  may  fancy  that 
we  would  like  to  be  the  suzerain  power  on  the  continent,  with 
United  States  officials  in  authority  in  every  Spanish  and  Portu- 
guese American  capital.  The  stern  ancient  question  presses: 
What  right  has  the  United  States  to  assume  a  protectorate,  and 
much  less  any  form  of  sovereignty,  over  South  America?  The 
South  American  governments  are  as  independent  as  our  own; 
they  are  growing  more  stable  and  less  revolutionary  every  year. 
There  are  no  traditions  common  between  us  to  constitute  us  an 
acknowledged  Lord  Protector  over  them.  On  the  contrary,  our 
conduct  toward  Colombia  and  the  Philippines,  and  the  extra- 
ordinary utterances  of  some  of  our  public  men  seem  to  have 


210  SELECTED  ARTICLES  ON 

already    produced    a    certain    nervousness    among   our    Spanish- 
American  neighbors  who  naturally  resent  our  patronage. 

Neither  does  international  law,  which  has  never  in  the  past 
given  the  Monroe  Doctrine  any  clearly  acknowledged  footing, 
admit  the  right  of  the  United  States  to  mark  off  the  American 
continent  as  its  own  preserve,  and  to  stand,  like  a  dog  in  the 
manger,  to  warn  other  friendly  peoples  from  entering  it.  In 
short,  so  far  as  we  are  good  friends  of  the  South  American 
peoples,  so  far  as  we  are  friends  of  our  own  kinsmen  over  the 
seas  on  the  continent  of  Europe,  so  far  as  we  desire  permanent 
amicable  relations  with  the  people  of  Japan,  so  far  as  our 
intentions  in  South  America  are  honestly  humane  and  philan- 
thropic, we  have  no  need  whatever  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine 
any  longer.  On  the  side  of  our  common  humanity  all  our  inter- 
ests are  substantially  identical.  On  the  other  hand,  so  far  as 
we  purpose  to  exploit  the  continent  for  our  own  selfish  interests, 
so  far  as  we  aim  at  the  extension  of  our  power,  so  far  as  we 
purpose  to  force  our  forms  of  civilization  and  our  government 
upon  peoples  whom  we  deem  our  "inferiors,"  our  new  Monroe 
Doctrine  rests  upon  no  grounds  of  justice  or  right,  it  has  no 
place  with  the  Golden  Rule,  it  is  not  synonymous  with  human 
freedom :  it  depends  upon  might,  and  it  doubtless  tends  to 
provoke  jealousy,  if  not  hostility  and  war. 


Atlantic  Monthly.  111:721-34.  June,  1913 

Monroe  Doctrine :  An  Obsolete  Shibboleth.    Hiram  Bingham 

Of  the  difficulties  of  establishing  any  kind  of  an  alliance  be- 
tween ourselves  and  the  South  American  Republics  no  one  who 
has  traveled  in  South  America  can  be  ignorant.  As  has  been 
well  said  by  a  recent  Peruvian  writer:  "Essential  points  of  differ- 
ence separate  the  two  Americas — differences  of  language,  and 
therefore  of  spirit;  the  difference  between  Spanish  Catholicism 
and  the  multiform  Protestantism  of  the  Anglo-Saxons;  between 
the  Yankee  individualism  and  the  omnipotence  of  the  state  nat- 
ural to  the  South.  In  their  origin,  as  in  their  race,  we  find 
fundamental  antagonisms.  The  evolution  of  the  north  is  slow 
and  obedient  to  the  lessons  of  time,  to  the  influences  of  custom; 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  211 

the  history  of  the  southern  peoples  is  full  of  revolution,  rich  with 
dreams  of  an  unattainable  perfection." 

One  of  the  things  which  make  it,  and  will  continue  to  make 
it,  difficult  for  us  to  treat  fairly  with  our  southern  neighbors  is 
our  racial  prejudice  against  the  half-breed.  As  Senor  Calderon 
bluntly  says,  "Half-breeds  and  their  descendants  govern  the 
Latin-American  Republics" ;  and  it  is  a  well-known  fact  that 
this  leads  to  contempt  on  the  part  of  the  average  Anglo-Saxon. 
Such  a  state  of  affairs  shows  the  difficulty  of  assuming  that 
Pan-Americanism  is  axiomatic,  and  of  basing  the  logical  growth 
of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  on  "natural  sympathy." 

In  the  third  place,  the  new  form  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  de- 
clared, in  the  words  of  Secretary  Olney,  that  the  "United  States 
is  practically  sovereign  on  this  continent."  This  at  once  aroused 
the  antagonism  and  the  fear  of  those  very  southern  neighbors 
who,  in  another  sentence,  he  had  endeavored  to  prove  were 
"friends  and  allies,  commercially  and  politically,  of  the  United 
States." 

Less  than  three  years  after  the  enunciation  of  the  new  Mon- 
roe Doctrine  we  were  at  war  with  Spain.  The  progress  of  the 
war  in  Cuba  and  the  Spanish  colonies  was  followed  in  South 
America  with  the  keenest  interest.  How  profoundly  it  would 
have  surprised  the  great  American  public  to  realize  that  while 
we  were  spending  blood  and  treasure  to  secure  the  independence 
of  another  American  republic,  our  neighbors  in  Buenos  Aires 
were  indulging  in  the  most  severe  and  caustic  criticism  of  our 
motives!  This  attitude  can  be  appreciated  only  by  those  who 
have  compared  the  cartoons  published  week  after  week  during 
the  progress  of  the  war  in  this  country  and  in  Argentina.  In 
the  one,  Uncle  Sam  is  pictured  as  a  benevolent  giant  saving  the 
poor  maid  Cuba  from  the  jaws  of  the  ferocious  dragon,  Gen. 
Weyler,  and  his  cruel  mistress  in  Spain.  In  the  other,  Uncle 
Sam,  in  the  guise  of  a  fat  hog,  is  engaged  in  besmirching  the 
fair  garments  of  the  Queen  of  Spain  in  his  violent  efforts  to 
gobble  up  her  few  American  possessions.  Representations  of 
our  actions  in  the  Philippines  are  in  such  disgusting  form  that 
it  would  not  be  desirable  to  attempt  to  describe  some  of  the 
Argentine  cartoons  touching  upon  that  subject. 

Our  neighbors  felt  that  a  decided  change  had  come  over  the 
Monroe  Doctrine!  In  1823  we  had  declared  that  ."with  the  ex- 


212  SELECTED  ARTICLES  ON 

isting  colonies  or  dependencies  of  any  European  Power  we  have 
not  interfered,  and  shall  not  interfere"  (so  runs  the  original 
Monroe  Doctrine).  In  1898  we  not  only  interfered,  but  actually 
took  away  all  of  Spain's  colonies  and  dependencies,  freeing  Cuba 
and  retaining  for  ourselves  Porto  Rico,  Guam,  and  the  Philippines. 

Without  for  a  moment  wishing  to  enter  into  a  discussion  of 
the  wisdom  of  our  actions,  I  desire  to  emphasize  the  tremendous 
difference  between  the  old  and  the  new  Monroe  Doctrine.  This 
is  not  a  case  of  theories  and  arguments,  but  of  deeds.  What 
are  the  facts? 

In  1895  we^  declare  that  we  are  practically  sovereign  on  this 
continent ;  in  1898  we  take  a  rich  American  island  from  a  Euro- 
pean Power;  and  in  1903  we  go  through  the  form  of  preventing 
a  South  American  Republic  from  subduing  a  revolution  in  one 
of  her  distant  provinces,  and  eventually  take  a  strip  of  that 
province  because  we  believe  we  owe  it  to  the  world  to  build  the 
Panama  Canal.  Again,  let  it  be  clear  that  I  am  not  interested 
at  this  point  in  defending  or  attacking  our  actions  in  any  of 
these  cases — I  merely  desire  to  state  what  has  happened  and  to 
show  some  of  the  fruits  of  the  new  Monroe  Doctrine.  "By 
their  fruits  ye  shall  know  them." 

Another  one  of  the  "fruits"  which  has  not  escaped  the  at- 
tention of  our  neighbors  in  South  America  is  our  intervention 
in  Santo  Domingo,  which,  although  it  may  be  an  excellent  thing 
for  the  people  of  that  island,  has  undoubtedly  interfered  with 
their  right  to  do  as  they  please  with  their  own  money. 

Furthermore,  within  the  past  three  years  we  have  twice  landed 
troops  in  Central  America  and  taken  an  active  part  by  way  of 
interfering  in  local  politics.  We  believed  that  the  conditions 
were  so  bad  as  to  justify  us  in  carrying  out  the  new  Monroe 
Doctrine  by  aiding  one  side  in  a  local  revolution. 

Of  our  armed  intervention  in  Cuba  it  is  scarcely  necessary 
to  speak,  except  to  refer  in  passing  to  the  newspaper  story,  cred- 
ited and  believed  in  Cuba,  that  if  American  troops  are  again 
obliged  to  intervene  in  the  political  life  of  that  country  they  will 
not  be  withdrawn,  as  has  been  the  practice  in  the  past. 

The  menace  of  intervention,  armed  intervention,  the  threat- 
ened presence  of  machine  guns  and  American  marines  have  re- 
peatedly been  used  by  Latin-American  politicians  in  their  en- 
deavors to  keep  the  peace  in  their  own  countries.  And  we  have 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  213 

done  enough  of  that  sort  of  thing  to  make  it  evident  to  disinter- 
ested observers  that  the  new  Monroe  Doctrine,  our  present  policy, 
is  to  act  as  international  policeman,  or  at  least  as  an  elder- 
brother-with-a-big-stick,  whenever  the  little  fellows  get  too  fresh. 

Is  this  Doctrine  worth  while? 

Let  us  see  what  it  involves,  first,  from  the  European,  second, 
from  the  Latin-American  point  of  view. 

By  letting  it  be  known  in  Europe  that  we  shall  not  tolerate 
any  European  intervention  or  the  landing  of  European  troops 
on  the  sacred  soil  of  the  American  Republics,  we  assume  all  re- 
sponsibility. We  have  declared,  in  the  words  of  Secretary  Olney, 
that  the  United  States  is  "practically  sovereign  on  this  continent, 
and  that  its  fiat  is  law  upon  the  subject  to  which  it  confines 
its  interposition.  Therefore  European  countries  have  the  right 
to  look  to  us  to  do  that  which  we  prevent  them  from  doing. 
A  curious  result  of  this  is  that  some  of  the  American  Republics 
float  loans  in  Europe,  believing  that  the  United  States  will  not 
allow  the  Governments  of  their  European  creditors  forcibly  to 
collect  these  loans. 

Personally  I  believe  that  it  ought  to  be  an  adopted  principle 
of  international  law  that  the  armed  intervention  of  creditor  na- 
tions to  collect  bad  debts  on  behalf  of  their  bankers  and  bond- 
holders is  forbidden.  If  this -principle  were  clearly  understood 
and  accepted,  these  bankers  and  underwriters  would  be  far  more 
particular  to  whom  they  lent  any  great  amount  of  money  and 
under  what  conditions.  They  would  not  be  willing  to  take  the 
risks  which  they  now  take,  and  many  unfortunate  financial 
tangles  would  never  have  a  beginning.  It  is  natural  for  a  Re- 
public which  has  great  undeveloped  resources,  much  optimism, 
and  a  disregard  of  existing  human  handicaps,  to  desire  to  borrow 
large  amounts  of  money  in  order  to  build  expensive  railroads 
and  carry  out  desirable  public  improvements.  It  is  equally  natu- 
ral that  capitalists  seeking  good  interest  rates  and  secure  invest- 
ments, should  depend  on  the  fact  that  if  the  debtor  country 
attempts  to  default  on  its  national  loans,  trfe  Government  of  the 
creditors  will  intervene  with  a  strong  arm.  It  is  natural  that 
the  money  should  be  forthcoming,  even  though  a  thorough,  busi- 
nesslike, and  scientific  investigation  of  the  possessions  and  re- 
sources of  the  borrowing  nation  might  show  that  the  chances 
of  her  being  able  to  pay  interest,  and  eventually  to  return  the 

16 


214  SELECTED  ARTICLES  ON 

capital,  were  highly  problematical  and  to  be  reckoned  as  very 
high  risks. 

Millions  of  dollars  of  such  loans  have  been  made  in  the  past. 
It  is  perfectly  evident  that  many  of  these  loans  can  not  be  repaid ; 
that  the  time  is  coming  when  the  creditor  nations  will  look  to 
us  as  the  policeman  or  "elder  brother"  of  the  western  hemi- 
sphere to  see  to  it  that  the  little  boys  pay  for  the  candy  and 
sweetmeats  they  have  eaten.  Is  it  worth  while  that  we  should 
do  this  ? 

One  can  not  dodge  the  truth  that  the  continuation  of  our  sup- 
port of  this  Doctrine  implies  that  we  will  undertake  to  be  re- 
sponsible for  the  good  behavior  of  all  of  the  American  nations. 
If  we  are  the  big-brother- with-the-club,  who  will  not  permit 
any  outsider  to  spank  our  irritating  or  troublesome  younger 
brothers,  we  must  accept  the  natural  corollary  of  keeping  them 
in  order  ourselves,  for  we  can  not  allow  the  American  family 
to  become  a  nuisance,  and  some  members  of  it  have  a  decided 
tendency  in  that  direction.  Is  this  task  worth  while?  Will  it 
not  cost  more  than  it  is  worth?  Is  there  not  a  better  way  out 
of  the  difficulty? 

Furthermore  Europe  knows  that  in  order  to  continue  to 
execute  our  self-imposed  and  responsible  mission  we  must 
run  counter  to  the  most  approved  principles  of  the  law  of 
nations. 

The  right  of  independence  is  so  fundamental  and  so  well 
established  a  principle  of  international  law,  and  respect  for  it 
is  so  essential  to  the  existence  of  national  self-restraint,  that 
armed  intervention,  or  any  other  action  or  policy  tending  to  place 
that  right  in  a  subordinate  position,  is  properly  looked  upon 
with  disfavor,  not  only  in  Latin  America,  but  by  all  the  family 
of  civilized  nations.  The  grounds  upon  which  intervention  is 
permitted  in  international  law  differ  according  to  the  authority 
one  consults,  but  in  general  they  are  limited  to  the  right  of 
self-preservation,  to  averting  danger  to  the  intervening  state, 
and  to  the  duty  of  fulfilling  engagements.  When,  however,  the 
danger  against  which  intervention  is  directed  is  the  consequence 
of  the  prevalence  of  ideas  which  are  opposed  to  the  views  held 
by  the  intervening  state,  most  authorities  believe  that  intervention 
ceases  to  be  legitimate.  To  say  that  we  have  the  right  to  inter- 
vene in  order  to  modify  another  state's  attitude  toward  revolu- 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  215 

tions  is  to  ignore  the  fundamental  principle  that  the  right  of  every 
state  to  live  its  life  in  a  given  way  is  precisely  equal  to  that  oi 
another  state  to  live  its  life  in  another  way. 

In  the  last  analysis  no  intervention  is  legal  except  for  the 
purpose  of  self-preservation,  unless  a  breach  of  international  law 
has  taken  place  or  unless  the  family  of  civilized  states  concur 
in  authorizing  it. 

If,  then,  our  adherence  to  the  Monroe  Doctrine  means  prac- 
tically disregard  of  the  principles  of  the  accepted  law  of  nations, 
is  it  worth  while  to  continue?  Why  should  we  not  abandon  the 
Monroe  Doctrine,  and  publicly  disclaim  any  desire  on  our  part 
to  interfere  in  the  domestic  quarrels  of  our  neighbors?  Why 
should  we  not  publicly  state  to  Europe  that  we  shall  not  inter- 
vene except  at  the  request  of  a  Pan  American  Congress,  and 
then  only  in  case  we  are  one  of  the  members  which  such  a  Con- 
gress selects  for  the  specific  purpose  of  quieting  a  certain  trouble- 
some neighbor? 

From  the  Latin- American  point  of  view,  the  continuance  of 
the  Monroe  Doctrine  is  insulting,  and  is  bound  to  involve  us 
in  serious  difficulties  with  our  neighbors.  We  seem  to  be  blind 
to  actual  conditions  in  the  largest  and  most  important  parts 
of  Latin  America,  such  as  Brazil,  Argentina,  and  Chile.  We 
need  to  arouse  the  average  citizen  to  study  the  commercial  situ- 
ation and  the  recent  history  of  those  three  Republics.  Let  him 
ponder  on  the  meaning  of  Brazil's  $100,000,000  of  balance  of 
trade  in  her  favor.  Let  him  realize  the  enormous  extent  of 
Argentina's  recent  growth  and  her  ability  to  supply  the  world 
with  wheat,  corn,  beef,  and  mutton.*  Let  him  examine  Chile's 
political  and  economic  stability.  Let  him  ponder  whether  or  not 
these  nations  are  fit  to  take  care  of  themselves,  and  are  worthy 
of  being  included  in  an  alliance  to  preserve  America  for  the 
Americans,  if  that  it  is  worth  while,  and  if  there  is  any  danger 
from  Europe.  Let  him  ask  himself  whether  or  not  the  "A  B  C" 
powers — that  is,  the  Argentine,  Brazilian,  and  Chilean  Govern- 
ments— deserve  our  patronizing,  we-will-protect-you-from-Europe 
attitude. 

The  fact  is  we  are  woefully  ignorant  of  the  actual  conditions 
in  the  leading  American  Republics.  To  the  inhabitants  of  those 

*  In  1912  Argentina's  exports  amounted  to  $480,000,000  of  which 
$200,000,000  represented  wheat  and  corn  and  $188,000,000  pastoral  products. 
—The  Author. 


216  SELECTED  ARTICLES  ON 

countries  the  very  idea  of  the  existence  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine 
is  not  only  distasteful  but  positively  insulting.  It  is  leading  them 
on  the  road  toward  what  is  known  as  the  "A  B  C"  policy,  a  kind 
of  triple  alliance  between  Argentina,  Brazil,  and  Chile,  with  the 
definite  object  of  opposing  the  encroachments  of  the  United 
States.  They  feel  that  they  must  do  something  to  counteract 
that  well-known  willingness  of  the  American  people  to  find  good 
and  sufficient  reasons  for  interfering  and  intervening;  for  ex- 
ample, for  taking  Porto  Rico  from  Spain,  for  sending  armies 
into  Cuba,  for  handling  the  customs  receipts  of  Santo  Domingo, 
for  taking  a  strip  of  territory  which  (South  Americans  believe) 
belongs  to  the  Republic  of  Colombia,  for  sending  troops  into 
Nicaragua,  and  for  mobilizing  an  army  on  the  Mexican  frontier. 
(In  regard  to  the  latter  point  it  may  be  stated,  in  passing,  that 
it  is  not  the  custom  for  South  American  nations  to  mobilize 
an  army  on  a  neighbor's  frontier  merely  because  that  country  is 
engaged  in  civil  war  or  revolution.) 

To  the  "A  B  C"  powers  even  the  original  Monroe  Doctrine 
is  regarded  as  long  since  outgrown  and  as  being  at  present 
merely  a  display  of  insolence  and  conceit  on  our  part.  With 
Brazil  now  owning  the  largest  dreadnoughts  in  the  world;  with 
Argentina  and  Chile  building  equally  good  ones;  with  the  fact 
that  the  European  nations  have  long  since  lost  their  tendency 
toward  monarchical  despotism  and  are  in  fact  quite  as  demo- 
cratic as  many  American  Republics,  it  does  seem  a  bit  ridiculous 
for  us  to  pretend  that  the  Monroe  Doctrine  is  a  necessary  ele- 
ment in  our  foreign  policy. 

If  we  still  fear  European  aggression  and  desire  to  prevent 
a  partition  of  South  America  on  the  lines  of  the  partition  of 
Africa,  let  us  bury  the  Monroe  doctrine  and  declare  an  entirely 
new  policy — a  policy  that  is  based  on  intelligent  appreciation 
of  the  present  status  of  the  leading  American  powers — let  us 
declare  our  desire  to  join  with  the  "A  B  C"  powrers  in  protecting 
the  weaker  parts  of  America  against  any  imaginable  aggressions 
on  the  part  of  European  or  Asiatic  nations. 

Some  people  think  that  the  most  natural  outlet  for  the 
crowded  Asiatic  nations  is  to  be  found  in  South  America,  and 
that  Japan  and  China  will  soon  be  knocking  most  loudly  for 
the  admission  which  is  at  present  denied  them.  If  we  decide 
that  they  should  enter,  well  and  good;  but  if  we  decide  against 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  217 

such  a  policy,  we  shall  be  in  a  much  stronger  position  to  carry 
out  that  plan  if  we  have  united  with  the  "A  B  C"  powers. 

If  these  "A  B  C"  powers  dislike  and  despise  our  maintenance 
of  the  old  Monroe  Doctrine,  it  is  not  difficult  to  conceive  how 
much  more  they  must  resent  the  new  one.  The  very  thought 
that  we,  proud  in  the  consciousness  of  our  own  self-righteousness, 
sit  here  with  a  smile  on  our  faces  and  a  big  stick  in  our  hands, 
ready  to  chastise  any  of  the  American  Republics  that  do  not 
behave,  fairly  makes  their  blood  boil.  It  may  be  denied  that  this 
is  our  attitude.  -Grant  that  it  is  not,  still  our  neighbors  believe 
that  it  is,  and  if  we  desire  to  convince  them  of  the  contrary 
we  must  definitely  and  publicly  abandon  the  Monroe  Doctrine 
and  enunciate  a  new  kind  of  foreign  policy. 

We  ought  not  to  be  blind  to  the  fact  that  there  are  clever 
authors  residing  in  Europe  who  take  the  utmost  pains  to  make 
the  Latin-Americans  believe — what  they  are  unfortunately  only 
too  willing  to  believe— that  we  desire  to  be  not  only  practically 
but  actually  sovereign  on  the  western  hemisphere.  A  recent 
French  writer,  Maurice  de  Waleffe,  writing  on  "The  Fair  Land 
of  Central  America,"  begins  his  book  with  this  startling  an- 
nouncement of  a  discovery  he  has  made : 

The  United  States  have  made  up  their  mind  to  conquer  South  America. 
Washington  aspires  to  become  the  capital  of  an  enormous  empire,  com- 
prising, with  the  exception  of  Canada,  the  whole  of  the  new  world.  Eighty 
million  Yankees  want  to  annex  not  only  40,000,000  Spanish-Americans  but 
such  mines,  forests,  and  agricultural  riches  as  can  be  found  nowhere  else 
on  the  face  of  the  globe. 

Most  of  us,  when  we  read  those  words,  smile,  knowing  that 
they  are  not  true;  yet  that  does  not  affect  the  fact  that  the 
Latin-American,  when  he  reads  them,  gnashes  his  teeth  and  be- 
lieves that  they  are  only  too  true.  If  he  belongs  to  one  of 
the  larger  republics,  it  makes  him  toss  his  head  angrily  and 
increases  his  hatred  toward  those  "Yankis,"  whose  manners  he 
despises.  If  he  belongs  to  one  of  the  smaller  republics,  his 
soul  is  filled  with  fear  mingled  with  hatred,  and  he  sullenly 
awaits  the  day  when  he  shall  have  to  defend  his  state  against 
the  Yankee  invaders.  In  every  case  the  effect  produced  is  con- 
trary to  the  spirit  of  peace  and  harmony. 

In  another  book,  which  is  attracting  wide  attention  and  was 
written  by  a  young  Peruvian  diplomatist,  there  is  a  chapter 


218  SELECTED  ARTICLES  ON 

entitled  "The  North  American  Peril,"  and  it  begins  with  these 
significant  words :  "To  save  themselves  from  Yankee  imperial- 
ism, the  American  democracies  would  almost  accept  a  German 
alliance  or  the  aid  of  Japanese  arms ;  everywhere  the  Americans 
of  the  North  are  feared.  In  the  Antilles  and  in  Central  America 
hostility  against  the  Anglo-Saxon  invaders  assumes  the  character 
of  a  Latin  crusade."  This  is  a  statement  not  of  a  theory,  but 
of  a  condition  set  forth  by  a  man  who,  while  somewhat  severe 
in  his  criticism  of  North  American  culture,  is  not  unfriendly 
to  the  United  States,  and  who  remembers  what  his  country  owes 
to  us.  Yet  he  asserts  that  in  the  United  States  "against  the 
policy  of  respect  for  Latin  liberties  are  ranged  the  instincts  of  a 
triumphant  plutocracy." 

The  strident  protest  in  this  book  has  not  gone  out  without 
finding  a  ready  echo  in  South  America.  Even  in  Peru,  long  our 
best  friend  on  the  southern  continent,  the  leading  daily  papers 
have  during  the  past  year  shown  an  increasing  tendency  to  criti- 
cize our  actions  and  suspect  our  motives.  Their  suspicion  goes 
so  far  as  actually  to  turn  friendly  words  against  us.  Last 
September  a  successful  American  diplomat,  addressing  a  dis- 
tinguished gathering  of  manufacturers  in  New  York,  was  quoted 
all  over  South  America  as  stating  that  the  United  States  did 
not  desire  territorial  expansion,  but  only  commercial,  and  that 
the  association  should  combat  all  idea  of  territorial  expansion 
if  any  statement  proposed  it,  as  this  was  the  only  way  to  gain 
the  confidence  of  South  America.  This  remark  was  treated  as 
evidence  of  Machiavellian  politics.  One  journalist  excitedly  ex- 
claimed, "Who  does  not  see  in  this  paternal  interest  a  brutal 
and  cynical  sarcasm?  Who  talks  of  confidence  when  one  of  the 
most  thoughtful  South  American  authorities,  Francisco  Garcia 
Calderon,  gives  us  once  more  the  cry,  no  longer  premature,  'Let 
.us  be  alert  and  on  our  guard  against  Yankeeism.' " 

Even  the  agitation  against  the  Putumayo  atrocities  is  mis- 
understood. "To  no  one  is  it  a  secret,"  says  one  Latin-American 
writer,  "that  all  these  scandalous  accusations  only  serve  to  con- 
ceal the  vehement  desire  to  impress  American  and  English  in- 
fluence on  the  politics  of  the  small  countries  of  South  America; 
and  they  can  scarcely  cover  the  shame  of  the  utilitarian  end 
that  lies  behind  it  all." 

Another  instance  of  the  attitude  of  the  Latin-American  press 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  219 

is  shown  in  a  recent  article  in  one  of  the  leading  daily  papers 
in  Lima,  the  Government  organ.  In  the  middle  of  its  front  page 
in  a  two-column  space  is  an  article  with  these  headlines :  "North 
American  excesses — the  terrible  lynchings — and  they  talk  of  the 
Putumayo !"  The  gist  of  the  article  may  easily  be  imagined. 
It  begins  with  these  words :  "While  the  Saxons  of  the  world  are 
producing  a  deafening  cry  over  the  crimes  of  the  Putumayo, 
imagining  them  to  be  like  a  dance  of  death,  and  giving  free 
rein  to  such  imaginings ;  while  the  American  Government  re- 
solves to  send  a  commission  that  may  investigate  what  atrocities 
are  committed  in  those  regions,  there  was  published,  as  regards 
the  United  States,  in  La  Razon,  of  Buenos  Aires,  a  fortnight 
ago  the  following  note,  significant  of  the  'lofty  civilization  and 
high  justice'  of  the  great  republic  of  the  north."  Here  follows 
a  press  dispatch  describing  one  of  the  terrible  lynchings  which 
only  too  often  happen  in  the  United  States.  Then  the  Peruvian 
editor  goes  on  to  say,  "Do  we  realize  that  in  the  full  twentieth 
century,  where  there  is  not  left  a  single  country  in  the  world 
whose  inhabitants  are  permitted  to  supersede  justice  by  summary 
punishment,  there  are  repeatedly  taking  place,  almost  daily,  in 
the  United  States  lynchings  like  that  of  which  we  are  told  in  the 
telegraphic  dispatch?" 

Is  it  worth  our  while  to  heed  the  "writing  on  the  wall"? 

Is  it  not  true  that  it  is  the  present  tendency  of  the  Monroe 
Doctrine  to  claim  that  the  United  States  is  to  do  whatever  seems 
to  the  United  States  good  and  proper  so  far  as  the  western 
hemisphere  is  concerned?  Is  there  not  a  dangerous  tendency 
in  our  country  to  believe  so  far  in  our  own  rectitude  that  we 
may  be  excused  from  any  restrictions,  either  in  the  law  of  na- 
tions or  in  our  treaty  obligations,  that  seem  unjust,  trivial,  or 
inconvenient,  notwithstanding  the  established  practices  of  civil- 
ized nations?  Our  attitude  on  the  Panama  tolls  question,  our 
former  disregard  of  treaty  rights  with  China,  and  our  willing- 
ness to  read  into  or  read  out  of  existing  treaties  whatever  seems 
to  us  right  and  proper,  have  aroused  deep-seated  suspicion  in 
our  southern  neighbors,  which,  it  seems  to  me,  we  should  en- 
deavor to  eradicate  if  we  have  our  own  highest  good  at  heart. 

Are  we' not  too  much  in  the  state  of  mind  of  Citizen  Fix-it, 
who  was  more  concerned  with  suppressing  the  noisy  quarrels  of 
his  neighbors  than  with  quietly  solving  his  own  domestic  dim- 


220  SELECTED  ARTICLES  ON 

culties?  Could  we  see  ourselves  as  our  southern  neighbors  see 
us  in  the  columns  of  their  daily  press,  where  the  emphasis  is  still 
on  the  prevalence  of  murder  in  the  United  States,  the  astonishing 
continuance  of  lynching,  the  freedom  from  punishment  of  the 
vast  majority  of  those  who  commit  murder,  our  growing  disre- 
gard of  the  rights  of  others,  bomb  outrages,  strikes,  riots,  labor 
difficulties, — could  we  see  these  things  with  their  eyes,  we  should 
realize  how  bitterly  they  resent  our  assumed  right  to  intervene 
when  they  misbehave  themselves  or  when  a  local  revolution  be- 
comes particularly  noisy. 

So  firmly  fixed  in  the  Latin-American  mind  is  the  idea  that 
our  foreign  policy  to-day  means  intervention  and  interference 
that  comments  on  the  splendid  sanitary  work  being  done  at 
Panama  by  Col.  Gorgas  are  tainted  with  this  idea. 

On  the  west  coast  of  South  America  there  is  a  pesthole 
called  Guayaquil,  which,  as  Ambassador  Bryce  says,  "enjoys  the 
reputation  of  being  the  pesthouse  of  the  continent,  rivaling  for 
the  prevalence  and  malignity  of  its  malarial  fevers  such  dens  of 
disease  as  Fontesvilla  on  the  Pungwe  River  in  South  Africa 
and  the  Guinea  coast  itself,  and  adding  to  these  the  more  swift 
and  deadly  yellow  fever,  which  has  now  been  practically  extir- 
pated from  every  other  part  of  South  America  except  the  banks 
of  the  Amazon.  ...  It  seems  to  be  high  time  that  efforts 
should  be  made  to  improve  conditions  at  a  place  whose  develop- 
ment is  so  essential  to  the  development  of  Ecuador  itself."  Re- 
cent efforts  on  the  part  of  far-sighted  Ecuadorian  statesmen  to 
remedy  these  conditions  by  employing  American  sanitary  engi- 
neers and  taking  advantage  of  the  offers  of  American  capital 
were  received  by  the  Ecuadorian  populace  so  ill  as  to  cause  the 
fall  of  the  cabinet  and  the  disgrace  of  the  minister  who  favored 
such  an  experiment  in  modern  sanitation. 

Peru  suffers  from  the  conditions  of  bad  health  among  her 
northern  neighbors,  and  yet  the  leading  newspapers  in  Peru,  in- 
stead of  realizing  how  much  they  had  to  gain  by  having  Guayaquil 
cleaned  up,  united  in  protesting  against  this  symptom  of  "Yanki" 
imperialism,  and  applauded  the  action  of  the  Ecuador  mob. 

Is  it  worth  while  to  continue  a  foreign  policy  which  makes 
it  so  difficult  for  things  to  be  done,  things  of  whose  real  advan- 
tage to  our  neighbors  there  is  no  question? 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  221 

The  old  adage  that  actions  speak  louder  than  words  is  per- 
haps more  true  in  Latin  America  than  in  the  United  States. 
A  racial  custom  of  saying  pleasant  things  tends  toward  a  sus- 
picion of  the  sincerity  of  pleasant  things  when  said.  But  there 
can  be  no  doubt  about  actions.  Latin- American  statesmen  smiled 
and  applauded  when  Secretary  Root,  in  the  Pan-American  Con- 
gress at  Rio  Janeiro,  said,  "We  consider  that  the  independence 
and  the  equal  rights  of  the  smallest  and  weakest  members  of 
the  family  of  nations  deserve  as  much  respect  as  those  of  the 
great  empires.  We  pretend  to  no  right,  privilege,  or  power 
that  we  do  not  freely  concede  to  ea.ch  one  of  the  American  re- 
publics." But  they  felt  that  their  suspicions  of  us  were  more 
than  warranted  by  our  subsequent  actions  in  Cuba,  Santo  Do- 
mingo, and  Nicaragua.  Our  ultimatum  to  Chile  on  account  of 
the  long-standing  Alsop  claim  seemed  to  them  an  unmistakably 
unfriendly  act  and  was  regarded  as  a  virtual  abandonment  by 
Secretary  Knox  of  the  policy  enunciated  by  Secretary  Root. 

Another  unfriendly  act  was  the  neglect  of  our  Congress  to 
provide  a  suitable  appropriation  for  the  Second  Pan-American 
Scientific  Congress. 

Before  1908  Latin-American  scientific  congresses  had  been 
held  in  Argentina  (Buenos  Aires),  Brazil  (Rio  Janeiro),  and 
Uruguay  (Montevideo).  When  it  came  Chile's  turn,  so  kind 
was  her  feeling  toward  Secretary  Root  that  the  United  States 
was  asked  to  join  in  making  the  Fourth  Latin-American  Sci- 
entific Congress  become  the  first  Pan-American.  Every  one  of 
the  four  countries  where  the  international  scientists  met  had 
made  a  suitable,  generous  appropriation  to  cover  the  expenses 
of  the  meeting.  Chile  had  felt  that  it  was  worth  while  to  make 
a  very  large  appropriation  in  order  suitably  to  entertain  'the 
delegates,  to  publish  the  results  of  the  congress,  and  to  increase 
American  friendships.  This  First  Pan-American  Scientific  Con- 
gress selected  Washington  as  the  place  for  the  second  congress, 
and  named  October,  1912,  as  the  appointed  time  for  the  meet- 
ings. But  when  our  State  Department  asked  Congress  for  a 
modest  appropriation  of  $50,000  to  meet  our  international  obli- 
gations for  this  Pan-American  gathering,  our  billion-dollar  Con- 
gress decided  to  economize  and  denied  the  appropriation.  When 
the  matter  came  up  again  during  the  Congress  that  has  just 


222  SELECTED  ARTICLES  ON 

finished  its  sessions,  the  appropriation  was  recommended  by  the 
Committee  on  Foreign  Affairs,  but  was  thrown  out  on  a  technical 
point  of  order. 

Now,  you  can  not  make  a  Latin-American  believe  that  the 
United  States  is  so  poor  that  it  can  not  afford  to  entertain  inter- 
national scientific  congresses  as  Argentina,  Brazil,  Uruguay,  and 
Chile  have  done.  They  argue  that  there  must  be  some  other 
reason  underlying  this  act  of  courtesy.  No  pleasant  words  or 
profuse  professions  of  friendship  and  regard  can  make  the  lead- 
ing statesmen  and  scientists  throughout  Latin  America  forget 
that  it  was  not  possible  to  hold  the  Second  Pan-American  Sci- 
entific Congress  because  the  United  States  did  not  care  to  as- 
sume her  international  obligations.  Nor  will  they  forget  that 
Chile  spent  $100,000  in  entertaining  the  First  Pan-American  Sci- 
entific Congress  and  that  the  10  official  delegates  from  the  United 
States  Government  enjoyed  the  bounteous  Chilean  hospitality  and 
were  shown  every  attention  that  was  befitting  and  proper  for 
the  accredited  representatives  of  the  United  States. 

In  short,  here  is  a  concrete  case  of  how  our  present  policy 
toward  Latin  America  justifies  the  Latin-American  attitude  to- 
ward the  country  that  has  been  maintaining  the  Monroe  Doctrine. 

Finally,  there  is  another  side  to  the  question. 

Some  of  the  defenders  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  state  quite 
frankly  that  they  are  selfish,  and  that  from  the  selfish  point  of 
view  the  Monroe  Doctrine  should  at  all  costs  be  maintained. 
They  argue  that  our  foreign  commerce  would  suffer  were  Europe 
permitted  to  have  a  free  hand  in  South  America.  Even  on  this 
very  point  it  seems  to  me  that  they  make  a  serious  mistake. 

You  can  seldom  sell  goods  to  a  man  who  dislikes  you,  ex- 
cept when  you  have  something  which  is  far  better  or  cheaper 
than  he  can  get  anywhere  else.  Furthermore,  if  he  distrusts 
you,  he  is  not  going  to  judge  your  goods  fairly  or  to  view  the 
world's  market  with  an  unprejudiced  eye.  This  can  scarcely 
be  denied.  Everyone  knows  that  a  friendly  smile  or  cordial 
greeting  and  the  maintenance  of  friendly  relations  are  essential 
to  "holding  one's  customers."  Accordingly,  it  seems  that  even 
from  this  selfish  point  of  view,  which  some  Americans  are  willing 
to  take,  it  is  absolutely  against  our  own  interests  to  maintain 
this  elder-brother-with-the-stick  policy,  which  typifies  the  new 
Monroe  Doctrine. 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  223 

Furthermore,  Germany  is  getting  around  the  Monroe  Doc- 
trine, and  is  actually  making  a  peaceful  conquest  of  South 
America  which  will  injure  us  just  as  much  as  if  we  had  allowed 
her  to  make  a  military  conquest  of  the  southern  republics.  She 
is  winning  South  .American  friendship.  She  has  planted  col- 
onies, one  of  which,  in  southern  Brazil,  has  350,000  people  in  it, 
as  large  a  population  as  that  of  Vermont  and  nearly  as  large 
as  that  of  Montana.  Germany  is  taking  pains  to  educate  her 
young  business  men  in  the  Spanish  language,  and  to  send  them 
out  equipped  to  capture  Spanish-American  trade.  We  have  a 
saying  that  "Trade  follows  the  flag."  Germany  has  magnificent 
steamers,  flying  the  German  flag,  giving  fortnightly  service  to 
every  important  port  in  South  America — ports  where  the  Ameri- 
can flag  is  practically  never  seen.  She  has  her  banks  and  business 
houses  which  have  branches  in  the  interior  cities.  By  their 
means  she  is  able  to  keep  track  of  American  commerce,  to  know 
what  we  are  doing,  and  at  what  rates.  Laughing  in  her  sleeve 
at  the  Monroe  Doctrine  as  an  antiquated  policy,  which  only 
makes  it  easier  for  her  to  do  a  safe  business,  Germany  is  engaged 
in  the  peaceful  conquest  of  Spanish  America. 

To  be  sure,  we  are  not  standing  still,  and  we  are  fighting 
for  the  same  trade  that  she  is,  but  our  soldiers  are  handicapped 
by  the  presence  of  the  very  doctrine  that  was  intended  to 
strengthen  our  position  in  the  new  world.  Is  this  worth  while? 

At  all  events  let  us  face  clearly  and  frankly  the  fact  that 
the  maintenance  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  is  going  to  cost  the 
United  States  an  immense  amount  of  trouble,  money,  and  men. 

Carried  out  to  its  logical  conclusion,  it  means  a  policy  of 
suzerainty  and  interference  which  will  earn  us  the  increasing 
hatred  of  our  neighbors,  the  dissatisfaction  of  Europe,  the  loss 
of  commercial  opportunities,  and  the  forfeiture  of  time  and  at- 
tention which  would  much  better  be  given  to  settling  our  own 
difficult  internal  problems.  The  continuance  of  adherence  to 
the  Monroe  Doctrine  offers  opportunities  to  scheming  statesmen 
to  distract  public  opinion  from  the  necessity  of  concentrated 
attention  at  home  by  arousing  mingled  feelings  of  jingoism  and 
self-importance  in  attempting  to  correct  the  errors  of  our 
neighbors. 

If  we  persist  in  maintaining  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  we  shall 
find  that  its  legitimate,  rational,  and  logical  growth  will  lead  us 


224  SELECTED  ARTICLES  ON 

to  an  increasing  number  of  large  expenditures,  where  American 
treasure  and  American  blood  will  be  sacrificed  in  efforts  to  re- 
move the  mote  from  our  neighbor's  eye  while  overlooking  the 
beam  in  our  own. 

The  character  of  the  people  who  inhabit  .the  tropical  Ameri- 
can republics  is  such,  the  percentage  of  Indian  blood  is  so 
great,  the  little  understood  difficulties  of  life  in  those  countries 
are  so  far-reaching,  and  the  psychological  tendencies  of  the  peo- 
ple so  different  from  our  own,  that  opportunities  will  continually 
arise  which  will  convince  us  that  they  require  our  intervention 
if  we  continue  to  hold  to  the  tenets  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine. 

It  is  for  us  to  face  the  question  fairly  and  to  determine 
whether  it  is  worth  while  to  continue  any  longer  on  a  road  which 
leads  to  such  great  expenditures  and  which  means  the  loss  of 
international  friendships. 

That  international  good  will  is  a  desideratum  it  needs  no 
words  of  mine  to  prove  to  anyone.  Looked  at  from  every  point 
of  view,  selfishly  and  unselfishly,  ethically,  morally,  commer- 
cially, and  diplomatically,  we  desire  to  live  at  peace  with  our 
neighbors  and  to  promote  international  friendship.  Can  this  be 
done  by  continuing  our  adherence  to  the  Monroe  Doctrine? 

Journal  of  Race  Development.  4:324-33.  January,  1914 
Monroe  Doctrine.    George  F.  Tucker 

We  should  not  forget  that  at  the  time  of  President  Monroe's 
declaration  this  country  had  a  population  of  only  a  few  millions, 
and  that  her  interests  were  inconsiderable  in  comparison  with 
those  of  today,  that  the  Spanish- American  countries  were  emerg- 
ing from  colonial  conditions  that  made  the  transition  to  inde- 
pendence and  democracy  difficult  and  problematical;  that  trade 
between  civilized  countries  was  not  extensive  and  was  largely 
limited  to  merchandise  peculiar  to  an  age  when  wants  were  few 
and  luxuries  little  known;  that  transportation  was  not  yet 
effected  by  the  agencies  which  man  has  since  called  from  latency ; 
that  knowledge  the  world  over  was  the  possession  of  the  few, 
and  that  such  a  thing  as  the  education  of  the  masses  was  hardly 
contemplated;  that  racial  affinities  and  prejudices  were  marked 
and  prevalent— a  fact  due  to  the  aloofness  of  nations,  caused  in 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  225 

a  large  measure  by  slow  and  imperfect  means  of  communication; 
that  there  were  few,  perhaps  no,  societies  and  associations  or- 
ganized to  promote  the  cause  of  peace  and  to  agitate  for  settle- 
ment of  wars  and  disputes  by  compromise  or  arbitration,  and 
that  no  one  dreamed — not  even  the  visionary  and  enthusiast — of 
the  discoveries  and  inventions  that  were  to  modify  the  methods 
of  trade  and  business,  augment  the  wealth  of  the  world,  raise 
the  standards  of  living,  bring  long  separated  peoples  into  closer 
relations  and  make  possible  cooperative  efforts  to  promote  amity 
and  good-will  among  nations. 

Is  it  not  a  fact  that  the  Monroe  Doctrine  might  possibly  be 
applied  today  to  the  detriment  of  the  southern  republics  in  whose 
interest  it  may  be  invoked,  and  possibly  to  the  discredit  of  the 
United  States?  It  is  fair  to  assume  that  there  are  only  two 
nations  that  are  likely  in  any  event  to  oppose  or  violate  this 
Doctrine  or  inhibition — Great  Britain  and  Germany.  In  the  past 
ninety  years  Great  Britain  has  advanced  from  the  rule  of  the 
few  to  that  of  the  many,  so  that  the  subjects  of  the  King  enjoy 
about  all  the  privileges  of  citizens  of  our  country;  she  has 
covered  the  seas  with  her  shipping,  and  has  developed  a  colonial 
system  the  most  remarkable  and  efficient  in  the  history  of  the 
world;  she  has  guarded  and  guards  her  subjects  in  every  corner 
of  the  globe,  and,  wherever  her  flag  flies,  the  lives  and  property 
of  aliens  are  accorded  the  same  protection  as  those  of  her  own. 
Now  is  it  not  probable  that,  if  Great  Britain  should  interfere 
in  the  affairs  of  a  Latin- American  country,  she  would  establish 
a  system  calculated  to  promote  the  interests  of  that  country,  and 
not  at  all  inimical  to  those  of  the  United  States?  And  what 
system?  Not  that  of  the  old  Great  Britain  governed  by  gentle- 
men, but  that  of  the  Great  Britain  of  today  governed  by  the 
people. 

Ninety  years  ago  Germany  was  a  collection  of  states  without 
cohesion  and  with  a  not  redundant  population.  Now  regard  the 
aspect  of  governmental  unification,  and  consider  her  great  ad- 
vance not  only  in  education  and  all  the  activities  that  go  with 
learning,  but  in  manufacturing  and  trade  and  commerce.  The 
growth  in  population  has  been  marvelous,  and  the  label  "Made 
in  Germany,"  testifies  everywhere  to  commercial  expansion  and 
prosperity,  but  her  territory  is  hardly  sufficient  to  maintain  her 
constantly  increasing  numbers,  and  she  naturally  seeks  other  IQ- 


226  SELECTED  ARTICLES  ON 

calities  for  those  who  are  handicapped  at  home  by  the  struggle 
for  existence.  Now  if  Germany  should  take  over  a  Latin- Ameri- 
can country,  would  its  people  be  subjugated  and  deprived  of  their 
liberties,  or  would  they  affiliate  with  the  conquerors  and  profit 
by  the  appropriation?  And  how  would  our  own  institutions  be 
affected?  Would  there  be  ground  for  apprehension  that  such 
an  appropriation  would  be  a  menace  to  our  democratic  govern- 
ment? The  speaker  does  not  answer  these  questions,  but  he 
adverts  to  the  fact  that  there  are  several  million  German-Ameri- 
cans ;  that  they  have  been  famed  for  their  indifference  to  political 
intrigue,  and  have  been  and  are  equally  famed  for  their  diligence, 
their  frugality,  their  thrift,  and  their  loyalty  to  their  adopted 
land.  So  far  as  is  known,  they  have  never  attempted  to  destroy 
the  American  republic,  but  on  the  other  hand  have  been  among 
the  foremost  to  contribute  to  its  prosperity. 

But  how  about  coaling  stations  and  the  transference  to  Ameri- 
can shores  of  the  European  military  system?  This  suggests 
other  questions.  Have  not  the  great  Powers  of  Europe  all  they 
can  attend  to  in  colonial  enterprise  and  expansion,  especially 
since  their  taking  over  of  the  available  portions  of  Africa,  under 
spheres  of  influence?  Would  not  the  maintenance  of  military 
strong-holds  and  coaling  stations  in  Central  and  South  America 
be  an  element  of  weakness  rather  than  of  strength?  Command- 
ing a  large  portion  of  the  trade  of  these  southern  republics  are 
not  Great  Britain  and  Germany,  for  example,  better  off  than 
they  would  be  if  they  were  compelled  by  expensive  military  and 
naval  measures  to  guard  a  commerce  which  prospers  and  in- 
creases under  the  protection  of  the  countries  with  whom  it  is 
carried  on? 

The  chief  solicitude,  perhaps,  of  the  alarmists  relates  to  the 
Panama  Canal.  The  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty  has  been  supplanted 
by  the  Hay-Pauncefote  convention.  Under  the  direction,  and  at 
the  expense  of  this  country,  the  Canal  is  nearly  completed.  It  is 
to  be  neutralized.  The  United  States  may  maintain  such  military 
police  as  may  be  necessary  to  protect  it  against  lawlessness  and 
disorder ;  belligerent  vessels  are  restricted  in  method  and  activity, 
and  the  provisions  of  the  treaty  are  to  apply  to  waters  adjacent 
to  the  Canal,  within  three  marine  miles  of  either  end.  And  what 
is  this  solicitude?  Is  it  not  that  the  littoral  is  in  peril,  that  is 
the  shores  adjacent  to  the  Canal,  particularly  on  the  Atlantic 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  227 

side;  that  some  strong  European  Power  may  appropriate  a  part 
of  this  littoral,  and  that  the  position  of  the  United  States  may 
be  thus  rendered  insecure  and  the  Monroe  Doctrine  made  in- 
effective? Great  Britain  may  be  eliminated  from  consideration, 
for  there  is  no  reason  to  believe  that,  after  settling  the  pro- 
tracted controversy  over  Isthmian  transit,  she  is  going  to  pursue 
a  course  which  may  weaken  the  alliance  she  has  entered  into  to 
further  her  own  trade.  With  the  English  speaking  peoples  in 
accord,  is  there  ground  for  apprehending  interference  with  the 
littoral,  or  the  establishment  of  coaling-stations  in  any  parts 
thereof,  or  in  any  of  the  islands  of  the  Caribbean  Sea?  Is  not 
the  logical  conclusion  that  the  successful  operation  of  this  great 
.waterway  will  prove  such  a  benefit  to  the  commercial  nations 
of  the  globe,  that  no  one  of  them  will  be  disposed  to  pursue  a 
policy  calculated  to  give  umbrage  to  the  others? 

A  matter  which  merits  attention  is  the  enforcement  of  money 
claims.  The  Latin-American  republics  have  been  frequent  bor- 
rowers of  European  money-changers,  and  frequently  also  the 
disinclination  or  refusal  to  settle  has  led  to  threats  of  coercion. 
In  one  notable  instance — a  little  over  a  decade  ago — war  was 
actually  resorted  to  and  the  American  people,  misled  by  the  yel- 
low newspapers,  were  distracted  by  the  bugaboo  of  an  invaded 
Monroe  Doctrine.  The  case  was  that  of  Venezuela.  It  is  not 
contended  that  the  government  of  Venezuela  repudiated  its  obli- 
gations;  in  fact,  that  government  only  objected  to  the  amount  of 
the  claims,  and  proposed  that  they  be  passed  upon  by  a  board  of 
Venezuelans,  while  the  creditor  nations  urged  their  reference  to 
a  mixed  commission.  The  method  adopted — the  sinking  of  Vene- 
zuelan war  vessels  and  the  bombardment  of  Venezuelan  ports — 
is  believed  to  be  one  of  the  first  attempts  in  history  to  enforce 
commercial  demands  by  virtual  acts  of  war.  It  is  to  be  noted, 
however,  that  both  Great  Britain  and  Germany  disavowed  to 
the  American  government  in  advance  any  intention  to  acquire 
territory,  the  German  ambassador  assuring  the  State  Department, 
"We  declare  especially  that  under  no  circumstances  do  we  con- 
sider in  our  proceedings  the  acquisition  or  the  permanent  occu- 
pation of  Venezuelan  territory."  The  intention  to  acquire  terri- 
tory was  disavowed,  but  were  not  the  attitude  and  measures  of 
Great  Britain  and  Germany  in  a  sense  an  interference  in  the 
affairs  of  Venezuela,  and  were  the  interests  of  South  and  Cen- 


228  SELECTED  ARTICLES  ON 

tral    America,    and    those    of    the    United    States    in    any    way 
jeopardized? 

Before  dismissing  the  subject,  we  feel  that  the  attitude,  the 
views,  the  preferences  and  purposes  of  the  Latin-American  gov- 
ernments deserve  attention,  for  it  may  be  that  today  they  regard 
the  assumed  protectorate  of  the  United  States  as  different  from 
the  very  acceptable  service  rendered  ninety  years  ago.  Suppose 
that  one  of  the  Latin-American  republics  desires  to  hand  over 
its  autonomy  to  a  European  Power  or  for  a  consideration  to 
cede  to  that  Power  a  bit  of  territory  for  the  location  of  a 
coaling-station,  has  the  United  States  a  right  to  set  up  the  Mon- 
roe Doctrine,  and,  if  set  up,  would  it  prove  a  deterrent?  With- 
out answering  this  question  can  we  not  say  that  the  United 
States  has  shown  too  little  general  interest  in  the  affairs  of  her 
Spanish-American  neighbors?  The  matter  of  interrelation  is  one 
which  this  country  should  not  ignore,  and  which  means  far  more 
to  the  Latin-Americans  than  the  North  American  people  at  pres- 
ent comprehend.  During  the  last  twenty  years  several  of  our 
southern  neighbors  have  made  such  progress,  and  have  so  in- 
creased their  resources,  that  they  are  amply  able  to  look  out  for 
their  own  affairs  in  the  event  of  threatened  aggression  of  Euro- 
pean nations. 


Review  of  Reviews.  34: 114.  July,  1906 
Commercial  Side  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine 

What  has  our  adhesion  to  the  Monroe  Doctrine  done  .for  the 
extension  of  American  commerce?  This  question  has  been  raised 
in  connection  with  the  coming  Pan-American  Conference  at  Rio. 
Harold  Bolce,  a  writer  in  the  July  number  of  Appleton's  Mag- 
azine, ventures  the  assertion  that  our  trade  with  South  America 
would  be  greater  if  England  owned  that  entire  continent. 

The  latest  figures  show  that  little  British  Guiana  bought  more  goods 
from  America,  by  one  million  dollars'  worth,  last  year  than  the  whole  of 
Venezuela  did,  and  Venezuela  has  an  area  equal  to  all  that  of  the  United 
States  east  of  the  Mississippi  River  and  north  of  the  fringe  of  Gulf  States. 
The  Britisher  the  world  over  is  a  big  buyer  of  American  merchandise. 
To  Canada,  with  its  less  than  six  million  people,  we  sell  more  goods  in 
six  months  than  we  do  in  a  whole  year  to  all  the  republics  of  South 
America,  with  its  upward  of  forty  million  inhabitants.  Theoretically, 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  229 

it  would  appear  that  a  practical  nation  like  America  would  gather  material 
benefits  from  its  guardianship  of  a  continent.  The  opposite  is  true.  It  is 
the  European  nations,  protesting  against  the  Monroe  Doctrine,'  who  have 
prospered  most  in  the  southern  portion  of  the  western  hemisphere.  In 
the  past  decade,  for  example,  Germany's  progress  in  Brazil  has  been  phe- 
nomenal, while  we  have  lost  ground  in  that  republic. 

The  latest  returns  show  that  the  amount  of  merchandise  bought  by  all 
nations,  exclusive  of  the  United  States,  amounted  last  year  to  11.6  billions 
of  dollars.  Of  that  America  supplied  14.33  per  cent.  If  the  Monroe 
Doctrine  were  of  any  value  in  getting  foreign  trade  for  the  United  States, 
our  proportion  of  the  commerce  of  South  America  would  be  greater  than 
our  share  in  the  trade  of  countries  beyond  the  pale  of  our  political  pro- 
tection. But  of  South  America's  imports  we  supply  only  13.28  per  cent. 

After  recalling  the  disasters  resulting  to  the  London  banking 
house  of  Baring  and  to  American  financial  interests  from  the 
failure  of  Argentina  to  meet  her  obligations,  in  1890,  this  writer 
continues : 

Some  people  question  Uncle  Sam's  right  to  act  as  the  receiver  for 
insolvent  San  Domingo,  but  any  one  who  will  study  the  path  of  panics  will 
realize  that  it  is  a. solemn  obligation  upon  the  part  of  the  American  nation 
to  avert,  whenever  possible,  any  financial  collapse  in  the  countries  of  Latin 
America.  The  disaster  that  began  in  Buenos  Ayres  reached  America  when 
our  harvests  were  prodigal,  and  when  our  factories  were  running  overtime. 

It  is  more  picturesque,  perhaps,  to  think  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  as 
safeguarding  our  export  trade  with  South  America.  In  1890  we  were 
shipping  at  the  rate  of  $32,000,000  worth  of  goods  to  the  southern  half 
of  this  hemisphere,  but  twenty  years  of  such  commerce  would  not  com- 
pensate the  United  States  for  the  loss  we  sustained  in  the  three  years  of 
failures  following  the  fall  of  the  house  of  Baring.  In  that  brief  period  of 
panic  the  liabilities  of  failures  in  the  United  States  amounted  to 
$650,000,000. 

Summing  up  the  lessons  of  the  past,  Mr.  Bolce  shows  that 
the  downfall  of  a  Latin-American  republic  represents, — first,  the 
alarm  of  Europe  and  the  collapse  of  some  of  its  financial  houses ; 
second,  a  reflex  disaster  in  the  United  States,  and,  third,  the 
utter  demoralization  of  the  South  American  people  who  hold  the 
spurious  paper  of  the  defunct  republic. 

The  total  export  and  import  trade  of  South  America  now 
exceeds  $1,000,000,000, — a  sum  greater  than  that  representing  the 
trade  of  the  United  States  in  1870. 


17 


230  SELECTED  ARTICLES  ON 

North  American  Review.  173:832-44.  December,  igoi 

Shall  the  Monroe  Doctrine  Be  Modified?    Walter  Wellman 

Tne  weakness  and  falseness  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  is  that 
it  applies  not  only  to  the  islands  and  seas  near  our  shores  and 
to  the  isthmus,  where  we  have  a  large  and  unmistakable  special 
interest,  but  broadly  to  the  whole  hemisphere,  in  a  considerable 
part  of  which  we  have  almost  no  actual  interest  at  all,  and 
where  the  interest  of  other  Powers  is  in  many  cases  equal  to 
ours  and  in  some  cases  far  greater  than  ours.  What  is  the 
evidence  that  the  United  States  possesses  an  interest  in  middle 
and  lower  South  America  sufficiently  greater  than  that  of  the 
remainder  of  the  world  to  give  the  United  States  a  reasonable 
right  to  exclusive  privilege?  Not  in  the  preservation  of  a 
republican  form  of  government,  for  as  a  general  principle  no 
nation  has  a  right  to  dictate  what  the  form  of  government  of 
any  of  its  neighbors  shall  be;  besides,  the  Monroe  Doctrine 
applied  to  Brazil  when  it  was  under  a  monarchy  as  well  as  now, 
when  Brazil  is  a  republic;  further,  the  chief  countries  of  Europe, 
whose  possible  activities  in  South  America  we  seek  to  limit, 
are  better  democracies  than  the  best  of  the  governments  we  seek 
to  'perpetuate.  Evidence  is  not  found  in  trade,  investment  of 
capital,  or  colonization,  for  in  all  these  respects  several  Euro- 
pean nations  have  vastly  greater  interests  in  South  America 
than  the  United  States.  It  is  not  found  in  the  danger  of  greater 
proximity  of  European  Powers,  for  proximity  is  not  o'f  itself  a 
danger,  except  in  special  circumstances  or  when  accompanied  by 
the  menace  of  enmity.  No  one  will  assert  that  any  European 
Power  is  the  enemy  of  the  United  States.  We  have  friendly 
relations  with  them  in  all  other  parts  of  the  world ;  the  assump- 
tion that  our  friendship  would  be  endangered  by  having  them 
nearer  to  us  is  of  itself  a  false  and  unfriendly  note.  You  may 
say  that  you  will  not  have  your  friend  as  a  dweller  in  your  own 
house,  but  you  may  not  with  decency  or  consistency  forbid  him 
to  live  in  your  neighborhood. 

Besides,  when  the  Monroe  Doctrine  was  born  proximity 
counted  for  much  more  than  it  does  in  this  day  of  electricity, 
cables,  steam  and  sea  power.  Now  it  counts  only  under  special 
circumstances.  We  should  be  justified  in  saying1  we  did  not  want 
Germany  in  Cuba,  or  Russia  in  Mexico,  or  France  in  the 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  231 

Isthmus.  But  what  has  the  political  control  of  Argentina,  or 
Patagonia,  or  Brazil,  or  Chili,  to  do  with  the  security  of  the 
United  States?  The  proximity  excuse,  even  if  valid,  would  not 
hold  as  to  South  America.  New  York  is  farther  from  Rio 
Janeiro  than  from  Hamburg,  Bremen,  Cherbourg  or  Liverpool. 
It  is  much  farther  from  New  York  to  Buenos  Ayres  than  from 
New  York  to  any  port  of  western  Europe. 

The  one  broad  justification  of  United  States  exclusiveness 
in  central  and  lower  South  America — superiority  of  interest — 
does  not  exist.  Is  there  any  particular  justification?  It  might 
be  found  in  two  new  declarations  accompanying  the  Monroe 
Doctrine,  as  follows : 

1.  That  the  United  States  will  at  once  assume  a  suzerain's 
relations  to  all   South  American  nations,  maintaining   responsi- 
bility for  them,  standing  between  them  and  the  remainder  of  the 
world,  securing  or  offering  redress  for  all  wrongs  committed  by 
them,  and  disciplining  such  of  them  as  may  be  rash  enough  to 
reject  our  control. 

2.  That  wherever  government  fails  and  disorder  or  wrong 
follows   in    South    America,    the    United   States    will    take   over 
such  territory  in   its   role  of  primate   Power — as  a  trustee  for 
civilization — and    through     annexation    and    its    own     superior 
administration  bring  about  better  conditions. 

Declaration  of  such  policies  as  these  would  be  aggression 
and  imperialism  of  the  boldest  stamp,  and  would  doubtless 
involve  us  in  no  end  of  troubles  with  South  American  states. 
But  they  would  afford  a  better  basis  for  the  Monroe  Doctrine 
than  none  at  all,  and  would  at  least  possess  the  merit  of  candor 
and  consistency  of  an  unmistakable  though  selfish  sort.  If  the 
United  States  is  going  to  fence  off  all  America  and  put  up  "no 
tresspass"  signs  against  all  comers,  we  must  on  demand  show 
at  least  a  color  of  justification.  But  we  cannot  in  decency  put 
up  the  signs,  forbidding  all  others  to  go  in  and  improve,  and 
at  the  same  time  declare  that  we  have  no  intention  of  doing1  so. 
We  cannot  assume  an  attitude  of  responsibility  for  the  selfish 
purpose  of  keeping  others  out,  and  then  repudiate  that  respon- 
sibility in  order  to  save  ourselves  the  trouble  of  meeting  it. 

The  Monroe  Doctrine,  as  applied  to  the  whole  hemisphere, 
is  to-day  the  one  example  of  a  first-class  Power  setting  its 
strength  against  progress.  There  is  abroad  to-day  a  world- 


232  SELECTED  ARTICLES  ON 

movement  which  follows  natural  law,  which  is  as  irresistible 
as  the  march  of  time  itself — a  movement  in  which  we  are  our- 
selves mightily  participating  in  various  parts  of  the  globe.  This 
movement  is  the  centralization  process,  a  political  phase  of  the 
natural  law  of  survival  of  the  fittest.  In  the  present  state  of 
international  morality,  it  does  not  mean  the  passing  of  the 
small  into  the  control  of  the  great,  for  the  doctrine  of  the 
absolute  domination  of  the  strong  over  the  weak  is  happily 
becoming  obsolete.  The  essence  of  the  law  and  of  the  move- 
ment which  springs  from  it  is  the  passing  of  the  inefficient  and 
unfit  and  the  coming  6f  the  efficient  and  worthy.  Thus  there 
is  constantly  going  on  the  transfer  of  control  from  the  incom- 
petent to  the  competent,  from  the  ineffective  to  the  effective, 
from  the  inferior  to  the  superior.  The  first  and  most  important 
function  of  government  is  uplifting  the  people  governed.  As  the 
world  is  now  constituted,  broadly  speaking,  all  governments  which 
do  this  are  insured  against  overthrow  from  without,  for  it  is  one 
of  the  glories  of  civilization  at  the  beginning  of  the  twentieth  cen- 
tury that  the  strong  do  not  prey  upon  the  weak,  so  the  weak  be 
only  competent.  But  every  government  which  is  both  weak  and 
incompetent,  which  fails  to  meet  its  responsibilities  to  its  people 
and  to  the  world,  is  inevitably  threatened  both  from  within  and 
from  without.  For  object-lessons  on  the  bright  side  of  the  pic- 
ture, it  is  only  necessary  to  cite  Switzerland,  Belgium,  the  Nether- 
lands, Denmark,  Sweden,  Norway.  For  examples  on  the  darker 
side,  it  is  only  necessary  to  cite  Hawaii,  the  causes  which  led 
to  our  ousting  of  Spain  from  Cuba  and  the  Philippines,  Euro- 
pean overrunning  of  semi-savage  Africa,  the  concert  of  all  the 
Powers  in  distressed  China.  This  principle  of  the  constantly 
increasing  responsibility  of  the  superior  and  competent  nations, 
of  the  constantly  lessening  sway,  influence  and  territory  of  the 
inferior  and  the  incompetent,  is  the  international  law  of  gravity. 
It  is  the  mightiest  force  in  the  progress  of  the  world,  the 
advancement  of  civilization,  the  preservation  of  peace.  It  is 
the  practical  application  of  the  theory  of  trusteeship  which  has 
wrought  great  works  in  Africa,  in  Asia,  in  the  islands  of  the 
sea,  and  which,  better  than  all,  has  brought  with  greater  and 
more  complex  responsibility  a  higher  morality  to  the  chief 
nations  of  the  world. 

There  is  one  exception  to  the  universality  of  the  application 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  233 

of  this  principle,  and  only  one.  This  is  found  in  the  western 
hemisphere.  The  youngest  and,  all  things  considered,  the 
greatest  and  most  progressive  of  the  Powers,  seeks  to  put  up 
the  barrier  and  prevent  the  world-movement  touching  the  shores 
of  America.  It  recognizes  the  virtue  of  the  principle  every- 
where else,  and  itself  aids  in  its  application  to  the  islands  of 
the  Pacific  and  to  China;  but  it  has  declared  it  will  not  have 
it  here.  The  United  States  stands  absolutely  alone  in  its 
championship  of  the  incompetent  against  the  competent,  in  its 
purpose  to  perpetuate  the  rule  of  the  inferior  and  to  bar  out 
that  of  the  superior.  If  Central  and  South  American  govern- 
ments were  Switzerlands,  Belgiums,  Netherlands  and  Scandi- 
navias  there  might  be  excuse  for  the  United  States  setting  up 
the  dead-line  of  its  imperious  will  for  their  protection.  But  if, 
like  the  Swiss,  the  Belgians,  the  Dutch  and  the  Scandinavians, 
these  American  governments  were  fulfilling  their  proper  mission, 
adequately  meeting  their  responsibilities,  the  protection  of  the 
United  States  would  not  be  needed.  Th^  enlightened  opinion  of 
the  world  would  protect  them,  as  it  protects  the  minor  states  of 
Europe. 

The  United  States  would  occupy  a  wholly  correct  and 
justifiable  position  if  it  assumed  that  its  great  power  and 
commanding  influence  gave  it  leadership  in  the  western  world ; 
that  it  intends  to  meet  the  responsibilities  of  its  leadership; 
that  it  will  not  sit  idly  by  whilst  a  competent  American  gov- 
ernment, one  which  has  shown  its  fitness  to  survive,  is  being 
subverted  by  the  superior  force  of  some  outsider;  that  it 
must  have  an  early  and  loud  voice  in  determining  what  is 
and  what  is  not  international  morality  on  these  continents. 
Such  attitude  would  be  irreproachable. 

Were  the  United  States  to  confine  its  South  American 
declaration  to  that  of  a  special  interest,  without  any  attempt 
to  assert  exclusiveness,  it  would  have  the  free  hand.  It  could 
meet  every  case  that  might  arise  upon  the  merits  of  that 
case.  It  could  select  the  instances  in  which  it  would  have 
nothing  to  say,  and  those  in  which  it  might  have  very  much  to  say. 
It  could  protect  the  competent,  but  would  not  be  bound  to  protect 
the  incompetent.  It  could  make  sure  that  in  every  case  to  which 
it  extended  its  interposition  it  had  right  and  reason  on  its  side. 
But  this  is  not  the  Monroe  Doctrine.  That  doctrine  sets  up  an 


234  SELECTED  ARTICLES  ON 

arbitrary,  immovable,  unvariable  rule  of  action.  It  declares  that 
not  only  may  we  of  right,  but  that  we  shall  and  must,  interfere  in 
any  and  every  case  whatsoever,  regardless  of  the  circumstances, 
where  native  control  is  threatened  from  without.  It  binds  us  to 
interference  not  only  where  interference  would  be  a  duty,  but 
where  it  would  be  a  crime.  It  ties  us  to  the  principle  that  all 
native  control,  no  matter  how  wretched  or  unstable,  must  be  per- 
petuated at  any  cost;  that  no  European  control,  no  matter  howl 
desirable  or  promising,  can  be  permitted  under  any  circumstances. 

Conditions  have  greatly  changed  since  the  Doctrine  declared 
that  European  presence  in  this  hemisphere  would  be  a  menace  to 
the  United  States.  One  European  nation  is  already  here,  with  an 
area  greater  than  our  own,  but  her  presence  is  not  a  menace.  If 
British  rule  in  Canada  were  incompetent ;  if  the  people  were 
oppressed ;  if  disorder  ensued ;  if  our  peace  and  prosperity  were 
menaced;  if  our  sensibilities  were  harassed  year  after  year,  then 
it  is  quite  probable  we  should  have  to  put  an  end  to  it.  Spain's 
rule  in  Cuba  and  Portp  Rico  was  inefficient  and  led  to  so  many 
evils  that  we  finally  ousted  her,  and  were  well  within  our  rights  in 
doing  so.  But  we  did  not  oust  her  because  she  is  of  Europe ;  nor 
because  she  is  a  monarchy ;  nor  because  she,  as  a  European  Power, 
was  a  menace  to  us.  We  ousted  her  solely  because  she  was  in- 
competent. We  have  taken  good  care  to  hold  in  our  hands  a 
power  over  the  new  Cuba  which  gives  us  the  right  to  oust  or 
correct  any  native  misrule  that  may  follow.  But  as  to  South 
America  we  have  declared  over  and  over  again  that  we  will  not 
ourselves  apply  this  wholesome  rule,  and  through  the  Monroe 
Doctrine  we  assert  that  we  will  not  permit  any  one  else  to  do  so. 

If  a  new  Prussia  or  Bavaria  were  set  up  in  Brazil,  a  new 
Italy  in  Argentina,  another  Holland  in  Patagonia,  a  new  Brit- 
tany in  Guiana,  who  can  say  that  the  result  would  constitute  a 
menace  to  the  United  States?  Would  there  not  then  be  all  the 
greater  reason  for  perpetual  peace  between  those  mother  coun- 
tries and  the  first  power  of  the  western  world?  Is  it  not  true 
that  the  wider  the  Great  Powers  spread  their  people  and  their 
trusteeship,  the  more  complex  and  diffuse  becomes  their  respon- 
sibility; that  the  farther  they  extend  their  commerce  and  their 
capital,  the  more  sure  a  perpetual  world  peace?  Would  not 
such  a  European  colonization  and  control  in  South  America 
make  for  good  to  the  United  States  in  every  way — in  greater 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  235 

stability  of  government,  in  a  higher  civilization,  in  an  uplifting 
of  the  people  now  there  and  great  accretion  to  their  numbers, 
in  broadening  markets? 

The  Monroe  Doctrine  had  its  origin  more  than  three-quar- 
ters of  a  century  ago.  There  was  justification  for  it  then,  but 
the  conditions  have  wholly  changed.  There  is  now  no  "Holy 
Alliance"  trying  to  make  absolutism  and  government  by  divine 
right  dominate  the  earth.  What  the  Monroe  Doctrine  was 
devised  to  meet  has  no  longer  to  be  met.  The  Doctrine  was  a 
move,  and  a  good  one,  in  the  international  game  of  that  hour. 
If  we  could  frighten  off  the  absolutists  with  a  "no  trespass" 
placard,  it  was  a  clever  thing  to  -do.  But  why  keep  the  placard 
up  forever,  after  the  rules  and  aim  of  the  game  have  wholly 
changed  ? 

No  other  nation  has  accepted  the  Monroe  Doctrine.  As  yet, 
it  has  never  been  affirmed  by  any  branch  of  our  government 
save  the  executive.  True,  it  is  well  supported  by  public  opin- 
ion. But  has  that  public  opinion  ever  paused  to  analyze  it  in 
its  modern  application?  Has  it  not,  rather,  placed  the  Doctrine 
upon  a  pedestal  and  made  an  idol  and  a  fetich  of  it,  without  well 
comprehending  what  it  signifies?  Have  not  the  people  fallen 
down  and  worshipped  it  as  a  sanctified  being,  and  without  the 
slightest  conception  of  whether  it  is  a  true  or  false  god,  a  tower 
of  strength  or  a  sign  of  weakness?  Foreign  statesmen  marvel 
that  the  United  States  should  persist  in  attempting  to  force  this 
rule  of  international  relationship  upon -them.  They  have  not  as 
yet  thought  it  wise  to  contest  it,  but  they  only  await  the  coming 
of  the  hour — the  occasion  when  the  attitude  of  the  United  States 
is  more  than  usually  weak,  because  without  a  basis  of  natural 
right  to  stand  upon — when  the  incentive  to  them  is  sufficiently 
important  to  make  the  contest  worth  while.  It  is  certain  as 
fate  that  the  world  will  not  go  on  forever,  mute  and  astonished 
at  our  dead-line,  but  crossing  it  not.  And  it  is  certain,  too, 
that  when  it  is  crossed,  it  will  be  crossed  at  its  weakest  point, 
and  probably  with  two  or  three  of  the  Powers  moving  side  by 
side.  What  is  the  United  States  to  do  then?  It  is  not  pleasant 
to  think  of  that  emergency.  If  we  are  in  the  right,  we  shall 
have  nothing  to  fear.  But  if  we  are  in  the  wrong — and  the 
other  Powers  will  take  care  to  select  an  instance  in  which  we 
are  in  the  wrong — it  may  not  be  so  easy  to  retreat. 


236  SELECTED  ARTICLES  ON 

One  justification  for  the  Monroe  Doctrine  often  urged  is  that 
it  keeps  European  Powers  out  of  America,  and  therefore  mini- 
mizes the  danger  of  friction  with  them.  But  it  does  not  keep 
them  out.  They  are  there  with  their  capital,  their  banks,  their 
commerce,  their  colonists.  Even  the  Monroe  Doctrine  does  not 
pretend  to  reach  that  extreme  of  exclusiveness  which  would  en- 
able the  United  States  to  stop  South  American  countries  inviting 
European  capital  and  European  people  into  their  territory.  If 
we  cannot  stop  Europeans  going  there,  we  cannot  presume  to  con- 
trol the  perfectly  natural  consequences  of  their  presence.  Yet 
the  validity  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  may  be  tested  in  precisely 
such  an  emergency.  Suppose  German  colonists  in  large  numbers 
settle  in  some  South  American  country.  They  gain  a  numerical 
majority  in  a  province.  They  own  nine-tenths  of  the  property, 
pay  nine-tenths  of  the  taxes  and  constitute  the  wholesome  intel- 
ligent part  of  the  community.  Yet  they  are  denied  suffrage ; 
are  denied  participation  in  the  local  government;  are  ruled  by 
corrupt,  oppressive,  arrogant  natives ;  life  and  property  are  in- 
secure ;  the  colonists  appeal  to  Fatherland  for  help,  and  help  is 
sent  them ;  there  is  trouble  between  Germany  and  the  native  gov- 
ernment ;  and,  when  it  is  over,  the  Kaiser  establishes  a  colony  and 
gives  it  the  protection  of  the  German  flag.  The  Monroe  Doctrine 
requires  the  United  States  to  interpose  and  say  this  shall  not  be  ; 
that  we  will  not  permit  these  German  colonists  to  go  under  the 
wing  of  the  Fatherland.  What  right  have  we  to  say  anything  of 
the  sort,  and  what  would  be  Germany's  righteous  answer  to  our 
interposition?  What  would  be  the  opinion  of  the  world  as  to  the 
merits  of  such  a  controversy?  Should  we  not  be  asked  where 
are  our  interests,  our  colonists,  our  capital,  the  rights  of  our  citi- 
zens, that  give  us  license  to  interfere? 

Let  us  suppose  that  Italian  colonists  are  so  badly  treated  in 
some  South  American  country,  and  Italy  herself  so  wantonly  in- 
sulted when  she  attempts  to  secure  redress,  that  war  follows. 
Surely  we  have  no  divine  right  to  prevent  Italy  exercising  her 
sovereign  prerogative  of  going  to  war  when  she  has  been  wronged 
and  flouted.  After  victory  in  a  costly  conflict,  Italy  may  find 
territory  the  only  available  indemnity.  We  had  no  right  to  inter- 
vene to  stop  the  war;  but  now  the  Monroe  Doctrine  requires  us 
to  intervene  to  deprive  Italy  of  the  natural  and  proper  recom- 
pense for  her  sacrifices. 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  237 

Let  it  be  supposed,  again,  that  Scandinavian  colonists  become 
the  numerical  majority  in  the  citizenship  of  a  South  American 
country.  On  some  account,  such  as  threatened  troubles  with  some 
powerful  and  warlike  neighbors,  through  plebiscite  a  majority 
of  the  voters  of  that  country  elect  to  attach  themselves  to  Sweden 
and  Norway  as  a  colony,  hoping  thereby  to  obtain  national  se- 
curity. Sweden  and  Norway  accept  the  responsibility.  But  the 
Monroe  Doctrine  requires  the  United  States  to  interpose.  There 
may  be  no  Americans  or  American  interests  in  the  colony.  The 
union  may  be  a  consummation  devoutly  to  be  wished  by  all 
friends  of  peace  and  progress.  It  is  not  aggression  that  is  pro- 
posed, or  seizure  by  force,  but  an  amicable  arrangement.  Never- 
theless, the  Monroe  Doctrine  compels  the  United  States,  for  con- 
sistency's sake,  to  interpose;  to  say  to  the  colonists  they  shall 
not  do  as  they  wish  with  their  own ;  to  say  to  the  Scandinavian 
governments  that  their  activities,  praiseworthy  though  they  are 
admitted  to  be,  are  restrained  by  our  will  as  expressed  by  Mr. 
James  Monroe  in  the  year  1823. 

To  such  lengths  are  we  led  when  we  adopt  as  our  guide  a  rule 
made  a  long  time  ago  for  an  emergency  then  existing  but  now 
unknown;  a  rule  which  not  only  commits  us  to  a  prescribed  line 
of  conduct  for  ourselves,  but  to  the  attempt  to  prescribe  the  con- 
duct of  our  co-equals.  While  in  our  pride  and  prosperity  we  go 
confidently  along,  following  the  traditional  path  marked  out  in 
1823,  problems  are  arising  in  South  America.  European  emigra- 
tion, European  capital  are  going  thither.  Difficulties,  friction, 
complications,  exasperations  will  arise.  We  expect  to  have  a 
powerful  voice  in  any  political  rearrangement  of  that  continent 
which  may  ensue ;  and  it  is  a  vital,  a  living  question  whether  we 
are  going  to  speak  as  of  this  day,  as  practical  men  at  the  begin- 
ning of  the  twentieth  century,  or  whether  our  voice  is  to  come  out 
of  the  distant  past ;  whether  we  are  to  permit  ourselves  to  be  in- 
volved in  trouble  by  an  effort  to  maintain  an  antiquated  doctrine 
which  requires  that  we  treat  all  cases  according  to  a  hard  and 
fast  rule,  or  whether  we  shall  put  in  its  place  the  modern,  work- 
able policy  of  the  free  hand  which  may  be  expressed  in  three 
words,  "Primacy,  not  exclusiveness." 

No  nation  now  presumes  to  stake  off  a  large  part  of  the  world 
outside  its  own  sovereignty  as  reserved  for  its  exclusive  activities. 
If  it  attempts  activity  beyond  its  own  boundaries,  and  beyond  the 


23S  SELECTED  ARTICLES  ON 

field  where  circumstances  give  it  special  rights,  it  does  so  frankly 
upon  the  basis  of  open  rivalry — that  all  have  the  right  to  com- 
pete, and  competition  must  be  adjusted  on  the  principle  of  "give 
and  take."  Nearly  all  the  nations  have  participated  in  the  sub- 
division of  Africa.  Nearly  all  have  taken  a  hand  in  Asia.  The 
United  States  has  as  much  right  in  China  as  Russia  or  England, 
if  our  policy  is  such  as  to  send  us  thither.  As  Theodore  Roose- 
velt so  well  said  at  Minneapolis  last  September:  "The  United 
States  must  not  shrink  from  playing  its  part  among  the  great 
nations.  We  cannot  avoid  hereafter  having  duties  to  do  in  the 
face  of  other  nations."  The  United  States  is  not  shrinking.  We 
have  been  in  China.  We  are  in  the  great  Philippine  archipelago 
with  our  sovereignty,  and  we  shall  build  a  new  nation  there, 
nearly  twice  as  far  from  our  shores  as  Brazil  is  from  Germany 
or  Italy.  We  are  more  or  less  a  factor  in  what  may  be  called  all 
the  world  politics  of  the  times.  We  could  not  keep  out  if  we 
would,  and  we  would  not  if  we  could.  Wherever  we  go  we  en- 
counter no  arbitrary  dead-lines,  no  trespassing  placards.  It  is  not 
wholly  consistent  for  us  to  play  the  game  with  a  free  hand  in 
Europe,  in  Asia,  in  the  islands  of  the  sea,  wherever  we  wish,  and 
at  the  same  time  sit  as  the  dog  in  the  manger  in  all  the  great 
region  to  the  south  of  us. 


Century.  87:233-41.  December,  1913 

Is  There  a  Sound  American  Foreign  Policy?  W:  Morgan  Shuster 

Conceding  perfectly  that  it  was  a  splendid  stroke  of  diplomacy 
to  frighten  land-hungry  monarchies  away  from  South  and  Cen- 
tral America  at  a  time  when  that  territory  was  politically  un- 
formed and  in  a  state  of  chaos,  the  question  remains  whether 
to-day,  on  impartial  analysis,  any  reason  exists  for  continuing 
such  a  stand.  The  following  inquiries  should  aid  in  reaching  a 
conclusion : 

1.  Is   the   Monroe   Doctrine  based   on   any  great  moral   or 
ethical  ground? 

2.  Is  it  of  any  strategical  advantage  to  the  United  States? 

3.  Does    it   cement    friendly    relations    between    the    United 
States  and  other  great  nations? 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  239 

4.  Does  it  create  friendly  political  bonds  between  the  United 
States  and  the  South  and  Central  American  countries? 

5.  Does  it  aid  those  countries  to  maintain  stable  and  en- 
lightened governments,  and  thus  assure  to  the  world  peace,  order, 
and  justice  within  their  borders? 

6.  Does  it  tend  to  make  those  countries  keep  faith  in  their 
financial  relations  and  engagements  with  the  rest  of  the  world? 

7.  Does  it  raise  American  prestige  and  create  respect  for  the 
American  citizen  in  those  countries? 

8.  Does  it  benefit  American  trade  and  commerce  with  those 
countries  or  any  other  place? 

The  answer  to  every  one  of  these  questions  must  be  an  em- 
phatic no,  except  to  the  second,  to  which  a  modified  no  may  be 
returned. 

1.  The  United  States  never  assumed  moral  or  ethical  grounds 
in  warning  Europe  against  forcible  colonization  in  the  western 
hemisphere.     It    announced    a    policy    then    believed    to    be    one 
of  necessary  self-protection.     There  was  no  other  principle  in- 
volved.   The  United  States,  on  the  contrary,  has  itself  gone  into 
the  eastern  hemisphere  and  colonized,  with  the  avowed  intention 
of  bettering  political  and  economic  conditions. 

2.  There-  is  no   strategical  advantage  in  keeping  European 
nations  out  of  the  western  hemisphere,   except  as  to  the  zone 
of  danger  of  attack  on  the  Panama  Canal,  and  if  the  Monroe 
Doctrine  disappeared  to-morrow,  it  would  still  be  the  right  of 
the  United   States  to  take  steps   against  the  gathering  of  any 
armed  force  which  might  threaten  the  canal,  either  on  territory 
now  forming  independent  states  or  on  adjacent  colonies  already 
possessed  by  European  nations.     There  would  be  no  need  to  in- 
voke the  Monroe   Doctrine  against  any  demonstration  of  that 
kind,  now  or  at  any  time  in  the  future. 

3.  Far  from  cementing  friendly  relations,  the  Monroe  Doc- 
trine is  considered  by  Europe  to  be  an  offensive  display  of  Ameri- 
can arrogance,  dictated  by  motives  purely  selfish,  however  futile 
might  be  the  effort  to  follow  them  up. 

4.  The  Monroe  Doctrine,  and  especially  certain  official  in- 
terpretations which  have  recently  been  put  on  it,  is  genuinely 
feared  and  hated  by  South  Americans,  whatever  professions  may 
be  made  by  some.    I  happened  to  be  in  Buenos  Aires  during  the 
summer  of  1912  when  the  news  of  the  Lodge  resolution,  adopted 


240  SELECTED  ARTICLES  ON 

by  the  Senate  as  a  result  of  the  Magdalena  Bay  discussion,  was 
received.  I  can  testify  personally  that  this  officially  sanctioned 
interpretation  or  extension  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  aroused  there 
great  indignation  against  the  United  States,  despite  the  fact  that 
the  Argentine  people  are  naturally  and  normally  most  friendly 
toward  Americans.  That  this  resolution  produced  similar  feel- 
ings in  other  South  American  countries  was  amply  confirmed 
later. 

5.  That  it  could  never  aid  the  people  of  any  nation,  where 
the  temptation  to  pay  personal  politics  is  ever  present  and  strong, 
to  know  that  they  might  riot  with  comparative  immunity  from 
punishment,  seems  self-evident.     The  whole  tendency  of  such  a 
situation  is  to  foster  national  irresponsibility. 

6.  The  answer  to  the  fifth  question  applies  equally  well  to  the 
sixth.    The  belief  that  the  Monroe  Doctrine  could  be  invoked  to 
protect  them  in  the  last  extremity  has  steadily  encouraged  ex- 
travagance and  reckless  financial   engagements   on  the  part  of 
several  Latin-American  nations.    The  appeal  made  last  April  by 
Guatemala  that  the  United  States  should  stand  between  her  and 
her  European  creditors  is  exactly  in  point. 

Could  there,  in  fact,  be  a  greater  temptation  to  small  nations 
to  be  reckless  in  their  dealings  with  European  lenders  than  to 
have  the  United  States  stand  guard  over  their  territorial  in- 
tegrity at  all  hazards?  In  addition,  the  American  people  thereby 
virtually  undertake  the  thankless  and  noisome  task  of  collecting 
Europe's  debts.  It  is  well  known  that  the  American  Government 
will  go  to  lengths  for  European  creditors  to  which  it  would  re- 
fuse to  go  for  its  own  citizens.  One  result  of  this  is  that  Ameri- 
can bankers  have  always  been  loath  to  finance  any  Latin- 
American  business,  public  or  private,  unless  there  was  a 
substantial  participation  therein  by  European  capital,  in  order 
that  there  might  always  be,  in  case  of  necessity,  a  club  with  which 
to  beat  the  United  States  Government  into  more  vigorous  asser- 
tion of  the  lenders'  or  investors'  rights.  Could  there  be  a  more 
humiliating  position  for  Americans? 

Meanwhile  the  bankers  of  Europe  laugh  at  our  ingenuousness, 
and  give  thanks  that  there  is  a  cheap  and  ready  method  of  get- 
ting their  Latin-American  chestnuts  pulled  out  of  the  fire. 

7.  In  considering  the  question  of  American  prestige  as  af- 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  241 

fected  by  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  it  must  be  remembered  that  one's 
reputation  is  always  determined,  justly  or  unjustly,  by  others. 
Not  by  its  own  consciousness  of  right  is  the  standing  of  the 
United  States  fixed  in  the  eyes  of  the  Latin-American  peoples, 
but  by  their  opinions  as  to  the  real  motives  underlying  the  Ameri- 
can political  attitude  toward  them.  It  is  true  that  the  American 
nation  is  constantly  misrepresented  in  the  western  hemisphere, 
but  it  is  the  Monroe  Doctrine  which  gives  the  handle  to  those 
who  wish  to  create  suspicion  and  distrust. 

In  the  United  States  there  are  already  some  who  expect,  and 
in  South  and  Central  America  there  are  many  who  fear,  the 
coming  of  a  vast  American  federation,  stretching  from  Alaska 
to  Cape  Horn,  with  every  range  of  climate  and  production,  but 
with  a  governing  and  directing  nucleus  situate  in  the  north  tem- 
perate zone,  represented  by  appointive  executives  or  elective  offi- 
cials and  political  agents,  as  the  local  situation  may  indicate,  but 
all  subject  to  the  quickening  impulses  of  those  in  power  at 
Washington. 

A  dream  it  might  be  for  an  Alexander  or  a  Napoleon,  but 
a  ludicrous  nightmare  in  this  twentieth  century.  Fortunately,  it 
exists  principally  in  the  perfervid  imaginations  of  persons  of 
radical  anti-American  tendencies ;  but  even  so,  it  is  a  theme  with 
which  to  excite  antipathy,  a  horn  on  which  to  blow  a  call  to 
unite  against  the  feared  and  hated  "imperialists"  from  the  North. 

8.  There  can  be  no  doubt  that  the  feelings  of  Latin- Ameri- 
cans toward  the  Monroe  Doctrine  do  not  help  American  trade 
and  commerce  with  them,  either  on  sentimental  lines  or  in  a 
practical  way.  Other  things  being  nearly  equal,  a  business  man 
prefers  to  deal  with  those  toward  whom  he  feels  friendly;  in 
many  cases  he  will  even  put  up  with  something  a  little  different 
from  what  he  actually  desires  in  order  to  do  business  with  a 
friend.  The  personal  equation  plays  a  specially  large  part  in  busi- 
ness with  Latin-America,  and  to  that  extent  American  trade 
competitors  are  actually  handicapped. 

Then  the  effect  of  the  American  Government's  policy  of  hesi- 
tating to  assert  vigorously  purely  American  financial  claims,  lest 
it  touch  an  already  irritated  spot,  is  of  course  to  give  European 
bankers  and  investors  an  additional  advantage  in  the  South 
American  field. 


242  SELECTED  ARTICLES  ON 

Viewed  from  every  point,  therefore,  this  unique  American 
foreign  policy  does  not  stand  forth  as  ethically  sound,  just,  wise, 
practicable,  or  expedient. 

There  remain  only  two  other  questions  :  Could  it  be  main- 
tained, if  it  should  actually  be  defied?  Is  it  practical  to  modify 
or  drop  it? 

As  to  the  first  question,  it  must  be  remembered  that  the  Euro- 
pean Powers,  even  Great  Britain,  have  never  accepted  this  policy 
save  at  times  when  it  was  convenient  to  tolerate  it.  It  has  es- 
caped serious  challenge  thus  far  principally  because  the  Euro- 
pean nations  have  been  torn  by  fears  and  jealousies  of  one  an- 
other, and  this  state  has  served  to  keep  active  attention  focused 
nearer  home.  There  is  no  reason  to  think,  however,  that  before 
the  dream  of  universal  disarmament  comes  true,  some  powerful 
nation  or  group  of  nations  will  not  deliberately  deny  the  United 
States'  vaguely  derived,  loudly  proclaimed,  contingent,  but  ex- 
clusive, equity  in  every  square  mile  of  territory  in  the  western 
hemisphere,  which,  through  the  partial  or  complete  breaking 
down  of  the  existing  forms  of  government,  may  become  exposed 
to  intervention  and  occupation. 

The  world's  present  distribution  of  territory  and  inhabitants 
cannot  last  forever.  The  rapidly  increasing  population  of  certain 
European  and  Asiatic  nations,  the  additional  room  which  will  be 
absolutely  required  by  them,  the  growing  trade  and  increasing 
interests  of  Europe  in  South  America,  the  ever-present  land- 
hunger — all  these  factors,  in  the  face  of  the  vast  stretches  of  a 
rich  undeveloped  and  sparsely  settled  continent,  will  inevitably 
bring  it  about  that  hitherto  rival  nations  will  recognize  their 
common  welfare,  call  a  truce  among  themselves,  and  test  this 
vague  suzerainty  of  the  United  States  at  some  convenient  time 
and  place.  Pretexts  for  aggressive  action  will  never  be  lacking. 

When  the  day  of  trial  approaches,  the  American  people  will 
receive  scant  warning.  Ex-President  Roosevelt  recognized  this 
when  he  said,  "The  Doctrine  will  be  respected  as  long  as  we  have 
a  first-class,  efficient  navy — not  very  much  longer."  But  did  he 
mean  a  navy  strong  enough  to  defeat  England's,  or  Germany's, 
or  the  English  and  French  fleets  combined? 

Our  national  hat  is  already  in  the  ring.  When  a  serious  move 
is  made  to  kick  it  out,  the  American  people  will  be  suddenly  faced 
by  the  most  tremendous  crisis  in  their  history.  There  will  be 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  243 

only  two  alternatives  :  to  fight  an  appalling  war,  probably  against 
overwhelming  odds ;  or  to  retire  under  pressure  in  national 
humiliation. 

It  is  useless  to  claim  that  the  United  States  could  count  on 
England  for  aid.  She  has  made  her  alliances  based  on  what  are 
deemed  her  imperative  geographical  and  political  necessities.  To 
her,  in  this  matter,  the  United  States  is  a  formidable  trade  rival 
pursuing  a  somewhat  fatuous  political  course. 

Despite  the  higher  instincts  of  man's  intellectual  side, — love  of 
peace  and  justice,  abhorrence  of  war's  cruelty  and  suffering, — 
the  attitude  of  any  large  number  of  people  gathered  into  a  nation 
has  always  been  principally,  if  not  conspicuously,  influenced  by 
purely  material  considerations. 

For  example,  England  dared  to  make  no  small  part  of  the 
world  her  empire  because  of  her  geographical  isolation,  her  im- 
munity to  attack  by  land.  This  powerful  sense  of  security  at 
home  had  much  to  do  with  shaping  her  policies.  France,  on  the 
other  hand,  though  exposed  on  every  side  by  land  and  sea,  plays 
her  important  part  through  faith  in  her  wealth  and  in  the  en- 
forced assistance  of  England  should  she  ever  again  be  seriously 
threatened  with  invasion.  Germany  is  similarly  exposed  to  at- 
tack, and,  if  anything,  more  so  than  France.  Her  coasts  are 
within  easy  striking  distance  of  England's  superior  navy;  her 
frontiers  are  menaced  on  one  side  by  the  French  army  and  on  the 
other  by  Russia's  formidable  forces.  Only  southward  may  she 
look  for  some  respite  from  the  strain  of  constant  preparedness. 
Germany  has  been  so  occupied  in  knitting  herself  together  and 
insuring  continued  existence  as  an  empire  that  she  has  had  little 
time  to  acquire  important  colonies.  Russia  lies  like  a  colossus 
across  northern  Europe  and  Asia,  protected,  except  from  attack 
by  Germany  and  Austria,  by  climatic  conditions  and  the  nature 
of  her  frontiers.  She  easily  holds  her  western  boundaries  against 
Europe  while  extending  her  flag  and  influence  eastward  over  Asia 
until  she  touches  Japanese  interests  in  the  north  or  threatens 
India  in  the  south.  Italy's  passive  attitude  in  European  affairs 
is  largely  due  to  her  exposed  position  on  the  Mediterranean. 

With  regard  to  the  United  States,  her  mainland  territory  is 
fortunately  several  thousand  miles  from  the  natural  military  and 
naval  bases  of  the  European  Powers.  This  was  her  great  safe- 
guard in  the  early  days  of  the  republic,  and  it  has  never  ceased 


244  SELECTED  ARTICLES  ON 

to  be.  Virtually  free  by  nature  from  serious  danger  of  land 
invasion,  she  has  grown  to  be  a  world  Power  through  prolonged 
peace  and  industry,  with  little  of  the  strain  and  drain  entailed  by 
the  maintenance  of  immense  military  establishments  such  as  have 
economically  weakened  Europe. 

But  this  gracious  isolation  ceases  to  aid  the  American  flag  and 
prestige  when  the  United  States  indulges  in  irritating  challenges, 
which,  if  accepted,  would  necessitate  the  issue  being  decided 
far  beyond  her  own  coasts.  Off  Sandy  Hook  or  the  Panama 
Canal,  the  American  fleet  may  be  doubly  efficient,  with  shore  bat- 
teries behind  it  and  harbors  and  supplies  within  easy  reach.  But 
what  becomes  of  this  advantage  of  geographical  isolation  from 
European  naval  bases  if  a  hostile  fleet  shall  defy  the  Monroe 
Doctrine  off  Rio  de  Janeiro  or  Curityba  or  at  Montevideo?  Has 
the  United  States  in  such  case  any  strategical  advantage  at  all? 
In  other  words,  is  the  American  navy  capable  of  defending 
against  attack  by  one  or  more  great  world  Powers  not  only  the 
Atlantic,  Pacific,  and  gulf  coast-lines  of  the  United  States,  but 
the  immense  coast-line  of  another  vast  continent?  The  question 
may  well  cause  reflection  to  the  most  ardent  jingo. 

Unless  the  American  people  are  determined  on  building  and 
maintaining  an  absolutely  commanding  fleet,  the  assertion  of  the 
Monroe  Doctrine  under  modern  conditions  becomes  somewhat 
blatant. 

To  understand  better  how  the  nations  of  Europe  regard  it, 
let  us  suppose  that  just  before  the  Spanish -American  War  was 
declared,  and  while  Spain  was  endeavoring  to  subdue  the  Filipino 
rebellion,  it  had  occurred  to  Japan  to  proclaim  her  aversion  to 
the  taking  of  the  Philippine  Islands  by  any  other  western  power. 
Is  there  any  doubt  as  to  the  way  that  the  United  States  would 
have  regarded  such  a  declaration? 

It  would  be  prudent  for  the  American  people  to  study  carefully 
and  analyze  a  foreign  policy  which  is  a  constant  menace  to  their 
pride  and  tranquillity;  which  exacts  care,  risk,  responsibility,  and 
expenditure  from  its  sponsor,  and  renders  up  only  shadowy  ad- 
vantages. Common  sense  and  political  strategy  unite  in  de- 
manding that  the  false  and  unnecessary  features  of  the  Monroe 
Doctrine  be  abandoned  before  some  sudden  shift  in  the  world's 
political  balance  may  compel  it.  Otherwise  red  danger  looms 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  245 

large  for  the  United  States  the  day  when  some  great  Powers 
compose  their  fancied  difficulties  and  forget  old^animosities. 

There  always  remains,  of  course,  the  question  how  the  United 
States  could  modify  or  withdraw  from  certain  features  and  corol- 
laries of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  without  appearing  either  to  show 
weakness  or  to  invite  and  sanction  hostile  aggression  against 
Latin- American  countries.  The  problem  is  a  complicated  one ; 
but  if  the  American  people  once  became  convinced  that  a  change 
of  policy  should  be  had,  the  means  and  the  opportunity  for  a 
President  to  make  a  "new  interpretation"  would  not  be  hard  to 
discover. 

It  should  be  possible  to  make  plain  to  our  fellow-Americans 
to  the  south  that  while  the  United  States  desires  to  build  up  and 
maintain  with  them  the  most  intimate  and  cordial  political  and 
trade  relations,  based  on  genuine  friendship  and  mutual  confi- 
dence and  respect,  it  should  be  clearly  understood  that  the  United 
States  recognizes  the  most  complete  sovereignty  and  freedom 
of  action  on  the  part  of  all  existing  independent  nations  in  the 
western  hemisphere,  including  both  their  privileges  and  their 
liabilities  according  to  the  law  of  nations,  but  that  because  of 
propinquity  and  similarities  in  institutions  and  forms  of  govern- 
ment, the  United  States  has  an  inherent  special  interest  in  any 
dispute,  controversy,  or  change  of  sovereignty  in  which  any 
American  nation  or  portion  thereof  might  become  involved,  and 
therefore  expects  that  interest  to  be  considered  in  any  settle- 
ment which  might  be  made  of,  or  any  consequences  which  might 
arise  from,  any  such  dispute,  controversy,  or  change. 

The  question  of  how  a  change  may  be  brought  about  in  the 
eyes  of  the  world,  and  particularly  with  the  Latin- American 
nations,  regarding  the  real  attitude  of  the  United  States  in  its 
foreign  relations  and  line  of  conduct  may  well  engage  the  serious 
attention  of  all  thinking  Americans.  It  is  a  duty  which  should 
not  be  evaded  because  of  its  difficulty  or  the  obscurity  which 
surrounds  the  exact  degree  of  harm  resulting  or  danger  threat- 
ening from  the  actual  state  of  affairs. 

Even  in  acting  upon  the  Monroe  Doctrine  itself  the  United 
States  has  not  appeared  to  be  entirely  consistent.  The  alacrity 
with  which  American  marines  were  poured  into  Nicaragua,  a 
tiny  nation,  contrasted  with  the  indecision  which  has  been  plainly 


246  SELECTED  ARTICLES  ON 

and  not  unnaturally,  shown  regarding  a  somewhat  similar  condi- 
tion of  affairs  in  a  neighboring  country  of  much  greater  resisting 
powers,  must  inevitably  make  even  the  one  American  foreign 
policy  smack  somewhat  of  opportunism  in  unbiased  foreign  eyes. 
Is  it  not  wise  to  reshape  a  policy  to  meet  greatly  changed  con- 
ditions while  it  is  still  intact  and  even  unthreatened  ? 


Fortnightly  Review.  70: 1013-26.  December,  1901 

Some  Aspects  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine.     Sydney  Brooks 

If  Americans  could  only  for  a  little  while  free  themselves 
from  the  bondage  to  rhetoric  and  sentiment,  and  collect  them- 
selves for  the  effort  of  seeing  things  as  they  are,  they  would,  I 
believe,  recognise  that  to  abandon  the  Monroe  Doctrine  would 
entail  as  little  harm  to  their  political  and  material  interests  as  to 
their  moral.  In  their  present  condition  they  either  cannot  or 
will  not  see,  at  any  rate  they  do  not  acknowledge,  what  are  the 
obvious  effects  of  their  cherished  policy  on  South  America.  The 
Monroe  Doctrine  perpetuates  in  South  America  the  predominance 
of  a  religion  which  Americans  detest,  of  a  race  which  they  de- 
sjpise,  andTof  a  system  of  government  which  in  all  but  the  name 
is  a  flat  negation  of  everything  America  stands  for.  It  rules 
out  Teutonic  civilisation  in  favour  of  the  religious  and  military 
dispositions  beyond  which,  after  eighty  years'  trial,  the  Spanish 
and  Portuguese  mestizos  have  proved  their  incapacity  to  advance. 
In  the  name  of  Republicanism  it  condemns  a  whole  continent 
to  weakness,  backwardness,  and  anarchy.  It  precludes  all  moral 
progress  as  decisively  as  it  hampers  material  development;  it 
blocks  the  way  to  all  that  might  make  South  America  stable 
and  prosperous,  that  might  open  up  what  are  perhaps  the  richest 
untapped  markets  in  the  world,  that  might  stimulate  the  Ameri- 
cans themselves  by  contact  with  neighbours  on  their  own  level. 
On  almost  every  page  of  Professor  A.  H.  Keane's  "Central  and 
South  America,"  though  the  Monroe  Doctrine  is  never  mentioned, 
one  finds  the  traces  of  its  blighting  influence.  Here  is  a  colossal 
continent  with  a  destiny  that  should  rival  Russia's,  magnificently 
watered,  inhabitated  by  Caucasians,  all  of  it  sparsely  populated 
and  much  of  it  barely  explored,  teeming  with  mineral  and  agri- 
cultural wealth,  and  yet  lying  half -derelict,  the  prey  of  revolu- 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  247 

tionary  turbulence — and  all  for  lack  of  a  strong  government  that 
would  ensure  to  capital  the  fruits  of  its  enterprise. 

As  things  are,  there  appears  to  be  nothing  in  front  of  South 
America  but  a  cycle  of  revolutions.  The  hope  of  a  stable,  orderly 
rule  ever  being  evolved  under  the  presidency  of  half-caste  attor- 
neys and  guerilla  chieftains  is  one  that,  after  the  experience  of 
the  last  eighty  years,  no  one  entertains.  From  Patagonia  to  Pan- 
ama there  broods  over  the  continent  the  spirit  of  insecurity, 
disorder,  and  insurrectionary  violence.  There  is  no  real  guaran- 
tee, except  perhaps  in  the  case  of  Chili  and  Argentina,  that  what 
is  now  happening  in  Colombia  and  Venezuela  may  not  to-morrow 
be  the  fate  of  any  and  every  South  American  state.  Such  a  guar- 
antee can  only  be  forthcoming  under  a  firm,  well-established  and 
responsible  government,  and  no  such  government  is  possible  un- 
less and  until  either  the  United  States  or  some  European  Power 
takes  the  matter  in  hand.  But  the  Americans,  at  all  events  for 
the  present,  have  no  intention  of  expanding  southwards.  They 
do  not  colonise  South  America  themselves ;  they  are  not  reserving 
it  for  any  private  schemes  of  aggrandizement;  they  barely  even 
trade  with  it.  Such  benefit  as  they  derive  from  warning-off  Eu- 
rope from  South  America  is  altogether  indirect,  and  this  again 
differentiates  Pan-Americanism  from  such  an  honestly  self-seek- 
ing and  tangible  movement  as  Pan-Germanism.  When  Americans 
drop  declamation  on  the  subject  and  condescend  to  argument, 
their  reasoning  runs  substantially  as  follows : — "It  is  to  our  inter- 
ests to  keep  South  America  impotent  and  in  a  restless  state  of 
anarchy  because  only  so  can  we  maintain  the  hegemony  of  the 
American  continent  without  trouble  or  expense  to  ourselves. 
Under  existing  conditions  our  position  is  invulnerable ;  nobody 
can  conquer  America,  and  we  are  consequently  spared  the  burden 
of  huge  armaments  and  their  inevitable  drain  on  the  productive 
energy  of  the  people.  But  once  admit  that  European  Powers 
have  the  right  to  absorb  South  America  at  will,  and  the  whole 
situation  is  changed:  We  should  then  be  no  longer  the  sovereign 
of  the  new  world;  our  'fiat'  would  be  'law'  only  within  the  precise 
confines  of  the  United  States,  and  the  national  prestige  and 
authority  would  be  proportionately  diminished.  More  than  that. 
By  allowing  our  rivals  in  peace  and  our  possible  enemies  in  war  to 
establish  themselves  at  our  very  doors,  we  provide  them  gratui- 
tously with  a  jumping-off  ground  from  which  they  may  be 


248  SELECTED  ARTICLES  ON 

tempted  to  spring  at  our  throat,  and  we  lay  upon  ourselves  the 
necessity  of  guarding  against  their  encroachments  by  shouldering 
the  dead-weight  of  militarism,  to  our  long  and  happy  exemption 
from  which  the  nation  owes  much  of  its  prosperity." 

To  decide  how  far  these  arguments  are  sound  and  how  far 
illusions,  it  is  almost  enough  just  to  glance  at  the  map.  The 
United  States  is  already  girdled  on  three  sides  with  a  chain  of 
foreign  holdings,  one  of  them  all  but  as  large  as  herself  with  a 
contiguous  boundary  line  of  over  3,000  miles.  Yet  no  American 
considers  that  Canada,  or  Great  Britain  through  Canada,  is  in  any 
way  a  menace  to  the  security  of  the  United  States.  If  through 
all  these  years  the  possession  of  Canada,  Newfoundland,  Ber- 
muda, Jamaica,  the  Lesser  Antilles,  Trinidad,  Belize  and  British 
Guiana  by  Great  Britain ;  of  Guadeloupe  and  its  dependencies, 
Martinique,  St.  Pierre  and  Miquelon  and  French  Guiana  by 
France;  of  St.  Thomas  and  Santa  Cruz  by  Denmark,  and  of 
Dutch  Guiana  by  Holland — has  been  found  compatible  with  the 
maintenance  by  Americans  of  a  regular  army  of  21,000  men 
and  of  a  navy  third  or  fourth  rate  in  size  whatever  it  may  be  in 
quality,  with  what  force  can  it  be  argued  that  the  acquisition,  let 
us  say,  of  a  portion  of  Brazil  by  Germany,  3,000  miles  at  least 
from  American  territory,  would  endanger  the  United  States  or 
necessitate  the  addition  of  a  single  man  or  a  single  ship  to  the 
national  defences  ?  The  very  conditions  which  Americans  picture 
to  themselves  as  a  calamity  to  be  warded  off  at  any  cost,  do  as 
a  matter  of  fact,  and  in  all  their  essentials  exist  at  this  moment 
without  causing  them  the  slightest  anxiety.  That  is  to  say,  the 
country  is,  and  has  been  for  a  hundred  years,  "threatene'd"  by 
a  score  of  fortified  positions  and  naval  stations  held  by  foreign 
powers  almost  within  sight  of  the  American  coast.  And  if 
these,  in  spite  of  the  manifest  fitness  of  many  of  them  as  bases 
of  operations,  can  be  regarded  without  uneasiness,  can  be  held 
guiltless  of  harbouring  any  peril  to  the  United  States,  wherein 
would  lurk  the  danger  of  the  annexation  by  a  European  Power 
of  Patagonia  or  Uruguay?  One  may  even  go  further,  and  con- 
ceive the  whole  of  South  America  proper,  from  the  Bay  of 
Panama  to  Cape  Horn,  partitioned  among  the  Governments  of 
Europe  without  being  able  to  say  where  or  how  the  safety  of  the 
United  States  would  be  jeopardised.  The  invulnerability  of 
America  would  be  no  less  complete  then  than  now,  her  power 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  249 

would  be  just  as  great,  her  resources  in  no  ways  diminish,  her 
frontiers  as  much  or  as  little  exposed  as  they  are  to-day.     It 
can,  I  believe,  be  shown  that  even  the  danger  of  a  conflict  would 
be  lessened,  and  that  Europe's  anxiety  to  keep  the  peace  with 
America  would  be  considerably  more  pronounced  than  one  can 
pretend  it  to  be  at  this  moment.    For  however  much  the  various 
Powers  might  quarrel  among  themselves  in  South  America,  they 
would  all  be  at  one  in  desiring  the  friendship  of  their  mighty 
neighbour  to  the  north.     Self-interest  would  constrain  them  with 
a  compelling  force  there  could  be  no  escaping,  not  to  risk  their 
colonies  by  provoking  a  conflict  with  the  Usited  States ;  and  the 
possibility  of  an  anti- American  coalition  with  which  Americans 
torture  their  imaginations,  should  they  abandon  the  Monroe  Doc- 
trine, is  the  veriest  bugaboo.    But  it  is  said  that  American  pres- 
tige would  be  damaged.    Would  it?    The  prestige,  if  one  can  call 
it  such,  that  the  Monroe  Doctrine  confers  upon  the  United  States, 
is  that  of  the  dog  in  -the  manger  simply.    It  produces  in  Europe 
nothing  but  exasperation,  enmity  and  a  maddening  desire,  which 
one  of  these  days  will  be  uncontrollable,  to  combine  for  a  de- 
cisive rush;  and  even  among  the  South  American  states  them- 
selves it  has  aroused  a  suspicious  resentment  which  its  occasional 
usefulness  as  a  diplomatic  cloak  has  by  no  means  allayed.    Among 
the  many  hallucinations  which  surround  the  Monroe  Doctrine, 
none  has  been  more  curious  than  the  belief  which  Americans 
held  quite  seriously  up  to  a  year  or  two  ago,  that  it  was  a  sort 
of  self-acting  barrier  against  European  "aggression,"  and  had  only 
to  be  advertised  as  such  to  be  automatically  effective.     The  idea 
that  they  might  one  day  be  called  upon  to  fight  for  it  has  only 
j  ust  occurred  to  them ;  but,  having  occurred  to  them,  they  at  once 
and  with  remarkable  intensity  begin  the  building  of  a  powerful 
fleet.    This,  to  be  sure,  is  only  common-sense,  but  it  carries  with 
it  an  inference  which  Americans  should  lose  no  time  in  digesting. 
The  Monroe  Doctrine,  instead  of  being  a  protection  against  "the 
burden  of  militarism,"  invites  it.     Whether  the  appearance  of 
Europe  on  South  American  soil  would  entail  on  the  United  States 
any  considerable  addition  to  her  fighting  strength  is  at  least  ex- 
tremely arguable.     What  is  clear  is  that  to  make  the  Doctrine 
effective  Americans  must  ultimately  be  prepared  to  face  one,  and 
possibly  more  than   one,   of   the   strongest   Powers   of  the  old 
world.    They  cannot  issue  a  challenge  to  all  Europe  without  the 


250  SELECTED  ARTICLES  ON 

force,  if  necessary,  to  oppose  all  Europe ;  and  the  lowest  standard 
of  naval  strength  which  the  Monroe  Doctrine  imposes  upon  them 
is  that  which  regulates  the  policy  of  the  British  Admiralty.  They 
must,  that  is,  build  and  equip  a  fleet  that  shall  be  more  than  equal 
to  the  strongest  combination  that  any  two  Powers  can  bring 
against  them.  This,  of  course,  is  not  a  very  formidable  under- 
taking to  a  country  of  the  wealth  and  resources  of  the  United 
States,  a  country  which  light-heartedly  pays  out  every  year  on 
padded  and  fraudulent  pension  claims  more  than  any  nation  on 
earth  expends  on  its  fleet.  But  it  altogether  does  away  with  the 
convenient  fallacy  that  the  Monroe  Doctrine  is  an  insurance 
against  large  armaments.  In  their  anxiety  to  avoid  a  problemati- 
cal increase,  which  at  the  worst  would  be  a  small  one,  in  their 
war  strength,  Americans,  without  quite  realising  it,  are  incurring 
the  certain  liabilities  of  what  may  prove  the  naval  supremacy  of 
the  world,  of  what  must  at  all  events  be  a  colossal  fleet.  So  far 
as  "militarism"  goes,  the  enforcement  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine 
seems  likely  to  affect  America  as  the  retention  of  Alsace-Lor- 
raine has  affected  Europe. 

There  seems  to  be  an  idea  in  England  that  the  devotion  of 
Americans  to  the  Monroe  Doctrine  has  been  somewhat  weakened 
by  the  Spanish  War,  and  that  having  interfered  so  decisively  in 
the  affairs  of  the  old  world,  they  now  feel  it  to  be  logically 
impossible  to  resist  the  claims  of  Europe  to  have  a  voice  in 
South  American  destinies.  I  do  not  believe  the  idea  is  at  all  a 
correct  one,  or  that  the  Spanish  War  has  had  anything  but  a  pre- 
cisely contrary  effect.  It  has  whetted  the  appetite  for  land,  has 
confirmed  the  American  sense  of  invincibility,  and  has  turned  out 
such  a  pleasant  prelude  to  the  drama  of  expansion,  that  if  to- 
morrow the  freedom  of  transit  across  the  Isthmus  of  Panama 
were  to  be  threatened  by  the  Venezuelan  revolutionists,  President 
Roosevelt  would  have  the  whole  country  behind  him  in  settling 
the  Central  American  problem  by  annexation.  Moreover,  one 
has  to  remember  that  the  Monroe  Doctrine  wears  only  such 
aspects  as  Americans  care  to  give  it,  and  that  it  is  they,  and  not 
Europe,  who  determine  the  construction  to  be  put  upon  it.  It  has, 
in  consequence,  the  virtue  of  a  most  complaisant  elasticity,  and 
I  honestly  do  not  know  of  anything  in  the  remotest  degree 
touching  upon  South  America  that  it  could  not  be  stretched  to 
cover.  Long  before  the  Spanish  War  it  was  appealed  to  to 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  251 

justify  the  seizure  of  Cuba  on  the  ground  that  if  America  did 
not  take  it  somebody  else  would.  The  Southern  slave-holders, 
whose  political  influence  depended  on  the  extension  of  slavery  to 
fresh  states,  used  it  as  a  pretext  for  the  annexation  of  Texas; 
and  General  Grant  sought  to  prove  that  it  made  the  absorption  of 
San  Domingo  inevitable.  The  Monroe  Doctrine  even  provided 
the  basis  of  a  protest  against  the  confederation  of  the  Canadian 
provinces.  Perhaps  its  most  amazing  distortion  is  to  be  found  in 
a  report  of  the  Senate  Committee  on  Foreign  Affairs,  issued  in 
1898,  just  when  the  Cuban  question  was  nearing  its  crisis: — "We 
cannot  consent  upon  any  conditions  that  the  depopulated  portions 
of  Cuba  shall  be  recolonised  by  Spain  any  more  than  she  should 
be  allowed  to  found  a  new  colony  in  any  part  of  this  hemisphere 
or  islands  thereof."  On  the  other  hand,  it  has  several  times  been 
overlooked  when  precedent  would  have  seemed  to  demand  its 
employment.  It  is  a  fact,  for  instance,  that  the  French  were 
turned  out  of  Mexico  without  the  Monroe  Doctrine  being  once 
mentioned  in  official  despatches.  It  is  somewhat  difficult,  there- 
fore, to  say  at  any  given  moment  what  the  Doctrine  involves  or 
precisely  represents.  Mr.  Olney,  for  instance,  in  the  notorious 
despatches  to  which  I  have  already  referred,  declares  that  "it 
does  not  establish  any  general  protectorate  by  the  United  States 
over  other  American  states,"  but  further  on  he  announces  that 
"the  United  States  is  practically  sovereign  on  this  continent,  and 
its  fiat  is  law  upon  the  subjects  to  which  it  confines  its  interposi- 
tion." How  these  two  statements  are  to  be  reconciled  is  by  no 
means  obvious.  "It  does  not,"  he  goes  on,  "relieve  any  American 
state  from  its  obligations  as  fixed  by  international  law,  nor  pre- 
vent any  European  Power  directly  interested  from  enforcing  such 
obligations,  or  from  inflicting  merited  punishment  for  the  breach 
of  them."  But  here,  again,  every  one  knows,  though  Mr.  Olney 
does  not  state  it,  that  the  "merited  punishment"  inflicted  must 
be  such  as  the  United  States  approves,  and  must  never  take  the 
form  of  permanent  seizure  of  the  offending  state's  territory. 
"It  does  not  contemplate  any  interference  in  the  internal  affairs  of 
any  American  state,  or  in  the  relations  between  it  and  other 
American  states.  It  does  not  justify  any  attempt  on  our  part  to 
change  the  established  form  of  government  of  any  American 
state,  or  to  prevent  the  people  of  such  state  from  altering  that 
form  according  to  their  own  will  and  pleasure."  I  imagine  the 


252  SELECTED  ARTICLES  ON 

time  may  come  when  the  words  I  have  italicised  will  be  quoted 
against  the  United  States  Government  with  uncomfortable  apt- 
ness ;  for  it  is  quite  conceivable  that  some  day  or  other  the  Ger- 
mans in  Brazil  or  the  Italians  in  Argentina  may  voluntarily  enroll 
themselves  as  self-governing  colonies  under  the  flag  of  the 
Motherland.  In  which  case,  no  doubt  Mr.  Olney's  unfortunate 
admission  will  be  quietly  dropped,  and  some  American  statesman 
of,  say,-  1950,  will  succeed  in  proving  that  the  new  contingency 
comes  entirely  within  the  category  of  forbidden  things.  A  cer- 
tain Mr.  Howard,  of  Texas,  speaking  in  Congress  nearly  fifty 
years  ago,  was  rash  enough  to  say  that  the  Monroe  Doctrine  did 
not  mean  "that  every  settlement  upon  any  sand-bank  on  this 
continent  is  an  offence  which  is  to  result  in  war."  One  gives, 
perhaps,  the  best  rough-and-ready  definition  of  its  scope  by  say- 
ing that  to  the  American  of  to-day  that  is  just  what  it  does  mean. 
It  is  very  doubtful  whether,  at  this  stage  of  the  world's  his- 
tory, it  is  possible  for  one  nation  permanently  to  exclude  all 
other  nations  from  a  country  which  she  herself  refuses  to  con- 
trol or  accept  any  responsibility  for.  And  that  is  exactly  the 
position  into  which  the  Monroe  Doctrine  forces  the  United  States. 
The  Americans  admit  no  liability  whatever  for  the  outrages,  dis- 
orders, and  financial  crookedness  of  the  half-caste  republics 
under  their  patronage.  It  is  not  their  behaviour  to  Europe,  but 
Europe's  behaviour  towards  them  that  the  United  States  claims 
the  right  to  supervise.  If  any  European  Power  were  to  claim 
a  similar  irresponsible  suzerainty  over  even  the  most  worthless 
region  in  Africa,  it  would  be  instantaneously  challenged;  and  it 
is  altogether  too  much  to  expect  that  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  which 
takes  upon  itself  to  dispose  of  the  one  valuable  domain  still  left 
open  on  this  rapidly  dwindling  planet,  should  not  eventually  be 
brought  to  a  decisive  test.  It  seems  part  of  the  inevitable  evolu- 
tion of  things  that  an  over-crowded  Europe,  ceaselessly  endeav- 
ouring to  lower  the  social  pressure  by  emigration,  and  to  carve 
out  by  conquest  or  annexation  exclusive  reserves  for  traders, 
should  one  day  fling  itself  upon  South  America  as  it  already  has 
upon  Africa  and  China.  It  is  possible  to  imagine  a  score  of 
incidents  that  might  call  for  European  intervention  in  the  near 
future;  for  South  America  is  a  land  of  sporadic  unrest,  and  one 
knows  how  conveniently  apt  the  property  of  the  citizens  of  a 
country  that  is  bent  on  expansion  is  to  get  damaged  and  to  need 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  253 

protection  whenever  there  is  the  slightest  disorder.  Whether 
by  accident  or  design,  or  as  the  result  of  the  steady  ousting  of 
the  mestizo  adventurers  from  authority  by  the  foreign  settlers, 
the  United  States  seems  destined  to  be  faced  with  these  alterna- 
tives: — to  fight  and  keep  South  America  as  it  is,  to  "Egyptize" 
the  great  continent  on  her  southern  borders,  or  to  submit  to 
seeing  it  parcelled  out  among  the  nations  of  Europe.  I  cannot 
doubt  what  will  be  the  choice  of  America.  Dominated  by  tradi- 
tion and  sentiment,  and  carried  away  by  the  national  conviction 
that  anything  that  touches  -the  American  continent  must  affect  the 
fraction  of  it  which  she  occupies,  she  will  elect  to  fight.  She 
will  act  as  she  was  ready  to  act  at  the  time  of  the  Venezuelan 
affair,  when,  be  it  never  forgotten,  she  was  prepared  to  plunge 
Anglo- Saxondom  into  war  and  risk  a  hundred  million  pounds' 
worth  of  trade  sooner  than  see  a  strip  of  territory,  eighteen 
hundred  miles  from  her  southernmost  boundary,  pass  from  the 
control  of  half-caste  revolutionists  into  British  hands.  When- 
ever the  issue  is  raised  again  I  believe  her  course  will  be  the  same. 
Once  more  she  will  espouse  the  lower  civilisation  against  the 
higher,  will  support  a  system  for  which  she  has  no  moral  or  in- 
tellectual sympathy  against  a  system  all  but  identical  with  her 
own,  and  will  stand  with  all  her  power  in  the  path  of  those  reno- 
vating influences  that  can  alone  redeem  South  America.  No  con- 
sideration of  national  safety,  as  I  have  tried  to  argue,  really 
counsels  such  a  course,  and  material  interests  are  all  against  it. 
It  will  nevertheless  be  adopted,  unless — what  under  the  conditions 
of  American  politics  it  is  vain  to  hope  for — there  should  be  a  sud- 
den accession  of  Geist,  a  wider  outlook  among  tHe  leaders,  and 
a  campaign  of  education  to  free  this  momentous  question  from 
its  entangling  alliance  with  sophistry  and  passion.  A  recent 
writer  declares  the  Monroe  Doctrine  to  be  simply  the  principle 
of  self-protection  under  a  concrete  name.  It  may  have  been 
so  once,  but  the  developments  of  the  last  eighty  years  appear 
to  have  changed  it  into  an  infringement  of  the  sovereign  rights  of 
other  nations,  far  greater  in  its  scope  than  any  warranted  by 
simple  self-preservation.  Self-preservation,  for  example,  may, 
and  as  some  think  will,  make  it  necessary  for  the  United  States 
to  extend  her  authority  over  Mexico  and  the  Isthmus  of  Panama; 
but  by  no  possible  stretch  of  reasoning  can  it  be  held  to  justify 
the  policy  that  would  make  of  all  South  America  a  terra  clausa. 


14  DAY  USE 

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